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Abstract
Echidnas have evolved separately from other mammalian groups for more than 200
million years and incorporate a mixture of reptilian and mammalian features. Because
of these factors, they have historically been considered ‘primitive’ animals. However
they have successfully adapted to a wide variety of ecological niches and their
neurophysiology demonstrates a number of unusual and apparently advanced
characteristics, including a relatively large brain and cerebral cortex and a
comparatively massive frontal cortex. These attributes make the echidna an intrinsically
compelling subject for cognitive testing.
Studies of learning in the echidna have thus far been limited to only a handful of
experiments. These have demonstrated that echidnas are capable of easily forming a
position habit in a T-maze, show rapid improvement across a series of successive habitreversals, are capable of learning visual discriminations and perform well in
instrumental discrimination tests.
This study aims to expand on these results by conducting a number of cognitive tests of
the echidna’s learning abilities, specifically its’ ability to learn colour, shape and
conditional discriminations, as well as the presumptively ‘high-level’ relationally based
tasks of same/different and conditional same/different categorisation. This thesis also
examines the ongoing debate about the mental processes involved in relational
categorisation and how commonly they occur in non-human animals.
In a wider context, echidnas are an ideal candidate to explore competing theories of
cognitive evolution by examining whether a phylogenetically and physiologically
‘primitive’ species can perform what are generally considered to be ‘advanced’
cognitive tasks and what role ecological factors might play in the development of those
abilities. Using an echidna as a subject also increases the comparatively small number
of species used for cognitive testing and its’ distinct evolutionary history means these
results provide a valuable comparison to the cognitive development of more commonly
studied species.
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Frontispiece: Pitpa in the Taronga Zoo enclosure

“Further studies of learning will undoubtedly disclose
important facts about the intelligence of these
remarkable animals and modify the quaint, explicitly
and tacitly-held views that echidnas are little more than
animated pin-cushions or, at best, glorified reptiles.”
– Buchmann and Rhodes (1978, p. 144)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
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Cognition and cognitive ability are terms whose meanings are usefully
vague and which must be defined in each context that they are used.
(Thomas 1996, p. 157)
Researchers have been trying to assess the cognitive capacities of animals for more than
a century (see Romanes 1883). This series of experiments aims to contribute to the
continually growing field of the scientific study of animal cognition and, as Thomas
points out above, it is important to clarify the theoretical framework within which this
study has been placed. Terms such as ‘cognition’ and ‘intelligence’ are problematic
even when applied to humans and debate continues both about what constitutes human
intelligence and how to measure it. The issue becomes even more contentious when
applied to non-human animals (McFarland 1989; Toates 1995; Wynne 2001). There are
a number of competing views as to what constitutes animal cognition, or the even more
contentious term ‘intelligence’, and the best ways in which to make relative assessments
of different species.
The differing approaches to studying animal cognition can be broadly separated into
two schools – the “anthropocentric” method of examining: “Can animals do what
people do, and if so how?” and the “ecological” approach of asking: “How and why do
animals do what they do in the wild?” (Shettleworth 1998, p. 17) Traditionally, the
anthropocentric approach of psychologists, often described as comparative cognition,
focuses on animal cognition with reference to the type of cognitive processes seen in
humans. Broadly speaking, this approach uses a small number of laboratory species
(such as pigeons, rats and non-human primates) and artificially designed experiments to
closely examine the inner workings of cognitive mechanisms. The ecological approach
of biologists, on the other hand, is generally only interested in animal cognition as it
relates to species-specific activities. This approach focuses less on the “how” of
cognition; rather it examines both the “why” of naturally observed cognitive processes
by relating them to an animal’s ecology and the “who” by studying a wide range of
species (see discussion in Shettleworth 1998).
Historically, there have been four major schools of thought in the study of animal
cognition – anthropomorphism, general process learning theory, linear progression (all
of which would be placed under the anthropocentric banner) and the more biologically
based mosaic evolution (also known as cognitive modularity).
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1.1 Anthropomorphism
Let man visit Ourang-outang in domestication, hear expressive
whine, see its intelligence when spoken [to]; as if it understood every
word said – see its affection – to those it knew – see its passion and
rage, sulkiness, and very actions of despair; and then let him dare to
boast of his proud pre-eminence.
(Darwin 1987, p. 79)
The idea that animals are essentially “little people” is a very ancient one. Some of the
world’s earliest artworks depict human bodies with animal heads, suggesting a belief
that animals have human qualities (Wynne 2001). In 1883 Romanes argued parrots
knew what they were saying, rooks had a sense of justice and dogs enjoyed a joke.
However, the first widespread attempt to scientifically demonstrate human-like mental
abilities in animals was born out of Darwin’s theory of evolution and his revolutionary
claims that animals are related to humans mentally as well as physically (Shettleworth
1998). According to Darwin (1871, p. 62), “… there is no fundamental difference
between men and the higher mammals in their mental faculties”.
Hundreds of observations of animal behaviour were collected by various authors with
the aim of proving animals were on an intellectual par with man. Many of these
observations did indeed seem to show animals displaying great feats of reasoning and
even morality. However, these examples were generally little more than anecdotes and
when scientists such as C. Lloyd Morgan (1894) and Thorndike (1898) began to
conduct systematic experiments the results fell far short of the anecdotal evidence. The
idea soon fell out of favour and is now generally discounted in the scientific community
(Grindley 1950).

1.2 General process learning theory
The moral and higher intellectual nature of man is as unique a
phenomenon as was conscious life on its first appearance in the
world …
(Wallace 1869, p. 391)
Despite the somewhat misleading label, general process learning theory is the opposite
of anthropomorphism in that it is based on the idea that human intelligence is unique.
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Historically this idea was widely accepted. In the 18th century Descartes drew a sharp
distinction between “rational man and dumb brutes” (cited in Mackintosh 1988) and in
the 19th century this view was even held by one of the earliest exponents of evolutionary
theory A. R. Wallace (see quote above).
Even in more recent times, some authors continue to espouse this idea (e.g. Lieberman
1991; Pinker 1994). Lachman, Lachman and Butterfield (1979), for example, claim:
“Whenever higher mental processes are involved, we heartily disagree that human and
animal behaviour are necessarily governed by the same principles. We regard the
human as a specialised product of evolution, as an animal whose cognition is also
specialised” (p. 211), while Curruthers (1989) speculated that it was all “darkness” in
the animal mind. Others claim that some capacities, such as tool-making, symbolism,
syntax, culture, self-awareness, consciousness, imitation, deception, theory of mind and
morality, are exclusively human (see references in Gibson 2002). These authors dismiss
evidence from other scientists that purports to demonstrate capacities in animals once
thought unique to humans (e.g. self-recognition, deception, imitation, culture, theory of
mind, tool-use) which supports the opposing view that the cognitive differences
between animals and humans are matters of degree, rather than of kind (see references
in Gibson 2002).

1.2.1 Argument for general process learning theory
One of the most well-known champions of general process learning theory is Macphail
(1982, 1985, 1987), who argues that not only is man “intellectually superior”, based on
his language capabilities, but that there is essentially no difference in the intelligence of
non-human vertebrates. Macphail’s “null hypothesis” is that “there are no differences,
either quantitative or qualitative, among the mechanisms of intelligence of non-human
vertebrates” (Macphail 1982, p. 330). According to authors such as Macphail, all animal
learning (and hence animal intelligence) can be accounted for using the same set of
principles – an approach known as general process learning theory (Seligman 1970).
These general principles encompass only the most basic forms of learning – habituation
and associative learning – and it is worth outlining them here as they form the building
blocks of animal learning on which experiments such as this one are based.
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1.2.1.1 Habituation
One of the simplest forms of learning is habituation. This occurs when repeated
exposure to a stimulus results in decreased responsiveness, such as when territorial male
songbirds reduce their aggression toward familiar neighbours during the breeding
season and only react to new arrivals, thus giving them more time and energy for
attracting mates (Falls 1982). Habituation shows that animals can learn to recognise
stimuli and is found in a broad range of species from one-celled organisms to humans
(Lea 1984a; Macphail 1993).

1.2.1.2 Associative learning
Animals are continuously learning associations in the world around them and adjusting
their behaviour accordingly. For example, eating certain flavours will lead to illness
while others are beneficial, so an animal that is able to learn this relationship will live a
longer and healthier life. Similarly, an animal that can distinguish the sound of an
approaching predator from that of prey is more likely to survive to leave offspring to the
next generation than one that cannot. The process whereby animals generally learn these
kinds of relationships between signals and consequences is called associative learning.
(See Pearce 1997; Wynne 2001).
Associative learning (or conditioning) occurs when one event becomes paired with
another resulting in a change in an animal’s behaviour (Pearce 1997). The processes of
associative learning are traditionally split into two classes – classical and operant
conditioning.

1.2.1.2.1 Classical conditioning
While conducting experiments on the physiology of digestion, Pavlov (1927) obtained
results that led him to develop one of the basic theories of learning. He discovered that
dogs would salivate when presented with a signal that had previously been paired with
food. The signal (for example, ringing a bell), which was neutral and did not produce a
response by itself, was called the “conditioned stimulus” (CS). The significant event (in
this case food), which already produced a response, was called the “unconditioned
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stimulus” (US). While initially the dogs showed little reaction to the signal, with
continual pairing of the CS (sound) with the US (food), they eventually began to
salivate during the CS even before the food was delivered. The response to the stimulus
(in this case salivation) was defined as the “conditioned response” (CR). (See Pearce
1997; Wynne 2001).
While subsequent research has both refined and modified Pavlov’s early principles (e.g.
Gallistel 1990, 1992; Rescorla and Wagner 1972), its general precepts still form the
basis of classical conditioning. Classical conditioning (also called Pavlovian, respondent
or type I conditioning) is the process of training an animal to associate a signal with an
event. If the anticipated event is a desirable one, the response to the signal will likely be
preparation for such an event, such as salivation for food or sexual arousal for the
arrival of a mate. If the anticipated event is an aversive one there will generally be some
form of protective or aggressive response, such as running away or cowering, or
adopting an aggressive posture. This ability to use one stimulus as the predictor of the
occurrence of another has been demonstrated in a wide variety of species, from simple
marine snails to humans. (See Lea 1984a; Wynne 2001).

1.2.1.2.2 Operant conditioning
In classical conditioning there is a relationship between a CS and a reinforcer regardless
of the subject’s behaviour, in operant conditioning (also known as instrumental or type
II conditioning) there is a relationship between the subject’s behaviour and the
occurrence of the reinforcer. This relationship is often called contingency – the delivery
of reinforcement is contingent on the performance of a behaviour in response to the
presentation of a CS. (See Mackintosh 1983).
Operant conditioning was first described by Thorndike (1911). Thorndike’s best-known
studies involved cats and puzzle boxes – cages which could be opened from the inside
by some kind of latch mechanism. A cat was placed in the box with food outside.
Initially, the cat would flail around randomly in the cage until it chanced upon the
action that would release the latch. It was then allowed access to the food for a short
period, and then placed back in the puzzle box. Thorndike found that, over successive
trials, the time it took for the cat to escape from the box gradually decreased. He
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regarded this as merely blind trial and error learning, with the food serving to strengthen
the hypothetical connection between the perception of the stimuli and the response. This
approach is now considered too simplistic. However the proposal that reward is
essential for learning became the basis of operant conditioning where the experimenter
delivers a reward (such as food) after the animal has responded in a certain way. (See
Pearce 1997; Wynne 2001).
Operant conditioning shows animals can learn what responses produce particular
outcomes and has been demonstrated in a large number of animal groups including
amphibians (tadpoles), lizards (anoles, collared lizards, iguanas), fish (goldfish, koi
carp, queen triggerfish), birds (pigeons, doves, chickens, gulls, quail) and mammals
(marsupials, rodents, rabbits, cats, dogs, raccoons, skunks, ferrets, minks, some farm
animals, several primates) (Wynne 2001).

1.2.1.3 Evidence for general process learning
There is considerable evidence to support the general process view, particularly in the
research of Bitterman and colleagues with honeybees (e.g. Abramson and Bitterman
1986; Bitterman, Menzel, Fietz and Schafer 1983; Couvillon and Bitterman 1984)
which demonstrated the similarity in basic associative learning among species as
diverse as honeybees and mammals (Kamil 1994).
Gould and Gould (1986) point out that many seemingly highly complex behaviours are
in fact the result of innate “programs” and “subroutines” that require no conscious
awareness. Even the famous dance “language” of bees (von Frisch 1953), in which
foragers return to the hive and communicate the distance, direction and quality of the
food source via a series of body movements, is wholly innate and can be performed and
understood by bees with no prior experience (Gould and Gould 1986). However, despite
the widespread use of programmed learning in the animal world, Gould and Gould
(1986) contend that not all learning can be explained through simple programs based on
trial and error and associative learning. One such example is the use of cognitive maps,
in which animals as diverse as rats and bees have demonstrated the ability to utilise
mental maps to determine locations and then use that information to direct their
behaviour.
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Gould and Gould (1986) further contend that much of the intellectual accomplishments
of humans – such as language acquisition, Aristotelian logic, categorisation, pattern
recognition etc. – are also based on pre-existing wiring and storage. According to the
authors: “The more we look at the behaviour of insects, birds and mammals, including
man, the more we see a continuum of complexity rather than any dramatic difference in
kind that might separate the intellectual Valhalla of our species from the apparently
mindless computations of insects” (p. 35).
In addition, as Kamil (1994) points out, “the demonstration of a general learning
process present in many species does not rule out the possibility of important,
significant species differences, both qualitative and quantitative” (p. 24).

1.2.2 Argument against general process learning theory
1.2.2.1 Species differences
While the principles of associative learning found in classical and operant conditioning
have been extremely successful in explaining numerous instances of learning, many
scientists believe it is not possible to account for all learning using these principles, as
Macphail (1987) claims. Critics of Macphail argue he bases his assertions about animal
learning on a very narrow definition of intelligence supported by performance on
general problem-solving tests in arbitrary environments and specifically excludes
specialised species adaptations, such as song learning in songbirds (Roitblat and von
Fersen 1992).
Roitblat and von Fersen (1992) argue that this approach seems to arbitrarily define
species differences in intelligence out of existence. They and many other authors
continue to argue that the biological context of learning must be considered and that
adaptive pressures have led to different kinds of learning within individuals and species
(e.g. Bolles 1970; Garcia, McGowan and Green 1972; Huber 1995; Lea 1984a; Rozin
and Kalat 1971; Tolman 1949) (see Shettleworth 1998). Examples of the types of
species-based learning in which associative learning theories cannot be generally
applied include adaptive specialisations, species-specific behaviours and special
learning, and these will be explored in section 1.4.
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1.2.2.2 Task differences
In addition to species-specific adaptations, other authors claim rigorous animal research
has demonstrated a number of cognitive capabilities that cannot be explained by
traditional associative learning theories. Zentall (1999) cites a number of examples of
more ‘advanced’ cognition that have been demonstrated in animals – such as the
symbolic representation of stimuli (in which two arbitrary stimuli are associated with a
third event and emergent relations develop) and the ability to plan ahead, and to choose
whether to plan ahead or not. Other examples of more complex learning in animals that
cannot be easily accounted for by simple associative learning include those based on
relational learning such as relative numerosity (Jaakkola, Fellner, Erb, Rodriguez and
Guarino 2005) and transitive inference (Gillan 1981) (see section 3.6 for more
examples) as well as more socially based abilities such as imitation (Akins and Zentall
1996). According to Zentall (1999), experiments like those above are providing
“increasing evidence that the boundary between the mental capacities of humans and
those of other animals is not nearly so clear as was once thought” (p. 208).

1.2.3 Limited general process theory
Despite the opposition to general process learning theory, it is worth noting that there
are “different degrees of generality” (Wright, Rivera, Katz and Bachevalier 2003, p.
195). Some authors, such as Wright et al. (2003), support a general process account of
certain cognitive abilities without explicitly rejecting the idea that other abilities might
be specific to certain species. According to Kamil (1994): “It is quite conceivable,
perhaps even likely, that some mechanisms of intelligence are widespread throughout
broad segments of the animal kingdom while others are not” (p. 35).
For example, Wright et al. (2003) favour a type of general process account of
same/different categorisation. Their theory holds that same/different categorisation is
common among virtually all vertebrates. According to this theory, while there is no
qualitative difference between species for this task, i.e. they can all do it, there are
quantitative differences in performance between species, such as the stimulus set size
required to achieve criterion performance.
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1.3 Linear progression
1.3.1 Species hierarchy
… most people have a vague idea of the relative intelligence of
animals. As a general rule, those species that are more like us
physically are judged to be more intelligent.
(Zentall 2000b, p. 198)
The idea that intelligence is distributed in a linear progression based on a phylogenetic
scale from simplest (and hence least intelligent) to most complex (and hence most
intelligent, i.e. man) has existed since Aristotle (Hodos and Campbell 1969) and was
widespread in the 19th century (Mackintosh 1988). Even in more recent times, there is
still support for this viewpoint. Jensen (1980), for example, a well-known authority on
intelligence ranking in humans, has stated that he believes there is an ascending scale of
intelligence that accords with an animal’s “phylogenetic status” and position on the
“phylogenetic hierarchy”: “Single-cell protozoans (e.g. the amoeba) rank at the bottom
of the scale, followed in order by the invertebrates, the lower vertebrates, the lower
mammals, the primates and man” (p. 175).
The views of Jensen (1980), and others, were based in Darwinian Theory, however
many believe this a misinterpretation of Darwin’s ideas. While Darwin’s (1859) theory
that all existing species are descended from different, earlier species is now generally
accepted, it is considered erroneously simplistic to view evolution as a linear
progression in which one species evolves from another in strict sequence. Instead, it is
now believed that animals are related via a family tree structure, in which different
species branch off from common ancestors (Shettleworth 1993). Phylogeny cannot be
used to organise animals into a linear scale based on evolutionary relationships, let
alone intelligence. Furthermore, Darwinian Theory is about adaptation to the
environment, which does not necessarily involve progress or increasing complexity – or
increasing intelligence (Mackintosh 1988).
Evidence against a linear progression of intelligence began to be produced during the
late 19th century consisting of numerous field-based observations and anecdotal reports
of evolutionarily ‘primitive’ animals performing seemingly complex behaviours.
10

However, some of these early reports were criticised as being unscientific, in particular
Romanes’ Animal Intelligence (1883). By the early 20th century, the introduction of
more rigorous scientific standards to the study of animal behaviour by authors such as
Thorndike (1898) led to the production of more reputable studies demonstrating
relatively complicated behaviour in supposedly simple animals (see Wynne 2001).
More recently, tests involving the ability to acquire a learning set – that is, how long it
takes a subject to learn the underlying discrimination principle when exposed to
successive non-repeating discriminations – injected new life into the linear progression
camp. Harlow (1949) was the first to study this phenomenon and concluded that the
ability to form learning sets was related to phylogenetic position, with species closest to
man being most efficient. Initial results from mammals showed performance consistent
with a single ladder of intellectual improvement in line with their evolutionary position,
with rhesus monkeys performing better than New World squirrel monkeys, followed in
descending order by cats, rats and squirrels (Shettleworth 1998). However, further
experiments showed other animals did not fall where expected on the ladder (review in
Macphail 1982). For example, blue jays perform in a qualitatively similar way to rhesus
monkeys (Kamil 1985), while the marsupial dunnart has demonstrated a better learning
set performance than rhesus monkeys (Bonney 2001).
Aside from the contrary results, one of the problems with proposing a “‘magic bullet’
task” (Wynne 2001, p. 187) such as learning set to enable animals to be ranked by
‘intelligence’ is that factors other than ‘intelligence’ can account for the poor
performance of some species (Wynne 2001). Comparisons between species based on
laboratory experiments generally ignore the fact that different species have evolved in
different ecological and social environments, meaning there are numerous contextual
features that might favour or disadvantage one species over another (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1990). As Tinbergen (1951, p. 12) remarked: “One should not use identical
experimental techniques to compare two species, because they would almost certainly
not be the same to them.”
A number of experimental variables have been shown to have a negative impact on
different species’ performance. One example is stimulus modality. Rats perform well in
learning set tasks using olfactory cues (Eichenbaum, Fagan and Cohen 1986; Slotnick
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and Katz 1974), but performance deteriorates when spatial cues are used (Zeldin and
Olton 1986) and barely rises above chance when visual cues are employed (Warren
1965) (see Shettleworth 1998). Dolphins have so far proved incapable of mastering the
learning set problem using visual stimuli, but do so easily when auditory stimuli are
used (Herman and Arbeit 1973; see also Herman 1980); while monkeys have the
reverse proclivity, showing far greater proficiency in visually based tasks than in
comparable studies conducted using auditory stimuli (see D’Amato and Salmon 1984).
The experimental apparatus itself may be unsuitable; for example, rats can learn a shape
discrimination in a jumping stand (Lashley 1938a) but not in a modified Yerkes test
apparatus (Munn 1930a, 1930b). Dolphins also fare better with dynamic rather than
static visual cues (Herman, Richards and Wolz 1984). Factors such as motor and
motivation inequalities can also have an overwhelming effect on the performance of
some species (Thomas 1986). (For more examples of inhibitory procedural factors see
section 3.7.3).
Along with the discrediting of learning set as an intelligence ranking task, there has
been widespread criticism of an intelligence hierarchy based on a phylogenetic ranking
(Deacon 1990; Hodos and Campbell 1969; Mackintosh 1988; Pearce 1997; Rowe 1990;
Salas, Broglio and Rodriguez 2003; Shettleworth 1998; Thomas 1980, 1986; Tomasello
and Call 1997; Wynne 2001). Oakley and Plotkin (1979) even went so far as to argue
that labelling animals according to a supposed directional progress in evolutionary
change from simple to increasingly complex was “one of the great myths of modern
science” (p xiv) which was flawed in both a taxonomic and functional sense while
Tomasello and Call (1997) described it as “medieval” (p. 430) (see also Campbell and
Hodos 1991; Hodos and Campbell 1969; Lockard 1971).
Despite this overt criticism, there still seems to be a tacit belief that some animals are
more ‘primitive’ or ‘simple’ than others based on their evolutionary history. In 1977
Banks and Flora conducted a survey of college students asking them to rank the
intelligence of a variety of animals out of 10, which they duly did with apes at the top
with 9.2 and fish at the bottom with 1.7. The actual rankings were not the aim of the
study but it revealed what is seemingly still a widespread assumption – that there is a
progressive development of intelligence in the animal kingdom, culminating in humans
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(Pearce 1997). According to Salas et al. (2003), “although misleading and anachronistic,
this common sense conception of vertebrate evolution is widespread in different fields
of neurosciences and psychology, even today” (p. 73). Similarly, Deacon (1990, p. 193194) claimed: “Despite enormous advances in the fields of evolutionary biology and
neurobiology in recent decades, we are still struggling to escape 19th century
preconceptions about brain evolution. Although most of us would disavow these ideas,
many contemporary theories of human brain evolution tacitly assume a scala naturae
perspective.”
While there is little explicit support for the linear progression theory, its precepts are
implicit in many animal cognition books and journal articles. Animals such as primates
are generally viewed as ‘advanced’ and there is a presumption in the literature of
comparative cognition that they will be able to perform relatively complex cognitive
tasks while much less is expected of more ‘primitive’ species. Recent examples of this
view include: “Such emergent relations can also be demonstrated in learning tasks with
simpler organisms (e.g. rats and pigeons)” (Nakagawa 2003, p. 487) and “…
domesticated animals … in common with other higher animals” (Lomas, Piggins and
Phillips 1998. p. 250).

1.3.2 Task hierarchy
Not all concepts are equal.
(Flemming, Beran and Washburn 2007, p. 55)
While overt support for the idea of a phylogenetic intelligence ranking of species has
largely fallen out of favour, a separate concept of a hierarchy of cognitive processes is
still held by many authors. This idea of ranking cognitive tasks takes a number of forms.
At one end of the spectrum is the seemingly common sense perception that some tasks
are inherently more difficult than others. For example, in examining same/different
categorisation (see section 3.7) Premack (1983a, 1983b) and Thompson (1995) point
out that one type of task (physical matching or paired comparison same/different – S/D)
required only a single comparison between two physical stimuli to determine the correct
response while another type of task (second-order same/different judgments) required
that three separate comparisons be made before the correct response could be selected.
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The greater number of within-task activities led the authors to claim that second-order
same/different tasks were “fundamentally more complex than either physical matching
or paired comparison S/D tasks” (Thompson 1995, p. 211).
Similarly, Wright et al. (2003, p. 184) claim that: “Judgments of relationships that
transcend individual features of the stimuli can be considered higher order learning, and
therefore abstract-concept learning can be considered higher order”, Tavares and Tomaz
(2002) referred to certain tasks constituting “high-cognitive abilities” (p. 132) and Vonk
(2003, p 77) said: “An understanding of second-order relations … demonstrates an even
more complex cognitive skill”.
Tomasello and Call (1997), while being fervent critics of species ‘intelligence’ ranking,
maintain that cognitive adaptations can be referred to as “more or less complex,
depending on such things as the number of elements that must be perceptually
monitored and behaviorally controlled” (p. 431).

1.3.2.1 Hierarchical models
Some authors have formalised these ideas by creating hierarchical models of task
difficulty of varying levels of complexity. Huber (2001), for example, argues that
animal categorisation falls into a “middle” range between simple discrimination and the
formation of symbolic representations, while Herrnstein (1990) divides discrimination
in non-humans into five functional levels ranging from the lowest to the highest level of
abstraction – discrimination (identifying and responding to stimuli), categorisation by
rote (memorisation of stimuli), open-ended categories (categorising stimuli based on
some principle of perceptual similarity), concepts (categorising stimuli based on criteria
other than perceptual similarity) and abstract relations (categorisation based on the
relationship between stimuli). Zayan and Vauclair (1998) proposed a similar
classificatory scheme broadly based on Herrnstein’s (1990) levels – categorisation by
rote, open-ended categorisation, conceptual categorisation and categorisation of abstract
relations.
One of the best-known models was created by Thomas (1980, 1986, 1996), which
involved an eight-level task hierarchy. While the system is hierarchical (because lower
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levels are generally prerequisites for higher levels), it does not mean an animal will use
the processes serially. Instead, an animal would use all the processes in its repertoire as
needed, either serially or in parallel.
LEVEL

CATEGORY

8

Bi-conditional concepts: Using class concepts in bi-conditional
relationships, e.g. “A if and only if B”. This involves two
conditionals: “if A, then B” and “if B then A”. To be a conceptual
bi-conditional, A, B or both must involve class concepts. For
example: relational matching to sample “if AA, choose BB, not
CD” (see section 3.7.5).

7

Conjunctive, disjunctive and conditional concepts: Using
class concepts in conjunctive (“and-therefore” reasoning e.g. “A
and B go together, therefore choose B when you see A”),
disjunctive (opposite of conjunctive, e.g. “A and B don’t go
together so don’t choose B when you see A”) or conditional (“ifthen” reasoning, e.g. “if A then choose B”) relationships (see
section 3.7.4).

6

Absolute or relative class concepts Stimuli comparison leading
to the adoption of a generalised response rule based on inherent
stimulus features (absolute, e.g. perceptual categorisation,
section 3.4) or relational similarity (relative, e.g. relational
categorisation, section 3.6 and 3.7).

5

Concurrent discriminations: Learning to make an operant
response to only one of a set of stimuli for more than one set of
stimuli concurrently.

4

Chaining operant responses: Learning a connected sequence
of operant responses to obtain reinforcement.

3

Simple operant conditioning: Learning to repeat a voluntary
response to obtain reinforcement (see section 1.2.1.2.2).

2

Classical conditioning: Making reflex responses to a new
stimulus that has been repeatedly paired with the original innate
stimulus (see section 1.2.1.2.1).

1

Habituation: Learning not to respond to a repeated stimulus that
has no consequences (see section 1.2.1.1).
Thomas’ hierarchy of learning abilities
(Thomas 1996; Sappington and Goldman 1994)

It has even been suggested that Thomas’ (1996) model should be broken down even
further. Many authors consider relative class concepts to be ‘higher-level’ learning than
absolute class concepts (e.g. Herrnstein 1990; Wasserman, Hugart and KirkpatrickSteger 1995; Wright et al. 2003; Zayan and Vauclair 1998). Although Thomas (1996)
places them both on level 6 of his hierarchy, even he acknowledges an “operational
difference” between the two abilities in that relative tasks require comparison between
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stimuli whereas absolute tasks do not. Thompson (1995) suggests that a special class
within the absolute class concept be created to encompass performance on a
familiarisation/novelty procedure because it is based on relational and not physical
features.

1.3.2.2 Task hierarchy as intelligence index
A number of authors have gone further and stated that an animal’s intelligence can be
quantified in terms of its ability to learn particular tasks (e.g. Bitterman 1965; Corning,
Dyal and Lahue 1976; Harlow 1958; Mackintosh 1994; Macphail 1996; Masterton and
Skeen 1972; Passingham 1975; Povinelli 1994; Razran 1971; Rumbaugh and Gill 1974;
Thomas 1996; Viaud 1960). Thomas (1996) proposed that “… cognitive ability is
synonymous with learning ability, and learning ability is a fundamental and defining
aspect of intelligence” (p.157) that can be measured using his hierarchical system of
eight fundamental processes (see above). According to Thomas (1996), all measures of
cognitive ability involve one or more of these eight levels and that use of his hierarchy
could “meaningfully reflect an animal’s general intelligence” (Thomas 1980, p. 454).
Using Thomas’ (1980, 1986, 1996) system, an animal’s general cognitive ability, or
‘intelligence’, is determined by how many of the eight fundamental processes it can use.
According to Thomas (1996), levels 1-5 can be performed using rote learning and all
vertebrates may be capable of using level-five processes. Rensch (1967) cited data
demonstrating some degree of concurrent discrimination learning (level 5) in fish,
reptiles, birds and mammals (amphibians and monotremes are not mentioned).
Levels 6-8 involve so-called ‘concept’ learning (see section 3.8) and while Thomas
(1996) concedes that several avian and mammalian species have demonstrated a level 6
class concept according to his criteria, he claims only non-human primates have been
satisfactorily shown to use level 7 processes. However, Thomas’ (1996) objections to
non-primates demonstrating level 7 processes appears to be procedural and he concedes
that it is reasonable that some non-primate species may succeed at level 7. According to
the author, level 8 (using class concept in bi-conditional relationships) has yet to be
successfully tested in animals.
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The problem with using the relative difficulty of a task to create an intelligence
hierarchy is that it runs into the same objections as the learning set-based hierarchy
mentioned above. While not specifically linked to the discredited phylogenetic
rankings, in practical terms it still uses a fairly narrow range of artificially created tasks
to make a very broad assessment of overall intelligence. It is also susceptible to the
problem of procedural unsuitability impairing the performance of some species.

1.4 Mosaic evolution
As evolutionary psychologists are fond of saying, the mind is like a
Swiss Army knife, a general-purpose tool made of many specialised
parts.
(Shettleworth 1998, p. 566-567)
Another of the prevailing views of the extent and distribution of cognitive abilities is
based on viewing ‘intelligence’ in its ecological context, rather than making arbitrary
comparisons between species based on artificial tests. According to this more
biologically based approach, each species has evolved cognitive abilities in response to
its particular ecological niche and comparisons between species that have adapted to
different environments are meaningless. In this sense if two species are both equally
well adapted to their environments, they can be argued to be equally ‘intelligent’.
This idea was put forward by authors such as Seligman and Hager (1972) and Hinde
and Stevenson-Hinde (1973). They argued that since the intellectual processes of
animals are shaped by evolution, if different species inhabit radically different
environments, it would be expected that the nature of their intelligence would also be
radically different (see Pearce 1997). Jerison (1990) echoed that idea, arguing that
intelligence in the evolutionary sense is “multidimensional” (p. 361), suggesting that
there must be many varieties of intelligence due to the many places in the evolutionary
tree where encephalisation appears. He also holds that encephalisation is due to
adaptations, which require greater brain tissue for their control, and that those
adaptations can be called intelligent – “Many and various intelligences (in the plural)
must have evolved in conjunction with evolving environments and with brains and
behaviours adapted to those environments” (Jerison 1985, p. 29). He qualifies this by
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saying that, except for information-processing capacity, those adaptations are likely to
be “quite different from those involved in human intelligence” (Jerison 1990, p. 361).
One theory about how these adaptive intelligences may function is mosaic evolution, in
which each ecological problem leads to the evolution of a distinct cognitive mechanism
(Fodor 1983). The ideas behind this type of modular intelligence have been around for
some time. In 1966 Jolly described different types of intelligence (e.g. “social
intelligence” and “intelligence with respect to objects”), while Washburn, Jay and
Lancaster (1965, p. 1546) concluded “learning … is not a generalised ability; animals
are able to learn some things with great ease and other things only with the greatest
difficulty. Learning is … the process of acquiring skills and attitudes that are of
evolutionary significance to a species when living in the environment to which it is
adapted.”
This concept has gained increasing support in recent years (e.g. Barton and Harvey
2000; Falk and Dudek 1993; Musser 2003; Northcutt and Kaas 1995; Rehkämper,
Frahm and Cnotka 2008; Rowe 1990; Salas et al. 2003; Shettleworth 1998, Wynne
2001). According to Musser (2003): “Mosaic evolution describes a phenomenon seen in
many organisms: archaic features occur alongside highly specialised or advanced
features in the same plant or animal” (p. 928). One of the champions of mosaic
evolution is Shettleworth (1998), who proposes that the animal mind is made up of a
variety of adaptively specialised cognitive modules (see also Cosmides and Tooby
1994; Geary and Huffman 2002; Gigerenzer 1995, 1997; Hermer and Spelke 1996;
Wagner and Wagner 2003; Wright and Katz 2006). Each ecologically distinct group
will have evolved those modules that are required by the demands of its environment.
While taking the opposing view of the distribution of animal intelligence to that of
linear hierarchy, the biological approach can be described as more accurately Darwinian
in its origins as it reflects the adaptive process of physical evolution. According to
Jerison (1985): “That intelligences would be of various kinds is almost an axiom of
evolutionary analysis, since adaptations evolve in the contexts of the environments in
which they are effective, and species never occupy identical niches” (p. 29).
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Some examples of the way in which adaptation in response to ecological demands
affects the development of cognitive abilities include adaptive specialisations, speciesspecific behaviours and special learning. All these phenomena meet a reasonable
definition of learning – changes in behaviour based on experience – and demonstrate
that contrary to the general process view, there are important differences between
species which can often be related to their natural history (Kamil 1994).

1.4.1 Adaptive specialisations
According to Salas et al. (2003): “The vertebrate brain shows a remarkable range of
diversity and specialised adaptations” (p. 73). A good example of an adaptive
specialisation is found in the way that rats (and other vertebrates) learn to avoid painful
and dangerous stimuli. Garcia and Koelling (1966) conducted an experiment using rats
in which two conditioned stimuli (CS), a flavour and an audio-visual cue, were each
paired with two unconditioned stimuli (US), illness and an electric shock, to see if the
rats would learn to avoid the CS. The experiment showed this type of aversive learning
has two features that distinguish it from traditional associative learning. Firstly, it can
take place even with long delays between the presentation of the CS and the US, while
in traditional conditioning experiments the reinforcers lose their effectiveness with even
short delays. Secondly, it showed that learning only occurred when the CS and the US
were in seemingly biologically relevant combinations. When illness was used as a US,
aversive learning was found to be specific to flavours and not audio-visual cues; with
electric shock as a US, learning was specific to audio-visual cues and not flavours. (See
Lea 1984a; Shettleworth 1998).
The idea that the biological relevance of CS-US combinations influences learning is not
only found in aversive conditioning. A similar phenomenon was demonstrated by
Shettleworth (1975), who rewarded hamsters with food whenever they demonstrated
one of six behaviours. She found the three behaviours that had a plausible association
with food (rearing up, digging and scrabbling) increased in frequency but the three
others (scratching, face-washing and scent-marking) were largely unaffected by reward
(see Lea 1984a).
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Adaptive specialisations have also been demonstrated that are specific to certain
biologically relevant stimuli. Advances in neurological studies have revealed that
monkeys and sheep, like people, have a special neurological face-processing module
(Kendrick et al. 1995; Phelps and Roberts 1994).

1.4.2 Species-specific behaviours
Another example of the influence of biology on learning is found in species-specific
behaviours. One such behaviour is autoshaping (Brown and Jenkins 1968), in which
pigeons are placed in an operant chamber and a circle on the wall is lit before food is
presented. Pigeons will reliably start pecking at the circle, even though it has no effect
on the delivery of food. The finding that animals sometimes engage in species-specific,
food-related behaviours that are irrelevant or counterproductive to the experimental
paradigm has also been demonstrated elsewhere. For example, in one experiment
raccoons being reinforced for putting coins in a bank started delaying reinforcement by
‘washing’ the coins (rubbing them together in their paws) (Breland and Breland 1961)
and rats have shown difficulty learning to perform behaviours other than defensive ones
in response to an electric shock (Bolles 1970). (See Shettleworth 1998).
Important species differences in learning can be found even between closely related
species (Kamil 1994). Naturalistic studies of nest and egg recognition have found that
royal terns (who nest in dense colonies where it is difficult to discriminate nest sites)
learn to recognise their own eggs while herring gulls (who build elaborate nests spaced
further apart) learn to recognise their nests but not their eggs (Shettleworth 1984).
Herring gulls learn to recognise their chicks by the time they are old enough to wander
from the nest (Tinbergen 1953). In contrast, kittiwakes (who nest on cliff edges and
whose chicks cannot wander) recognise only their nest sites and not their own eggs or
chicks (Cullen 1957).
While further study needs to be carried out to determine whether these types of species
differences in behaviour also reflect differences in learning ability, other types of
special learning have been tested for such differences.
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1.4.3 Special learning
Further evidence of the way biological context influences learning is found in the area
of special learning abilities, that is, abilities that seem to be acquired through slightly
different processes than those described in associative learning theories. These special
abilities seem to have an instinctual component that may operate independently or in
tandem with more traditional types of learning. One of the best-known special learning
abilities is imprinting, in which a newly hatched chick rapidly learns the mother’s
appearance (Lea 1984a). Other examples of special learning include song acquisition in
birds (Konishi and Nottebohm 1969) and homing and migration in birds (Matthews
1968) and other animals.
Controlled experiments have been conducted to determine whether species-specific
song learning reflects differences in actual learning ability rather than just behaviour
(Kamil 1994). In one such study, Kroodsma and Canady (1985) raised eastern and
western marsh wrens in identical conditions and exposed them to the same number of
tutor songs. The authors found the western wrens learned significantly more songs than
the eastern wrens. Interestingly, the authors also found neuroanatomical and ecological
differences between the populations that correlated with the difference in song learning
ability.

1.5 CONCLUSIONS
As discussed earlier in this chapter, animal intelligence has often been defined by
comparing it to human intelligence – either that they are essentially the same
(anthropomorphism) or completely different (general process learning theory), both of
which theories have largely fallen from favour.
More contentious is the idea of a species hierarchy of intelligence, with an evolutionary
progression from least to most intelligent. As discussed above, the idea of a rigid ‘top to
bottom’ ranking of animals by intelligence is no longer explicitly accepted; however the
tacit assumptions based on this idea continue to pervade animal cognition research.
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How much influence these assumptions have on which animals are tested on complex
cognitive problems, and the results of such tests, is open to conjecture. However, one of
the underlying principles of this study is the rejection of a species intelligence hierarchy
based on evolutionary position and the consequent importance of not making
assumptions about which animals can perform certain tasks based on their phylogenetic
relatedness to humans. In this sense, the study is also underpinned by the ideas of
mosaic evolution – that animals have evolved particular skills and abilities to deal with
the cognitive demands of their particular ecological niches, not become progressively
more ‘intelligent’ throughout evolution.
However, while the present study attempts to discredit the concept of a species
intelligence hierarchy, it does not reject the idea of some type of legitimate task
hierarchy based on varying levels of complexity – an idea that has come under fire from
some exponents of mosaic evolution. One of the major critics is Shettleworth (1998),
who explicitly links task hierarchies with species hierarchies. She dismisses the idea of
a hierarchy of learning processes as having an “unjustifiably narrow behavioural and
phylogenetic base” because it sees animal intelligence as “consisting of learning,
primarily learning to solve problems said to require intelligence in people rather than
problems that occur in the species own environment, and it focuses on data from
socially isolated individuals of a few species solving problems about physical causation
in the laboratory” (p. 569-570).
There is certainly merit in these criticisms. It can be argued that cognitive tests should
be devised with greater consideration for individual species’ ecology; that they should
try and replicate more naturalistic social and physical environments; and that a greater
variety of species should be tested (one area this study attempts to address). However,
in some senses this is an argument about semantics. Authors such as Shettleworth
(1998), Mackintosh (1988) and Tomasello and Call (1997) claim that rank order
presupposes a single dimension of intelligence, a criticism also levelled at I.Q. testing in
humans, and that instead scientists should focus on the efficiency of different species at
solving ecologically relevant tasks. It is true that the use of task hierarchies by authors
such as Thomas to rank species’ intelligence is based on a limited definition of
‘intelligence’ as learning ability. In fact, Thomas (1980) acknowledges that intelligence
cannot be considered apart from an animal’s “biological equipment”. In this category he
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includes features such as motor, sensory and motivational aspects. Relatively
independent of these, he considers that aspect of intelligence related to how an animal
‘knows’ and responds to its environment – which can either be inherent or learned. It is
this learning aspect of intelligence that he ranks on his hierarchy.
While agreeing with the basic principle of mosaic evolution – that all species, in an
adaptive sense, are equally intelligent in their own ways – this study takes the view that
not all comparison between species and cognitive tasks is meaningless. Furthermore, a
hierarchy of cognitive processes is not the same thing as, and does not automatically
lead to, the idea of phylogenetic hierarchy and the two ideas must be dealt with
separately.
What Shettleworth (1998) defines as intelligence, i.e. “solving problems of ecological
relevance” (p. 570) has variously been defined as the “synthetic approach” (Kamil
1988), the adaptive-evolutionary point of view (Rozin and Schull 1988) and
evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992). While this approach is
valuable, it often dismisses other approaches to studying animal cognition as
“anthropocentric” (Shettleworth 1993, p. 179). However, defining intelligence only as it
relates to solving everyday ecological problems goes against the generally understood
meaning of intelligence and its common definition in both human and animal
intelligence literature – that it encompasses both a set of specific cognitive skills and the
more general problem-solving ability that adapts to novel environments and situations
(Tomasello and Call 1997; Myers 1986; Wilson, Mackintosh and Boakes 1985b; review
in Thomas 1980). According to Pearce (1997): “Many authors consider that the defining
characteristic of intelligence is that it enables animals to behave adaptively” (p. 11).
Testing animals only on tasks they would naturally encounter rules out the fact that at
least some animals do appear to have general, flexible learning abilities, which may
have evolved to deal with ecologically complex and dynamic environments and social
systems. In a broader sense, these types of flexible learning abilities could also be
viewed as the cognitive component of the evolutionary process – the ability to adapt.
That is, not only what do they do, but also what can they do. Wynne (2001), another
supporter of the mosaic account, takes a similar position to Shettleworth on the issue of
species hierarchy, yet allows for a broader view of intelligence: “… as long as we stay
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away from attempts to rank the ‘intelligence’ of different species, the term might still be
a useful one … as a short-hand term for ‘wide-ranging problem-solving abilities’” (p.
4). Tomasello and Call (1997), also critics of species intelligence ranking, allow that
species may solve adaptive problems with either “narrowly crafted special-purpose
cognitive mechanisms (modules)” or “more domain-general general-purpose cognitive
mechanisms” (p. 431).
Furthermore, rejecting the idea of task hierarchies out of hand also leads to the
inevitable conclusion that all tasks are equal. While it is important to try and avoid an
anthropocentric view of how animals perform various tasks, it seems self-evident that
some cognitive abilities are inherently more complex than others, irrespective of how
they evolved. It is possible to agree with Shettleworth’s (1998) modular theory of the
distribution of cognitive abilities and still argue that the ‘modules’ vary in complexity.
Even Shettleworth (1998) seems to acknowledge this in a roundabout fashion. In
discussing this topic, she refers to a study in which a one-celled organism performs a
task in an evolutionarily successful yet “extremely simple” manner (p. 570). An even
clearer example is seen in Shettleworth’s analysis of degrees of numerical competence:
“Counting is near the top end of a continuum of abilities collectively termed numerical
competence … near the bottom end in terms of apparent cognitive complexity and
resemblance to what people do when they count is numerosity discrimination ...” (p.
365). Similarly, while Wynne (2001) claims the “whole notion of a psychological scale
is now considered outdated” (p. 12), he too refers to some behaviours as being
“complex” or having explanations that are more or less “complicated” (p. 4).
Interestingly, some authors have explicitly linked the mosaic account and the task
hierarchy models. Wright et al. (2003, p. 195) claim that studies focused on which
animals can perform “abstract-concept” learning take a “decidedly modular approach …
sometimes taking the form of a hierarchy beginning with simple associative (itemspecific) learning through category (natural-concept) learning, and ending with
relational (abstract-concept) learning or analogical (relations-among-relations) learning.
A species that fails to pass the test for the next higher level is thought to not have this
specialised function or cognitive module”.
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If intelligence is seen to include the ability to solve problems in a dynamic and flexible
manner, then testing animals using stimuli and situations which are not part of their
natural ecology is also important. An artificial task, in addition to being easier to control
and analyse, examines an animal’s ability to deal with unpredictable environments –
that is, its ability to learn. And because tasks do vary in complexity, they allow
scientists to determine how complex a problem an animal might be able to solve and
examine the means by which that solution is found. This type of testing can also be used
to examine more biologically based questions such as – do some physical and social
environments encourage generalist problem-solving ability, do animals from different
ecologies use different means to solve the same problems etc.
This study combines aspects of both the first approach, by examining the ability of an
animal to perform a complex, artificially constructed cognitive task, and the second, by
using a non-traditional, phylogenetically ‘primitive’ species and contextualising the
results in terms of that species’ unique physiology and ecology.
Finally, while championing the value of artificial testing of general cognitive abilities, it
is important to acknowledge its limitations, particularly in terms of species comparison.
These types of experiments are not exhaustive tests of general ‘intelligence’ and, in
isolation, can really only shed light on a particular animal’s ability to perform a specific
task under specific conditions. Making comparisons between species’ ability to perform
a particular task is problematic. Firstly, as discussed earlier, an animal’s inability to
perform a task may be due to procedural incompatibilities such as modality (Macphail
1982; Thomas 1986; Wright et al. 2003); secondly, it is impossible to exactly reproduce
the conditions of stimulus, response, reinforcer and motivation (Bitterman 1975;
Wasserman 1993a) and thirdly, the ability of different species to perform a particular
task does not mean that the same cognitive processes are at work (Wasserman 1993a).
However, that does not mean the ‘comparative’ should be removed from comparative
cognition. Wasserman (1993a) argues that it is possible to provide animals with an
essentially equivalent experience, “to have the critical features of the experimental
design or paradigm effectively operative and suitable for each species under
consideration” (p. 156). Once a substantial body of experimental literature has been
amassed, these types of results might cautiously be used to make comments about
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comparative ‘intelligence’ in terms of generalised adaptiveness or, more simply,
learning ability based on the number, variety and complexity of tasks a species can
perform. This type of comparative cognition should not be aimed at creating some sort
of species’ intelligence ranking; rather it can be used to examine the similarities and
differences in the processes of cognition and how those processes have evolved in
different species (Cook 1993; Shettleworth 1993; Wasserman 1993a).

1.6 RATIONALE
The cognitive capacities of animals remain a relatively unexplored
research area.
(Zentall 2000a, p. 122)
In summary, this study has been designed to contribute to the ongoing debate about
comparative animal cognition by setting these experiments in the intellectual framework
of both the task hierarchy and mosaic approaches.
While the idea of a species hierarchy of intelligence based on phylogenetic position is
not generally explicitly supported, an implicit belief in this type of cognitive ranking
still pervades animal cognition literature. This study uses a fairly extreme case to test
this belief by examining the ability of a member of one of the most evolutionarily
‘primitive’ mammalian species, the echidna, to perform what is considered a relatively
‘advanced’ cognitive task, conditional same/different categorisation.
The mosaic perspective argues that species evolve particular abilities to adapt to their
particular ecological niches. This paper seeks to expand on this idea and examine
whether a species with a varied ecology, such as the echidna, might evolve the ability to
adapt to novel learning situations such as those found in artificial discrimination testing
and perform complex cognitive tasks. It also attempts to examine what role a varied
ecology might play in the development of ‘advanced’ mental abilities.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SUBJECT – THE ECHIDNA
(TACHYGLOSSUS ACULEATUS)
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The selection of the species to be used in these experiments was subject to a number of
criteria. As outlined in the introduction, one of the goals of this study was to examine
the validity of the idea of a phylogenetic hierarchy of intelligence – whether explicitly
expressed or implied by the language and expectations of a segment of animal cognition
literature. To accomplish this it was decided to select a subject that has been regarded as
phylogenetically ‘primitive’ – a word which often seems to be used to delineate species
which are evolutionarily far removed from humans as well as to those that emerged
early in evolutionary terms.
One of the theories opposed to a phylogenetically based intelligence hierarchy is that of
mosaic evolution, which asserts that different species have developed specific cognitive
abilities in response to differing ecological pressures rather than become progressively
more generally ‘intelligent’ over time. Because of this, it was important that the subject
had a varied ecology that might lead to the evolution of relatively complex problemsolving abilities.
The Australian short-beaked echidna, Tachyglossus aculeatus, fulfilled both these
criteria. Because of the theoretical goals of this experiment it is important to review
what is known about the subject’s evolutionary history, ecology, biology, environment
and cognitive ability. For the sake of brevity, this information has been limited to those
characteristics of the echidna that are relevant to this study.

2.1 Biology, evolution and behaviour
2.1.1 Taxonomy, classification and distribution
Tachyglossus aculeatus (the common or short-beaked echidna) is one of three extant
species of monotreme mammals. The others are the long-beaked echidna (Zaglossus
spp.), found only in Papua New Guinea, and the platypus (Ornithorhynchus anatinus),
found in Eastern Australia and Tasmania. Monotremes display numerous plesiomorphic
reptilian characteristics; the most obvious being that they are oviparous (egg-laying) and
the eggs are covered with keratin that forms the covering of most reptile eggs. Other
anatomical features with reptilian characteristics include: formation of an egg ‘tooth’ in
the embryo; a single cloacal outlet; structure of the reproductive organs; bones in the
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skull and shoulder girdle and some features of the eyes and ears. However, echidnas are
classified as mammals and belong to the subclass Prototheria of the class Mammalia.
This is because they also possess mammalian characteristics – they are covered in hair;
suckle their young with milk secreted from mammary glands; are able to generate body
heat internally (endothermy); possess three ossicles in the middle ear; have only one
bone in the lower jaw; have a false palate and a diaphragm separating chest from
abdomen (Abensperg-Traun 1990; Augee, Gooden and Musser 2006; Australian
Wildlife Series 1981; Gates 1973; Griffiths 1978, 1989; Musser 2003). This mixture of
mammalian and reptilian characteristics is reflected in the name “echidna”, which is
derived from the Greek goddess Ekhidna who was half woman, half serpent (Augee et
al. 2006).
Five subspecies of Tachyglossus aculeatus have been described – aculeatus, setosus,
acanthion, multiaculeatus and lawesii. The main criteria of differentiation are: fur
length and colour; spine length and thickness and the length of the claw on digit two on
the hind limb relative to that on digit three (Augee et al. 2006; Griffiths 1978, 1989). In
general, the subspecies can be related to habitat (Augee et al. 2006); however no major
behavioural differences have been described.
The echidna has a geographical range from close to the equator in Papua New Guinea to
43°S in Tasmania (Augee and Gooden 1993). The echidna is the most widely
distributed native mammal in Australia (Morrow, Andersen and Nicol 2009; Strahan
1984), occurring in all major habitats in mainland Australia and Tasmania (Nicol 2003).
Indeed, apart from the house mouse, no other mammal can be found in so many
divergent ecologies (Augee et al. 2006). It has been recorded in habitats as diverse as
the Simpson Desert (Griffiths 1978), the tropical grasslands of the Northern Territory
(Augee et al. 2006) and the Southern Alps (Griffiths 1968), as well as a variety of
altitudes from the lowland eucalyptus woodland around Port Moresby to altitudes of up
to 1600 metres in the central highlands of New Guinea (Augee et al. 2006).
Tachyglossus aculeatus aculeatus, the subject of this study, is found mainly in
southeastern Australia (Abensperg-Traun 1990).

29

2.1.2 Evolution
It is widely accepted that mammals developed during the Mesozoic era more than 200
million years ago from mammal-like reptiles known as synapsids (Augee et al. 2006;
Divac 1995). They are generally recognised as having branched into three main lines:
prototherians (monotremes), metatherians (marsupials) and eutherians (placentals)
(Divac 1995); although there is still some debate about these classifications (Watson
1990). The point of divergence of the monotremes from modern therians (marsupials
and placentals) is uncertain.
The orthodox view is that monotreme ancestors represent the earliest mammalian
lineage, predating the lineage that became the therian ancestor of modern placentals and
marsupials (Dorit, Walker and Barnes 1991; Graves 1991; Musser 2003; Rowe 1990).
The idea that the therians (marsupials and eutherians) are more closely related to each
other than to prototherians (monotremes) – the so-called “Theria hypothesis” (Huxley
1880) – is based on a wide range of anatomical and physiological features, such as the
numerous plesiomorphic features retained by monotremes, and recent fossil material
(Kirsch and Mayer 1998; Musser 2003). This theory has also received the majority of
support from nuclear gene sequence data and immunological gene studies (Killian,
Buckley, Stewart, Munday and Jirtle 2001; reviews in Belov and Hellman 2003;
Madsen 2009; Musser 2003).
A secondary theory, the “Marsupionta hypothesis” (Gregory 1934, 1947; Kirsch and
Mayer 1998; Kühne 1973, 1977), suggests that monotremes and marsupials are more
closely related to each other than either is to eutherians. The idea that monotremes and
marsupials evolved from the same ancestor is supported by mitochondrial genome
sequencing and DNA hybridisation analyses (reviews in Belov and Hellman 2003;
Madsen 2009; Musser 2003).
While these are the two main theories, some palaeontologists believe that, despite their
many plesiomorphies, monotremes share a close relationship to therians. This idea has
found support in some reworked mitochondrial DNA experiments, despite the fact that
previous mtDNA studies had been found to support Marsupionta. Another theory, that a
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split between monotremes, marsupials and eutherians happened almost simultaneously,
receives more support from geneticists than palaeontologists (Musser 2003).
Whichever theory is correct, fossil records and genetic studies indicate monotremes
have evolved independently from all other mammals for at least 120 million years and
more likely more than 200 million years (Clemens 1979; Dawson 1983; Griffiths 1968,
1978; Krubitzer and Campi 2009; Madsen 2009; Musser 2003; O’Brien and Graves
1990; Phillips, Bennett and Lee 2009; Rismiller 1999). The fossil record shows a
platypus-like monotreme that is about 120 million years old (Archer, Flannery, Ritchie
and Molnar 1985) and new fragmented fossil remains suggest monotremes have
evolved independently for more than 200 million years (Woodburne, Rich and Springer
2003). The results of a number of genetic studies indicate monotremes split from
therians between 204 and 237 million years ago (reviews in Grützner, Deakin, Rens, ElMogharbel and Graves 2003; Madsen 2009). Echidnas are often thought to have
evolved separately from platypus for between 35 million and 65 million years
(Abensperg-Traun 1990; Dawson 1983; Griffiths 1978; Griffiths, Wells and Barrie
1991; Musser 2003; Richardson 1987; Westerman and Edwards 1992). Phillips et al.
(2009) combined genetic and fossil evidence to estimate the divergence at between 19
and 48 million years while molecular dating studies place the split variously between 17
and 57 million years (review in Belov and Hellman 2003), 17 and 80 million years
(references in Rowe, Rich, Vickers-Rich, Springer and Woodburne 2008) and 17 and 35
million years (references in Phillips et al. 2009).

2.1.2.1 Echidnas as ‘primitive’ mammals
The evolutionary history of monotremes has influenced how they are viewed in the
wider scientific community, particularly as they are generally considered to be the
mammals most distantly related to humans (Krubitzer, Manger, Pettigrew and Calford
1995), and they are often referred to as the “oldest living mammals” (e.g. Rismiller
1999; Rismiller and McKelvey 2003) and “living fossils” (Phillips et al. 2009). Graves,
Hope and Cooper (1990) point out that one of the difficulties faced in studying
monotremes is the array of entrenched misconceptions about them, such as the idea that
they are atypical, aberrant animals who only survived because they were geographically
isolated and did not face competition from more ‘advanced’ eutherians.
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T. H. Huxley, an evolutionary biologist writing in the late nineteenth century, believed
that monotremes “represent earlier, and serial stages in the evolution of true viviparous
mammals” (from Graves et al. 1990, p. 144) and incorporated this idea into his
nomenclature. The placentals were classified as eutherians (“true beasts”) and
marsupials as metatherians (“other beasts”), while monotremes were placed in the
subclass prototherians (“first beasts”) and were considered even less “true beasts” than
marsupials because they laid eggs (Graves et al. 1990). The lesser status of monotremes
as “almost mammals” (Augee et al. 2006, p. 1) was further stressed by the grouping of
eutherians and metatherians into the separate subclass therians. According to Augee et
al. (2006), the view of echidnas as “some sort of early test model that wasn’t quite right
has tarnished them for two centuries” (p. 1).
The impact of Huxley’s theories was described by Tyndale-Biscoe in 1973:
Huxley’s idea has had a long and baneful influence on the
understanding of marsupials and monotremes; it encouraged people to
think that by studying these mammals they could ride a sort of
Wellsian Time Machine back to the origin of mammals. Even more,
that this was the only proper purpose in studying these animals,
notwithstanding the clear evidence of convergence to show that they
are marvellously adapted to their present environment. Huxley’s
grandson, Julian, began to redress the balance by emphasising in his
“Evolution: the modern synthesis”, that all living animals must be
viewed in the context of their adaptations to the present environment,
but the old idea dies hard.
(cited in Graves et al. 1990, p. 144)
Huxley’s influence can be seen almost a century later in MacIntyre’s (1967) proposition
that monotremes be studied not as mammals but as living therapsid reptiles (one of the
synapsids, a subgroup of which were the ancestors of mammals) and be referred to as
“quasi-mammals” to emphasise their distance from “true or therian mammals”.
According to Musser (2003), the comparatively ancient nature of some of the echidna’s
features “has led most scientists to consider monotremes – in spite of their
specialisations – to be primitive mammals far removed from marsupial and eutherian
mammals” (p. 928). Abbie (1938, p. 150) described echidnas as “primitive mammals”
and Lende’s (1964) study of echidna neurophysiology was titled “Representation in the
cerebral cortex of a primitive mammal”. As recently as 2003 echidnas were still being
referred to as “primitive mammals” (Hassiotis, Paxinos and Ashwell 2003, p. 829).
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However, authors such as Graves et al. (1990) refute the idea that monotremes are not
“true beasts”. Like eutherians, they are fur-bearing and suckle their young with milk
from mammary glands and as such are defined as mammals. The major difference
between eutherians, marsupials and monotremes is their means of nurturing their young
in the very early stages – extended interuterine life in eutherians, attached to a teat in a
pouch in marsupials and in an egg in monotremes. Graves et al. (1990) argue that these
differences in their modes of reproduction are not stages in an evolutionary process but
rather are adaptations to an uncertain environment where it is advantageous to produce
disposable young. As such, they contend, marsupials and monotremes must be regarded
as “true beasts”.
The dismissal of echidnas as ‘primitive’ also cannot be justified on evolutionary
grounds. The echidna’s ancestors may have emerged early in mammalian evolution, and
in that sense can be regarded as ‘evolutionarily primitive’, however that does not mean
they necessarily represent the “ancestor of all mammals” (Krubitzer 1998, p. 1127) or
the ancestral form (Northcutt and Kaas 1995; Rowe and Bohringer 1992) as they are
often viewed. They have evolved from ancient stock, but their evolution has not stood
still for the past 200 million-or-so years. As Musser (2003) points out, there is an
“exceptionally long history for the group, allowing a great deal of time in which to lose
ancestral features and develop new characteristics” (p. 928), in much the same way that
today’s eutherian mammals do not resemble their early progenitors. Echidnas have
retained some plesiomorphies (see above), but mosaic evolution (see section 1.4) allows
for archaic features to occur alongside highly specialised or advanced features (Musser
2003; Northcutt and Kaas 1995).
According to Rowe (1990), the echidna’s “retention of phylogenetically ancient
mechanisms for reproduction need not mean that other body systems have been
constrained in their evolutionary adaptability” (p. 265). In fact studies have shown that
echidnas are a unique mix of primitive features and unique specialisations in both their
physiology (see section 2.1.1) and neurophysiology (see section 2.2.1). Krubitzer and
Campi (2009, p. 52) stated: “Fossil records indicate that extant monotremes … are
highly derived, particularly in the structure of their bill, and in this respect do not
resemble the first mammals.”
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O’Brien and Graves (1990) describe monotremes as an independent and successful
evolutionary attempt which parallels rather than precedes that of the more ‘advanced’
mammals. It can be argued that the success of the echidna is demonstrated by the fact
that they are still a numerous and widely distributed species while many other, more
recently evolved species are endangered or have become extinct. As Augee et al. (2006)
point out; echidnas “have been around for a lot longer than placentals and have
remained masters of their environmental niches” (p. 1).
Indeed, it may be the retention of some ‘primitive’ attributes that has proved the key to
the echidna’s evolutionary success. For example, burrowing enables echidnas to avoid
predators and temperature extremes; its food sources are protected underground; it can
forage in the dark using other highly attuned senses; body temperature and metabolism
can be lowered and controlled in response to extreme cold or food deprivation and they
are extremely tolerant to low oxygen conditions. These types of adaptations mean
today’s echidnas are well equipped to deal with crises such as bushfires, floods and cold
winters and may have meant they were better able to survive challenging environmental
changes that led to the extinction of more ‘advanced’ mammals (Augee et al. 2006).

2.1.3 External features
Echidnas are easily identified by their covering of long, sharp spines with hair present
between the spines. Adults measure about 30-45cm in length and weigh up to 8kg, with
males weighing about 25% more than females. The echidna’s body is dorso-ventrally
compressed with a domed back and flat or slightly concave ventral surface and there is
no outward sign of a neck. An ear hole is located on either side of the head but the
external pinnae are usually not discernable. The small eyes are situated well forward on
the head and appear to be directed forward, rather than sideways. The small mouth
(which can only be opened far enough to allow the passage of the tongue and prey) and
large nostrils are located on the tip of the snout. The snout is covered by soft skin
sensitive to tactile stimuli and measures 7-8cm in length in the adult. Echidnas have a
rudimentary tail and short, powerful limbs with large digging claws (Griffiths 1989).
There is only one opening for the passage of waste and reproductive products, hence the
name of the Order Mono (one) tremata (opening). Male echidnas have no scrotum and
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the testes are internal while the pouch in females only develops during pregnancy, so
there is little external indication of sex. However, juveniles of both sexes bear a small,
sharp spur that is usually shed by the female later in life but persists in the male (Augee
and Gooden 1993; Griffiths 1989).

2.1.4 Senses
2.1.4.1 Vision
The echidna’s visual system is an unusual mixture of mammalian and reptilian
characteristics (Augee et al. 2006) and is generally considered relatively
unsophisticated. In his study of the echidna’s retinal topography, for example, Stone
(1983) found that in some ways the retina seemed “undifferentiated, perhaps primitive”
(p. 176). It is not uncommon for non-scientists to believe echidnas are blind (Rismiller
1999), while scientists have compared them to the “virtually blind” mole and bat
(Allison, Van Twyver and Goff 1972, p. 173) based on limited evidence (Gates 1973).
However, although echidnas appear to rely more on olfactory, auditory and tactile
sensory information (Griffiths 1968; Gates 1979), as would be expected for an animal
whose subterranean prey is often not visible (Augee et al. 2006), experiments have
suggested “echidna vision does not appear to be as dismal as some of the anatomists
would have one believe” (Gates 1978, p. 155).
Contrary to early reports, the echidna is capable of changing the dioptric characteristics
of its eyes to focus on both distant and close objects, suggesting its “visual system is
more sophisticated than the anatomy of its eye would indicate” (Gates 1973, p. 112).
The echidna’s eyes are directed forward to some degree and there seems to be a
significant overlap of the visual fields and some degree of binocular vision (Augee et al.
2006). Despite its lack of a corpus callosum, the echidna’s visual system also involves
interocular transfer of visual information, demonstrating a “reasonable degree of
complexity” (Gates 1973, p. 112). In addition, the echidna’s visual cortex appears to be
substantially larger than that found in the platypus (Krubitzer et al. 1995; Rowe 1990),
supporting Campbell and Hayhow’s (1972) contention that vision plays a more
significant role in the echidna than in its monotreme relation.
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It has been argued that the fibre content of the optic nerve is a useful indicator of visual
acuity as well as the importance of vision in an animal relative to its other senses
(Bruesch and Arey 1942; Gates 1973; Woollard 1927). Estimates of the number of optic
nerve fibres in the echidna, while small compared to those for highly visual animals
such as monkeys and ducks, has nonetheless been described as “substantial” (Gates
1973, p. 110) and is more than double that for another “non-visual” animal, the bat,
which is capable of making a simple visual discrimination (Gates 1973; Griffiths 1978).
Another indicator of visual ability is found in the ratio of myelinated (“coated”) to
unmyelinated (“uncoated”) fibres, with myelinated fibres being more effective as the
insulating effect of the myelin coating allows for more efficient conduction of
information (in the form of action potentials) in the optic nerve (Bear, Connors and
Paradiso 1996). The echidna has very few of the less-effective unmyelinated fibres, and
in this respect more closely resembles other mammals than non-mammals such as the
frog, which has a large number of unmyelinated fibres (Gates 1973).
In practical tests of the echidna’s visual acuity, Gates (1973, 1978) demonstrated that
echidnas are able to discriminate stimuli on the basis of black/white; vertical/horizontal
stripes (down to 1mm in width) and oblique stripes. His series of experiments showed
echidnas can see at least as capably as a rat and could use sight to forage (Augee and
Gooden 1993; Gates 1978).
There has been considerable debate about whether echidnas possess colour vision,
which is indicated by the presence of cone-shaped photoreceptors in the retina. Both
O’Day (1938) and Prince (1956) found a few cones in a predominantly rod retina, but in
a 1952 article O’Day states that the retina has rods only. Duke-Elder (1958) and Walls
(1942) both claim there are rods only. However, many of these early studies have been
criticised for their lack of methodological rigour (Gates 1973). More recently Rismiller
(1999) claimed that echidnas have no colour vision, as their eye is a pure rod retinal
system, while there is an uncited reference in Augee and Gooden (1993) claiming
echidnas do have cones for colour vision. Griffiths (1978) even speculated that some
echidnas might have a few cones while others have a purely rod retina. In one of the
more recent references, Augee et al. (2006) claimed that 10 to 15 per cent of the
photoreceptors in the echidna’s eye are cones (a figure replicated by Young and
Pettigrew 1991), compared to about 5 per cent for humans. However, unlike most other
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mammals, there is little regional specialisation in the way the cones are distributed.
While the physiological studies are suggestive, no studies have directly tested the
echidna’s capacity for colour vision.

2.1.4.2 Smell
Current knowledge suggests that the echidna locates its prey primarily through its sense
of smell (Abensperg-Traun 1990; Griffiths 1968). This theory is supported by the
echidna’s very well developed olfactory organs (not seen in the platypus) and the
“enormous” area covered by the olfactory epithelium (Griffiths 1978, p. 182), as well as
the large size of the olfactory tubercles in the echidna’s brain (Griffiths 1968). In terms
of the external morphology of the echidna’s brain, Krubitzer (1998) describes “a
striking expansion of the olfactory system, including the pyriform cortex and olfactory
bulb” (p. 1142). While there have been no specific tests of the echidna’s olfactory
ability, the importance of olfaction to the echidna is further supported by observations
of the echidna’s foraging habits (Griffiths 1968), including their ability to forage in the
dark and the fact that a number of blind echidnas have been known to survive
successfully in the wild (Abensperg-Traun 1994; Augee et al. 2006).
While it has yet to be definitively tested, it is also believed olfaction plays an important
role in echidna courtship and reproduction. A number of the normally solitary males
find and follow a female in a “train” for between 7 and 37 days, with the female at the
head and the males lined up nose to tail behind her, suggesting the action of a sexual
pheromone. In addition, smell may play a role in hatchlings finding their mother’s milk
patch, since their sight and hearing are not fully developed at that stage (Augee et al.
2006).

2.1.4.3 Touch
Behavioural evidence from echidnas suggests they rely heavily on the tactile sense, both
from the snout and tongue (Griffiths 1978; Augee and Gooden 1993) and from the distal
limbs during digging and burrowing (Rowe, Mahns, Bohringer, Ashwell and Sahai
2003). In fact Rowe et al. (2003) claim monotremes “perhaps more than any other
mammalian species … display an enormous reliance upon tactile mechanisms (p. 884).
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This assessment is reinforced by anatomical and electrophysiological studies that have
revealed the prominent role of tactile inputs in the sensory-motor cortex (Rowe et al.
2003).

2.1.4.4 Hearing
The echidna’s ears are internally fairly similar in structure to eutherian mammals and
tests have demonstrated that the echidna’s hearing is also very similar in frequency
range to that found in many eutherians. In terms of sensitivity the echidna’s hearing
falls at the lower end of the eutherian scale, being somewhat less sensitive than that of a
cat, and more closely resembling that of the Mongolian gerbil (Griffiths 1978).
However, as Griffiths (1978) points out, a somewhat limited range of frequencies does
not denote defective hearing – it is more likely that the echidna’s sensitivity range is
most effective for detecting noises emitted by its prey or vibrations transmitted through
bone. In fact, the stiffness of the middle ear system is more suited to the transmission of
bone-conducted rather than airborne sounds (Augee et al. 2006) and Johnstone (cited in
Griffiths 1968) found that a tap on the snout elicited a large microphonic potential.
According to Johnstone, “the echidna ear appears to be every bit as efficient as that in
the Eutheria” (p. 115).

2.1.4.5 Electroreception
Monotremes are unique among mammals in that they share with some fish and
salamanders the capacity for electroreception – the ability to detect weak electrical
fields through a mosaic of mechanoreceptors and electroreceptors in their skin (Nicol
2003). Studies indicate the echidna uses electroreception through its snout to aid in the
detection of food (Augee and Gooden 1992; Gregory, Iggo, McIntyre and Proske 1989;
Nicol 2003) in a similar manner to its close relative the platypus, which uses electrical
receptors in its bill to forage (Proske and Gregory 2003). However, the difference in the
number of electroreceptors in the snout of the echidna (a few hundred to 2000)
compared with the 40,000 receptors in the platypus’ bill suggests that electroreception is
not used to the same extent in the echidna as it is in the platypus (Krubitzer and Campi
2009).
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2.1.5 Longevity, mortality and predation
Echidnas appear to be very long-lived and the maximum recorded life span is 49 years
for a captive echidna at Philadelphia Zoo (Augee et al. 2006; Griffiths 1978). Longevity
in the wild is difficult to assess, as it is not possible to determine the age of echidnas.
Studies by Griffiths (1989) led him to estimate Tachyglossus can live in a natural
habitat for at least 20 years, while echidna researcher Peggy Rismiller has reported a
free-living echidna being observed over a period of 45 years (Augee et al. 2006).
A study of the causes of death in free-living echidnas found the leading cause of death
was injury by motor vehicles, with most of the others dying from disease or parasites
(Griffiths 1989). While the echidna has no active defensive or offensive weapons, its
passive defence mechanisms are extremely effective. Firstly, they are hard to find, being
rarely active during broad daylight, and hard to see, being well camouflaged in
undergrowth or forest litter. Even if they are found, their sharp spines seem to deter
most predators and when threatened they can curl themselves into a spine-covered ball
or dig straight down and bury themselves completely in the soil for long periods. As a
last-ditch effort, they eject a stream of unpleasant-smelling urine (Augee et al. 2006;
Nicol and Andersen 2003). Faecal examination of foxes and dingoes show that these
carnivores ingest echidna flesh but it is considered unlikely they could kill and eat an
adult echidna and more likely scavenge carcasses. However, burrow young are known
to be taken by feral cats, dingoes and goannas (Abensperg-Traun 1990; Griffiths 1989).

2.1.6 Home ranges
Echidnas do not exhibit territoriality – they are solitary, but mutually tolerant and will
even share nest sites when they are in short supply. However they do have a definite
home range, one that may overlap with other echidnas of both sexes. (Augee et al. 2006;
Griffiths 1989) There have been a number of studies in which the home ranges of
echidnas have been determined and, although different methodologies were used, there
is a remarkable similarity between the average home range sizes across a range of
different habitats
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Augee, Ealey and Price (1975) found animals on Kangaroo Island, South Australia,
have a mean home range size of 65 ha. Griffiths, Kristo, Green, Fogerty and Newgrain
(1988) determined the home ranges of three lactating echidnas on Kangaroo Island to be
14, 28 and 50 ha, a mean of 31 ha. Abensperg-Traun (1991) found the average home
ranges of adult echidnas in wheatbelt reserves in Western Australia to be 65 ha. Augee,
Beard, Grigg and Raison (1992) calculated a mean home-range size of 42 ha for
echidnas in the Snowy Mountains. Wilkinson, Grigg and Beard (1998) studied echidnas
in the highlands of southeast Queensland and determined a mean home range size of 50
ha, while Rismiller and McKelvey (1994) found a mean of 55 ha for echidnas on
Kangaroo Island. According to Nicol, Vanpé, Sprent, Morrow and Andersen (2011), the
short-beaked echidna has a smaller home range than comparably sized eutherian
carnivores and omnivores, consistent with their low metabolic rate (see section 2.1.8).
It has been observed that males have larger home ranges than females in some species
(Platt, Brannon, Briese and French 1996). None of the aforementioned studies found a
significant difference between the home ranges of males and females. However,
Griffiths et al. (1988) found the mean home range of lactating echidnas was 31 ha,
lower than that recorded in the other studies, which presumably included a combination
of males and females. However, the fact that the lactating echidnas were caring for
young may well have reduced their normal foraging range so no conclusions about the
relative home range size of male versus female echidnas can be drawn. More recently,
however, Nicol et al. (2011) radiotracked echidnas in Tasmania over a 13-year period
and calculated the mean annual home-range size of males was 107 ha, twice that of
females (48 ha).

2.1.7 Prey and foraging
The echidna is an insectivore whose diet includes small beetles, beetle larvae,
lepidopteran larvae and earthworms. However, its main food source consists of ants and
termites that it gathers by probing its snout into the galleries of nests and mounds and
other places occupied by these insects (Abensperg-Traun 1988; Grant 1983; Griffiths,
Greenslade, Miller and Kerle 1990; Griffiths and Simpson 1966).
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Ants and termites are a reliable food source because their population levels are kept
constant by the buffering effect of the mound or nest against environmental fluctuations.
Both ants and termites are social insects with a highly aggregated distribution, being
found in nests excavated either in the soil or decaying wood or in mounds built mainly
of clay or earthy material (Gay 1970). However, both ants and termites have developed
mechanical and chemical defences, such as increased size, chemical secretions,
swarming, biting and stinging (Abensperg-Traun 1988, 1993, 1994; Abensperg-Traun,
Dickman and De Boer 1991; Griffiths et al. 1990; Griffiths and Simpson 1966).
It is believed the echidna uses a variety of sensory mechanisms to locate prey. Smell is
considered to be important; however the echidna’s snout also contains a variety of
sensory endings for touch, vibration and weak electric fields that may all play a part in
prey detection. The echidna may also hear its prey moving in logs or underground
transmitted via bone conduction from the snout to the inner ear. Vision may also play a
role, but, as discussed above, is not necessary for echidna prey detection (Augee et al.
2006).
When prey is located, it is rapidly exposed by the digging claws on the forelimbs and
taken in by the long, flexible tongue (Abensperg-Traun 1990). The name Tachyglossus
means “fast tongue” and the echidna’s tongue can be extruded up to 180mm at the rate
of 100 times per minute. The tongue is covered with a sticky secretion so any ants or
termites that come into contact with the tongue stick to it and are drawn back into the
mouth. Echidnas have no teeth; instead insects are broken up by keratinised spines on
the top of the tongue grinding against sets of spines on the roof of the mouth (Dawson
1983).

2.1.8 Thermoregulation, metabolism and hibernation
Monotremes were long assumed to have inferior thermoregulatory capabilities
compared to other mammals due to the fact they have the lowest body temperature of
any mammal. Even when active, an echidna’s body temperature rarely goes above 34°C
and its mean body temperature has been estimated at around 28-30°C (Grigg, Augee
and Beard 1992) and 32°C (Nicol 2003; Nicol and Andersen 2003). They also have a
lower metabolic rate than other mammals and use about one-third as much oxygen as a
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dog, cow or human (Augee et al. 2006). These factors, along with a tendency to enter
torpor, led Martin (1902) to write: “Echidna is the lowest in the scale of warm-blooded
creatures” (cited in Nicol 2003, p. 796) and Robinson, in 1954, to describe echidnas as
“the most primitive of the mammals with respect to their thermoregulation” (cited in
Brice 2009, p. 256).
However, these supposedly ‘primitive’ attributes can also been seen as adaptively
advantageous. It takes about two-thirds less energy and subsequently less food to
maintain an echidna compared to a similar-sized placental, with even greater savings
made during hibernation (Augee and Gooden 1993). Lactating females are also able to
regulate their metabolism and compensate for the energy costs of milk production so
that their daily energy budget is the same as that of non-reproductive females (Schmid,
Andersen, Speakman and Nicol 2003). In addition, the echidna’s relatively low oxygen
requirements may also be helpful in tolerating the reduced oxygen conditions
experienced during burrowing, as well as other physiological adaptations such as:
efficient tissue use of oxygen; bradycardia (slowing of the heart); redistribution of blood
flow favouring the brain, heart and nervous system and blood haemoglobin with a high
affinity for oxygen (Dawson 1983).
It was once widely assumed that hibernation was ‘primitive’ in both an evolutionary and
functional sense – a return to a poikilothermic state due to metabolic failure (Augee and
Gooden 1992). Martin, the author of the first studies of monotreme temperature
regulation, stated in 1902 that “… during the winter echidna abandons all attempts at
homeothermism” and “… echidna shows defective homeothermism” (cited in Augee
and Gooden 1992, p. 174). However, it has since been demonstrated that echidnas in the
wild do show ‘true’ hibernation (Grigg et al. 2003) and that this is not a failure of
thermoregulation but an energy-saving mechanism tied closely to the reproductive cycle
(Beard, Grigg and Augee 1992; Nicol and Anderson 2002; Nicol 2003).
According to Augee and Gooden (1992), hibernation in echidnas is both complex and
highly adaptive. Echidnas undergo both daily torpor and hibernation – the pattern and
extent of which vary in different climates (Schmid et al. 2003). Echidnas hibernate for
between 6 and 28 weeks of the year from early winter to early or late spring, at least in
the colder parts of their range, and during that time their body temperature falls to below
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5°C, heart rate drops to 4-7 beats per minute and respiration drops to 0.3 breaths per
minute. Like placental hibernators, echidnas periodically rouse themselves during
hibernation and warm themselves to their normal body temperatures for a short period
of time (Augee and Gooden 1993; Augee et al. 2006; Grigg et al. 1992). These bursts of
metabolic activity contradict C. J. Martin’s early view that the echidna “abandoned all
attempts at keeping warm in winter and sank into a reptilian state” (cited in Augee and
Gooden 1993, p. 50).
Echidnas are also remarkably flexible in their hibernation habits, showing a range of
patterns in response to differing environmental and behavioural conditions. As well as
shortening or lengthening their winter hibernation in response to reproductive activities
(Augee and Gooden 1993), they also occasionally show periods of shallow torpor
during the active season, such as during bad weather when they remain in a retreat and
their body temperature falls to 14-20°C (Grigg et al. 1992). Echidnas also seem to
hibernate in response to a relative, rather than an absolute, energy shortage, with all
echidnas hibernating every year in snowbound areas where food is scarce, while only a
proportion of echidnas hibernate each year in warmer areas with greater, if patchy, food
availability (references in Brice 2009). For example, the Kangaroo Island echidna
shows only short periods of reduced activity and torpor during the colder months
between April and August (Rismiller and McKelvey 1996), while eastern echidnas
show extended periods of deep hibernation (Beard and Grigg 2000; Grigg, Beard and
Augee 1989; Nicol and Andersen 2002). Even the echidna’s daily cycle is flexible and
they can be active either day or night depending on ambient temperatures (Augee and
Gooden 1993; Griffiths 1968).

2.1.9 Reproduction
Information about the echidna’s reproductive behaviour is limited due to their cryptic
nature (Morrow et al. 2009; Rismiller and McKelvey 2003). It is known that males and
females only come together to mate (between May and September depending on
environmental conditions, Augee and Gooden 1993) and males take no part in raising
young. After a gestation period of between 21 to 28 days, the female lays an egg which
is carried and hatches in the pouch after about 10 days, where the young is suckled with
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milk for about 55 days. The young (sometimes called a puggle) then lives in a nursery
burrow until it is weaned (Augee and Gooden 1993; Rismiller and McKelvey 2003).
One notable feature of the studies that have been undertaken is the variation in
reproductive behaviour found between different echidna populations. There are
significant differences in the use of nursery burrows and maternal care, with the timing
and duration of the period the young spends suckling in the pouch and then in the
burrow, as well as maternal behaviour throughout the entire reproduction period,
varying considerably between different regions of Australia (Morrow et al. 2009). For
example, Kangaroo Island echidnas wean the young at 204-210 days, but in Tasmania
weaning occurs at 139-152 days, even though the masses of the young are comparable
at weaning (Morrow et al. 2009).
Mating behaviour also varies. For example, the occurrence of so-called “echidna trains”
(Rismiller and Seymour 1991, see section 2.1.4.2), where a female echidna is followed
by male echidnas in single file during mating season, have been reported in New South
Wales, Victoria, the Northern Territory and Kangaroo Island off South Australia
(Griffiths 1978; Rismiller 1992; Rismiller and McKelvey 1996, 2000). However,
studies of echidna populations at higher altitudes at Mount Kosciusko and south-east
Queensland never found more than one male with a female (Beard and Grigg 2000;
Beard et al. 1992). Another difference is the timing of mating, occurring soon after
hibernation in eastern Australia, while Tasmanian echidnas show significant overlap
between hibernation and reproduction (Morrow et al. 2009). Taggart, Breed, TempleSmith, Purvis and Shimmin (1998) suggested there were fundamental differences in
echidna courtship behaviour depending on the climate. According to Morrow et al.
(2009, p. 281) these differences in mating behaviour may be the result of “behavioural
flexibility in response to different climatic conditions”.

2.2 COGNITION
2.2.1 Neurophysiology
As discussed in section 2.1, monotremes have historically been considered primitive
and uninteresting due to their evolutionary history and plesiomorphic characteristics.
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When the brain of the echidna was studied, it was often merely as an example of a
‘primitive’ brain used to further the understanding of the evolutionary development of
the mammalian brain (Dawson 1983). The brain of the echidna does contain some
seemingly phylogenetically ancient features, such as the retention of a pars intercalis
encephali (Griffiths 1968), the lack of any discernible claustrum (Butler, Molnar and
Manger 2002; Divac, Holst, Nelson and McKenzie 1987) and the presence of
commissural fibres rather than a corpus callosum (Griffiths 1968).
However, the brain of the echidna, compared to that of reptiles and birds, also contains
many anatomical structures that indicate it is essentially mammalian – such as the size
and configuration of the cerebellum, the mesencephalon, the telencephalon and the
neocortex (Griffiths 1968). In addition, the growing acceptance of the ideas of mosaic
evolution (see section 1.4) means that comparative neurologists are increasingly open to
the idea that phylogenetically ‘primitive’ brain components can co-exist with more
highly evolved mechanisms. Almost universally, studies have indicated that the
echidna’s brain is, in many respects, much more ‘advanced’ than its evolutionary
history or physiology might suggest (Divac 1995).

2.2.1.1 Brain size
A number of scientists have suggested ways to predict the relationship between
cognitive capacity and measures of cerebral development (for a review of early theories
see Riddell and Corl 1977). One of the simplest proposals for determining the degree of
brain ‘advancement’ is calculating relative brain size. According to authors such as
Rensch (1956), the greater the brain size relative to body weight, the greater the learning
capacity of that species.
Hassiotis et al. (2003) compared the echidna to other living and extinct metatherian and
eutherian mammals on a brain and body weight graph. The region occupied by the
echidna was similar to that of representatives of primates (squirrel monkey) and
carnivores (cat). It was also found that the echidna brain weights lay substantially above
the regression line showing the relationship between brain and body weight for
mammals as a whole and were also considerably higher than both living and extinct
metatherians of similar body weight. It is notable that mid-Triassic cynodonts, the
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purported evolutionary forebears of both monotremes and therians (Dawson 1983;
Griffiths 1978), have much smaller brains than any modern mammal of similar body
weight. Considering monotremes and therian mammals are thought to have followed a
separate evolutionary path for at least 200 million years (see section 2.1.2), brain
expansion must have occurred independently in monotremes and therians (Hassiotis et
al. 2003).
Another way of comparing brain size is to utilise encephalisation data. Brain size
increases with body size at a characteristic exponential rate (Finlay, Darlington and
Nicastro 2001). Jerison (1973) used regression equations to determine the expected
brain size for any given species, then used known data about actual brain size to
determine the “encephalisation quotient” (EQ), which indicated by what extent the brain
of that species had developed over and above body size requirements. According to
Jerison (1985): “Grades of encephalisation presumably correspond to grades of
complexity of information processing” (p. 30).
The EQ of the echidna, 0.5 to 0.75, is in the range of ‘progressive’ species of marsupials
such as kangaroos rather than the ‘primitive’ marsupials like opossums or basal
insectivores such as tenrecs. It is much larger than any reptile or insectivore and is
within the range for rodents (Divac 1995; Jerison 1973). In a similar fashion, Hassiotis
et al. (2003) used the method outlined by Hofman (1982) to calculate the mean
encephalisation index for the echidna and then compared that to other species. The
echidna’s encephalisation index was 0.066, which places it in a similar range to
carnivores (0.069) and prosimians (0.088) and is more than twice that of basal
insectivores (0.030) (used as representatives of ‘primitive’ placentals).
The ratio of brain mass to spinal cord mass is also considered a useful indicator of
neural organisation and ‘intelligence’. This theory is based on ratios, which vary from
those for fish, in which brain mass is less than that of the spinal cord, to those for
mammals. The ratio for cats is 4:1, for primates 8:1 and for man 10:1. The
corresponding ratio for echidnas is a respectable 6:1 (Dawson, 1983).
However, the idea that brain size correlates to intelligence is not universally accepted.
Macphail (1982) claims to have found “no convincing behavioural evidence … that
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brain-size measures do predict intellectual capacity” (p. 335), Bingham (1990) reports
that there is no evidence to support the “brain size/intelligence story” (p. 347) and
Holloway (1990) claims there is “no solid empirical evidence … that any significant
relationship exists between brain size and adaptive behavioural repertoires” (p. 360).
Marler (1996) argues that a relatively small brain size has been no impediment to the
“impressive” cognitive achievements of birds, an argument echoed by Chittka and
Niven (2009) regarding insects. In an interesting twist, Gibson (2002) examined a
number of studies and concluded that while absolute brain size predicts the known
differences in cognitive ability between monkeys and apes, encephalisation measures do
not, a result echoed for primates in general by Deaner, Isler, Burkart and van Schaik
(2007).
Manger (2006) received extensive international publicity for claiming there was “no
neural basis for the often-asserted high intellectual abilities of cetaceans” (p. 293),
despite their volumetrically large brains – or, as The Daily Telegraph glibly put it:
“Dolphins are flippin’ idiots” (The Daily Telegraph 2006). Manger (2006) based his
assertion on a review of cetacean brain structure related to behaviour and evolution.
According to Manger (2006), the dolphin’s sizeable brain is not based on neuron
quantity but is instead due to a large number of glial cells that serve as insulation to
protect the mammal against cold ocean temperatures. However, many cetacean experts
have been highly critical of Manger’s conclusions – citing the numerous studies
showing complex dolphin neuroanatomy and behaviour (e.g. Bonoguore 2006; Marino
et al. 2007; Sherriff 2006) – as well as of the paper itself. Lori Marino, for example, said
it was “very unfortunate that such a methodologically and theoretically flawed paper as
Manger’s has received any attention at all” (Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society
2006) and that the generally accepted view was that “the large brain of cetaceans
evolved to support complex cognitive abilities” (Marino et al. 2007, p. 0966).
Despite some dissenting voices, many authors continue to equate brain size with
intelligence. Byrne (1993) says there is “strong support to the belief that larger brains
allow more intelligent behaviour” (p. 697) while Pearce (1997) claims that: “If two
species possess the same body size but one has a considerably larger brain, then it is
likely that this extra brain will enable its owner to be the more intelligent” (p. 9). Falk
(1990) believes that “‘intelligence’ may have been related to the increase in brain size
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for various groups of mammals across the Cenozoic … [and] when controlling for
allometry and comparing species … bigger brains were and are better brains” (p. 344)
and Krantz (1990) holds that it is clear that “intelligence is related to brain size” (p.
362), while Smith (1990) claims it “seems nearly absurd to argue, as some do, that
evolutionary increase in brain size does not signify increased ‘intelligence’” (p. 366).
This view has also affected species selection for cognitive testing. Herman (2002), for
example, states: “An exceptionally large brain … make[s] the bottlenosed dolphin
(Tursiops truncatus) an ideal species for studying intellectual processes and potential”
(p. 275). (For more references see Falk 1990).
Empirical testing of the relationship between brain size and learning ability has been
limited. Rensch (1956) presented data from a variety of species that, he argued, showed
a positive correlation between absolute brain size and learning ability. However, the
data was all from different studies, making it hard to determine if the results instead
reflected differences in task difficulty and/or training procedures (Johnston 1982).
Riddell and Corl (1977) found that reliable relationships do exist between cerebral
development (calculated using a number of different cerebral indices) and learning
ability in a sample of 23 species. However, the criteria for learning ability was restricted
to a small number of relatively simple tasks such as learning sets, successive
discrimination reversals, delayed alternation, conditioned response reversals and
extradimensional shifts. Similarly, Gossette (1968) found learning performance in birds
and mammals correlates positively with relative brain size using successive
discrimination reversal learning. More convincingly, Rumbaugh and Pate (1984) used
an encephalisation index to accurately predict species differences between seven nonhuman primate species on a complex learning task.
Jerison (1985) suggests that learning ability, at least in its most basic form, does not
require large amounts of brain tissue, citing the learning abilities of pigeons and other
unencephalised species. Rather, he argues that there is empirical evidence for a
correlation between “the grade of encephalisation and what an animal appears to know
when it copes with a task” (p. 30) – that is, that brain enlargement is involved with the
use of sensorimotor information and the subsequent “construction of representations of
reality from neural data … which may be another way to describe intelligence” (p. 30).
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While it is important not to confuse correlation with causality (Healy and Rowe 2007),
much of the support for equating bigger brains with increased ‘intelligence’ is based on
the idea that additional brain size above that expected for body size (Jerison’s 1973
“EQ”) may be selected for specialised or elaborate behaviours or demanding niches.
Indeed, those animals with high EQs do show a wider range of behavioural complexity
– carnivores have a higher EQ than their prey; frugivores surpass folivores among
prosimians and primates; and careful parents outrank careless ones (Finlay et al. 2001).
A number of studies have also linked increased encephalisation to greater behavioural
flexibility and adaptability to novel environments (Gossette 1968; Lefebvre, Reader and
Sol 2004; Marino 2005; Ratcliffe, Brock-Fenton and Shettleworth 2006; Schuck-Paim,
Alonso and Ottoni 2008; Sol 2009; Sol, Bacher, Reader and Lefebvre 2008; Sol,
Duncan, Blackburn, Cassey and Lefebvre 2005). According to Finlay et al. (2001, p.
265), in general the “bottom feeders of each vertebrate radiation stake out the lowest
edge of the EQ range” (Eisenberg 1981; Gittleman 1994, 1995; Jerison 1973; Stephan,
Baron and Frahm 1988). These findings suggest the echidna, with its higher than
expected encephalisation ratings, may display a higher degree of behavioural
complexity than previously thought and is not a “bottom feeder”.
Another way in which many scientists justify the “bigger equals better” theory of
relative brain size is by contending that there must be some adaptive advantage for
animals to evolve large, complex brains. Schusterman, Reichmuth and Kastak (2000)
theorise: “One can imagine large brains evolving in animals because of the adaptive
value of some aspects of reasoning” (p. 1), while Northcutt and Kaas (1995) claim:
“Mammals with large brains and expanded isocortex have not simply enlarged the
isocortex but … have acquired more complex cortical processing networks” (p. 375).
According to Aboitiz (2001), neural processing power is primarily increased through
neural network reorganisation, which benefits from increases in brain mass that allow
more space for connectional rearrangements and increased synapse specificity.
As Deacon (1990) points out, the energetic cost of neural tissue means there would need
to be strong selection pressure to evolve a larger brain. If brain tissue is not used to
increase fitness (presumably through the development of more complex mental
abilities), it tends to diminish through natural selection (Beilharz, Luxford and
Wilkinson 1993). As Smith (1990) points out in relation to humans, in light of the
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“enormous” costs of a large brain: “For natural selection to bring about enlarged brains,
the benefit must exceed the cost” (p. 366).
Hassiotis et al. (2003) speculate that the low body temperature and metabolic rate of the
adult echidna (see section 2.1.8) may mean its relatively large brain is less metabolically
demanding and, by inference, may not require as great an adaptive ‘trade-off’.
Addressing the first factor, low body temperature, it is true that the central nervous
tissue is one of the most heat susceptible tissues in mammals (Brinnel 1990) and is
considered by a number of authors to be a significant constraint on increased brain size
(e.g. see review in Falk 1990). That the echidna’s thermoregulatory abilities and low
body temperature might make it less costly to keep a larger brain cool seems a
reasonable proposition. According to Caputa (1990), a low body temperature should be
advantageous because in mild hyperthermia “brain temperature is likely to remain
constant with little effort from the system for selective brain cooling” (p. 352). This idea
also receives some support from Falk’s (1990) “radiator” theory that the increase in
brain size in human evolution is due to the development of a cooling network of cranial
veins that removed thermal constraints on brain enlargement.
However, as to the second factor, whether the echidna’s low overall metabolic rate
translates to a brain with lower metabolic requirements is unknown. According to
Barton (1990), as a rule the brain is a “metabolically expensive organ to run” (p. 345)
while Krantz (1990) describes it as “an unparalleled metabolic drain” (p. 363). In
humans, for example, the brain represents approximately 2% of body weight, but
consumes about 20% of metabolic resources (Holloway 1990), compared with a 2%
metabolic cost to an average, relatively small-brained marsupial (Smith 1990). This
suggests that the development of large brains would have to be supported either by
higher overall metabolic rates or the reallocation of a higher proportion of metabolic
output to the brain – a situation that would seem to necessitate some kind of adaptive
benefit. In addition, even if there were reduced metabolic pressure on adult echidnas,
the growth of a large brain would still represent a considerable anabolic burden during a
young echidna’s development (Hassiotis et al. 2003). Also, since metabolic rate
increases by a negative allometric coefficient of 0.75 with body weight, it is more
difficult for smaller animals like the echidna to maintain each gram of tissue (Smith
1990).
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Finally, even if the echidna’s low body temperature and metabolic rate were
contributing factors in enabling echidna brain encephalisation, it would seem that these
factors, much like Falk’s (1990) “radiator” in humans, would be permissive conditions
for the development of larger brain size rather than providing selective pressure for its
evolution (Finlay 1990; Foley 1990). Larger brain size would still require some adaptive
rationale, such as an ecological requirement for greater ‘intelligence’. According to
Jerison (1973, p. 7): “To the extent that intelligence is correlated with the mass of tissue
in the brain, the monotremes are best considered to be at almost the same level as living
progressive placental mammals; they presumably have reached that level by parallel
evolution.”

2.2.1.2 Cortical size and gyrification
A high proportion of cerebral cortex to total brain volume is also often related to a high
degree of cognitive development (Hassiotis et al. 2003). Studies have shown that the
echidna has a large proportion of total brain volume occupied by the cerebral cortex
(43%), higher than that for basal insectivores (13%) and the American opossum (22%)
and comparable to that found in eutherian mammals (prosimians 54%) (Pirlot and
Nelson 1978).
Hassiotis et al. (2003) compared the echidna’s relative brain cortical surface area to a
wide group of therian mammals and found it to be similar to that of placental carnivores
and well above that of a basal insectivore placental mammal like the hedgehog. The
echidna’s cortical surface area is also well above the relationship between basal cortical
surface area and body weight (Hofman 1982). Results above the regression line are
considered to indicate “there is an amount of ‘extra’ cortical tissue present, which may
be associated with improved information processing capacity” (Hassiotis et al. 2003, p.
844). Analysis of cortical thickness also indicated that the echidna isocortex has a
similar thickness to homologous areas in placental mammals of similar body weight
(e.g. cat) (Hassiotis et al. 2003).
Another possible indicator of the echidna’s brain development is the fact that its
neocortex is markedly gyrencephalic (folded), in contrast to the neocortex of the
platypus and many marsupials, which are smooth, or lissencephalic (Griffiths 1989;
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Rowe and Bohringer 1992). The degree of cortical folding in the echidna is 36% of
isocortex buried in fissures, comparable to that in many placental mammals such as the
cat (40%) and squirrel monkey (39%) (Hassiotis et al. 2003).
The relatively large, gyrencephalic cerebral cortex of the echidna has been a source of
amazement to neuroanatomists for many years. Elliot Smith wrote in 1902:
The most obtrusive feature of this brain is the relatively enormous
development of the cerebral hemispheres which are much larger, both
actually and relatively, than those of the platypus. In addition the extent
of the cortex is very considerably increased by numerous deep sulci.
The meaning of this large neopallium is quite incomprehensible. The
factors which the study of other mammalian brains has shown to be the
determinants of the extent of the cortex fail completely to explain how
it is that a small animal of the lowliest status in the mammalian series
comes to possess this large cortical apparatus.
Elliot Smith (cited in Griffiths 1968, p. 101)
Animals with gyrencephalic brains are often considered to be more ‘intelligent’, as well
as perceptually and behaviourally more complex (Welker 1990). According to this
theory, increasing the surface area of the cerebral cortex through folding allows for a
greater number of cortical modules, and hence a greater number and diversity of brain
functions, to be accommodated without increasing the size of the cerebrum (and head)
beyond biologically feasible limits (Augee and Gooden, 1993; Dawson 1983; Jerison
1973). According to Hassiotis et al. (2003): “… a highly gyrified cortex is considered
the hallmark of more neurologically advanced mammals such as carnivores, primates
and cetaceans” (p. 827).
Some authors have sounded a note of caution about using gyrencephaly as an indicator
of ‘higher’ brain development. They point out that many primates, particularly small
primates (e.g. marmosets), are lissencephalic yet still exhibit cognitively complex
behaviours (Rowe 1990; Russell 1979). Fuster (1997) further suggests that gyrification
may be in part attributable to mechanical factors, not simply functional differentiation,
and is largely a function of brain size. However, the fact that there are a number of
animals whose brains are both relatively large and lissencephalic suggests this cannot be
the whole story (Welker 1990). Even if it were the case, it does not explain why the
echidna has such a relatively large brain to begin with.
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Other scientists have suggested that cortical fissuration is to some degree attributable to
increased innervation of specialised sensory surfaces (review in Welker 1990). This
phenomenon is found in the echidna, which has a relatively large proportion of the
somatosensory cortex allocated to the snout and tongue, reflecting the behavioural
importance of these areas to the insectivore echidna (Johnson 1990; Lende 1964, 1969).
However, these specialised sensory surfaces do not seem to be responsible for the
echidna’s highly gyrified cortex. Unlike the cortex of the platypus, which is nearly all
sensory and motor regions, the total area taken up by the equivalent regions in the
echidna are comparatively small and located in the caudolateral corner of the
hemisphere (Johnson 1990; Krubitzer et al. 1995).
In 1902, Elliot Smith pointed out that other small terrestrial insect-eaters such as
pangolins and anteaters and fossorial animals such as bandicoots, hedgehogs and
armadillos have highly macrosmatic brains with large areas devoted to olfactory
processes coupled with a small neocortex. By contrast the echidna, which has a
seemingly similar lifestyle, has both macrosmatic features and a large complicated
neocortex (Augee et al. 2006).
Interestingly, it has been argued that animals displaying the pattern of a large
sensorimotor representation and small neocortex, such as the platypus and anteaters,
constitute a more primitive group of mammals that reflect a less highly evolved stage of
cerebral cortical development. Animals with smaller proportions of sensorimotor
representation, such as the higher primates and cats (and also the echidna), are often
considered to display a more advanced stage of cortical development, although this
theory is not universally accepted (Dawson 1983; Lende 1969; Rowe 1990).

2.2.1.3 Forebrain size
Another puzzling aspect of the echidna’s brain is the frontal cortex. In humans, the front
29% of the cerebral hemispheres has no specific motor or sensory representation and is
therefore referred to as the “silent area” or the prefrontal cortex (Fuster 1997). In the
echidna this area takes up a remarkable 50% of the cerebral cortex, proportionately
more than any other animal including man (Augee and Gooden 1993; Lende 1969;
Rowe 1990), prompting Divac, Holst et al. (1987) to describe the echidna’s prefrontal
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area as “outstandingly large” (p. 303). As mentioned in section 2.2.1.2, the sensorimotor
area of the echidna’s brain is relatively small on examination of external morphology.
However, when the sensorimotor regions of the echidna are opened completely, they are
still quite extensive (Krubitzer et al. 1995) – it is the elaboration of the frontal cortex
that has led to their caudal displacement (Lende 1969).
In 1969 Lende claimed the significance of the large expanse of frontal cortex in the
echidna was obscure, saying there were “no broad hints of its function from either
neuroanatomy or behavioural observations” (p. 272). The mystery continues, with
Johnson, in 1990, saying: “The functional significance of the additional ‘silent’ cortex
of the echidna remains to be determined” (p. 343).
While the function of the “silent area” in animals is still largely unknown, in humans it
is believed to be involved in complex cerebral processes such as future planning,
construction of alternative interpretations of events, novelty detection, behavioural
monitoring, choosing between options, personality traits and memory (Augee and
Gooden 1993; Augee et al. 2006). Imaging studies have shown that the prefrontal cortex
is activated when human subjects plan (Dagher, Owen, Boecker and Brooks 1999) or
solve problems requiring general intelligence (Duncan et al. 2000), and tests have
shown a significant correlation between the volume of frontal grey matter and the
results of intelligence tests (Thompson et al. 2001). Fuster (1997) describes it as “the
substrate for neural activity of the highest order” (p. 6) and the “substrate of abstract
intelligence” (p. 67). Oakley and Plotkin (1979, p. xiv) claim the evolution of the
vertebrate forebrain, especially in birds and mammals, appears to relate to areas such as
“learning, memory, intelligence, complex-problem solving, cross-modal integration,
reasoning, consciousness, freewill, sleep and dreaming”. While the hippocampus is
considered likely to be critical to long-term information storage (Hauser, Gardner,
Goldberg and Treves 1993); Ashby, Isen and Turken (1999), Fuster (1997), GoldmanRakic (1988, 1995) and others have suggested that the prefrontal cortex is the primary
centre for working memory.
So, although there is still debate around the organisation of functions and processes in
the frontal cortex, it is generally accepted that its functions in humans are relatively
sophisticated. To perform this type of role, the area requires the association of incoming
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sensory information, which is generally projected via the thalamus to the prefrontal
cortex in eutherian mammals. Generally speaking, the thalamocortical relationships in
the echidna are similar to those found in placental mammals, providing some support
for the area having similar functions in both echidnas and placentals (Augee et al. 2006;
see section 2.2.1.4). Indeed, the extensive frontal cortex of the echidna presented a
problem for comparative neurologists who believed, firstly, that monotremes
represented an archetypal mammalian form and, secondly, that the frontal cortex was an
area whose relative size was assumed to increase in ascending the phylogenetic scale
(Rowe 1990).
Some authors deal with this problem by claiming that humans possess the largest
prefrontal cortex and simply ignoring the echidna altogether. Fuster (1997), for
example, claims that “the frontal cortex becomes not only larger but more complex,
more fissurated and convoluted, as mammalian species evolve. In primates the process
reaches its culmination with the human brain” (p. 7). Other authors have questioned
whether this region in the echidna can be considered homologous with that found in
humans. Krubitzer (1998), for example, speculates it might be part of an olfactory
specialisation. It has also been suggested that the area is used to process information
from electroreceptors (Augee et al. 2006).
If the echidna’s frontal cortex is comparable to that of humans, the question arises:
“Why should an animal like the echidna, with its apparently simple existence, have a
frontal cortex comparable with that of man?” (Dawson 1983, p. 30). Jerison (1976)
argues that forebrain structures became more complex because increasing demands
were being made on the nervous systems of vertebrates as they moved into increasingly
diverse and demanding ecological niches. If that is the case, the echidna’s adaptation to
a wide range of ecosystems, from desert to alpine, could help explain its remarkable
frontal cortex development (see section 6.3 for further discussion of possible triggers for
neurophysiological development in the echidna).

2.2.1.4 Comparable microcircuitry
Despite the suggestive nature of the echidna’s brain structure, allometric data such as
relative brain, neo-cortical and frontal cortical volumes should be interpreted cautiously.
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Relative size is important to the functional properties of brains only if the microcircuitry
is comparable and the cortical structures perform a similar function (Divac 1995) – facts
which are by no means certain between species, particularly those that are
evolutionarily distant. As Holloway (1993) points out, the brain of every species is
somewhat different – each has a unique history of natural selection, drift, migration and
neural ontogenesis, as well as the development of species-specific behaviours. Despite
these caveats, some comparative data is available to support the argument that at least
some of the echidna’s brain structures may correspond with those found in eutherian
mammals, a few examples of which are described below.

2.2.1.4.1 Frontal cortex
Two groups of scientists have attempted to determine whether the frontal area of the
echidna corresponds to the prefrontal cortex in placental mammals by comparing the
sources and destinations of efferent and afferent connections in the frontal cortex
(Divac, Holst et al. 1987; Divac, Pettigrew, Holst and McKenzie 1987; Welker and
Lende 1980). The prefrontal cortex has been defined as “the part of the cerebral cortex
that receives projection fibres from the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus” (Fuster
1997, p. 41), a criteria that is widely supported (e.g. Akert 1964; Rose and Woolsey
1948; Uylings and Van Eden 1990). Both groups found the echidna’s prefrontal cortex
has connections with a region of the thalamus seemingly homologous to the
mediodorsal nucleus. Non-thalamic efferent and afferent connections with the frontal
cortex were also from similar sources to those found in placentals. These findings led
the authors to conclude that the echidna’s frontal area does correspond to the prefrontal
cortex found in placental mammals (Rowe 1990).

2.2.1.4.2 Cerebral cortex
The echidna brain shares many other structural features with placental mammals. These
include a six-layered isocortical structure (Hassiotis et al. 2003) and similar neuronal
distribution. Hassiotis et al. (2003) found that values for neuronal density in the echidna
cerebral cortex were comparable to those for placental mammals of similar body weight
(e.g. macaque and cat) and that the number of glia per neuron in the echidna isocortex
was actually substantially higher than in similar areas in therian cortex. They also found
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that the echidna’s cerebral cortex contains the same major groups of neurons found in
the placental cortex, although with a higher proportion of unusual pyramidal cell
morphologies than that found in placentals.

2.2.1.4.3 Sensorimotor region
Another possible indicator that the echidna’s ‘advanced’ brain features are operating in
a similar manner to eutherian mammals is if there is a comparable level of sensory input
being processed. The use of microelectrodes has provided evidence that, in many
species, there are several cortical maps of the receptive surface of each modality (e.g.
retina, the organ of Corti and skin). It is believed that each map processes one aspect of
the modality in question so a greater number of maps would allow an animal to extract
more detailed information about an environment. Considerable variation in the number
of sensory maps in the cortex of different species was found (Divac 1995).
Krubitzer et al. (1995) studied the organisation of the sensory cortex in monotremes and
found they had four somatosensory maps, even though “the presence of complex,
multiple representations observed in these species is generally not associated with
primitive brains” (p. 284). The number discovered in monotremes is greater than that
found in hedgehogs and American opossums (Johnson 1990). In addition, the authors
found areas onto which different modalities converge in the back of the echidna’s brain
(an association cortex) as well as a number of cortical specialisations.
The idea implicit in a number of theories of cortical evolution that monotremes are
‘primitive’ and ‘lower’ also suggests that they will have less differentiated brains with
fewer cortical subdivisions than ‘advanced’ or ‘higher’ mammals (Krubitzer et al. 1995;
see Deacon 1990 for review and refutation). However, the studies by Krubitzer et al.
(1995) on the organisation of the somatosensory cortex in monotremes led them to
claim that: “The presence of multiple sensory areas, association cortex and anatomical
and functional specialisations within a cortical field indicate that monotreme brains are
not ‘generalised and undifferentiated’” (p. 299). Divac (1995, p. 3) agreed, saying:
“These observations suggest that the brain in monotremes is, in some respects,
advanced.”
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Other features of the echidna’s neural sensory apparatus have also proved comparable to
those found in placental mammals. The internal structure of the auditory and visual
cortices in the echidna exhibit a similar columnar array of cortico-cortical connections
(Dann and Buhl 1995; Hassiotis et al. 2003) and the cortical columns in echidnas and
monkeys are of the same width (Divac, Pettigrew et al. 1987). It has been observed that
dendritic spine density of echidna pyramidal neurons in the somatosensory cortex and
apical dendrites of motor cortex pyramidal neurons is lower than that found in eutheria,
a factor which might limit functional capacity (Hassiotis et al. 2003). However, studies
have also shown that morphology, density and distribution of synapses in the echidna
somatosensory cortex is similar to that in eutheria (Hassiotis et al. 2003). Allison and
Goff (1972) found the configuration of both early and late components of the evoked
potentials recorded over the sensorimotor areas was very similar to those of placentals,
implying similar underlying intracortical mechanisms. These results suggest that the
echidna’s brain is processing sensory information in equivalent detail to placental
mammals (Rowe 1990).

2.2.1.4.4 Spinal cord
The echinda’s spinal cord is relatively shorter than that of a human (possibly to
facilitate its curled defensive posture), however corticospinal fibres extend down the
greater length of the spinal cord. According to Augee et al. (2006), this is a feature of
“advanced neurological organisation” (p. 54) found in primates and carnivores but not
in marsupials and some placentals such as armadillos, hedgehogs and tree shrews
(Augee et al. 2006; Rowe 1990). The arrangement of nerve cells is also similar to those
found in eutherian mammals (Augee et al. 2006). Despite these suggestive findings, the
cortical origins of the corticospinal fibres in echidnas have not yet been fully examined
so the contribution of the sensory cortex to the corticospinal tract in the echidna has yet
to be established (Johnson 1990).

2.2.1.4.5 Conclusion
The results of numerous comparative microcircuitry studies, such as those described
above, led Hassiotis et al. (2003) to declare that, in most structural parameters, the
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echidna’s cerebral cortex is “comparable to those placental mammals usually considered
neurologically advanced and behaviourally complex” (p. 848).

2.2.2 Cognitive studies
Why should an animal with a seemingly prosaic existence have a relatively complex
brain structure? To examine this question requires methods for measuring relevant
cognitive behaviour that can be examined in both natural and laboratory settings.

2.2.2.1 Foraging strategies
One of the most important tasks of any animal is to find food and one of the most
effective methods of testing an animal’s learning ability is to study its foraging
behaviour. Feeding behaviour has long provided the central data for psychological
theories of learning and motivation as it has a number of cognitive aspects such as goal
orientation, self-initiation, adaptation, cost/benefit analysis and complex means
activities such as search, detection, capture, handling and storage (Collier and RoveeCollier 1981; Menzel and Wyers 1981).
Ants and termites are a potentially rewarding food item for predators because colonies
represent a concentrated source of energy (Abensperg-Traun and Steven 1997) – a
“food patch”. Optimal foraging theory predicts that animals should respond to patchily
distributed food resources and allocate their foraging efforts to maximise the rate of
energy intake. Such efficient foraging leaves more time for other activities such as
mating, increasing fitness in terms of lifetime reproductive success (Abensperg-Traun et
al. 1991). Studies have found that echidnas do forage efficiently, allocating more
foraging time to patches where food is most abundant (Abensperg-Traun and De Boer
1992; Abensperg-Traun et al. 1991).
However, one of the assumptions of optimal foraging theory is that foraging can be
constrained by a number of factors. For example, animals may not maximise their rate
of energy intake if they forage in suboptimal patches to avoid predation or competition
or if there is a need for vigilance while feeding (Abensperg-Traun et al. 1991). Echidnas
have few predators (Griffiths 1989), however they have been shown to be constrained in
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their foraging by temperature extremes (Abensperg-Traun and De Boer 1992), shelter
availability (Abensperg-Traun 1991; Smith, Wellham and Green 1989) and, in
particular, the defence mechanisms utilised by their prey (Abensperg-Traun et al. 1991).
One way in which echidnas deal with ant and termite defences is through short-duration
feeding, where foraging is limited to the point where exposure to the defence becomes
intolerable (Abensperg-Traun 1990). Abensperg-Traun et al. (1991) found echidnas
forage for short periods (<30 seconds) at food patches containing the large and well
defended Drepanotermes termites and move before soldier-worker ratios increase to
intolerable levels.
However, the relationship between echidna foraging and prey defence is not a simple
one. Echidnas sometimes ignore prey defences if the energetic reward is particularly
high. For example, the mounds of Nasutitermes exitiosus and Drepanotermes
tamminensis termites are sometimes attacked during spring and autumn when the nests
may contain energy-rich alates. For the rest of the year, these nests are rarely attacked
by echidnas because of the ferocious defence of the inhabitants (Abensperg-Traun 1990;
Abensperg-Traun and Steven 1997).
Griffiths and Simpson (1966) found echidnas attacked the highly aggressive moundbuilding ant Iridomyrmex detectus despite being affected by their defences. At the end
of feeding one of the echidnas was observed to give “a display of great animation,
rolling over, scratching furiously at his chest and abdomen with the grooming-toes to
rid himself of tormenting ants” (p. 140). However, the attacks on the mounds occurred
only in springtime, coinciding with the presence of virgin queen ants that contain 47.2%
fat and provide a valuable energy-rich meal. When the virgin queens left the mounds,
the attacks ceased. The employment of short feeding bouts (except for instances of high
energetic reward) in response to prey defence is one indication of foraging efficiency
and adaptability.
Another way to determine the echidna’s foraging efficiency is to study its patchselection strategy. Ant and termite mounds represent energy-rich food patches that, in
practical terms, are very unlikely to be depleted during a feeding bout. In terms of
optimal foraging theory, the most efficient foraging strategy for echidnas would seem to
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be to “win-stay” and return to a previously rewarding food patch rather than to “winshift” and avoid a previously rewarding location.
However, the effectiveness of their prey’s defences indicate echidnas should be more
likely to employ a “win-shift” strategy and, at least in the short term, go to another food
patch where prey defences have not been triggered. If echidnas are naturally
predisposed to follow a win-shift strategy, they should be expected to learn the win-shift
task faster and more effectively than the win-stay task at short retention intervals. This
was the finding of a study by Burke, Cieplucha, Cass, Russell and Fry (2002) using a
retention interval of five minutes. These results are supported by studies of wild
echidnas, in which the echidnas were observed undertaking short-duration feeding bouts
with a mean 1.63 minutes then moving on to another patch (Abensperg-Traun 1988;
Abensperg-Traun 1990; Abensperg-Traun et al. 1991) – a win-shift strategy.
If the echidna’s win-shift strategy is dictated by its prey’s defences, it would be
expected that they would switch to a win-stay strategy over longer retention intervals
after their prey’s defences had dissipated. However, when the retention interval was
increased to 90 minutes the subjects were unable to learn either of these strategies,
suggesting they were unable to remember the locations they had visited (or not visited)
(Burke et al. 2002).

2.2.2.2 Memory
Foraging behaviour has also provided the basis for studying the memory capacity of the
echidna. It seems clear that to effectively forage in a stable, patchily distributed
environment would require an effective spatial memory. Quince (1998) used a
simulated foraging task to determine whether echidnas possess an accurate spatial
memory. The experiment revealed the echidnas were able to learn the location of a food
source (in this case a baited food dish) and encode it in their spatial memory in order to
revisit the site after a retention interval of up to 10 minutes (Burke, personal
communication). However, while the study did demonstrate that echidnas are able to
use spatial memory for foraging, the tests were conducted over short time intervals and
further studies would be required to determine whether similar results would eventuate
from longer intervals. The study of win-stay/win-shift foraging strategies mentioned in
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section 2.2.2.1 indicates that they are unable to remember previously visited locations
after intervals of 90 minutes (Burke et al. 2002).
In contrast, Buchmann and Rhodes’ (1978) study of instrumental learning in echidnas
(see section 2.2.2.4) suggests echidnas are able to utilise long-term memory under a
different testing condition. The 1978 experiments tested discriminations based on
spatial and visual/tactile information. When three of the echidnas were re-tested one
month after the conclusion of the experiments they rapidly achieved levels of
performance comparable to those previously attained in late testing.
While all of the above studies seem to indicate echidnas possess an accurate short-term
memory, the contrasting results of long-term memory performance between the
Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) and the Burke et al. (2002) studies suggest there may be
different memory mechanisms at work in different tasks. The first study largely
involved the use of visual stimuli to perform a task, while the second was conducted
using spatial information. It is possible echidnas, while possessing an effective longterm visual memory, have only evolved a short-term spatial memory strategy (a
phenomenon that has also been observed in hummingbirds and rats) or that win-shift
behaviour at short retention intervals is not a foraging adaptation at all (Gaffan and
Davies 1981). Another possibility is that the mismatch between the test situation in the
foraging study and the echidna’s natural environment (such as the relatively large
spatial scale over which echidnas actually forage, see section 2.1.6) may account for the
subject’s failure to remember locations at greater time intervals under these
experimental conditions (Burke et al. 2002).

2.2.2.3 Social behaviour
Echidnas are largely solitary animals and generally only come together during the
breeding season (Griffiths 1978). Two early studies aimed at documenting and
evaluating the echidna’s social behaviour were not promising. Brattstrom (1973)
documented the social and maintenance behaviour of Tachyglossus aculeatus aculeatus
in laboratory and outdoor cages and in a semi-wild state in Victoria. Brattstrom
documented some 65 behavioural postures and found evidence of a loose hierarchy in
laboratory situations, with subordinate individuals attempting to avoid contact with
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dominant (larger) individuals. However, he concluded that the behavioural patterns and
postures of the echidna were less complex than most mammals and even those of many
lizards.
Augee, Bergin and Morris (1978) studied echidna behaviour in captive animals in an
enclosure at Taronga Zoo, Sydney. The enclosure was exposed to natural weather and
light conditions and presented a spacious and complex environment with opportunity
for spatial segregation. In this study, the animals grouped together in preferred sites and
were mutually tolerant. In contrast to Brattstrom’s (1973) study, no evidence of
territorial behaviour or of a hierarchy based on size was observed. There was a
dominance hierarchy among animals of the same sex, but its basis could not be
determined.
Even in naturalistic settings observations of the behaviour of captive animals can be
misleading due to the artificial nature of the environment. In order to investigate
echidna intelligence and learning ability, a small number of cognitive-based laboratory
studies have been conducted.

2.2.2.4 Learning studies
Studying the echidna’s behaviour in the wild has shown that it is capable of coping in a
wide variety of environments, is very efficient at finding its prey and is able to
determine the boundaries of its territory and keep to those limits even in a complex
environment. It also displays behavioural flexibility in response to differing
environments – for example, in the Snowy Mountains, presumably in response to the
cold conditions, echidnas do not appear to form courtship “trains” as they do in other
environments and females leave their young in their burrow rather than carry them in
their pouch (see section 2.1.9). However, little is known about the echidna’s ability to
learn (Augee and Gooden 1993; Augee et al. 2006).
One of the first documented examples of learning in Tachyglossus aculeatus was found
by Saunders, Teague, Slonim and Pridmore (1971). Using four echidnas they showed
short-beaked echidnas were capable of easily forming a position habit in a simple Tmaze when they were trained to select either left or right for a food reward, with
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subsequent rapid extinction. The acquisition rate of choice behaviours was almost
identical to that reported for a similar level of T-maze training in the rat. The
improvement in running speed exhibited similar characteristics as that often reported for
the rat in a runway situation.
Saunders, Chen and Pridmore (1971) used the T-maze to show that echidnas were
capable of successive habit-reversal learning. This type of study has been widely used to
make comparative estimates of intellectual capacity in a variety of vertebrates (e.g. fish,
turtles, birds, rats, kangaroos and even mentally retarded children). These experiments
involve teaching the subject to form a position habit in a simple two-choice alternative,
such as the T-maze. Once criterion is reached, the situation is reversed so the alternate
choice becomes the correct response. The important information is whether the animal
shows any improvement across reversals.
Saunders, Chen and Pridmore (1971) used three echidnas as subjects and reversals were
made every three sessions (each session consisted of ten trials). All three echidnas
showed rapid improvement across a series of successive reversals, a similar
performance to that found in eutherian mammals on similar tasks. They were also able
to make ‘one-trial’ reversals, which have often been demonstrated in rats but never with
nonmammalian (avian) species.
Gates (1973, 1978), in a study designed to examine the echidna’s visual capabilities,
showed echidnas were able to easily learn simple two-choice visual discriminations,
including black/white, vertical/horizontal and circle/triangle. Gates pointed out that the
echidnas obtained learning of an easy discrimination in about the same number of trials
required for rats (Sutherland and Mackintosh 1971).
Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) investigated instrumental learning in Tachyglossus
aculeatus setosus using repeated reversals of paired instrumental discrimination tasks.
The echidnas had to press one of two pedals with the forefoot to receive a food reward.
Two discriminations were used, positional (right/left) and visual/tactile (black/rough
and smooth/white), with changes being made to the surface of the pedals.
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The echidnas showed evidence of instrumental reversal learning in both the positional
and visual/tactile conditions with results that compared favourably with those
obtainable for eutherian mammals in comparable tests, including cats, rats and mentally
retarded human subjects. Echidnas also appeared to be capable of achieving criterion
performance “in a smaller number of reversals than other mammals tested on
instrumental tasks” (Buchmann and Rhodes 1978, p. 142).
Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) also suggested the echidnas’ selective improvement
(superior performance in reversal-shift conditions) was generally considered evidence
of some form of stimulus organisation or stimulus coding (the animal storing,
classifying and integrating the information it receives). Mackintosh (1974) considered
this might be a property of highly organised neural systems that, if valid, may indicate
echidnas possess a complex level of cerebral organisation.
In addition, Augee et al. (2006) suggest that the results show echidnas are able to store,
classify and integrate visual and tactile information, “indicating a degree of attention
characteristic of a highly organised nervous system” (p. 51). Interestingly, the authors
also point out that this process is believed to be carried out in the frontal cortex – an
area of the brain that is greatly enlarged in echidnas (see section 2.2.1).

2.2.3 Conclusion
The findings of the above studies of neurophysiology, foraging efficiency and cognitive
ability suggest the echidna may possess a greater cognitive capacity than previously
thought. However there is a paucity of experimental data and more studies are required
to explore the abilities of this unusual animal. It is even possible echidnas possess
abilities not tested by current procedures, particularly if they utilise unusual senses. For
example, studies have demonstrated the presence of electroreceptors in the echidna’s
snout and the ability to detect an electric field both in water and buried underground
(Augee and Gooden 1992; section 2.1.4.5).
Buchmann and Rhodes (1978, p. 144) summarised the current state of knowledge of
echidna intelligence when they wrote: “Further studies of learning will undoubtedly
disclose important facts about the intelligence of these remarkable animals and modify
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the quaint, explicitly and tacitly-held views that echidnas are little more than animated
pin-cushions or, at best, glorified reptiles.”

2.3 RATIONALE
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the echidna is a suitable subject for this
study because it fulfils the criteria of being both phylogenetically ‘primitive’ and
ecologically diverse. In addition, there are a number of other factors that make the
echidna an appealing subject for cognitive experiments. The echidna is of particular
interest because it is a member of the unique phylogenetic class, monotremes. The
general biology of echidnas has been well documented, particularly by Griffiths (1968,
1978); however there has been comparatively little study of their learning abilities.
Monotremes are often considered more primitive than eutherians and are generally
expected to be less successful at performing comparable tasks. However, the echidna’s
successful adaptation to a wide variety of ecological niches, the surprisingly ‘advanced’
physiology of their brains and the results of the few cognitive studies that have been
conducted show they are worthy candidates for further study of learning ability.
In addition to its intrinsic value, the echidna is also worth studying to provide a
comparative study of mammalian evolution. Monotremes are thought to have followed
a separate evolutionary course from placental mammals for at least 200 million years
(see section 2.1.2). O’Brien and Graves (1990) describe monotremes as an example of
parallel evolution, in which the echidna and platypus have successfully evolved to suit
their evolutionary niches using different physiological and behavioural means than that
of the more ‘advanced’ mammals. Such a distinct evolutionary history means the
behaviour of the echidna provides a valuable comparison to the behaviour of eutherian
mammals and may provide an appropriate control group for testing hypotheses about
the evolution of behaviour in different mammalian families (Kimble and Whishaw
1994). Also, as argued by Bonney and Wynne (2003) in relation to marsupials, studying
monotreme psychology could help address the issue of the relative influence of
evolutionary history versus niche in determining learning ability.
Finally, there has been repeated criticism of the tendency in psychologically based
animal learning studies to concentrate on only a few species (Beach 1950; Bitterman
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1960; Kamil 1994). As Bonney and Wynne (2003, p. 188) pointed out: “Comparative
studies of learning have traditionally used only a very limited range of species … the
range of species studied by comparative psychologists has remained quite small.” While
the authors were lamenting the paucity of studies using marsupials, the point is even
more salient when applied to monotremes (see section 2.2.2.4). This study attempts to
address the imbalance by undertaking cognitive testing in a rarely studied species.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TASK
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As stated in the introduction, this study attempts to examine echidna cognition in the
theoretical framework of both the hierarchical and modular viewpoints. To satisfy the
hierarchical side of the equation – to test a ‘primitive’ animal on an ‘advanced’
cognitive task – it was necessary to provide the subject with a relatively complex
cognitive problem. To incorporate the modular view, it was also important to select a
task that, while providing the subject with a complex novel learning situation, would
still draw on abilities the subject would likely have evolved in its natural ecology.
The selection of the echidna as a subject, for the reasons outlined in chapter 2, ruled out
certain ‘advanced’ abilities completely foreign to the echidna’s experience, such as
those with a basis in group dynamics or requiring specific physical abilities (e.g.
imitation, language, tool use etc.). Previous studies with echidnas had already
demonstrated their ability to perform basic visual discriminations (see section 2.2.2.4).
It was therefore decided to build on those results by starting these experiments with
some simple visual discriminations and then moving on to more complex category
discriminations.

3.1 Discrimination
While not the main focus of this paper, it is important to provide a brief overview of
basic discrimination for a number of reasons. Firstly, the basic visual discrimination
experiments at the beginning of this study – conducted to confirm the results of earlier
studies and to provide discrimination training – need to be put into context. Secondly,
both the methodology and theories behind basic discrimination provide the foundation
for an examination of categorisation, which will be discussed in greater detail in
sections 3.3 to 3.8.

3.1.1 Definition and discrimination in nature
In order to survive and reproduce, animals must be able to discriminate. All animals
need to find nutritious food and avoid poisonous substances as well as distinguish
predators from harmless creatures. Social animals must be able to identify the group to
which they belong, pair-bonded animals need to differentiate their mates, and parents
and dependent offspring must be able to recognise each other (Pearce 1997).
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For discrimination to have any adaptive value it must involve not only the ability to
perceive differences between stimuli, but also to associate behaviours with particular
stimuli. Classical ethologists have observed that a broad range of animals are able to use
a variety of sensory modalities to make discriminations and respond selectively to
objects in their environment. One of the most commonly cited examples of this
phenomenon is the male stickleback. A male stickleback which is ready to breed
performs a courtship display when he sees a female stickleback in breeding condition
(identified by a swollen belly) enter his territory, but shows a head-down threat posture
when another male (identified by a red belly) appears (Tinbergen 1951).
However, discrimination is not limited to visual stimuli. For example, ewes recognise
and are attracted to the scent of their offspring (Kendrick, Levy and Keverne 1992) and
birds are able to discriminate the vocalisations of their own species from those of other
species and display more aggressive behaviour towards the latter (Nelson and Marler
1990).
Discrimination learning, then, occurs when different stimuli signal the occurrence of
corresponding events to an animal and it behaves accordingly in their presence (Pearce
1994a). The literature on habituation and conditioning shows that animals can readily
learn about biologically relevant stimuli through simple exposure to naturally occurring
stimuli (Lea 1984a; Shettleworth 1998). However, it is difficult to isolate the factors
controlling discrimination in naturally occurring stimuli so most discrimination learning
studies involve training animals to discriminate artificial stimuli.

3.1.2 Discrimination training
While discriminative behaviour can be acquired through general experience, it can also
be taught. Discrimination training involves differentially reinforcing animals for
performing different, arbitrary responses to each of two or more stimuli (Shettleworth
1998).
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3.1.2.1 Methods
Discrimination training involves the presentation of different stimuli to subjects and
then arranging different schedules of reinforcement for responses to each stimulus
(Mackintosh 1974). The stimuli could be presented either simultaneously on a single
trial or successively on consecutive trials.

Much of the traditional literature on

discrimination training used T-mazes (in which the subject had to enter one of two
arms) or jumping stands (in which the subject had to jump from a starting platform to
one of two ledges).
To test a simultaneous visual discrimination, for example a black/white discrimination,
one of the T-maze arms or doors (or the pictures in front of the jumping platform
ledges) is randomly made black and the other white and only choices to one colour are
reinforced, irrespective of the side on which it appears. In a successive black/white
discrimination, the stimuli are presented consecutively and only one colour is
reinforced. This “go/no go” discrimination can be assessed by comparing running
speeds or latencies (Mackintosh 1974, Shettleworth 1998).
More recently operant methods have become more widely used because they provide
for automated testing for numerous animals on numerous trials. Operant procedures
have discrete trials, as in the T-maze, but also use free operant procedures where one or
the other of the stimuli to be discriminated is always available and response rates are
compared in different stimulus-reward conditions. A successive free-operant procedure
is referred to as a multiple schedule, while simultaneous free-operant discriminations
are called concurrent schedules. The ‘incorrect’ stimulus does not have to be completely
unrewarded. Intermittent reinforcement can be provided in the presence of both stimuli
and the response rates compared (Shettleworth 1998).

3.1.2.2 Stimuli
A broad range of visual stimuli has been used to demonstrate discrimination learning in
an artificial setting. These range from very basic stimuli such as black versus white
(Gates 1978) and geometric shapes (Baldwin 1981) to complex stimuli such as
photographs (Davenport and Rogers 1971). Discrimination has also been examined
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using other sensory modalities such as sound (Dewson and Burlingame 1975), smell
(Michelsen 1959), taste (Stapleton, Luellig, Roper and Delay 2002) and touch
(Buchmann and Rhodes 1978).

3.1.3 Discrimination experiments
As basic discrimination itself is not the focus of this study, a complete review of the
extensive experimental literature on this topic would be superfluous. However, it is
worth stressing the ubiquity of discriminative ability. The majority of discrimination
experiments have been conducted with rats and pigeons due to their expediency as
experimental subjects, but many other species have also been tested.
In an overview of discrimination learning among animal taxa Rensch (1967) cited
numerous studies demonstrating discrimination learning in fish (e.g. perch, trout),
reptiles (eg. lizards, iguanas), birds (e.g. pigeons) and mammals (e.g. mice, rats, zebras,
donkeys, horses and elephants). Discrimination learning has also been demonstrated in
many other taxa such as insects (Dyer, Neumeyer and Chittka 2005), amphibians
(Gillette 2002), marsupials (Bonney and Wynne 2002a, 2002b) and monotremes (Gates
1978). Hennessey, Rucker and McDiarmid (1979) found that even a single complex
cell, the protozoa Paramecium, could be trained to discriminate between two auditory
stimuli. Considering the importance of discrimination to an animal’s ability to survive
and reproduce, it seems likely that virtually all animals are able to discriminate.
For a more extensive review of experimental discrimination learning, Mackintosh 1974
provides an overview of traditional work that is brought up to date in Mackintosh 1983
and Mackintosh 2000.

3.1.4 Discrimination learning theory
While general learning theory can be used to examine a wide variety of learning,
including discrimination learning, many theorists have tried to explain more specifically
how animals learn to discriminate stimuli. The discovery of three important
discrimination processes – stimulus generalisation, transposition and peak shift – have

72

greatly facilitated the formation of such theories. These processes are described before
discussing the major theories of discrimination.

3.1.4.1 Discrimination processes
3.1.4.1.1 Stimulus generalisation
Stimulus generalisation describes the phenomenon whereby reinforcement of a
behaviour in the presence of one stimulus causes this behaviour to occur in the presence
of similar, previously unseen, stimuli. The strength of the response to the novel stimuli
tends to decrease as the degree of similarity to the training stimulus decreases. A wellknown example of this type of generalisation gradient is found in an experiment
conducted by Guttman and Kalish (1956). After training pigeons to peck at a yellow
580-nm key light, 10 other wavelengths were tested and a fairly symmetrical
generalisation gradient was obtained with the most responding to the yellow training
stimulus and gradually less responding as the wavelength became progressively shorter
and longer either side of 580-nm (Mazur 2002).

3.1.4.1.2 Transposition
Köhler (1918) first demonstrated the process of transposition by training chickens to
perform simultaneous discriminations between two grey cards of different degrees of
brightness and select the lighter of the two (S+). The birds were then given a test using
the original S+ card and a lighter card. The author found that the birds chose the lighter
card, even though it meant rejecting the card they had been trained to select (cited in
Pearce 1997).

3.1.4.1.3 Peak shift
In 1959, Hanson conducted an experiment examining wavelength discrimination in
pigeons using successive, rather than simultaneous, presentation. During the testing
phase, Hanson found the pigeons demonstrated peak shift – that is, the highest rate of
responding occurred in the presence of light with a wavelength slightly less than S+,
rather than S+ itself (Pearce 1997).
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3.1.4.2 Discrimination theories
Using the phenomena described above as well as the results of other studies, a number
of authors have sought to formulate formal theories of discrimination. These theories
can be broadly divided into absolute and relational models.

3.1.4.2.1 Absolute theories
Absolute discrimination learning theories are based on the premise that animals solve
discriminations using the absolute properties of the stimuli with which they are trained,
not on the basis of any relationship between the stimuli. Absolute discrimination
learning theories can be divided into two main categories: (i) the elemental approach
which assumes that when two or more stimuli are presented for discrimination, each
stimulus acquires excitatory or inhibitory strength independently; and (ii) the nonelemental (or configural) approach which assumes that entire stimulus configurations
acquire excitatory or inhibitory strength.

3.1.4.2.1.i The elemental approach

Spence

Spence (1936, 1937) put forward the first formal theory of discrimination learning. He
proposed that if an animal was rewarded for approaching a set of stimuli (S+) it would
result in an increase in the tendency to repeat the response to each of the stimuli in the
future. If the animal was not rewarded for approaching a set of stimuli (S-), the
tendency to repeat the response to any of the stimuli would be reduced (Pearce 1997).
According to Spence, animals learn about the absolute properties of stimuli. For
example, in choosing between a black and a white stimulus an animal would not use
relational information but would select the stimulus that had the highest approach
strength. Spence’s theory accounts for both transposition and peak shift, at least in
successive discrimination experiments, by proposing that an excitatory generalisation
gradient is created around the S+ and an inhibitory gradient around the S-. The approach
strength of any stimulus is then determined by the difference between these two
gradients.
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Evidence for Spence’s theory has been found in studies demonstrating that an inhibitory
generalisation gradient does in fact develop around the S- (e.g. Honig, Boneau, Burstein
and Pennypacker 1963). However, the theory fails to explain the results of other
experiments, such as the so-called intermediate-size problem (Gonzalez, Gentry and
Bitterman 1954, see section 3.1.4.2.2) and feature-positive discriminations, where the
subject learns not to respond to a stimulus that has been intermittently paired with an S+
stimulus but never rewarded alone (Wagner 1969). According to Spence, any stimulus
that has been rewarded, even intermittently, should gain a measure of excitatory
strength and this has been shown not to occur in feature-positive discriminations
(Pearce 1997; Mazur 2002).

Rescorla-Wagner

The Rescorla-Wagner model (1972) bears some similarity to Spence’s theories. They
both assume that conditioning can gradually change an animal’s responding in either an
excitatory or inhibitory manner and that animals learn about the absolute properties of
stimuli. However, unlike Spence, Rescorla and Wagner believed that an animal’s
response to a stimulus could be affected by the properties of other stimuli that were
present. Because of this, the Rescorla-Wagner model is able to explain feature-positive
discrimination as the result of the associative strength of the S+ stimulus eventually
blocking and reducing the associative strength of the intermittently reinforced stimulus
(Pearce 1997).
The theory has also been able to explain other forms of discrimination more effectively
than Spence’s model, particularly with some modifications. One of these modifications
(Blough 1975; Rescorla 1976) has been to assume that stimuli are composed of
elements which gain and lose associative strength in the same manner as stimuli viewed
as a single element. If the elements belonging to one stimulus are shared by other
stimuli, the model is then able to explain stimulus generalisation and peak shift (Pearce
1997).
Another modification was suggested to account for negative patterning, in which
animals are rewarded in the presence of stimulus A and stimulus B, but never in the
presence of both (AB). The Rescorla-Wagner theory suggests that responding to AB
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should be greater than either A or B as the response to the compound is created by the
sum of the excitatory strength of A + B. However, the results of such experiments show
the opposite to be true – A and B eventually gain more excitatory strength when
presented separately. To overcome this problem Rescorla and Wagner (1972) suggested
that when stimuli are presented together they create a hypothetical configural cue that
acts as another stimulus. The configural cue is then assumed to acquire inhibitory
properties that counter the excitatory influence of the individual stimuli (Pearce 1997).
Despite its success, the Rescorla-Wagner model cannot satisfactorily account for all
discrimination experiments, particularly those concerning the influence of similarity on
discrimination learning. In one experiment by Redhead and Pearce (1995), the authors
used the Rescorla-Wagner model (including the configural cue modification) to show
that the model makes incorrect predictions in the case of a three-stimulus discrimination
(A+, BC+, ABC-) which seem to counterintuitively suggest that a discrimination
between two sets of stimuli would be easier when they were similar (BC and ABC) than
when they were different (A and ABC) (see Pearce 1994b, 1997).

3.1.4.2.1.ii The non-elemental approach

Configural theory

While the foregoing theories are elemental in the sense that they assume animals learn
about each stimulus separately, configural theory (Pearce 1987, 1994a) holds that when
a compound stimulus is presented for discrimination a configural representation is
formed of the entire pattern that will have a single association with the outcome of the
trial. (This is in contrast to the configural cue modification to the Rescorla-Wagner
model mentioned above in which the configural cue operates as an additional stimulus
feature). Generalisation to novel stimuli occurs not along separate feature dimensions
but between patterns of stimuli. This theory appears to provide a more accurate
explanation of the relationship between similarity and discrimination learning seen in
the experiment by Redhead and Pearce (1995), described above (section 3.1.4.2.1.i.), as
well as a simpler explanation for negative patterning.
Many absolute theorists continue to support the elemental approach (e.g. McLaren,
Kaye and Mackintosh 1989), while others have argued that both elemental and
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configural associations may form during discrimination learning (e.g. Kehoe 1988).
However, none of these theories can account for instances where animals appear to be
using relational information to solve discriminations (Pearce 1997).

3.1.4.2.2 Relational theories
While the absolute position on discrimination learning assumes that animals either
respond to each stimulus without reference to any others or form a configural
representation of the whole pattern, relational theory assumes that animals solve
discriminations based on the relationship between the stimuli. By definition, there is no
elemental approach to relational theories; instead they can be classed as a non-elemental
or configural approach.

Köhler

One of the major proponents of the relational position was Wolfgang Köhler (1918),
who explained the results of his transposition experiments (see section 3.1.4.1.2) by
suggesting that the birds were solving the discriminations on the basis of the
relationship between the cards (lighter/darker) rather than the absolute properties of the
stimuli (cited in Pearce 1997).
While absolute theorists such as Spence (1936, 1937) and Rescorla and Wagner (1972)
preferred to explain Köhler’s simple transposition experiment using elemental theories,
they are less able to explain other transposition experiments. For example, Gonzalez et
al. (1954) demonstrated the intermediate-size problem when they trained chimpanzees
to select the intermediate-sized stimulus from a set of three. Spence’s theory predicts
that when three novel stimuli are presented, the one closest to S+ should be selected.
Instead, the subjects continued to select the intermediate stimulus, suggesting relational
information had been used (Pearce 1997).
Further support for the relational position was provided by Thomas who used college
students as subjects to demonstrate that the peak of a generalisation gradient tended to
shift toward the middle of the range and that this peak shift could be controlled by the
choice of stimulus. For example, if S+ was a bright light and S- a low light, a peak shift
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towards brighter lights occurred when the stimuli included some very bright lights
(Thomas, Mood, Morrison and Wiertelak 1991) (Mazur 2002).

Abstract concept learning

While absolute theories of discrimination learning found wide acceptance for many
years, particularly due to the influence of the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model, the recent
publication of increasingly more complex discriminations such as perceptual
categorisation and so-called abstract concept learning has led to a renewed interest in
relational theories. While absolute theories have been offered for demonstrations of
complex perceptual categorisations, they have not been able to easily explain the ability
of some animals to discriminate between stimuli representing abstract concepts such as
same/different, larger/smaller, shorter/longer etc. that are readily explained as examples
of relational learning. Both perceptual categorisation and abstract concept learning, and
the theories that have arisen to explain them, are discussed sections 3.3 to 3.8.

3.2 Conditional discrimination
3.2.1 Definition
In a simple discrimination, one of the discriminative stimuli is always correct. However,
in a conditional discrimination there is a second layer of stimuli, variously called a cue,
sign or sample that informs the subject which stimulus to select on any given trial.
Except sometimes during training, the subject is not required to respond directly to the
sample; rather it comes to exert a kind of stimulus control over the subject’s selection of
discriminative stimuli (Carter and Werner 1978). Sidman (1986) suggested that
conditional stimuli control responding indirectly via the significance they impart on
other stimuli, while Cumming and Berryman (1965) proposed that a conditional cue
functions as a “selector of discriminations”, and provides “instructional control”.
Zentall, Hogan and Edwards (1984) defined a conditional discrimination as follows: “In
the presence of one or two (or more) conditional (or sample) stimuli an organism is
given a choice between two (or more) choice or comparison stimuli. In the presence of
one sample, one of the comparison stimuli is correct (i.e., reinforced); in the presence of
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the other sample, the other comparison stimulus is correct” (p. 390). Thus, conditional
discrimination embodies “if-then” conditional reasoning – if this happens then do that.
For example, the subject should choose the discriminative stimulus B1 when presented
with the conditional stimulus A1; and choose B2 when presented with A2 (Hanggi and
Schusterman 1995).
However, while many authors continue to define a conditional relationship in terms of a
hierarchical ordering of stimuli involving a superordinate (conditional) cue modulating
the significance of a subordinate (discriminative) cue (e.g. Sidman 1986; Cumming and
Berryman 1965), others believe there is no way to unequivocally assign uniquely
conditional or discriminative status to stimuli in conditional discrimination tasks,
especially when the stimuli are simultaneously presented (e.g. Thomas, Cook and
Terrones 1990; Thomas and Schmidt 1989). Whether or not a hierarchical relationship
exists, both sides agree that it is combinations of stimuli, rather than single stimulus
elements, which signal reinforcement contingencies in conditional discrimination
experiments, with the value of one cue modulating responding to a cue with which it is
paired (Thomas et al. 1990).
The results of numerous studies suggest that a conditional discrimination is more
difficult than a basic discrimination. In a large majority of studies using standard Tmazes, discrimination boxes or jumping stands where the discriminative stimuli are
located on the goal boxes, goal arms or doors, it was found that a simultaneous
discrimination is typically learned much faster than a successive conditional
discrimination using the same stimuli (Mackintosh 1974). Although, as Deacon,
Bannerman and Rawlins (2001) point out, this may be at least partly explained by the
fact that not all the information needed to solve the conditional discrimination is
simultaneously present in one trial. (See also the debate about simultaneous versus
successive presentation of stimuli in section 3.7.2.1.5).
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3.2.2 Conditional discrimination training
3.2.2.1 Methods
Like basic discrimination, conditional discrimination is generally trained using standard
operant procedures using apparatus such as T-mazes, discrimination boxes or jumping
stands where the discriminative stimuli are located on the goal boxes, goal arms or
doors. Conditional discrimination can also be tested using either simultaneous or
successive presentation of stimuli. (While outside the scope of this study, it is worth
noting that conditional discrimination need not be studied using instrumental
conditioning methods – e.g. Asratyan 1961; Looney, Cohen, Brady and Cohen 1977;
Saavedra 1975) (Carter and Werner 1978). The conditional discrimination procedure
can also be used to test other cognitive abilities such as transitive inference (if A is
bigger than B and B is bigger than C, is A bigger than C?) (e.g. Higa and Staddon 1993;
Treichler and Van Tilburg 1996).

3.2.2.1.1 Compound stimulus
In this form of conditional discrimination, one particular combination of stimuli is
reinforced while all other combinations (including any that include only one of the
stimuli present in the reinforced compound) are not reinforced.

3.2.2.1.2 Symbolic matching
One common variant of the conditional discrimination procedure involves symbolic
matching, in which the subjects are taught to match stimuli that have been arbitrarily
paired. A sample stimulus is shown, followed by the presentation of (or shown
simultaneously with) two or more response alternatives. The subject must choose the
response that goes with the sample – that is, the stimulus that has previously been paired
with the sample through reinforcement.
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3.2.2.1.3 Matching/non-matching-to-sample
In the matching-to-sample experimental paradigm, the subject must select from among a
number of discriminative stimuli one that matches a sample stimulus. Alternatively, in
the non-matching-to-sample paradigm, the discriminative stimulus that does not match
the sample must be selected. These methods of conditional discrimination testing can be
conducted using simultaneous or successive presentation of stimuli (delayed matchingto-sample) (see section 3.7.2.1 for fuller discussion). Matching and non-matching are
viewed as conditional discriminations because the reinforcement contingencies change
from trial to trial (Grant and Kelly 2001) and they can be solved using “if ... then”
reasoning (i.e. if the sample stimulus is red, choose the red discriminative stimulus).
However, there is ongoing debate as to whether matching/non-matching can also be
used to demonstrate relational learning in terms of responding to stimuli on the basis of
whether they are the same or different (see discussion in section 3.7.6.1).

3.2.2.1.4 Combined stimulus
In this method of testing conditional discrimination, which can be described as a
combined stimulus method, the conditional and discriminative cues are combined in the
same stimulus. There are a number of ways in which this method may be used.
One method, which has been called the ‘two-choice visual’ conditional discrimination
(Schrier and Thompson 1980), uses visual stimulus panels that contain both background
and foreground cues which operate independently as the conditional and discriminative
stimuli.
Another way in which stimuli can be combined in conditional discrimination
experiments involves using two different modalities (e.g. visual and spatial; visual and
auditory). For example, in a ‘two-choice spatial’ conditional discrimination conducted
in a T-maze, choosing the left maze arm is reinforced on presentation of one colour and
choosing the right maze arm is reinforced on presentation of another colour (Schrier and
Thompson 1980).
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3.2.2.2 Stimuli
Conditional discrimination can be tested using fairly basic stimuli. For example, using
the ‘two-choice spatial’ example cited above, a simple black/white T-maze conditional
discrimination could involve successive trials where the T-maze arms or doors are either
both black or both white on successive trials. When both sides are black a response to
one side is reinforced, when both are white a response to the other side is reinforced
(Mackintosh 1974). However, a conditional discrimination provision can also be added
to a more complex experiment. For example, Burdyn and Thomas (1984) trained
squirrel monkeys to select a pair of objects that manifested sameness when presented
with a triangle and to select a pair of objects that manifested difference when presented
with a heptagon (see section 3.7.4).
Like most discrimination experiments, the stimuli are usually visual; however stimuli
from other modalities such as auditory (Zuckerman and Blough 1974), tactile (Thomas,
Stengel, Sherman and Woodford 1987) and spatial location (Renouf and Gaborko 1988)
have also been used. Different modalities have also been combined in conditional
discrimination experiments (e.g. visual and spatial, Schrier and Thompson 1980, and
auditory, visual and tactile, Honey and Ward-Robinson 2001).

3.2.3 Conditional discrimination experiments
There is an anecdotal report of conditional discrimination experiments dating back as
far as 1799 and American and Russian investigators utilised the paradigm to study
‘conceptual’ behaviour in non-human primates during the 1920s and 30s (Carter and
Werner 1978). However, one of the first published scientific papers to define both the
importance of identifying the physical properties of the controlling stimuli and the
extent to which that control could be transferred to novel stimuli was conducted by
Lashley (1938b). In this classic series of experiments Lashley established conditional
reactions in rats using a ‘two-choice visual’ combined stimulus method. Each trial
consisted of the presentation of two stimulus boards. The discriminative stimuli (an
upright and inverted white equilateral triangle) appeared on every trial, while the
background was changed to function as a conditional cue. When the background was
black, jumping towards the upright triangle was reinforced, when the background
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consisted of horizontal stripes, the inverted triangle was reinforced. Despite Lashley’s
(1938b) success, he was unable to demonstrate a “generalised reaction” in accordance
with the single-rule model, in which a stimulus which is correct in the presence of sign
A is incorrect in the presence of sign B (see section 3.2.4.5) (Carter and Werner 1978).
According to Carter and Werner (1978), Lashley’s failure to establish a single-rule,
generalised conditional discrimination reaction using a combined stimulus method was
partly responsible for the rise in popularity of the matching/non-matching methods.
Two of the early pioneers of matching are Cumming and Berryman, who, together with
their students, designed some of the matching procedures now commonly used with
pigeons and other animals. In one of their early experiments (Cumming and Berryman
1961), pigeons were trained on simultaneous matching-to-sample using basic visual
stimuli consisting of three hues – red, green and blue (e.g. if red, pick red). The birds
exhibited a strong initial position bias and performance was poor for the first three or
four sessions. Within six to nine sessions, however, the subjects reached at least 90%
accuracy, then slowly improved to near 100% performance (Carter and Werner 1978).
Further matching experiments have confirmed pigeons have little difficulty performing
simple two-choice conditional discrimination tasks (Williams, Butler and Overmier
1990), although zero-delay matching-to-sample (in which the sample is removed when
the comparison stimuli are presented) appears to be harder to learn than simultaneous
matching (Carter and Werner 1978).
Experimenters have also demonstrated that many animals can also learn to perform
symbolic matching in which the stimuli have been arbitrarily paired (see section
3.2.2.1.2). Pigeons can easily learn symbolic matching based on hue (e.g. if red, pick
blue), although not as easily as matching-to-sample (Cumming and Berryman 1965). As
with regular matching, symbolic matching seems to be more difficult to learn using a
successive rather than a simultaneous procedure (Carter and Werner 1978). (For more
examples of matching and oddity see section 3.7).
Despite the early popularity of the matching/oddity method of testing conditional
discriminations, the combined stimulus method continued to be used. A series of
experiments with rats conducted in the 1950s, for example, received considerable
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attention using the ‘two-choice spatial’ combined stimulus method described in section
3.2.2.1.4 (see Schrier and Thompson 1980). More recently, the combined stimulus
method has experienced renewed popularity (e.g. Boneau and Honig 1964; Richards
1979; Thomas, Curran and Russell 1988; Thomas and McKelvie 1982; Thomas,
McKelvie and Mah 1985), particularly as an adjunct to testing relational categorisations
such as relative volume (Thomas and Ingram 1979) and same/different (e.g. Burdyn and
Thomas 1984; Flemming et al. 2007; this study; see section 3.7.4).
Combined stimulus conditional discrimination methods have also been used to test more
complex conditional paradigms. Riopelle and Copelan (1954) successfully trained five
rhesus monkeys to perform discriminations conditional on the colour of the tray on
which two stimulus objects (which were changed after 12 or 14 trials) were presented.
The monkeys were then able to generalise the conditional discrimination performance to
other tray colour sequences, including conditional cues consisting of up to four colours.
This ability to easily generalise the conditional discrimination performance to novel
conditional cues demonstrates that the subject’s responses were not dependent on the
specifics of the cue itself, but rather “response to a change in colour is critical”
(Riopelle and Copelan 1954, p. 145). One of the most impressive conditional
discrimination performances was demonstrated by a chimpanzee that was able to
successfully master 16 inter-related, concurrently presented conditional discrimination
problems – each demanding simultaneous responsiveness to five distinct cues (Nissen
1951).
Other animals that have demonstrated conditional discrimination learning include
rhesus monkeys (Spaet and Harlow 1943; Warren 1964), squirrel monkeys (Barge and
Thomas 1969; Burdyn and Thomas 1984; Thomas and Kerr 1976), capuchin monkeys
(D’Amato, Salmon, Loukas and Tomie 1986), pigeons (D’Amato et al. 1986) and rats
(Honey and Watt 1999). “Experiments using conditional discriminations have
confirmed that animals such as some birds, primates, sea lions and dolphins are capable
of making associations between sample and comparison stimuli” (Hanggi and
Schusterman, 1995, p. 543).
Even goldfish have been shown to acquire a conditional discrimination using both the
compound stimulus and matching/oddity methods. Zuckerman and Blough (1974)
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demonstrated that goldfish responded more often to a reinforced compound stimulus
made up of a particular combination of light and sound intensity than to combinations
that were not reinforced, even when they included one of the stimuli present in the
reinforced compound. Goldman and Shapiro (1979) found goldfish were also able to
acquire a conditional discrimination in which the reinforced stimulus on each trial
depended on the identity of a second stimulus that also differed from trial to trial (i.e.
matching-to-sample and oddity-from-sample, see section 3.7). In addition, Zhang,
Lehrer and Srinivasan (1999) used a successive choice task to demonstrate conditional
discrimination in honeybees.
Despite the success of many species in conditional discrimination experiments, the task
appears to be more difficult for some species to learn. Harbour seals, for example, have
shown little ability to master either visual matching-to-sample (Constantine 1981;
Renouf and Gaborko 1988) or visual symbolic matching tasks (Hanggi and
Schusterman 1995). Similarly, while pigeons easily learn a simple two-choice
conditional discrimination with a retention interval of a few seconds (e.g. Honig 1978),
there is a profound deterioration of matching performance at longer retention intervals
(e.g. Roberts and Grant 1976).
However, changes to experimental procedures can influence conditional discrimination
performance. For example, pigeons appear to find some types of stimuli more
discriminable than others, performing more accurately with hue samples (e.g. red and
green hues) versus line samples (e.g. horizontal and vertical lines) (Carter and
Eckerman 1975; Urcuioli and Zentall 1986; Zentall, Urcuioli, Jagielo and JacksonSmith 1989). Carter and Eckerman (1975) concluded that the rate of matching to sample
(or conditional discrimination) acquisition in pigeons was determined by the
discriminability

between

samples

and

between

comparisons,

with

sample

discriminability having a more pronounced effect.
It has also been shown that animals learn conditional discriminations faster and more
accurately when the reinforcers for each of the correct choices are either qualitatively or
quantitatively different (Trapold 1970), a phenomenon known as the differential
outcome effect (Peterson and Trapold 1980). In one such study, Brodigan and Peterson
(1976) demonstrated that pigeons showed improved performance compared to a control
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group when qualitatively different reinforcers (food or water) were correlated with each
conditional cue – a result that became more pronounced as retention intervals were
increased. Other authors such as DeLong and Wasserman (1981), Peterson, Wheeler
and Trapold (1980), Santi (1989) and Santi and Roberts (1985a) have shown similar
results with pigeons while the effect has also been demonstrated in other species such as
horses (Miyashita, Nakajima and Imada 2000), rats (Trapold 1970) and human children
(Maki, Overmier, Delos and Gutmann 1995).
Williams et al. (1990) further demonstrated that reliably correlating the spatial locations
of reinforcers and response keys could also lead to enhanced performance in pigeons in
a conditional discrimination task. Three groups of pigeons were taught to select the
correct response key of two vertically arranged response keys when presented with one
of two colours. The groups in which the location of the key was consistently correlated
with the location of the feeding tray (either top-key to top-feeder/bottom-key to bottomfeeder or top-key to bottom-feeder/bottom-key to top-feeder) showed better
performance than the group in which the locations of the response keys and feeding
trays were randomly correlated, particularly over longer retention intervals. Other
experiments have also demonstrated that utilising different response locations leads to
improved performance in simultaneous, zero-delay and delayed matching tasks
(Eckerman 1970; Zentall, Hogan, Howard and Moore 1978).
While stimulus discriminability, reinforcer type and the spatial location of reinforcers
and response keys have been shown to improve conditional discrimination performance,
it has been suggested that the effect is not caused by these factors themselves, but rather
by the subject’s behavioural responses to them. According to Urcuioli and Honig
(1980): “When sample-specific responding is occasioned by sample stimuli in matching
and oddity tasks with pigeons, such responding controls the choices between
comparison stimuli” (p. 251). The authors have put forward several lines of evidence to
support their hypothesis. Urcuioli and Honig (1980) introduced differential sampleresponse requirements into matching and oddity tasks using both easy to discriminate
(hue) and difficult to discriminate (line) stimuli. The authors found the pigeons used
sample-specific responding to control choice on the difficult to discriminate line stimuli
but not the easy to discriminate hue stimuli and that the sample-specific behaviours
effectively replaced the visual stimuli as the conditional cue. (Cohen, Looney, Brady
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and Aucella, 1976, also found differential sample-response requirements led to greater
facilitation of performance with line samples than with hue samples). Secondly,
Urcuioli and Honig (1980) concluded that Brodigan and Peterson’s (1976) differential
reinforcer experiments described above probably demonstrate stimulus control by
differential sample-response topographies due to the fact that the topography of a
pigeon’s key peck is affected by reinforcer type (food vs. water) (Jenkins and Moore
1973). Finally, Urcuioli and Honig (1980) point out that Eckerman (1970) has
demonstrated that sample-response locations are sufficient to operate as conditional
cues even when the samples that occasioned them are removed.
Another procedural factor that can affect conditional discrimination performance is
whether the stimuli are presented simultaneously or successively. In a series of
experiments using a blue or red keylight and a subsequently presented vertical or
horizontal line, Thomas et al. (1990) directly compared simultaneous and successive
presentation of stimuli. They found that pigeons were able to learn the successive
conditional discrimination only after relatively intensive training. However, when the
presentation of the colours overlapped the presentation of the lines (simultaneous
presentation), they were able to learn the task fairly easily. According to the authors, the
difference in the way animals appear to deal with simultaneous and successive
conditional discriminations probably accounts for the differences in the difficulty of
mastering the two tasks (see section 3.2.4.7). Even when conditional discrimination
problems are presented simultaneously, factors such as the physical proximity of the
stimuli can also affect performance (see the experiments of Thomas and colleagues in
section 3.2.4.1).
In addition to overall performance, experimental design can also affect the strategies
employed by subjects in conditional discrimination experiments. For example,
numerous experiments (mainly with pigeons) have studied coding strategy in delayed
successive conditional discriminations – essentially whether the subjects utilise
retrospective coding (remembering the sample they saw at the beginning of the trial, e.g.
Roberts and Grant 1976) or prospective coding (remembering which comparison
stimulus to respond to after the retention interval, e.g. Santi and Roberts 1985b).
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Studies have provided evidence supporting both coding theories. Blough (1996)
examined a number of papers and claimed that: “Most of the evidence from these
studies favours prospective coding …” (p. 118). Honig and Wasserman (1981) also
argued in favour of prospective coding based on their experiments showing that the rate
of forgetting was greater for a conditional compared to a simple discrimination.
(Retrospective coding based on the sample stage would be of equivalent difficulty for
both types of discrimination, while prospective coding for the comparison stimulus
stage involves a more complex response procedure for conditional discriminations,
hence the greater rate of forgetting). However, Urcuioli and Zentall (1990) found the
enhanced retention in the simple discrimination task obtained by Honig and Wasserman
(1981) could be accounted for by mediation of retention by differential outcome
expectancies (see above for discussion of the differential outcome effect). At the sample
stage in the simple discrimination, one sample always meant food and the other always
meant no food, whereas in the conditional discrimination that was not the case. When
Urcuioli and Zentall (1990) and Grant and Kelly (2000) modified the simple
discrimination procedure so all trials ended in reinforcement, they found no enhanced
retention in the simple discrimination compared to the conditional discrimination,
leading the authors to support the retrospective coding theory.
A third alternative to the coding dichotomy was suggested in experiments conducted by
Zentall et al. (1989), which found that the discriminability of stimuli, as well as the
number of stimuli in the sample and comparison sets, led the subjects to utilise both
coding strategies – “birds may retrospectively code hue samples because they are
particularly discriminable. With less discriminable line samples, they may prospectively
code” (p. 176) (see also Jackson-Smith, Zentall and Steirn 1993). However, experiments
using symmetrical reinforcement conducted by Grant and Kelly (2000) using both
colour and line samples and multiple test stimuli found no difference between a simple
and conditional discrimination task, leading the authors to conclude that, at least with
visual stimuli, “pigeons encode and remember the initial stimulus (i.e. code
retrospectively)” (p. 41).
While this section has discussed a number of procedural factors that can affect
conditional discrimination performance in animals, the ability of an individual species
to perform a particular task may also be related to ecological and behavioural factors.
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For example, although harbour seals failed in visual conditional discriminations (see
above), they were able to learn a spatial matching-to-sample task (Renouf and Gaborko
1988), suggesting spatially based cues may be more salient for this species (see Hanggi
and Schusterman 1995 for fuller discussion). Similarly, visual cues have been shown to
be more effective than auditory cues in conditional discrimination experiments with
pigeons (Thomas et al. 1988; Thomas et al. 1985).

3.2.4 Conditional discrimination learning theory
3.2.4.1 The configuration model
This theory of conditional discrimination holds that rather than two levels of stimulus
control operating independently, “all aspects of the stimulus situation or configuration
that can be detected by the subject come to exert some control over the discriminative
response” (Carter and Werner 1978, p. 566) – basically each problem is dealt with not
as a combination of elements but rather as a unique configuration (Pearce 1987). For
example, in a basic conditional discrimination, rather than there being two
discriminative responses modulated by a second layer of two conditional cues, in fact
four discriminations are learned based on the four combinations of discriminative and
conditional cues (Carter and Werner 1978). This approach has found some support (e.g.
Gullikson and Wolfle 1938). Thomas (1996) describes this phenomenon as rote
learning, and has argued that most conditional discrimination studies are disqualified
from having shown evidence of conditional reasoning because rote learning may have
been used (see Burdyn and Thomas 1984).
According to Thomas and Kerr (1976), the large number of trials taken to master some
complex conditional discriminations mentioned above (section 3.2.3) – 4320-6840 for
Spaet and Harlow’s (1943) monkeys and 15,796 for Nissen’s (1951) chimpanzee –
suggest that the primates learned the specific configurations rather than utilising a more
generalised rule. Studies by Gollin and Liss (1962) and Barge and Thomas (1969) have
also reported evidence suggesting specific configuration learning in conditional
discrimination testing in children and squirrel monkeys respectively.
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However, while the configuration model may account for some instances of conditional
discrimination learning, it cannot be universally applied. If the configuration model
holds, the results of matching and oddity experiments should show equal rates of
acquisition for the same number of stimulus alternatives. However, experiments such as
that conducted by Cumming and Berryman (1965) demonstrate this is not the case
(Carter and Werner 1978).
In addition, evidence of transfer to novel stimuli would suggest that something other
than configuration learning has been demonstrated. Lashley, for example, rejected the
configuration model explanation for his conditional discrimination experiments with
rats (Lashley 1938b, see section 3.2.3) after later finding instances of transfer to novel
stimuli containing variations of the discriminative stimuli, of the conditional stimuli or
both (Carter and Werner 1978). Similarly, the series of ‘two-choice spatial’ conditional
discriminations conducted with rats in the 1950s (see section 3.2.3.) suggested the
animals were using stimulus selection (e.g. if both black go left) rather than simply
learning to approach two of the four stimulus compounds (e.g. black-left or white-right)
based on the configuration of the entire of set of discriminative stimuli (Schrier and
Thompson 1980).
A universal configuration theory also seems inconsistent with the findings of Thomas
and colleagues. Thomas, McKelvie, Ranney and Moye (1981) demonstrated pigeons
could easily learn a conditional discrimination task based on wavelength discrimination
modulated by the physical context in which the different wavelengths were learned (e.g.
houselight on and tone present; houselight off and white noise present). However,
Thomas et al. (1985) were unsuccessful in attempting to train pigeons in a conditional
discrimination in which the stimuli of a vertical versus a horizontal line was conditional
on the colour of the stimulus background (red or blue), despite using a similar procedure
(see also Boneau and Honig 1964; Richards 1979 for examples of the difficulty pigeons
have acquiring conditional discriminations when both the conditional and discriminative
cues have been projected on the response key). Thomas and McKelvie (1982) did obtain
conditional discrimination learning with line angle and background colour
combinations, but had to use a more intensive training procedure.
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While the stimuli in both the Thomas et al. (1981) and Thomas et al. (1985)
experiments were simultaneously presented, Thomas and colleagues argue the
configuration model predicts the physical proximity of the stimuli in the second
experiment should more readily facilitate the formation of a perceptual unit or
configuration and thus enhance performance (Thomas et al. 1990; Thomas et al. 1988).
In fact the results suggest that, at least in some cases, stimulus configuring in the
perceptual sense actually hinders learning a conditional discrimination. Furthermore,
when the unsuccessful Thomas et al. (1985) experiment using line orientation and
background colours was repeated using a simultaneous procedure designed to prevent
configuring (the background colour preceded and then overlapped the presentation of
the lines), the experiment was successful (Thomas et al. 1988).

3.2.4.2 The compound-cue model
Spence (1952) postulated that responding in a conditional discrimination experiment
could be controlled by compounds or patterns of cues, such as the nominal
discriminative cue and its spatial location. Also known as the unique-cue account,
essentially the theory holds that there are configural elements that behave just like other
elements, except that they are active not when a single element is present but when there
is a particular conjunction of two or more stimuli (Wagner and Brandon 2001). So, each
conjunction of stimuli (e.g. X and Y) activates representations unique to X and Y and
also activates an additional cue unique to their conjunction (Honey and Ward-Robinson
2001). (See also Brandon, Vogel and Wagner 2000; Rescorla 1972; Saavedra 1975;
Wagner and Rescorla 1972).
While the configuration model and the compound-cue model are sometimes confused,
Schrier and Thompson (1980) argue that careful attention should be paid to the
distinction between the two approaches as they “both have their applications in the area
of conditional discrimination learning in addition to the multiple-rule and single-rule
models” (p. 293).
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3.2.4.3 The synthetic model
Honey and Ward-Robinson (2001) claim the results of their series of experiments with
rats casts doubt on the adequacy of both the compound-cue model and the configuration
model. For example, Honey and Watt (1999) trained rats in a conditional discrimination
where in one pair of contexts (A and B), two relationships were in force (X = food, Y=
no food) and in another pair of contexts (C and D) the opposite relationships were in
force (X = no food, Y = food), where X and Y were auditory stimuli. After they had
acquired this discrimination, the rats were given an aversive conditioning procedure in
which presentations of Context A were paired with a shock and those of Context C were
not. Subsequently, the rats showed a greater fear response in Context B than in Context
D – a generalisation between the contexts that had been associated with the same
food/no-food outcome. According to Honey and Ward-Robinson (2001), this result
cannot be explained by either the configuration or compound-cue models, which are
both activated by specific conjunctions of stimuli. In the Honey and Watt (1999)
experiment, Contexts A and B were not combined with one another at any point during
the study.
Honey and Watt (1998) developed a theory to explain this type of result, which they
described as a synthetic account. According to this model, stimuli that have been
presented on different trials (e.g. Contexts A and B) that have the same outcome (e.g. X
= food) can come to be associated with one another via the same ‘hidden unit’ which is
associated with a representation of the outcome of the trial. Experiments by the authors
(e.g. Honey and Ward-Robinson 2001; Honey and Watt 1998, 1999; Ward-Robinson
and Honey 2000) show support for the synthetic account by demonstrating that rats
show transfer between one contextual conditional discrimination and another when the
contexts are linked to the same associative relationships. The theory is also consistent
with the pattern of results found with different species, stimuli and procedures (e.g.
Delamater and Joseph 2000; Urcuioli, Zentall and DeMarse 1995; Zentall, Steirn,
Sherburne and Urcuioli 1991). (See Honey 2000 for a full treatment of this account).
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3.2.4.4 The multiple-rule model
The multiple rule model involves learning about stimulus-specific relations and assumes
the subject has learned a set of ‘if … then’ rules based on the stimuli with which it has
been trained. In this case, the introduction of novel stimuli should disrupt an established
conditional discrimination performance. There are two variations of the rule – one based
on selecting the correct choice and one based on avoiding the incorrect choice – which
may be distinguished by the extent to which novel choices, rather than novel cues,
disrupt performance (Carter and Werner 1978).
In order to make predictions about how subjects would respond to novel stimuli, several
investigators have added an assumption to the multiple-rule model known as the coding
hypothesis. Many forms of the coding hypothesis have been proposed, however the
most influential in conditional discrimination studies involves an intervening event
between the stimulus itself and the subject’s response. According to this version of the
hypothesis, stimulus-response correlations are mediated by another response that is
usually not observed. The subject then reports not directly to some aspect of the
stimulus, but instead on the occurrence of the (often covert) response made directly to
the stimulus. Thus the reporting response (R2) is conditional on the occurrence of the
coding response (R1) (Carter and Werner 1978).
Since the coding response is usually unobserved, its existence must be inferred from
behavioural data. Several lines of such evidence have been put forward to support the
coding response theory. Firstly, experiments have shown the importance of requiring a
response to sample as part of the experimental procedure (e.g. Eckerman, Lanson and
Cumming 1968; Maki, Gillund, Hauge and Siders 1977; Zentall, Hogan and Holder
1974) as well as demonstrating that different observing responses are made in the
presence of different sample stimuli (Berryman, Cumming and Nevin 1963; Blough
1959), particularly when the different samples are paired with different reinforcers
(Brodigan and Peterson 1976). Secondly, studies concerned with transfer to novel
stimuli have shown subjects transferring an already-learned coding response from a
familiar stimulus onto a novel stimulus (Cumming, Berryman and Cohen 1965).
Because of the difficulty of observing a coding response, some investigators have tried
to exert experimental control over their subject’s coding response by requiring
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experimenter-directed sample-specific responses to stimuli. These experiments have
shown that requiring sample-specific behaviour facilitates conditional discrimination
learning (Cohen et al. 1976; Eckerman 1970; Lydersen and Perkins 1974; Perkins,
Lydersen and Beaman 1973; Urcuioli and Honig 1980). However, in common with
other coding response experiments, these studies “demonstrate the usefulness of coding
responses, but they fail to demonstrate that conditional discriminations must be
mediated by coding responses” (Carter and Werner 1978, p. 577) (Carter and Werner
1978).

3.2.4.5 The single-rule model
The single-rule model can be described as a ‘generalised reaction’ based on a single
rule: “Any stimulus which is correct in the presence of conditional cue A is incorrect in
the presence of conditional cue B”. The most important feature of this model is the
condition that the subject will continue to respond correctly in a new situation as long as
each new discrimination fits the rule. Provided the subject continues to choose the
correct stimulus in accordance with previous training despite the use of novel stimuli,
performances using either the matching/non-matching method or a combined stimulus
method may be viewed as behaviour governed by a single rule (Carter and Werner
1978).
According to Schrier and Thompson (1980, p. 293), single-rule learning involves “the
learning of an abstract rule or concept that enables an animal to solve a new conditional
discrimination problem more quickly than it did the original problem”. In order to
conclude single-rule learning has taken place, the authors required that the superior
novel-trial performance must not be due to stimulus generalisation or be due to nonspecific transfer based on additional testing (i.e. adaptation to testing); a phenomenon
which has arisen in testing for ‘concept’ learning in monkeys (Schrier and Thompson
1980).
Nissen (1953) proposed two potential solutions to conditional discrimination problems:
“As long as problem-solution involves a fixed and invariable number of stimuli, the
possibility of response to specific stimulus-combinations or patterns remains. Only
when this possibility has been ruled out will there be a compelling need for the concept
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of the conditional stimulus as a predisposing set” (p. 281). According to Thomas and
Kerr (1976), if the opportunity for the first solution was available, then a conceptual
interpretation could not be conclusively suggested. Eliminating the potential for specific
configuration learning would require successful performance on the first (or only) trial
of a specific conditional discrimination.
When Thomas and Kerr (1976) tested squirrel monkeys on a conditional discrimination
task using single-trial oddity problems, the monkeys were able to achieve criterion
performance of 90%. Similarly, Riopelle and Copelan (1954) reported perfect
performance on the first trial transfer tests in their tray-colour conditional discrimination
described above. According to Thomas and Kerr (1976), both these studies justify a
conceptual interpretation: “Since there is no opportunity to learn specific stimuli or
stimulus patterns, successful performance may be interpreted as having a conceptual
basis” (p. 333).
Whether demonstration of ‘single-rule’ learning is evidence a subject is utilising an
‘abstract rule’ or even a ‘concept’ (Carter and Werner 1978; Schrier and Thompson
1980) is discussed further in sections 3.6 to 3.8.

3.2.4.6 Conjunctive reasoning
Thomas (1996) proposes that some experiments purporting to show conditional
discrimination may in fact be demonstrating conjunctive reasoning. Using the
experiment cited in section 3.2.2.2 (Burdyn and Thomas 1984), of which Thomas was
one of the authors, he describes how either conditional or conjunctive reasoning could
have been used to accomplish the task. Using conditional reasoning the rules of the task
would be “if a triangle is presented, then choose the sameness pair” and “if a heptagon is
presented, then choose the difference pair”. Using conjunctive reasoning the rules
would be “a triangle and a sameness pair go together so choose the sameness pair when
you see a triangle” and “a heptagon and a difference pair go together so choose the
difference pair when you see a heptagon”. While studies with humans have confirmed
the use of conditional reasoning (Bourne 1970), Thomas admits it would be problematic
to design an experiment which would isolate which form of reasoning was being used in
non-human animals.
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3.2.4.7 Multiple strategies
As Schrier and Thompson (1980, p. 293) point out (in relation to the difference between
the configuration and the compound-cue model), it is “probably not a question of this or
that model being correct, but of one model being appropriate under some circumstances
and another under other circumstances”.
For example, as mentioned in section 3.2.1, a number of theorists contend that there is a
fundamental difference in the way successive and simultaneously presented conditional
discriminations are solved. Thomas et al. (1990) claim that simultaneously presented
stimuli are not necessarily dealt with in a hierarchical manner, in which one stimulus
serves as a conditional cue indicating the correct selection of a discriminative cue.
Rather, that the subjects learn “what goes with what”. Thomas and Schmidt (1989)
conducted a generalisation test with pigeons that showed that if either of the S+
elements in a simultaneous conditional discrimination was held constant while the other
was varied along a dimension, the subjects would respond maximally to the appropriate
value of the varied dimension. According to the authors, this indicated that the pigeons
knew what values of the two cues went together, rather than utilising a unidirectional
instructional relationship between the cues.
In the case of successively presented stimuli, however, Thomas et al. (1990) believe the
task does involve sequential order, and thus a hierarchical structure. They base this
theory on experiments showing that when primates and pigeons are tested on a
previously learned matching-to-sample task in which the order of stimulus presentation
has been reversed, they are largely unsuccessful (e.g. D’Amato, Salmon, Loukas and
Tomie 1985; Sidman et al. 1982).
In a series of experiments Holland (1983; 1986a; 1986b; 1989) found the temporal
arrangement of stimulus presentation affects the way rats solve feature positive
conditional discriminations (in which a compound stimulus (XA) is reinforced, but one
of its elements (A) is separately nonreinforced). When X and A are presented
simultaneously, X acquires the ability to evoke a conditioned response based on its
association with the unconditioned stimulus, while A has little or no effect on
responding. However, when X is presented before A in a successive procedure, X
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comes to modulate the association between A and the unconditional stimulus –
effectively X “sets the occasion” for responding to A. According to Holland (1989), the
subjects in his experiments clearly used different strategies in solving the successive
and simultaneous conditional discriminations – an “occasion-setting” (i.e. hierarchical)
strategy for successive discriminations and an “associative” (i.e. configural) strategy for
simultaneous procedures.

3.3 CATEGORISATION
3.3.1 Definition
While a simple discrimination involves a single stimulus signalling a reward,
categorisation is a more complex discrimination in which the reward is signalled by a
variety of stimuli that share some common characteristic (Pearce 1994a). Categorisation
can be defined as the ability to treat stimuli that are similar (but not identical) as
equivalent – by sorting them into categories and reacting to them in the same manner
(Harnad 1987; Huber 2001; Medin and Smith 1984).
Considering the vast amount of sensory information organisms receive, categorisation
could be seen as an effective response to evolutionary pressures to minimise processing
requirements (Cook, Wright and Kendrick 1990; Delius, Jitsumori and Siemann 2000;
Huber 2001). Categorisation allows an animal to identify novel stimuli as members of a
particular class and generalise information about that class to the new members. This
enables an animal to respond appropriately to a wide variety of stimuli without having
to be conditioned to each and every example. This has obvious adaptive advantages as it
reduces the demands on an animal’s sensory and information-processing systems,
freeing them to deal with other competing exigencies of survival (Herrnstein 1984;
Wasserman 1993b).
According to Wasserman (1993b), categorisation means “an organism need not be
bound to respond to only those stimuli with which it has had prior experience,
correspondingly enhancing its ability to cope with a continually changing world” (p.
216). Similarly, Hanggi (1999) states that: “Grouping objects or events enables an
organism to respond efficiently and appropriately to stimuli” (p. 244). The utility of
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categorisation led Huber (1995, p. 135) to observe: “The critical adaptiveness of generic
categorisation makes us not wonder about its wide dispersion among vertebrate
species.”

3.3.2 Types of categorisation
For the purposes of this study discussions of categorisation experiments and theory have
been organised into three sections based on Zentall, Galizio and Critchfield’s (2002)
nomenclature of the main types of categorisation – perceptual categorisation,
associative categorisation and relational categorisation.
Because of the large number of experiments that have been conducted in this field it is
neither practical nor advisable to try and list them all. Instead this review attempts to
provide an overview of categorisation experimentation while still conveying an
understanding of the broad spectrum of both species and stimuli that have been used in
testing.
Many of the experiments listed in this section are referred to by their authors as studies
of ‘concepts’, ‘concept learning’, ‘conceptualisation’ etc. However, due to the
continuing debate over what constitutes conceptualisation, it was decided to take a more
conservative approach and label these studies as they would be fairly universally
accepted – as examples of categorisation. Whether any or all of them are also examples
of concept learning will be discussed in section 3.8.

3.4 PERCEPTUAL CATEGORISATION
The first type of categorisation in Zentall et al.’s (2002) list is perceptual categorisation.
As the echidna had previously demonstrated basic discrimination (see section 2.2.2.4)
but had never been tested on categorisation, perceptual categorisation seemed the next
logical ability to test. However, as the intent of this study was to test its subject with a
task generally perceived as ‘complex’ or ‘difficult’, it first needed to be established
whether perceptual categorisation met that criteria. A brief summary of this review has
been included, both to demonstrate why perceptual categorisation was considered
unsuitable for this study and also because perceptual categorisation forms both the
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historical and theoretical background to more complex forms of categorisation (for
reviews see Harnad 1987; Herrnstein 1984; Huber 1995; Pearce 1994a; Thompson
1995; Watanabe, Lea and Dittrich 1993).

3.4.1 Definition and perceptual categorisation in nature
This type of categorisation, also referred to as open-ended categorisation, relies on some
principle of “perceptual similarity” (Herrnstein 1990, p. 136) between items that belong
to a given class. While this similarity principle may be acquired with a given set of
exemplars, unlike categorisation by rote it should also generalise to novel examples of
the same kind (Herrnstein 1990; Zayan and Vauclair 1998).
The stimuli in these experiments generally have two properties. Firstly, all the positive
stimuli would be labelled by a human, and are labelled by the experimenter, with a
single name (e.g. person, pigeon, oak leaf etc.). Secondly, while they are based on
perceptual similarity, there is no obvious single perceptual property shared by all the
positive and/or negative stimuli (Lea 1984b).
Numerous

observational

studies

have

confirmed

that

animals

demonstrate

categorisation in the course of their normal activities. One of the most well known
examples of categorisation in the wild is that of predator-specific alarm calls. Vervet
monkeys studied in their natural habitat in Kenya categorised different aerial and
ground predators by giving different alarm calls and responding appropriately to them
(running into the trees for leopard alarms, looking up for eagle alarms and looking down
for snake alarms) (Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980a, 1980b). The authors claim that
by giving alarm calls to some species and not others, and giving distinct calls to
different predators, the monkeys were creating broad categories of ‘predator’ and ‘nonpredator’ and further categorising different types of predator. Predator-specific alarm
calls have also been demonstrated in other species such as chimpanzees (Goodall 1986),
ground squirrels (Owings and Leger 1980), prairie dogs (Ackers and Slobodchikoff
1999; Slobodchikoff, Kiriazis, Fischer and Creef 1991) and chickens (Evans, Evans and
Marler 1993).
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Observations of naturally occurring categorisation in animals are not limited to
identifying predators. Animals also use categorisation in other important areas of their
lives, such as social interaction and finding food. Guinea baboons, for example, have
been found to use visual categorisation to identify conspecifics (Zayan and Vauclair
1998) and a number of bird species (black-capped chickadees, bluejays and pigeons)
have demonstrated the ability to categorise leaves based on whether they have been
damaged by caterpillars (Cerella 1979; Heinrich and Collins 1983; Real, Iannazzi,
Kamil and Heinrich 1984) (Shettleworth 1998).

3.4.2 Perceptual categorisation training
3.4.2.1 Methods
As with discrimination learning, comparative psychologists have devised numerous
laboratory experiments to better understand both the scope and mechanics of nonhuman
categorisation. The subjects are trained using operant procedures similar to those used
in simple discrimination experiments (see section 3.1.2) to respond differentially to the
stimuli according to an experimenter-defined category (e.g. ‘person’, ‘non-person’).

3.4.2.1.1 Operant procedures

Successive presentation – go/no-go

One procedure used to test category learning is the go/no-go procedure (also used in
discrimination studies) where stimuli are presented successively and the subject is
rewarded for responding in some way (e.g. pressing a lever, pecking a key) in the
presence of one category (S+) and not responding in the presence of the other (S-) (see
review in Herrnstein 1984).

Simultaneous presentation

In simultaneous presentation, the stimuli are presented at the same time and the subject
is rewarded for selecting the stimulus that is a member of one experimenter-defined
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category (S+) and not the stimulus that is a member of another experimenter-defined
category (S-).

Match-to-sample

A third commonly used testing procedure is match-to-sample. This can be conducted
using either successively or simultaneously presented stimuli (see section 3.7.2.1 for
fuller discussion). In the successive presentation (called delayed matching-to-sample),
the S+ stimulus is first presented alone, then removed. After a designated delay period,
two or more stimuli are presented – an S+ stimulus and one or more S- stimuli – and the
subject is rewarded for selecting the S+ stimulus. In the simultaneous presentation, the
subject is able to view the sample and comparison stimuli at the same time. If the
sample and comparison S+ stimuli are identical, rather than just being members of the
same category, the match-to-sample procedure can also be used to test the subject’s
ability to perform a same/different categorisation task (see section 3.7.2.1).

3.4.2.1.2 Evidence for successful performance

Transfer to novel stimuli

Once the subject of a perceptual categorisation experiment has been trained to select the
correct (S+) stimuli and its performance has reached a pre-selected criterion level, proof
is required that they have not merely memorized the training stimuli. In most cases, the
behavioural evidence that the subjects perceive, or have successfully learned, the
categorisation task being studied is their ability to transfer their performance
spontaneously to novel exemplars of both the S+ and S- stimuli. According to Ohl,
Scheich and Freeman (2001, p. 733): “Transfer to novel stimuli is considered to be the
most decisive behavioural index for category learning.” (See also Lea 1984b).

Analyses of error patterns

In some studies, analyses of error patterns rather than correct responses to novel stimuli
are used to determine the nature and boundaries of the subjects’ categorisation
performance (Thompson 1995). For example, an animal that responds to novel pictures
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containing people, but not those containing monkeys or other mammals, could be
considered to have successfully learned the category ‘people’. Another animal that
responds to novel pictures containing people and monkeys, but not to those containing
other mammals may have learned the category ‘primate’ rather than ‘person’ (Schrier
and Brady 1987).

3.4.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli used are usually visual, ranging in complexity from simple line drawings
(Cerella 1980; Huber and Lenz 1993) to colour photographs (Herrnstein and Loveland
1964; Lumsden 1977) to three-dimensional objects (Cabe 1976; Delius 1992; Watanabe
1993) and even motion (Herbranson, Fremouw and Shimp 2002), however perceptual
categorisation experiments have also been conducted using other modalities such as
sound (Porter and Neuringer 1984; Sturdy, Phillmore, Price and Weisman 1999;
Weisman, Njegovan and Ito 1994; Wetzel, Wagner, Ohl and Scheich 1998).
Perceptual categorisation experiments are often separated into two groups based on the
type of stimuli used – natural categories such as people or trees and artificial categories
such as letters or numbers. That delineation has been followed here with a caveat – just
what makes a natural category ‘natural’ is by no means certain. Intuition or common
sense is usually invoked to determine the naturalness of a category, for example, trees
are natural, letters and numbers are artificial. While applying a more scientifically based
definition has proved problematic (Herrnstein 1984), this study has used the generally
accepted delineations. It is important to note, however, that assuming that stimuli
depicting ‘natural’ objects or scenes are more ecologically valid than artificial stimuli
on the basis that animals perceive them as representing real objects or places is
considered ill-founded by a number of authors (Fetterman 1996; Shettleworth 1998)
(see also section 3.8.3.1.3).

3.4.3 Perceptual categorisation experiments
Herrnstein and Loveland’s 1964 study is generally considered the pioneering work in
this field as it was one of the first studies in which the stimulus properties were not
easily specified by physical measurements (Malott and Siddall 1972; Huber 2001).
102

Most studies begin their review of this literature with Herrnstein and Loveland’s study,
and that convention will be followed here. However it is worth noting that perceptual
categorisation in animals, using more easily defined stimulus properties such as size,
shape or colour, was being tested prior to that study. The categories used in these
experiments included size (Kluever 1933), colour (Weinstein 1945), triangularity
(Andrew and Harlow 1948), numbers (Hicks 1956), novelty (Brown, Overall and
Blodgett 1959; Brown, Overall and Gentry 1958), patterns (Kelleher 1958) and even
guided missile targets (Skinner 1960) (see Malott and Siddall 1972).
Regardless of where one starts, however, a review of the literature soon demonstrates
that perceptual categorisation is extremely common among a wide variety of species.
Indeed, Herrnstein (1990, p. 138) asserts categorisation has “turned up at every level of
the animal kingdom where it has been competently sought”.

3.4.3.1 Pigeon studies
Pigeons have been the most common subject of categorisation experiments due to their
convenience as laboratory animals, acute perceptual capacity and lack of language
competencies (Huber 2001; Lea 1984b; Mackintosh 1995; Wasserman 1991), as well as
the fact that their basic behaviour and nervous system has been studied in great detail
(Zeigler and Bischof 1993). Because of the pigeon’s ubiquity as a test subject, and the
fact that the pioneering experiments in the field of non-human perceptual categorisation
were conducted using pigeons, they have been dealt with separately.

Natural categories

The seminal work in this field was conducted by Herrnstein and Loveland (1964), in
which they demonstrated that pigeons were able to discriminate slides containing people
from those that did not. The pigeons were trained by being rewarded with food when
they pecked in response to slides containing people. The subjects were able to quickly
learn the task and were easily able to transfer the performance to novel slides.
The groundbreaking aspect of this experiment was that, unlike the earlier categorisation
experiments mentioned in section 3.4.3, the positive and negative instances varied in a
103

large number of visual dimensions. As Huber (2001) points out, even the positive
‘person-present’ stimuli varied in number (from a single person to groups), appearance
(clothed, semi-nude, nude; adults and children; men and women; sitting, standing, lying;
different races), lighting and colouration etc. It was also determined that there was no
difference in average brightness between the positive and negative slides that might
provide an alternate explanation for the pigeons’ performance (Lea 1984b). According
to Herrnstein and Loveland (1964), the ‘person-present’ slides constituted “a class of
visual stimuli so diverse that it precludes simple characterisation” (p. 549).
However, Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) experiment drew criticism for a number of
reasons. It did not show the course of the criterion acquisition, as the data was restricted
to two selected sessions after discrimination performance had been stabilised. In
addition, the experiment used rates of pecking at stimuli to determine response rather
than discretely different behaviours. While Herrnstein (1990) has since claimed
measures based on the rate of responding in the presence of a stimulus in go/no-go
procedures have been shown to provide “sensitive and stable estimates of the subject’s
categorisation” (p. 140), other authors such as Siegel and Honig (1970) thought such
procedures left the results open to interpretive error.
These issues were addressed, and the results of Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964)
experiment confirmed, by Siegel and Honig (1970) who again demonstrated that
pigeons could discriminate between person-present and person-absent in a complex
visual display. They also found their subjects could generalise the discrimination to
novel examples even when reinforcement was omitted and when displays were inverted
180°, and transfer the discrimination from a successive to a simultaneous presentation
condition.
The ‘people’ experiment has been extended even further in one study using subclasses
of humans – human faces, human torsos and groups of humans – as the correct response
(Malott and Siddall 1972) and in another in which pigeons showed they could learn to
categorise pictures of a particular person not just of people in general (Jitsumori and
Yoshihara 1997; Troje, Huber, Loidolt, Aust and Fieder 1999).
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Pigeons have also demonstrated the ability to categorise stimuli based on whether or not
they contained pictures of pigeons. In a study by Poole and Lander (1971), pigeons
were able to discriminate between photographs containing pigeons and those containing
other birds or objects. Following training, tests revealed almost complete transfer to
new displays of pigeons and significantly less to other species of birds. The results
showed more rapid acquisition and higher level of discrimination than that for human
beings and approximated those for simple colour and form discriminations. This is
likely due to the salience of the stimuli and their relative simplicity. The significant
responses to pigeons compared to other birds show the discrimination was more specific
than just ‘birds’. The fact that the subjects were also able to transfer to new displays
containing unusual looking pigeons suggests the discrimination was not based solely on
physical similarity (Poole and Lander 1971).
Experiments have also demonstrated that after training pigeons can categorise on the
basis of numerous natural categories, including food (Watanabe 1991; 1993), man-made
objects (Lubow 1974), trees (Herrnstein, Loveland and Cable 1976; Herrnstein 1979;
Vaughan and Herrnstein 1987), bodies of water (Herrnstein et al. 1976), oak leaves
(Cerella 1979), fish (Herrnstein and de Villiers 1980); pigeons (Herrnstein 1990;
Watanabe and Ito 1991; Watanabe 1992); spherical/non-spherical objects (Delius 1992);
people, cars, cats, flowers and chairs (Bhatt, Wasserman, Reynolds and Knauss 1988),
birds and other animals (Roberts and Mazmanian 1988); geographic location (Honig
and Stewart 1988; Wilkie, Willson and Kardal 1989) and even bad parts on an
assembly-line inspection, such as defective pharmaceutical capsules or diodes
(Cumming 1966; Verhave 1966).
Although most laboratory experiments use static stimuli, a number of studies have also
demonstrated the ability of pigeons to categorise on the basis of motion. It has been
postulated that, due to the role of motion discrimination in such vital tasks as knowing
whether a predator is approaching or a prey escaping, that motion perception may have
evolved before other visual processes such as colour perception or visual acuity
(Husband and Shimizu 2001; Sekuler 1975; Walls 1942). In addition, it would be
expected that the flight characteristics of birds would lead them to evolve complex
motion perception and precise abilities to process dynamic visual stimuli (Herbranson et
al. 2002; Zentall et al. 2002). A study by Herbranson et al. (2002) showed that pigeons
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can accurately categorise the dynamic properties of a moving target in terms of its speed
and direction and Dittrich and Lea (1993) and Dittrich, Lea, Barrett and Gurr (1998)
demonstrated that pigeons are able to form abstract categories of naturalistic movement
patterns such as walking or flying.

Artificial categories

While it seems reasonable to assume pigeons would gain a fitness advantage in being
able to categorise on the basis of natural stimuli such as ‘trees’ and ‘pigeons’, they have
also proved adept at categorising on the basis of fairly abstract artificial categories.
These range from the perceptually simple category of ‘triangle’ (Watanabe 1991) to
more complex categories such as cartoon characters (Cerella 1980), schematic faces
(Huber and Lenz 1993, 1996), squiggles (Vaughan and Greene 1984), dot patterns
(Watanabe 1988), letters of the alphabet (Lea and Ryan 1983, 1990; Morgan, Fitch,
Holman and Lea 1976) and even the paintings of Monet and Picasso (Watanabe,
Sakamoto and Wakita 1995).
While most categorisation studies are conducted using visual stimuli, pigeons have also
displayed the ability to categorise on the basis of artificial auditory stimuli. In one such
experiment, pigeons were able to correctly categorise excerpts of two pieces of music –
Bach’s Toccatas and Fugues for organ and Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring. When other
pieces of music were introduced during the testing phase, the pigeons tended to place
modern music into the ‘Stravinsky’ category and baroque music into the ‘Bach’
category (Porter and Neuringer 1984).

3.4.3.2 Other animal studies
In addition to pigeons, a number of other avian species have also demonstrated
perceptual categorisation. For example, categorisation has been shown using auditory
stimuli, including budgerigars with contact calls (Trillmich 1976a; 1976b), chickens
with flock members (Ryan 1982; Ryan and Lea 1990), swamp sparrows with birdsongs
(Nelson and Marler 1989), zebra finches with song-note type (Sturdy et al. 1999),
Japanese quails with human speech phenomes (Kluender, Diehl and Killeen 1987), Java
sparrows with human language (English versus Chinese) (Watanabe, Yamamoto and
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Uozumi 2006), European starlings with rising and falling tones (Hulse, Cynx and
Humpal 1984) and black-capped chickadees with chickadee call-note types (Sturdy,
Phillmore and Weisman 2000). Like pigeons (see section 3.4.3.1.1), Java sparrows can
also categorise on the basis of musical styles – in this case classical versus modern. Not
only could they discriminate Bach (classical) from Schoenberg (modern) and transfer
the discrimination to novel pieces by the same composer, they also demonstrated
transfer of the discrimination to composers in the same style (i.e. Vivaldi, classical, and
Eliot Carter, modern) (Watanabe and Sato 1999).
Other avian species have also demonstrated the ability to form categories based on
visual stimuli, such as blue jays with moths (Pietrewicz and Kamil 1977) and leaf
damage caused by caterpillars (Real et al. 1984) and Bengalese finches with
conspecifics (Watanabe, Yamasita and Wakita 1993).
A different approach to perceptual categorisation in birds has been demonstrated by an
African Grey parrot called Alex. The parrot was able to respond to verbal questions
about the stimulus properties of particular objects (e.g. “What colour?” or “What
shape?”) with an appropriate vocalisation (e.g. “blue” or “four-corner”) and transfer
those labels to novel stimuli (Pepperberg 1983).
One of the earliest reports of picture categorisation in animals was conducted with
chimpanzees by Hayes and Hayes (1953). The subject successfully learned to choose
between pictures of two different object categories (eg. dog, cat, house) for
reinforcement. Each trial used new pictures of different members of the two classes and
a different set of categories was used every day. The first trial served as the training
trial. The subject later learned to match a real object with a picture of an object from
that class, even though the picture did not show the same object (Bhatt et al. 1988).
Numerous studies have demonstrated visual categorisation in monkeys of both natural
and artificial visual stimuli such as food and animals (Fabre-Thorpe, Richard and
Thorpe 1998), humans, monkeys and the letter A (Schrier, Angarella and Povar 1984),
monkey faces, human faces, flowers, fruit and trees (Sands, Lincoln and Wright 1982),
humans (D’Amato and Van Sant 1988; Schrier and Brady 1987), conspecifics (Fujita
1987), other species (Swartz 1983; Yoshikubo 1985); individuals of their own species
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(Bruce 1982; Rosenfeld and van Hoesen 1979); birds and other animals (Roberts and
Mazmanian 1988) and fish and trees (Vogels 1999a, 1999b).
Perceptual categorisation has also been shown in other primates including chimpanzees
with sign language vocabulary (Gardner and Gardner 1985) and humans (Fujita and
Matsuzawa 1986), baboons with alphanumeric characters (Vauclair and Fagot 1996),
gorillas with conspecifics, orangutans, humans, primates, animals and food (Vonk and
MacDonald 2002) and orangutans with conspecifics, primates and animals (Vonk and
Macdonald 2004).
Primates have also demonstrated perceptual categorisation using auditory stimuli,
including Japanese macaques with their own and other animals’ calls (May, Moody and
Stebbins 1989) and vervet monkeys with alarm calls, both natural (Owren 1990a) and
synthetic (Owren 1990b) and rhesus monkeys with human speech phonemes (Kuhl
1987; Waters and Wilson 1976).
Mammals other than primates have also shown the ability to perform perceptual
categorisations. Hanggi (1999) found horses could categorise geometric shapes on the
basis of whether they had an open or a filled centre, while Sappington and Goldman
(1994) demonstrated horses’ ability to categorise triangles of various shapes and sizes.
Chinchillas have demonstrated auditory discrimination of the phonemes of human
speech (Burdick and Miller 1975; Kuhl 1987; Kuhl and Miller 1975; Ohlemiller, Jones,
Heidbreder, Clark and Miller 1999), house mice can categorise on the basis of
ultrasound vocalisation (Ehret 1987) and Mongolian gerbils can categorise on the basis
of ascending and descending tones and transfer the ascending/descending category to
novel stimuli (Ohl et al. 2001; Wetzel et al. 1998).
As can be seen from the examples above, perceptual categorisation can be found in a
wide variety of species. It has even been demonstrated in insects and fish. Bumblebees,
for example, can categorise food items (flowers) to optimise foraging and are able to
generalise to novel exemplars (Dukas and Waser 1994) while carp can categorise music
on the basis of style (blues versus classical) (Chase 2001). However, it is likely that
different species’ characteristics and varying experimental methodologies give rise to
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divergent methods of achieving a successful performance. The next section examines a
number of theories about how animals accomplish perceptual categorisation.

3.4.4 Perceptual categorisation theories
Therefore, it is often difficult to specify, on the basis of the subjects’
response patterns, the exact array of stimulus properties exploited,
let alone the underlying perceptual or cognitive mechanisms (von
Fersen and Lea 1990).
(Troje et al. 1999, p. 354)
As demonstrated in the previous section (3.4.3), perceptual categorisation appears to be
fairly widespread in the animal kingdom. This suggests it might be unsuitable as a task
for this experiment as it indicates it is not a particularly ‘difficult’ or ‘complex’ task
(one of the criteria for this experiment – see section 1.6). The issue of the task’s
ubiquity is compounded by the fact that there is a lack of consensus over how it is
accomplished – whether using basic perceptual mechanisms or more complex cognitive
processes. Categorisation has been described as “a secret” (Herrnstein 1985, p. 129),
“utterly mysterious” (Marler 1982, p. 87) and “shrouded in mystery” (Premack 1983a,
p. 357) (Huber 2001). While the studies listed in the previous section show many
species can readily solve perceptual categorisation problems and generalise to other
instances of the categories, they provide little insight into the perceptual and cognitive
mechanisms underlying that performance. The polymorphous nature of many of the
categories studied make it very difficult to identify these categorisation mechanisms –
the categories cannot be defined in terms of any single stimulus dimension and no
single perceptual feature is likely to be a “necessary or sufficient” condition for
category membership (Herrnstein 1985). (See Roitblat and von Fersen 1992).
In broad terms, members of a category can be described as sharing a “family
resemblance” (Rosch 1975). To successfully categorise those members the animal must
adopt a response strategy based on its perception of similarity (Medin 1989). Further, it
must be able to separate the relevant cues from the irrelevant ones and be flexible in the
representations of the attributes of category members so it can treat some distortions and
transformations as irrelevant (Cerella 1982; Greene 1983). However, even assuming
perceptual categorisation is a largely a matter of assessing similarity, there is little
agreement about the level of abstraction used to sort open-ended categories (Huber
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2001) and numerous theories have been proposed to explain animals’ ability to learn
these types of perceptual categorisation tasks.

3.4.4.1 The genetic hypothesis
This theory suggests that a subject comes into a concept learning experiment with preexisting concepts. The idea was raised in Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) experiment,
where the authors suggested that the speed with which the subjects learned the task
indicated they had merely been taught the experimental procedure and had entered the
experiment with the concept ‘person’ already formed.
The genetic hypothesis was also invoked in Herrnstein et al.’s (1976) study showing
pigeons could learn to categorise pictures of trees. The authors suggested pigeons form
categories on the basis of both visual stimulus generalisation and the formation of object
categories. They proposed the formation of the object categories might be genetically
based, with objects with evolutionary significance, such as trees and water, being
grouped together on the basis of having similar psychological consequences.
Whether or not this idea has merit, it does not account for the numerous categorisation
studies conducted using stimuli that the subjects would not have encountered before,
such as fish (Herrnstein and de Villiers 1980) and chairs (Bhatt et al. 1988).

3.4.4.2 Rote learning
One possible explanation for successful performance of a perceptual categorisation is
that the animal simply memorises each stimulus and its appropriate response.
Considering the number of possible examples of a perceptual concept such as ‘person’
is prohibitively large this explanation initially seems unlikely, however the number of
examples actually used in any particular experiment is comparatively small and they are
often repeated over sessions (Lea 1984b).
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3.4.4.2.1 Evidence for rote learning
This type of categorisation is dependent on an animal’s memory storage abilities and a
number of studies have demonstrated the plausibility of this explanation. A study by
Vaughan and Greene (1984) showed pigeons successfully sorted up to 160 exemplars of
squiggles and 320 photographs into arbitrary categories and exhibited evidence of
memory retention when tested with the final 80 slides more than two years later.
Similarly, Von Fersen and Delius’ (1989) study showed pigeons could discriminate 100
different positive stimuli from a further 625 similar negative stimuli. Cook, Levison,
Gillett and Blaisdell (2005) conducted an experiment in which pigeons were able to
access, on average, approximately 830 memorised picture–response associations and
retain them for months at a time.
A prodigious capacity to classify arbitrary exemplars is not unique to pigeons. Research
from naturalistic settings has shown that a variety of birds can find a large number of
sites in which they have cached seeds, an ability thought to be an evolved adaptation for
food storing. While the recovery of these caches by marsh tits usually occurs within 24
hours after caching (Cowie, Krebs and Sherry 1981; Sherry 1982, 1984; Sherry, Krebs
and Cowie 1981; Shettleworth and Krebs 1982), Clark’s nutcrackers can still find
thousands of cached food sites after several months (Kamil and Balda 1985; Vander
Wall 1982). Similarly, Hawaiian honeycreepers are able to visually keep track of which
flowers (among more than 1000) they have already visited (Kamil 1978). Monkeys have
also been shown to have an excellent long-term memory for relatively large numbers of
pictorial stimuli (Ringo and Doty 1985) and humans have also demonstrated an
impressive capacity for rote categorisation (Nickerson 1965; Shepard 1967).

3.4.4.2.2 Evidence against rote learning
If memorisation was in fact the basis of these types of experiments then similarity
among stimuli and the identity of the category would be irrelevant and perceptual
categorisation, as it has been defined here, would not have been demonstrated.
However, while it is likely that some aspects of categorisation might be based on
memory (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990), numerous experiments have indicated that
memorisation is not the sole basis of this type of performance.
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Even with the pigeon’s memory capabilities, rote learning seems an unlikely
explanation for Herrnstein et al.’s (1976) experiment showing categorisation of pictures
of trees, bodies of water and a particular person. During training, the authors changed
the slides each day using a pool of 1840, 1760 and 1600 slides respectively for each of
the three experiments. An even less likely candidate for rote learning was demonstrated
in one of the experiments in Bhatt et al. (1988). Pigeons were able to learn a fourcategory discrimination (people, cars, flowers and chairs) using 2000 non-repeating
slides, demonstrating that repetitive training with a limited number of stimuli is not
necessary for successful perceptual categorisation performance. Indeed, in a natural
setting, even a prodigious memory would likely prove insufficient where the number of
exemplars of a given class (e.g. acorns for a foraging squirrel) would be open ended
(Cheney and Seyfarth 1990).
More significantly, most studies require the successful categorisation of transfer trials
using novel stimuli that the subject could not have stored in its memory (e.g. Bhatt et al.
1988). According to Herrnstein (1990): “The test of a categorisation beyond rote is
generalisation” (p. 145) and, as Zayan and Vauclair (1998) point out: “There is an
abundant literature showing the abilities of animals from different species to
successfully categorise to novel instances at their first presentations” (p. 90). Even
authors who argue that the ability of animals to categorise familiar objects is based on
them remembering each instance and the category to which it belongs (e.g. Astley and
Wasserman 1992; Pearce 1988, 1989, 1991) acknowledge that some other mechanism
must be employed to account for successful categorisation of novel stimuli.
It is true that some authors have questioned whether successful transfer to novel stimuli
is sufficient to demonstrate categorisation (e.g. Wasserman, Kiedinger and Bhatt 1988;
Zayan and Vauclair 1998). One possibility is that the categorisation of novel stimuli is
due to the stimuli in the training set being indistinguishable from those in the testing set
so that, rather than exhibiting categorisation, the subjects are simply not able to tell
them apart. According to Sturdy et al. (1999): “Transfer to untrained exemplars is
arguably the single most important feature of categorisation, but transfer alone is
insufficient to show that any given discrimination is based on open-ended
categorisation. One must also show discrimination among exemplars” (p. 210). One
possible example of the inability to discriminate within a category is found in Cerella
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(1979) where the pigeons were able to distinguish oak leaves from non-oak leaves but
were unable to distinguish between a specific oak leaf and oak leaves in general. A
similar inability to discriminate between within-category stimuli was found using
alphanumeric characters with baboons (Vauclair and Fagot 1996). However, while this
may account for successful transfer in cases where the stimuli are perceptually similar,
it does not explain the numerous instances of non-similarity based categorisation (see
section 3.4.4.3.4.ii); suggesting that rote learning alone is insufficient to explain
perceptual categorisation.

3.4.4.3 Exemplar theory
One theory that attempts to explain transfer to novel stimuli is exemplar theory (Astley
and Wasserman 1992; Pearce 1988, 1991), which parallels the non-elemental configural
theory of discrimination (see section 3.1.4.2.1.ii). Like rote learning, exemplar theory
assumes that individual, intact stimuli are stored in memory. However exemplar theory
also makes an important additional assumption that animals show primary stimulus
generalisation from one picture to another. Stimulus generalisation means the tendency
to respond to previously seen stimuli will generalise to a similar, novel stimulus.
According to this theory, the only information used to make perceptual categorisation
decisions is the memorised training stimuli and the degree of similarity between known
and new exemplars. The exemplar model, then, assumes a fairly elementary level of
categorisation – relying on common psychologically significant consequences rather
than a rule, common feature or abstract representation (Huber 2001; Roberts 1998).

3.4.4.3.1 Evidence for exemplar theory
Support for the exemplar view of perceptual categorisation has been found in a number
of experiments. Bhatt et al. (1988) and Schrier et al. (1984) showed that performance is
often better in the presence of photographs that have been used during the training
period than with novel photographs belonging to the same category. This suggests that
animals can learn about individual training stimuli and that this information could be at
least partly responsible for successful categorisation. A similar phenomenon is also
found in humans, where it is referred to as the “exemplar effect” (Homa, Dunbar and
Nohre 1991) (Pearce 1997).
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Furthermore, in a study examining symmetry recognition using chessboard patterns,
Huber et al. (1999) found pigeons used similarity to training stimuli, rather than a
symmetry concept, to generalise to novel stimuli. The authors found the pigeons
generalised only very conservatively from the training stimuli in a similar manner to the
template-matching system described by Cerella (1990).
However, the most common method for determining whether simple stimulus
generalisation is responsible for transfer to novel stimuli is to use artificially constructed
stimulus sets called “pseudocategories” or “pseudoconcepts” (Lea 1984b). Lea and
Ryan (1990) have divided such experiments into two categories – the “perverse
pseudoconcept task”, which involves the arbitrary assignment of category and noncategory exemplars to positive and negative classes, and the “random pseudoconcept
task” in which no ‘concept’ exists within the stimulus set.
A number of categorisation experiments utilising pseudoconcept tests have supported
the exemplar theory by concluding that the animals achieved discrimination by learning
only about the specific stimuli in the training phase (Cook et al. 1990; Schrier et al.
1984; Vaughan and Greene 1983). Cook et al. (1990) found uniform rates of
discrimination acquisition between birds trained using a true category condition and
those trained using a pseudoconcept and that transfer was determined by the specific
nature of the training exemplars. Their results influenced Huber (2001, Chapter 2,
online) to conclude that exemplar-based categorisation theories are “a plausible
alternative to more relational and analytic processing mechanisms”; while Roberts
(1998) claimed exemplar theory accounts for most picture classification experiments.

3.4.4.3.2 Evidence against exemplar theory
However, other authors using a similar pseudoconcept procedure have shown that
pigeons learn about category-specific information instead of, or in addition to, itemspecific information. Unlike the previous experiments, these showed that there was a
difference in responding between the ‘concept’ and ‘pseudoconcept’ groups, with better
performance in the concept groupings (e.g. Edwards and Honig 1987; Herrnstein and de
Villiers 1980; Wasserman et al. 1988). A similar result was found in zebra finches by
Sturdy et al. (1999), who demonstrated that the birds learned pseudocategory
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discriminations more slowly than true song-note category discriminations of the same
notes.
Results from studies in which subjects showed higher responding to negative stimuli
drawn from the same category as the positive exemplars have supported these results by
suggesting animals detect the perceptual coherence within natural categories and do not
rely solely on arbitrary relationships established during training (e.g. Astley and
Wasserman 1992). Similarly, Fujita and Matsuzawa (1986) and Fujita (1987) used a
procedure that allowed categories to emerge without reinforcement to demonstrate that
at least some primates appear to respond spontaneously to categories such as ‘human’
and ‘conspecific’.
However, not all authors view the results of these types of pseudocategory experiments
as evidence against exemplar learning. Shettleworth (1998), for example, argues that
slides belonging to a perceptual category like ‘people’ or ‘fish’ will have more in
common than members of a random group of slides, such as certain colours or contours.
If that is the case, stimulus generalisation will tend to improve performance among
category members and impede performance of pseudocategory members. Huber (2001)
argues that even if exemplar-based categorisation strategies are a plausible alternative to
more sophisticated mechanisms, the relevance for pigeons and other animals in the wild
has not been determined.

3.4.4.3.3 Why both types of results?
Several authors have attempted to determine why pseudoconcept studies have shown
such contradictory results. Wasserman and Astley (1994) distinguish between itemspecific and category-specific aspects of stimuli – the first used to discriminate between
instances of the same class and the second to discriminate between instances of different
classes. The use of category-specific information significantly facilitates classification
in terms of acquisition and transfer to novel stimuli. However, if category-specific
information is either unavailable or unable to be distinguished, then category learning
would be restricted to learning about each stimulus individually (Huber 2001).
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Similarly, Cook et al. (1990) suggests that categorisation may consist of two phases – a
“stimulus learning” phase in which only item-specific information that distinguishes an
exemplar from all other stimuli is learned; and a “concept” phase in which categoryspecific information is extracted. Huber (2001) argues that in cases where the second
phase does not follow the first, such as in his symmetry experiment mentioned above as
an example of exemplar learning (Huber et al. 1999), then true open-ended
categorisation has not been achieved. Another possibility is that the differing outcomes
are the result of experimental variables, such as the number of exemplars used, leading
to different strategies being employed by experimental subjects (see section 3.4.4.6).

3.4.4.3.4 Problems with exemplar theory
Huber (2001) points out there are a number of potential problems with exemplar theory:
i) How many exemplars can be stored and retrieved for comparison, and ii) how
similarity can be determined to ensure the subject responds only to instances of the
same category.

i) Number of exemplars

The first problem is the number of exemplars. Because exemplar theory relies on
comparison of a new stimulus with a known exemplar of the category, the individual
stimuli have to maintain their “memorial integrity” no matter how many stimuli are
presented (Huber 2001). However, there is no consensus on the number of exemplars
that can be remembered. As discussed in section 3.4.4.2, while the rote learning
capacity of species such as the pigeon is impressive, some tasks have been successfully
performed using stimulus numbers so large it seems unlikely they could all be
memorised (e.g. Herrnstein et al. 1976). There is also no way to account for studies
using large numbers of non-repeating stimuli (e.g. Bhatt et al. 1988).
Some authors have attempted to address this problem by creating variants of exemplar
theory which assume that categorisation is based on a small subset of the total number
of stimuli, or that specific retrieval rules determine which patterns are most likely to be
accessed (Huber 2001).
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ii) Assessment of similarity

The other problem with exemplar theory is that it is limited to stimuli that are similar to
the training stimuli. While exemplar-based mechanisms may be effective for categories
with highly similar members, it does not account for generalisation to dissimilar new
instances. It is also difficult to determine what defines similarity between two stimuli
that happen to be members of the same experimenter-defined category.
Lea (1984b) suggests that the simplest possibility is that two stimuli are similar if they
have features in common. Novel examples of human natural-language categories such
as ‘person’ or ‘fish’ will inevitably be somewhat similar to the training stimuli and
simple stimulus generalisation could account for correct discrimination in these cases
(see Shettleworth 1998; section 3.4.4.3.2).
However, this does not account for instances of categorisation where simple physical
similarity does not appear to have been the only controlling factor. For example, in
Herrnstein et al.’s (1976) experiments showing pigeons’ ability to categorise ‘tree’
versus ‘non-tree’, the positive stimuli did not need to have the typical features of trees
to be correctly classified – they did not need to be green or have leaves, trunks or
branches. Also, some of the non-trees exhibited tree-like features such as leaves or
branches, albeit in different configurations to that found on trees. For example, a picture
of celery, which was visually similar to a tree, was correctly identified as a non-tree. It
could be argued that this performance was aided by prior familiarity with trees on the
part of the pigeons (Herrnstein 1982). However, a similar result was found using slides
of fish of varying degrees of physical similarity (Herrnstein and de Villiers 1980), a
subject the test pigeons would not have previously experienced (Herrnstein 1982).
The study by Cook et al. (1990), cited in section 3.4.4.3.1 as providing evidence for
exemplar theory, also revealed an apparent theoretical inconsistency in the way in
which the stimuli were stored in the pigeons’ memory. The authors found that the
stimuli were not stored in their entirety; rather that the pigeons had selectively attended
to specific aspects of the stimulus array. Classification behaviour was controlled only by
animal figures in the pictures, irrespective of the background, rotation or reflection
about a vertical axis. This type of analytical process is more in line with feature theory.
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3.4.4.4 Feature theory
An alternative explanation for non-human perceptual categorisation that accounts for
generalisation to dissimilar novel stimuli is based on common features of the positive
and/or negative stimuli. According to feature theory, objects are characterised by the set
of perceptual features of which they are composed. A ‘feature’ can refer to any
elementary property of a stimulus that is psychologically processed. In a similar manner
to the elemental theories of discrimination learning (see section 3.1.4.2.1.i), features
gain a positive association when they are associated with trials with a positive
(rewarded) outcome and a negative association when associated with a negative
outcome. Membership of a category is then determined by whether or not a stimulus
contains one or more necessary defining features (Huber 2001).
There are two main schools of thought regarding feature theory:
Single features: This theory holds that a single common feature, such as some property
of the spatial frequency spectrum of the stimuli, is responsible for perceptual
categorisation. As discussed earlier, one of the tenets of perceptual categorisation is that
there is no single perceptual feature common to all members of a category, so this
theory would relegate animal categorisation to simple discrimination. However this
theory is largely dismissed as being lacking in empirical evidence (Lea 1984b).
Multiple features: This version of feature theory acknowledges that natural categories
are polymorphic in nature (Ryle 1949) and suggests that no single feature can account
for categorisation. Instead the subject uses some conjunctive, disjunctive or additive
combination of features. Discriminations designed to be solved using this method are
easily handled by pigeons (e.g. Lea and Harrison 1978; Von Fersen and Lea 1990).
Multiple feature theory also provides a plausible explanation of how novel stimuli are
correctly discriminated. As long as the new stimuli contain the right combination of
features they should elicit the same response as the training stimuli (Lea 1984b).
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3.4.4.4.1 Evidence for feature theory
A number of authors have acknowledged that attempts to prove a feature theory of
perceptual categorisation have been hindered by the difficulty in determining what, if
any, features are controlling the subject’s behaviour when richly detailed natural stimuli
are used (Cook et al. 1990; Fetterman 1996; Herrnstein 1984; Lea 1984b; Thompson
1995). Some evidence for feature-based control of categorisation performance has been
elicited by analysing slides that have been grossly misidentified. Monkeys trained to
categorise slides on the basis of whether or not they contained people were found to be
selecting slides partly based on the presence or absence of patches of red colouration:
slides showing a piece watermelon or a hyena carrying a dead flamingo were treated
like slides of people (D’Amato and Van Sant 1988). Similarly, experiments by both
Greene (1983) and Honig and Stewart (1988) with pigeons showed stimulus choice
being controlled by features of the background of photographs instead of the relevant
subjects (Huber 2001).
A more effective way of testing feature theory is to use artificial stimuli that, without
the complexity of natural scenes, can be modified to try and isolate the particular
features controlling the animal’s performance. For example, Morgan et al. (1976) and
Schrier et al. (1984) found their subjects (pigeons and macaques respectively) were
using multiple features to categorise alphanumeric characters. A number of these types
of artificial-stimulus experiments have been conducted to more closely analyse featurebased categorisation, and these generally fall into two categories.

Post-hoc analysis

The first type of experiment involves post-hoc analysis. Researchers attempt to interpret
their results by trying to identify the features that controlled the animal’s classification
performance. This is done either by correlating the features the experimenter was
attending to with the subject’s actual responses or by conducting sophisticated statistical
procedures such as cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling (see Blough 2001;
Huber 2001).
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One often-cited series of experiments was conducted using the Peanuts cartoon
characters (Cerella 1980, 1982, 1986). In these experiments pigeons were initially
taught to discriminate Charlie Brown from other cartoon characters. They were then
tested with slides of Charlie Brown that were deformed in some way (e.g. scrambled,
truncated, upside-down). The pigeons treated the unusual slides as equivalent to the
intact training stimuli, as “collections of local features rather than as representations of
three-dimensional objects” (Cerella 1980, p. 1). This result can be explained by feature
theory because the unusual slides contained all the features of the training stimuli, albeit
presented in a novel way (Pearce 1997).
Conversely, similar experiments conducted using budgerigars showed greater latencies
when the birds were viewing scrambled budgerigar faces compared to normal
budgerigar faces, suggesting the configuration of features is also important (Brown and
Dooling 1993). However, the influence of some sort of special face recognition (such as
that found in sheep, Kendrick et al. 1995, and monkeys, Phelps and Roberts 1994) as
well as the budgerigars’ extensive prior testing with normal faces raises some doubts
about these results (Shettleworth 1998).

The synthetic approach

This type of experiment involves an a priori method that enables the experimenter to
more rigorously test the subjects’ ability to extract the relevant features. This is a
synthetic approach in which artificial concepts are constructed that can be defined by a
small number of independent features, each with a predetermined probability of
occurrence (Huber 2001).
Huber and Lenz (1993) employed simple line drawings of human faces to test a linear
feature model. The faces contained four features that could be assigned one of three
values (-1, 0, +1) according to their position in the face and these values were then
arbitrarily assigned to categories. The combination of the values of the four features
determined whether it belonged to the negative or positive category (patterns with a
feature sum of zero were eliminated). In order to successfully categorise the stimuli the
pigeons had to be able to attend to all four features equally and combine that
information in an additive manner.
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The authors found the pigeons were able to perfectly divide all the stimuli into the
experimenter-defined categories after only three weeks. Analysis of pecking rates
confirmed that all four features had exerted equal control over the birds’ responding and
that the values were combined in an additive manner, leading Huber and Lenz (1993) to
interpret their results in terms of feature theory.

3.4.4.4.2 Evidence against feature theory
While feature theory has drawn support from a number authors (e.g. Cerella 1986;
Herrnstein et al. 1976; Lea 1984b; Morgan et al. 1976) it is not universally supported
either theoretically or empirically. Critics argue that tests of linear feature models are
usually conducted using artificial instead of natural stimuli and often lead to conflicting
results (Lea and Ryan 1990; Huber and Lenz 1993) (see Thompson 1995).
In addition, while it seems likely that animals make some use of features in solving
perceptual categorisation experiments, it is by no means certain that it is the only
method used. While authors such as Cerella (1980, 1986) have argued that pigeons
merely process “particulates” (local features) of visual information irrespective of their
global relationships to one another, other experimenters have demonstrated that pigeons
use information about both the properties and the spatial relationships of stimulus
features (Kirkpatrick-Steger and Wasserman 1996; Kirkpatrick-Steger, Wasserman and
Biederman 1996, 1998; Steele 1990; Wasserman, Kirkpatrick-Steger, Van Hamme and
Biederman 1993; Watanabe and Ito 1991).

3.4.4.4.3 Why both types of results?
In an overview of stimulus processing by pigeons, Cook (2001) suggests a number of
factors that might lead to the conflicting results of studies both supporting and refuting a
strict feature-based account of perceptual categorisation. Based on his own and others’
studies, Cook (2001) has concluded that pigeons use both feature and global
information to solve these types of categorisations depending on the experimental
design, a view that was demonstrated empirically by Matsukawa, Inoue and Jitsumori
(2004). Some of these design factors could include stimulus complexity, viewing
distance, stimulus location, attention reinforcement, and the relative salience of featural
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and configural information (Cook 2001), as well as the method used to scramble
stimulus objects (Kirkpatrick-Steger et al. 1998). For example, Cerella (1986) may have
found feature-based stimulus control because cartoon characters such as Charlie Brown
are designed to contain very strong and simple features. Conversely, the use of stimulus
objects made up of geons (simple, geometrical volumes modelled into objects, e.g. can,
handle, spout and nozzle = watering can) may have led to the global-based stimulus
control observed by Wasserman et al. (1993). Alternatively, Watanabe (2001) theorised
that pigeons were more sensitive to the global arrangement of what they saw as ‘real’
objects. The author found that scrambling photographs of people and pigeons severely
suppressed responding in pigeons, scrambling cartoons of pigeons suppressed
responding to a lesser extent, while scrambling cartoons of people had only a small
negative impact. (See also section 3.4.4.6).

3.4.4.5 Prototype theory
Another theory widely used in discussions of human concept learning (e.g. Shanks
1994) is that in viewing a number of exemplars, animals form a category prototype – an
‘ideal’ exemplar that represents the central tendency of the all exemplars viewed
(Shettleworth 1998). Once formed, it is assumed that the prototype is activated
whenever an exemplar is presented and that activation will elicit the appropriate
response for the category. The likelihood of the prototype being activated, and hence the
appropriate response being given, is related to the degree of similarity between the
exemplar and the prototype (Pearce 1997).

3.4.4.5.1 Evidence for prototype theory
Evidence for this theory was found in human studies that showed categorisations were
made more easily when there was a close resemblance between the exemplar and the
prototype (Posner and Keele 1968). Initial attempts to replicate this effect in animals
were unsuccessful (e.g. Lea and Harrison 1978; Pearce 1987), however recent
experiments have proved more fruitful (Aydin and Pearce 1994; Von Fersen and Lea
1990). Jitsumori (1996) trained pigeons to discriminate artificial polymorphous stimuli
differing along three six-valued features. Exemplars of the two categories were created
by manipulating the features of two different prototypes. When the pigeons were tested
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for transfer to novel stimuli (which included the two prototypes), the most pronounced
discrimination occurred between the prototypes rather than between the extreme
positive and negative stimuli. After ruling out a feature-based explanation using
distorted stimuli, the authors concluded that a prototype model best explained their
findings.

3.4.4.5.2 Evidence against prototype theory
Despite some success, experimental support for prototype theory remains relatively
weak. A number of studies have demonstrated that the prototypical effect in humans can
be explained by either feature (McClelland and Rumelhart 1985) or exemplar
(Hintzman 1986; Shin and Nosofsky 1992) categorisation theories and the same seems
to hold true for animals (Pearce 1997).
While pigeons in the studies by Aydin and Pearce (1994) and Von Fersen and Lea
(1990) did show better categorical performance with prototypical stimuli, the evidence
was tempered by the fact that prototypical forms had actually been presented to the
subjects before testing (Zayan and Vauclair 1998). Dépy, Fagot and Vauclair (1997)
showed baboons classified prototypes more accurately than other exemplars; however
analysis showed the monkeys had actually used feature and exemplar-based
associations. Further, a number of other studies have reported no difference between
prototypical and non-prototypical stimuli in birds (e.g. Huber and Lenz 1993; Jitsumori
1993; Lea, Lohmann and Ryan 1993; Watanabe 1988) and primates (Jitsumori 1994).
In addition, a number of researchers have found that even when animals seem to be
sensitive to the same natural categories as humans, their idea of the ‘ideal’ exemplar is
not always the same. Experiments conducted by Herrnstein (1979), Herrnstein and de
Villiers (1980) and Roberts and Mazmanian (1988), for example, showed animal
pictures rated by humans as ideal, or typical, exemplars did not match pictures that were
highly discriminable by animal subjects. Similarly, Cook et al. (1990) used line
drawings rated by humans on the basis of their prototypicality to train two groups of
pigeons on ‘good’ and ‘poor’ exemplars respectively. The authors found that transfer
was not influenced by the typicality of the test stimulus. Whatever features determined
the ‘good’ exemplars for humans were not salient for the pigeons, whose choices were
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determined by the range of training exemplars rather than the particular features of a
prototype (Thompson 1995). In all these cases, however, the influence of people’s prior
experience compared to that of pigeons must be taken into account. Herrnstein and de
Villiers’ (1980) study used photos of fish, presumably much more familiar to people
than pigeons. Unlike the pigeons, prior experience enabled human subjects to correctly
select photos of partially obstructed fish; however, it also led them to incorrectly select
whales.

3.4.4.6 Multiple strategy
A complement to the theories put forward to explain animal perceptual categorisation is
the idea of multiple strategy – that is, that animals don’t use just one of these
mechanisms but a combination. Which methods an animal uses to perform a
categorisation task may depend on how the experiment is conducted. Studies have
shown that pigeons, for example, will utilise simpler methods if they are able. “The
methodological problem is … that pigeons can categorise at levels of abstraction that
defy both explanation and simulation, but they do not have to” (Troje et al. 1999, p.
354). Kendrick, Wright and Cook (1990) found their perceptual categorisation study
with pigeons was controlled by rote memorisation when only a few stimulus items were
used, exemplar processing when more items were involved and by prototype learning
when even more items were used. Similarly, Wright and Katz (2006) claimed too few
training stimuli led to item-specific rather than relational learning in same/different
categorisation in pigeons (see section 3.7.3.1). A comparable effect is seen in humans,
where having fewer training stimuli appears to promote learning of individual stimuli
while the use of many training exemplars enhances category learning (Cook et al.
1990).
Pearce (1997) suggests that animals may employ different strategies depending on the
complexity of the stimuli being used. In addition, the nature of some tasks may
encourage animals to focus on components of stimuli, in line with feature theory, while
other tasks may lead to a more global perspective, such as that described in exemplar
theory (see Huber and Lenz 1993). In a series of experiments Cook and colleagues
found pigeons were quite elastic in how they processed visual information. Texture
stimuli consisting of large arrays of smaller elements with strong edges and surface-like
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characteristics led the pigeons to attend to global differences, while the use of
hierarchical figural stimuli led to a stronger influence of local, feature-based
information. Dynamic, object-like stimuli, on the other hand, suggested control by an
integration of object and motion properties over time (Cook 2001).
Greene (1983), in replicating Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) person/non-person
experiment, found that the pigeons’ performance had been controlled not only by the
category-relevant features of the people but also by irrelevant features in the
background. According to Greene, the pigeons seemed to use memorisation initially and
then use higher-order techniques when necessary. Similarly, in D’Amato and Van
Sant’s (1988) ‘person’ category experiment described in section 3.4.4.4.1, the presence
of a red patch was not the only method used by the monkeys to identify person-present
slides. Many slides without red colouration were correctly classified as showing people.
Huber et al. (1999) also provided evidence of pigeons’ tendency to switch between
learning about a symmetry category rule to relying on perceptual cues.
This phenomenon of multiple strategies being utilised within experiments may be at
work in the line-drawing discrimination study by Cook et al. (1990). Cited in section
3.4.4.3.1 as an example of exemplar learning, the authors also found aspects of feature
learning in the pigeons’ performance (see section 3.4.4.3.4). By using test variants of
the pictures, the authors found some features of the stimuli, such as 90-degree rotation
or reflection about the vertical axis, were not controlling the pigeons’ classification
performance. The birds also seemed to have selectively attended to specific aspects of
the stimuli and decomposed the pictures into at least the basic features of figure and
ground (Huber 2001).
Roitblat and von Fersen (1992) suggested the complexity of categorisation behaviours
required the creation of a more comprehensive theory that incorporated feature and
exemplar-based theories (e.g. relaxation theories). Finally, one important factor to take
into consideration when evaluating perceptual categorisation theories is the fact that the
vast majority of experimental studies are conducted with pigeons. The avian visual
system contains specialised structures and functions (Cook 2001), casting some doubt
on the universality of findings from pigeon-based studies.
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3.4.4.7 Concept learning
Despite the numerous perceptual mechanisms described above, many authors have
claimed that animals are able to successfully perform perceptual categorisations because
they possess a concept. What the term concept might mean when applied to nonhumans and whether perceptual categorisation, or indeed any form of animal
categorisation, can reasonably be called conceptual will be discussed in section 3.8.

3.5 Associative categorisation
The next type of categorisation in Zentall et al.’s (2002) list (see section 3.3.2) is
associative categorisation. It was decided not to test the echidna on this level due to the
paucity of experimental literature and, like perceptual categorisation, the lack of support
for the relative complexity of the task. However, it is worth providing a brief overview
as associative categorisation provides a theoretical backdrop to the next level of
categorisation.

3.5.1 Definition and associative categorisation in nature
While perceptual categorisation is based on some form of physical similarity, in
associative (or secondary) categorisation the stimuli within classes “bear no obvious
physical similarity to one another, but rather cohere because of shared functional
properties” (Zentall et al. 2002, p. 241). This shared function can include a common
response engendered by the stimuli or a common consequence with which they are
correlated.
Studies of the social relationships between animals have suggested categorisation based
on mediating associations other than perceptual similarity. Dasser (1988a, 1988b), for
example, used discrimination and match-to-sample tasks to demonstrate that two adult
female Java monkeys were able to discriminate mother-offspring and sibling pairs from
within their social group. There was no evidence that the discrimination was based on
physical similarity or extraneous cues. Rather the author concluded that, during the
years they had spent in the group, the subjects had been exposed to common functional
associations such as physical proximity and distinctive interactions leading to the
126

formation of social categories. Rhesus macaques have also shown they can categorise
on the basis of dominance relations among conspecifics (Bovet and Washburn 2003).
Similarly, studies of vocal categories have also suggested that animals can perform
associative categorisation based on functionally equivalent categories. Vervet monkeys
give two acoustically different calls (labelled ‘wrrs’ and ‘chutters’) at the approach of a
neighbouring group – that is, both calls belong to the same functional category. Cheney
and Seyfarth (1988) first measured a group of vervet monkeys’ reaction to one
individual’s ‘chutter’ call (based on gazes towards the caller). The group was then
repeatedly played that individual’s ‘wrr’ call until they had habituated to it (as measured
by a reduction in gazes towards the caller), then replayed the initial ‘chutter’ call. The
monkeys showed less interest in the ‘chutter’ call after being habituated to the ‘wrr’
call, suggesting that perhaps the monkeys categorise both calls on the basis of their
common referent (Thompson 1995).
Cheney and Seyfarth (1988) then conducted a similar experiment using two alarm calls
(‘leopard’ and ‘eagle’) that differed acoustically but, unlike the wrr and chutter calls,
had different referents. This time there was no reduction in response to the repeat of the
first ‘eagle’ call following habituation of the ‘leopard’ call, presumably because they
were associated with different referents and as such were in different categories
(Thompson 1995).
It is also possible that some experiments described as examples of perceptual
categorisation may have been solved using associative mechanisms. In the studies of
vervet monkey alarm calls (see section 3.4.1), in which the monkeys give different
alarm calls in response to different predators, it could be argued that the monkeys
formed categories based on both perceptually based stimuli (leopard, eagle, snake) and
associatively based stimuli (predator, non-predator) (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, 1980b).
Similarly, stimuli that have been successfully categorised by pigeons in the perceptual
categories ‘food’ (Watanabe 1991, 1993) and ‘pigeon’ (Poole and Lander 1971) may
have been classified according to functional labels such as ‘edible’ and ‘conspecific’
(Watanabe 1991).
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3.5.2 Associative categorisation experiments
There has not been an extensive history of testing for this type of categorisation
performance and most of what has been done has been conducted with language-trained
animals. Premack (1976, 1986) showed language-trained chimpanzees were easily able
to categorise different parts of fruit, such as seeds, as fruit even when symbols, rather
than real objects, were being used. Similarly, Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, Smith and
Lawson (1980) showed language-trained chimpanzees were able to group both items
and the symbols for those items into superordinate functional classes such as ‘food’ and
‘tools’ (see also Gardner and Gardner 1984, 1985).
In 1990 Cheney and Seyfarth claimed that up until that time only language-trained
chimpanzees had demonstrated associative categorisation in an experimental setting.
However, Tanaka has demonstrated non-language trained chimpanzees are able to
classify items according to complementary relationships. Tanaka (1995) found five
chimpanzees could use complementary relationships between objects (e.g. a bottle and
cap) to sort objects in an object-sorting task. Tanaka (1996) also found a non-language
trained female chimpanzee was able to match physical items (and their photographs) on
the basis of learned functional relationships in a matching-to-sample task. For example,
she could match one part of a two-part object to its other part (such as a box and its lid),
a container to its tool and a tool to its container, even when non-matches looked more
like the sample.
Bovet and Vauclair (1998) demonstrated that non-language trained baboons could
categorise novel pairs of objects based on their functional relationships (food versus
non-food). The authors also showed that the baboons could master the task even when
pictures, rather than the actual objects, were used as stimuli. Watanabe (1993, 1997)
proved pigeons could also correctly sort objects into food and non-food categories. As
with the Bovet and Vauclair (1998) study, the pigeons were able to generalise the
performance to novel stimuli regardless of the type of stimulus used (picture or object).
It has also been argued that non-language trained animals have demonstrated the ability
to perform associative categorisation in experiments using artificially created
associative categories. Instead of being solved based on ‘real life’ functional
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associations, these categories are made up of initially unrelated stimuli grouped together
by means of a common reinforcement history, forming equivalence classes (Lea 1984b).
(See section 3.7.6.1.1 for a discussion on the evidence for and against the formation of
equivalence classes in animals). One of the most popular ways in which the ability to
form these categories has been tested is through the use of a many-to-one matching
procedure in which two or more samples are associated with the same comparison
stimulus. Following training, a number of studies have found relationships emerging
between samples associated with the same comparison – a result also known as
common coding (Zentall 2000a) – and associatively based pseudocategories being
formed (see section 3.4.4.3.1 for more examples of pseudocategory experiments).
The most direct evidence for common coding is found when the introduction of new
stimuli transfer to the entire pseudocategory. This occurs when, following the creation
of the pseudocategories, one member of each of the pseudocategories is associated
through common reinforcement with novel stimuli. This association between the novel
stimulus and a single category member is then found to generalise to the remaining
members of the pseudocategory (e.g. Urcuioli et al. 1995; Urcuioli, Zentall, JacksonSmith and Steirn 1989).
Additional evidence for pseudocategory formation following many-to-one matching is
seen in experiments where it has proved difficult to reverse sample-comparison
associations which involve one member of the pseudocategory and not the other
(Nakagawa 1986; Zentall et al. 1991). Further, it has also been found that pigeons are
less able to discriminate between samples that have been associated with the same
comparison than those associated with different comparisons (Kaiser, Sherburne, Steirn
and Zentall 1997). Finally, support for pseudocategory formation is found in tests of
retention function in delayed matching-to-sample. Samples containing line orientation
are not remembered as well as those containing hues. However, there is comparable
retention of line orientation samples when they are associated with the same comparison
as a hue sample (Urcuioli et al. 1989; Zentall 2000a; Zentall et al. 1989).
Secondary categorical relationships can also form between perceptually similar items
using serial reversal training. Vaughan (1988), for example, reinforced pigeons for
responding to one set of tree slides but not another. After the initial discrimination had
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been mastered, the author then conducted discrimination reversals in which the S+ and
S- categories were alternated. After dozens of reversals the pigeons were able to reverse
the categories after the first few trials, suggesting they had formed two separate
categories from a pool of perceptually similar stimuli. However, it has been suggested
that the fact so many trials were required to achieve successful category reversal may
mean that perceptual similarity could impair the formation of secondary categorical
associations using standard training procedures (Thompson 1995). Kastak, Schusterman
and Kastak (2001) also used a discrimination reversal procedure to demonstrate that
California sea lions were able to classify stimuli into functional classes. The sea lions
were then able to transfer the emergent relations to a matching-to-sample procedure.
Not all experiments have supported the idea that training pseudocategories in animals
leads to the formation of true equivalence classes. Bhatt and Wasserman (1989) found
pigeons originally trained to categorise a pseudocategory were unable to generalise new
responses trained to a subset of the category to the other members of the category.
However, Wasserman, DeVolder and Coppage (1992) found the opposite result when
they used a variation of the procedure. The authors trained pigeons to make the same
response to two groups of perceptually dissimilar stimuli – chairs and cars. A new
response was then trained for just one of the groups (e.g. cars). When the pigeons were
tested on the second group (e.g. chairs), they tended to give the new response rather
than the old, despite having never been reinforced for doing so. The authors concluded
that because the two groups had previously been associated with a common response,
they had formed a new encompassing category consisting of physically different but
functionally equivalent items – an equivalence class.

3.5.3 Associative categorisation theories
3.5.3.1 Language training
Pearce (1997) suggested it was conceivable that language training was responsible for
the ability of animals such as the chimpanzees in Savage-Rumbaugh et al.’s (1980)
experiment to sort objects into functional categories. The chimpanzees were trained
with arbitrary lexigrams representing a class of objects – food and tools – which became
symbolic substitutes (like words) for the objects they represented. However, the ability
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of non-language trained animals to categorise non-similar stimuli into pseudocategories
based on common reinforcement history (see section 3.5.2) suggests that something
other than language-based ‘concepts’ are responsible for associative categorisation, a
position supported by Pearce (1997).

3.5.3.2 Mediated generalisation
One way in which animals may solve associative categorisations that have not been
expressly trained is by mediated generalisation (also called secondary stimulus
generalisation). This relies on the fact that different classes of objects tend to elicit
different responses. For example, in the Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980) experiment
mentioned above, a chimpanzee might react in some consistent way to food items, such
as by salivating. To solve the discrimination, the animal merely has to learn that objects
that elicit this reaction should be treated in one way and items that do not elicit this
reaction should be treated in another (Pearce 1997).
This method of solving associative categorisations could also account for the subjects’
ability to categorise other stimuli such as ‘predator’ (Seyfarth et al. 1980a, 1980b) and
‘conspecific’ (Poole and Lander 1971) as these groups might be expected to elicit a
different response which could theoretically be used to solve the task.
Evidence for mediated generalisation can be seen in experiments like those described in
section 3.5.2 in which reinforcement is used to create artificial associative categories
(pseudocategories) of arbitrary stimuli that function as equivalence classes. In these
instances the mediating factor is the reinforced response rather than a spontaneous
response to some aspect of the stimulus.

3.5.3.3 Concept learning
Another possibility is that associative categorisations are solved using conceptual
means, an issue which will be addressed in section 3.8.
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3.6 Relational categorisation
As discussed earlier, because of the continuing debate over whether successful
perceptual categorisation experiments with non-human animals are due to ‘high-level’
mental processes such as concept learning or the result of more prosaic mechanisms,
testing the echidna on this type of task would not provide sufficient evidence of
‘advanced’ mental abilities. Similarly, the possibility that associative categorisation can
be performed using mediated generalisation, in addition to the paucity of experimental
precedent in this area, meant that it too was not an ideal candidate for this study.
Relational categorisation, however, provides a more promising avenue for investigation.

3.6.1 Definition and relational categorisation in nature
Abstract concepts are rules about relationships (e.g., identity)
among stimuli. Abstract concepts are distinct from so-called
“natural” concepts (e.g., trees), which have some stimulus
feature(s) in common. Abstract concepts transcend the individual
features of stimuli and depend instead upon the relationship
between the stimuli being judged.
(Katz and Wright 2006, p. 80)
While perceptual categorisation is based on the perceptual similarity between stimuli
and associative categorisation is based on the functional commonality of stimuli,
relational categorisations (often described as abstract or relational concept learning) are
solved using the relationship between stimuli. Relational categories are described as
abstract because they transcend the specific attributes of the stimuli used to train them
(Wright 1997). According to Thomas (1996), the operational difference between what
he defines as an absolute class concept (perceptual categorisation) and a relative class
concept (relational categorisation) is that in perceptual tasks there is no need to compare
stimuli, while in relational tasks “the subject must compare the stimulus objects to
determine which one manifests the concept” (p. 160). Herrnstein (1990) described the
categorisation of abstract relations as dealing “not with the exemplars themselves, but
with relations between and among concepts” (p. 138).
Relational categorisation has been demonstrated using ecologically relevant stimuli. For
example, MacDougall-Shackleton and Hulse (1996) found starlings could form an
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abstract auditory concept based on rising versus falling tones at the same time as
attending to the absolute pitch of the sequences. According to the authors, the birds
were sensitive to both the absolute values of the stimuli and their relationships.
However, other studies using ‘natural’ stimuli have proved more difficult to interpret.
One possible naturally occurring relational category is based on social relationships. In
section 3.5.1, Dasser (1988a, 1988b) interpreted her finding that Java monkeys can
correctly categorise slides of pairs of monkeys from its social group based on whether
they are mother and offspring or siblings as an example of associative categorisation.
Shettleworth (1998) suggested insufficient evidence exists to determine whether this
ability is based on forming relational categories or if some role is played by perceptual
or associative mechanisms. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) argue that association rates
alone are insufficient to explain this ability, as related pairs of individuals do not always
interact in the same way or at the same rate as other pairs of the same relation. For
example, some mother-offspring pairs are close and relate often, while others are more
distant (e.g. Altmann 1980; Hinde 1974). Still, all are placed in the same social
relationship category (Dasser 1988a).
Field studies have also suggested that some species of monkey can learn about social
relationships. For example, when vervet monkeys are played screams of juveniles from
their group they look at the mothers (Cheney and Seyfarth 1980; Seyfarth and Cheney
1994) indicating a possible relational category ‘mother-offspring pair’. Similarly,
monkeys have been observed displaying redirected aggression, in which monkeys that
have been attacked retaliate against the aggressor’s affiliates (Aureli, Cozzolino,
Cordischi and Scucchi 1992; Cheney and Seyfarth 1986, 1989). Bovet and Washburn
(2003) claim these types of field studies, and the results of their own experiments with
rhesus macaques showing categorisation based on dominance relations, “seem to
indicate that monkeys can use abstract social concepts” (p. 400).
Another contentious example of relational categorisation in nature is found in studies of
vervet monkeys’ functionally equivalent ‘wrr’ and ‘chutter’ calls given at the approach
of a neighbouring group (Cheney and Seyfarth 1988; Seyfarth and Cheney 1988). As
discussed in section 3.5.1, Thompson (1995) interpreted these results as “evidence of
categorisation via secondary generalisation mediated by a common response or
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referent” (p. 207) – associative categorisation. However, the original authors claimed
the monkeys compared the stimuli based on an abstract relationship. “Results provide
clear evidence that vervet monkeys use meaning to make judgments about the relation
between two vocalisations … Such judgments require that an animal both recognise the
relationship between a call and its referent and compare two referents” (Seyfarth and
Cheney 1988, p. 74).

3.6.2 Relational categorisation experiments
While the above experiments do suggest that some animals perform categorisations
based on relationships in their natural environments, the lack of consensus about
whether they in fact understand relatedness or instead make use of perceptual or
associative mechanisms has led to numerous experiments being conducted to test the
idea using artificial stimuli.
Early evidence suggesting relational learning in non-humans was found in
discrimination experiments such as that conducted by Gonzalez et al. (1954) (see
section 3.1.4.2.2). More recently a number of other techniques have been developed to
test relational learning in animals. These studies have suggested that at least some
animals may be able to discriminate on the basis of a variety of abstract relational
criteria, such as self-concept in chimpanzees (Gallup 1970), serial order in monkeys
(D’Amato and Colombo 1988), insideness in pigeons (Herrnstein, Vaughan, Mumford
and Kosslyn 1989), symmetry in bees (Giurfa, Eichmann and Menzel 1996), relative
size in horses and parrots (Hanggi 2003; Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991), relative
volume in squirrel monkeys (Thomas and Ingram 1979); relative numerosity in pigeons
and dolphins (Honig and Stewart 1989; Jaakkola et al. 2005), above and below in bees
(Avargues-Weber, Dyer and Giurfa 2011), capuchin monkeys (Spinozzi, Lubrano and
Truppa 2004) and baboons (Depy, Fagot and Vauclair 1999), and transitive inference in
chimpanzees (Gillan 1981).
However, the majority of relational categorisation experiments are designed to test the
subject’s ability to categorise on the basis of whether items are the same or different.
For this reason, as well as those outlined in section 3.9, it was decided to focus on
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same/different discriminations rather than one of the other examples of relational
learning.

3.7 Same/different categorisation
3.7.1 Definition
When defining same/different categorisation (often called same/different concept
learning), as it will be used in this study, it is important to clarify what it is not. The
ability to recognise whether an object is novel or has been previously seen (with the
concomitant changes in reactivity) is a seemingly ubiquitous attribute in the animal
kingdom (see section 1.2.1.1). However, this kind of passive detection of like/unlike
relations is generally considered insufficient evidence of true same/different learning.
Instead a more active detection of sameness/difference is required – in broad terms, an
ability to make specific relational comparisons regardless of individual stimulus
qualities (Delius 1994).
In humans, the ability to classify events and objects into categories of same or different
based on relational information is considered an essential cognitive skill upon which
many other cognitive abilities are based. It is a skill that, at least since Aristotle’s time,
has been considered virtually universal among human adults (Delius 1994) and which
has more recently been demonstrated in human infants as young as seven months old
(Tyrrell, Zingaro and Minard 1993).
Noted psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan (1894) claimed non-human animals could not
learn abstract concepts like same and different, a claim reiterated a century later by
French (1995, p. xvi): “It is this subtle ability, perhaps more than any other, that sets
human cognition apart from any other on our planet.” However, because same/different
categorisation is often seen as the basis for reasoning in humans, its existence in animals
has been a popular avenue of study for scientists seeking to examine the phylogenetic
origins of human cognition (Delius 1994).
Kohts (1923) conducted one of the earliest experiments attempting to demonstrate that
same/different categorisation might not be the exclusive domain of humans by testing
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chimpanzees. Although his results were inconclusive, he started a research tradition that
has since demonstrated the ability not only in primates, but also in numerous other
species (Delius 1994). There are a number of procedures for testing same/different
categorisation, including spontaneous sorting (McClure and Culbertson 1977;
Matsuzawa 1990) and analogical reasoning (Gillan, Premack and Woodruff 1981). Far
more common, however, are matching/non-matching to sample, oddity and paired
comparison same/different tasks, all of which will be examined in this review.

3.7.2 Same/different categorisation training
3.7.2.1 Methods
3.7.2.1.1 Experimental paradigms
Same/different categorisation is generally tested using four main experimental
paradigms, which can be classified as:
i)

matching to sample – in which subjects are presented with a sample stimulus
and then required to select one of a number of comparison stimuli that is the
same as the sample stimulus (see also section 3.4.2.1.1);

ii)

non-matching to sample, or oddity-from-sample – is the same as matching
except the subjects are required to select the comparison stimulus which is
different from the sample stimulus;

iii)

oddity – in which a single odd stimulus must be selected from a group of
identical stimuli, and;

iv)

paired comparison – in which a different response is required depending on
whether the presented stimuli are the same as or different from one another or,
alternatively, in which subjects are required to discriminate between two
stimulus complexes, one containing identical elements and the other
containing dissimilar elements.
(adapted from King 1973)

Same/different categorisation experiments, whether they are conducted using
matching/non-matching or paired comparison procedures, can be conducted in a number
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of ways that can be broadly grouped according to the way in which stimuli are
presented – successively or simultaneously. In successive categorisation, a test stimulus
is presented followed by one or more comparison stimuli which are either the same as
or different from the test stimulus. In simultaneous categorisation, the test and
comparison stimuli are presented at the same time. Like perceptual and associative
categorisation, both methods of same/different categorisation training require the use of
a testing phase, such as transfer to novel stimuli, to ensure the task has not been solved
using rote learning (Premack 1983a; see section 3.4.2.1.2).

3.7.2.1.2 Successive presentation of stimuli
The successive method of same/different testing is usually conducted using a delayed
matching-to-sample procedure. In a delayed match-to-sample task the sample stimulus
is presented for a selected time period and then removed. After a delay interval, which
may be virtually instantaneous (zero-delay matching) or of longer duration (delayed
matching), two or more comparison stimuli are shown, one of which is the same as the
sample. If the task is to select same, the comparison stimulus that matches the sample
must be selected to gain a reward (e.g. Nissen, Blum and Blum 1948; Tavares and
Tomaz 2002). Successive same/different categorisation can also be tested by reinforcing
the subject for choosing the comparison stimulus that does not match the sample (i.e.
different) (e.g. Irle and Markowitsch 1987). This is called delayed non-matching to
sample, or oddity-from-sample. (See also Carter and Werner 1978; Roitblat 1984).
Although more commonly used for matching and non-matching, successive
presentation of stimuli can also be utilised in paired comparison same/different tasks. In
such cases, the sample stimulus is followed by the presentation of only one comparison
stimulus and the subject reinforced for responding in one way if the comparison
matches the sample and responding in another way (or not responding) if it doesn’t
(Katz, Sturz and Wright 2010b). Another variation of a successive procedure was used
by Cook, Kelly and Katz (2003), in which two different or two identical pictures were
alternated for 20 seconds (with inter-stimulus intervals) and the subject rewarded for
responding to the same sequence. A variation of this has been used to test
same/different using auditory stimuli, with subjects being required to respond
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appropriately to sequences of sound that are either the same or different (e.g. Cook and
Brooks 2009; Hoeschele, Cook, Guillette, Hahn and Sturdy 2012).
Discrimination testing using successive presentation of stimuli can also be used to test
abilities other than same/different learning. For example, delayed matching-to-sample
has proved a popular method to test memory in non-humans. By varying the time
between the presentation of the initial test stimulus and the presentation of the
comparison stimuli, the subject’s short-term or working memory can be examined (e.g.
D’Amato 1973; Grant 1976; Grant and Kelly 2000; Sands et al. 1982; Tavares and
Tomaz 2002). This technique can be further modified to test serial list memory by
presenting a single probe stimulus following a sequence of stimuli. The subject must
then decide if the probe stimulus appeared in the initial sequence (e.g. Thompson and
Herman 1977). Another experiment using successive presentation of stimuli is delayed
alternation, which involves the subject being reinforced for responding to the stimulus
to which it didn’t just respond. (See also Shettleworth 1998; Thompson 1995).

3.7.2.1.3 Simultaneous presentation of stimuli
Simultaneous presentation of stimuli is the most commonly used procedure for the
paired comparison same/different task. One variation of the procedure involves two (or
more) stimuli being presented at the same time (either separated or contained within a
single stimulus panel) and a different response (such as hitting one of two response keys
or symbols) being required of the subject depending on whether they are the same or
different (e.g. Edwards, Jagielo and Zentall 1983; Wasserman et al. 1995). This method
is sometimes referred to simply as the same/different procedure (e.g. D’Amato and
Colombo 1989; Wright et al. 2003), as distinct from a matching procedure.
Another technique involves a paired comparison task in which one stimulus containing
all the same elements and one stimulus containing all different elements are presented at
the same time and the subject is required to directly select the S+ (same or different)
stimulus (Blaisdell and Cook 2005; Chausseil 1991). (This procedure was the one
selected for use in these experiments.)
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Matching to sample can also be conducted using simultaneous presentation. In this type
of task, the subject is presented with a test stimulus and then, usually after an
observation period, two or more alternatives are presented so both the test and
comparison stimuli can be viewed simultaneously. The subject must then select the
sample most like the test stimulus (e.g. Gabor and Gerken 2012). Similarly, nonmatching-to-sample can be conducted simultaneously, with the subject having to select
the sample most unlike the test stimulus. Oddity learning can be tested simultaneously
without using the matching/non-matching procedure. In this scenario, a number of
stimuli are presented and the subject must select the single odd stimulus from among
the rest of the identical stimuli.

3.7.2.1.4 Combined successive/simultaneous presentation of stimuli
It is worth noting that some procedures could be described as hybrids combining
elements of both successive and simultaneous methods. For example, a match-tosample procedure in which the sample stimuli is presented first by itself followed by the
presentation of the comparison stimuli is generally described as a successive procedure
(see section 3.7.2.1.2). However, if the sample stimulus remains visible when the
comparison stimuli are shown, it has been argued (by Carter and Werner, 1978, for
example) that the procedure is simultaneous. Rather than being one or the other,
elements of both procedures seem to come into play in this type of experimental design
and it is possible that aspects of both procedures influence how such experiments are
solved.

3.7.2.1.5 Successive versus simultaneous presentation of stimuli
While successive presentation of stimuli is a popular method of testing memory (see
section 3.7.2.1.2), a number of authors contend that it is less effective than simultaneous
methods for testing same/different relational learning because it can more readily be
solved using other means. Being able to categorise two or more stimuli as being the
same or different must by definition be based on the relationship between those stimuli.
Mazur (2002) points out that relational theory has been found to better explain the
results of simultaneous discriminations. According to Premack (1983a, 1983b), the
same/different task is far easier for a subject to perform using successive rather than
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simultaneous discrimination and less likely to be solved using relationships:
“Unfortunately, the animal literature largely conflates the two cases, calling the
animal’s response in both cases “same/different” … the successive task may have little
to do with same/different” (Premack 1983b, p. 127).
For example, it has been argued that in non-human animals successive discriminations
aren’t solved using judgements about same/different, rather that the subject simply
reacts to whether it has experienced the item before. When stimuli are presented
successively, they do not need to be compared to determine whether they are members
of the same category and the stimuli can be accepted or rejected as a category member
on the basis of absolute discriminative features alone. Using the principles of
associative conditioning (see section 1.2.1.2), if the same stimuli evoke the same
concrete referent, the subject need only decide if it had previously occurred (Premack
1983a; Steirn and Thomas 1990; Thomas 1980; Thompson 1995). Instead of
same/different, it has been alleged that these experiments may actually be a test of
novelty in which stimuli are selected on the basis of relative familiarity rather than
identity (Premack 1983b; Shettleworth 1998). In addition to relative novelty, it has also
been argued that successive procedures like delayed matching-to-sample can be solved
on the basis of other non-relational means such as conditional discrimination, the
exclusion effect, configural theory and the oddity preference effect. (See section 3.7.6.1
for fuller discussion).
According to Castro, Kennedy and Wasserman (2010), simultaneous presentation
improves same/different discrimination performance by promoting comparison of the
same/different arrays. This encourages learning about the relative values of the stimuli
rather than item-specific learning. In their view, sameness is difficult to understand
without also referring to the twin relation of differentness.
While most criticism has been reserved for successive presentation of stimuli, Siegel
and Honig (1970) claim several early studies (e.g. Cahill and Hovland 1960; Hovland
and Weiss 1953) suggested that “concept attainment” (p. 385) was unduly facilitated by
simultaneous presentation. In addition, Honig (1962) found that the simultaneous
procedure produced fewer errors and more rapid extinction of the negative stimulus. He
argued that true extinction to the negative instance was achieved only in the successive
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case because with simultaneous training the pigeons could use the negative instance as a
cue to switch to the positive instance. This view was partly based on the fact that the
pigeons in his experiment could transfer from successive to simultaneous scenarios but
not the reverse. When Siegel and Honig (1970) compared successive and simultaneous
presentation in a people-present/people-absent categorisation using pigeons, they also
found performance improved when transferring from successive to simultaneous
presentation. However, in terms of overall performance, there was no appreciable
difference between the two testing methods in the acquisition of the discrimination,
providing little support for favouring successive over simultaneous presentation in
testing relational learning.
In an uncommon take on the argument, Fetterman (1996) suggests that animals may
perceive successive tasks as representing a single stimulus array, in which case there
would not be any significant difference between successive and simultaneous
procedures. “It is customary to distinguish between the apprehension of simultaneous
and successive stimulus patterns in terms of perceiving versus remembering, but this
dichotomy may be based on preconceptions about stimuli as discrete, momentary
events” (p. 10). Some support for this view can be found in Nakagawa (2000), who
examined transfer of learning between matching (or non-matching)-to-sample
discriminations and same/different discriminations and concluded that the same
mechanism governs the formation of associations between stimuli in both tasks.

3.7.2.2 Stimuli
Overwhelmingly, the stimuli used in same/different experiments tend to be visual,
ranging from pictures of simple geometric shapes (e.g. Cook 2002b) to photographs
(e.g. Cook, Katz and Kelly 2000) to three-dimensional objects (Keddy-Hector, Allen
and Friend unpublished; Tavares and Tomaz 2002). (For a review of visual exemplars
see Bovet and Vauclair 2000). However other stimulus modalities such as odour
(Langworthy and Jennings 1972) and sound (D’Amato and Colombo 1985; Dooling,
Brown, Park, Okanoya and Soli 1987; Herman and Gordon 1974; Wright, Shyan and
Jitsumori 1990) and even unusual sensory modalities such as echolocation (Roitblat,
Penner and Nachtigall 1990) have also been used. They can also vary across more than
one dimension. For example, matching-to-sample can be conducted using a single
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dimension (e.g. hue) or two dimensions (e.g. hue and geometric shape) (Carter and
Werner 1978).
Much of the initial research on paired comparison same/different categorisation in
animals used just two visual items to represent same or different (e.g. Edwards et al.
1983; Santiago and Wright 1984; Wright, Santiago, Urcuioli and Sands 1983).
Recently, however, a number of researchers have shown that same/different judgments
could be made using multi-element displays (e.g. Astley and Wasserman 1998, 1999;
Cook, Cavoto and Cavoto 1995, 1996; Cook, Katz and Cavoto 1997; Cook and Wixted
1997; Wasserman et al. 1995; Young and Wasserman 1997; Young, Wasserman and
Garner 1997). In the majority of experiments using multi-element displays, the displays
are presented one at a time, with a different response required for same and different
arrays. While not literally a ‘paired’ comparison, multi-element stimuli have been
grouped together with paired comparison same/different categorisation as they also
make use of a single simultaneous comparison rather than a successive procedure.

3.7.3 Same/different categorisation experiments
Due to the debate about whether matching/non-matching experiments constitute
same/different categorisation (see section 3.7.6.1), this experimental review has been
separated into sections reflecting the most common methods used to test same/different
learning.
In most academic literature reviews, delayed and zero-delay matching-to-sample (see
section 3.7.2.1) are generally grouped together under the label matching-to-sample
without the procedural method being individually specified and that convention is
followed here unless it is relevant to the discussion. The majority of experiments appear
to utilise the delayed procedure.

3.7.3.1 Matching-to-sample
Matching experiments, in which subjects are required to respond to a stimulus that is the
same as a sample stimulus, have been a popular method for testing a number of
different cognitive abilities since early studies by Kohts (1923) and Weinstein (1941)
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(see section 3.7.2.1.2). However, the focus here is on the use of the matching procedure
to test same/different categorisation. Whether matching provides sufficient evidence of
true relationally based same/different categorisation is discussed in section 3.7.6.1.
Matching-to-sample has been comprehensively established in primate species such as
chimpanzees (Nissen et al. 1948; Oden, Thompson and Premack 1988; Smith, King,
Witt and Rickel 1975); monkeys (D’Amato and Colombo 1985; D’Amato and Cox
1976; D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; D’Amato et al. 1986; Mishkin and
Delacour 1975; Mishkin, Prockop and Rosvold 1962; Tavares and Tomaz 2002;
Washburn, Rumbaugh and Richardson 1992), gorillas and orangutans (Vonk 2003).
However, it is certainly not limited to primates. Matching has been demonstrated in a
wide variety of species including rats (Roitblat and Harley 1988), pigeons (Maki and
Leith 1973; Roberts and Grant 1976; Zentall and Hogan 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978),
dolphins (Herman and Gordon 1974; Herman, Hovancik, Gory and Bradshaw 1989;
Roitblat et al. 1990), sea lions (Kastak and Schusterman 1994; Pack, Herman and
Roitblat 1991), corvids (Wilson et al. 1985b), horses (Gabor and Gerken 2012),
budgerigars (Manabe, Kawashima and Staddon 1995), goldfish (Goldman and Shapiro
1979; Zerbolio and Royalty 1983) and honeybees (Giurfa, Zhang, Jenett, Menzel and
Srinivasan 2001). Matching-to-sample has even been demonstrated using less common
sensory modalities, such as Roitblat et al.’s (1990) study in which a dolphin was trained
to perform a three-alternative delayed matching-to-sample task using only echolocation.
While matching-to-sample seems to be a relatively ubiquitous ability, a number of
studies have indicated some species find it easier to learn the task than others. For
example, the majority of the goldfish in Goldman and Shapiro’s (1979) matching (and
oddity) studies reached 75% performance level by the end of 70 training days, whereas
pigeons tested using a similar experimental paradigm reached accuracies of 90% or
better after 20 training days (Cumming and Berryman 1965). Differences in
performance between species also become apparent when transfer tests with novel
stimuli are introduced. Monkeys and chimpanzees have demonstrated the ability to
match novel stimuli after learning just one matching problem (although the monkeys
did not show complete transfer) (D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Oden et al.
1988). However, when pigeons and corvids (relatively closely related species) were
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tested using a similar experimental paradigm, the corvids were able to perform
generalised matching when the pigeons could not (Mackintosh 1988; Wilson et al.
1985b). Other experiments have also demonstrated pigeons failure to transfer a
matching performance to novel stimuli (e.g. Berryman, Cumming, Cohen and Johnson
1965; Cumming and Berryman 1961).

Matching in pigeons

Due to the prevalence of pigeons as an experimental subject, an examination of some of
the issues surrounding matching-to-sample in this species provides a good overview of
some of the general factors affecting non-human matching performance. The difficulty
experienced by species such as pigeons in transferring a previously learnt matching
performance to novel stimuli may be due to the utilisation of conditional rather than
‘conceptual’ rules (Cumming et al. 1965). It has been suggested that pigeons trained
using only a small number of stimuli do not seem to match novel samples but
apparently memorise conditional rules, i.e. “if the sample was red, choose red”
(Shettleworth 1998) – a multiple-rule model conditional discrimination (see section
3.7.6.1.1). Indeed, there has been an ongoing debate about whether pigeons could learn
the general principles of identity and oddity required to fully master this task
(Lombardi, Fachinelli and Delius 1984; Vonk 2003).
D’Amato et al. (1986) compared the performance of capuchin monkeys and pigeons
trained on both a matching (‘identity’ – S+ stimulus is the same as the sample) and a
conditional matching (‘symbolic’ – S+ stimulus not the same as the sample) task. The
authors argued that if a subject possessed a matching ‘concept’, identity and conditional
relations should be processed in different ways resulting in a larger difference in
response latency when conditional tasks were interspersed among identity trials than
when the reverse situation was tested. This pattern was found in the monkeys but not in
the pigeons, leading the authors to conclude that the monkeys were utilising a
“matching concept” on the identity tasks while the pigeons were processing identity
tasks in the same manner as the symbolic conditional relations.
Other studies have also indicated that pigeons perform equally well whether the
‘matching’ pair of sample and comparison stimuli is the same or not. For example,
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Wilson, Mackintosh and Boakes (1985a) found no systematic difference between
matching and conditional discriminations. Similarly, in a series of experiments
comparing matching and symbolic matching, Carter and Eckerman (1975) found
identity between a sample and one of the comparison stimuli appeared to play no role
for pigeons – “matching-to-sample is just as symbolic as is the symbolic matching
problem” (p. 664). In both paradigms, according to the authors, the pigeons learned a
set of specific “if … then” conditional discrimination rules in which the sample stimulus
served an “instructional” function indicating the correct comparison stimulus. Even a
number of early pigeon matching experiments that purported to show a matching
“concept” (e.g. Honig 1965; Malott and Malott 1970) were later criticised by Premack
(1978) and Carter and Werner (1978) respectively as being solved by more prosaic
means (Schrier and Thompson 1980).
While Zentall and Hogan (1974, 1975, 1976, 1978) claimed their series of matching
experiments demonstrated that pigeons could learn a relational “concept”, their
conclusion was not based on above chance transfer to novel stimuli, but rather on a
savings effect on acquisition – that is, better performance on novel (different coloured)
stimuli by those pigeons kept in the same (e.g. matching to matching) condition than
those shifted to the reversed (e.g. matching to oddity) condition. However, authors such
as Carter and Eckerman (1976), Carter and Werner (1978) and Premack (1978)
concluded that the differing results were due to interference with learning the new task
for the shifted birds rather than evidence of positive transfer in the non-shifted group.
After reviewing numerous conditional discrimination experiments with pigeons, Carter
and Werner (1978) claimed that there was no evidence pigeons were capable of singlerule “concept” learning using traditional matching procedures: “… at least with the
conditional discrimination procedures in common use, pigeons learn a set of samplespecific ‘if …, then …’ rules” (p. 594). However, despite their pessimistic appraisal,
Carter and Werner (1978) were “unwilling to assume that pigeons cannot learn such
concepts” (p. 596). Similarly, Wilson et al. (1985a) found pigeons in their experiments
did not utilise relational information to solve matching (or oddity) problems. However,
they concluded: “The present results do not, and could not, prove that pigeons are
incapable of such learning. It remains quite possible that under other conditions …
evidence for relational learning could be found” (p. 309). Similarly, Premack (1983a)
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suggested: “The pigeon’s poor record on generalized match-to-sample may be due more
to experimental artefacts than to limitations in intelligence” (p. 355).
In fact, studies have suggested that at least some differences in performance between
species may be the result of the suitability of the training procedures. According to
Wright (1997), in the basic matching-to-sample format, pigeons’ preferred strategy
seems to be to attend to configural patterns and physical elements rather than relational
or conceptual information. However, changes to experimental methodology can alter
their learning strategy to one based on the relationships between stimuli and “thereby
reveal their concept-learning ability” (p. 119).
According to Sidman (1992), previous failures of non-humans to display generalised
identity matching may have been caused by an irrelevant feature of the matching-tosample procedure. Because sample stimuli are usually displayed in one display location
and the comparison stimuli at two other display locations, subjects may come to identify
stimuli not only by their physical characteristics but also by their location. In addition,
evidence has been found for both colour and position preferences in pigeons’ matching
performance, particularly during the early stages of task acquisition (Cumming and
Berryman 1965).

Oddity preference effect

A number of authors have suggested that one reason for pigeons’ relatively poor
performance in matching tasks is that they are particularly susceptible to the oddity
preference effect (OPE), a predisposition to prefer stimuli that are relatively novel (see
section 3.7.6.1.5). This phenomenon has been demonstrated in various species such as
chimpanzees (Davenport and Menzel 1960), monkeys (Mishkin and Delacour 1975) and
corvids (Wilson et al. 1985b), however the main focus has been on OPE in pigeons (e.g.
Berryman et al. 1965; Wilson et al. 1985b; Zentall, Edwards, Moore and Hogan 1981).
For example, Ginsburg (1957), Berryman et al. (1965) and Zentall and Hogan (1974,
1975) all found that (at least initially) pigeons perform better on an oddity than a
comparable matching task. Wilson et al. (1985b) concluded that pigeons have “a
marked preference for oddity” that “somehow interferes with [their] ability to display
transfer of the matching or oddity rule” (p. 324).
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According to Wright and Delius (2005), there appears to be a general belief that OPE is
predetermined – an “initial preference for the odd stimulus” (Wilson et al. 1985a, p.
308) – however they claim that it is actually overlooked aspects of the experimental
procedure that lead to the creation of OPE. One possibility is that pigeons frequently
begin a trial by responding to the sample, an action which is then effectively
extinguished due to non-reward, decreasing the possibility they will respond to the
stimulus again when it appears as a comparison stimulus (Carter and Werner 1978).
Whether OPE is inherent or a product of experimental procedures, it may help explain
species differences in matching performance, particularly in pigeons.
In a contradictory argument, some authors claim there is little evidence for a
predisposition to novelty in pigeons (Zentall, Hogan, Edwards and Hearst 1980) and in
fact that pigeons “appear to be somewhat neophobic and are afraid of novelty” (Zentall
2000b, p 202). According to Zentall (2000b), this means the use of novel stimuli in
matching/oddity transfer tests may lead subjects to avoid the novel stimuli and in turn
skew the results unfavourably. (See D'Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Oden et al.
1988; Pack et al. 1991 for examples of neophobia in other species).
Despite these purported hindrances, a number of experiments have demonstrated that
pigeons can fully learn matching-to-sample under the ‘right’ experimental conditions
(e.g. Wright 1997; Wright and Delius 2005). To address the problem of possible
neophobia in pigeons, Zentall et al. (1981) conducted test trials using familiar stimuli
that had been used in training as both correct and incorrect comparisons. The pigeons
were successful and Zentall (2000b) claimed the results “suggest that pigeons use the
identity relation to learn both matching and oddity” (p. 202).

Training set size

While pigeons have struggled with matching tasks using only a small number of stimuli,
researchers have found that after training with a large number of stimuli for thousands
of trials pigeons are able to acquire a generalised matching ability (e.g. Wright, Cook,
Rivera, Sands and Delius 1988). Delius (1994) has suggested that the failure of many
matching experiments with pigeons was largely due to underestimating the pigeon’s
capacity and propensity for rote learning (see section 3.4.4.2.1), which would inhibit
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concept learning (see also von Fersen and Delius 1989). According to Murphy and
Cook (2008), pigeons often learn item-specific rules or configurations when tested with
a limited number of stimuli (Carter and Werner 1978; Wright 1997; see section 3.7.6.1),
interfering with relational learning.

Observing response effect

A number of authors have also demonstrated the importance of an observing response to
the sample stimulus in pigeons (e.g. pecking at the stimulus) (Colombo, Cottle and
Frost 2003; Zentall et al. 1974). Eckerman, Lanson and Cumming (1968), for example,
found pigeons had more difficulty learning a simultaneous hue matching task without
an observing response and showed serious disruption of an already established matching
behaviour when the observing response requirement was removed. Wright (1997) found
that as the number of pecks to the sample stimulus in a matching task increased,
configural learning gave way to learning about the sample-comparison relationship.
According to the author: “Pigeons making the most sample responses showed complete
concept learning” (p. 119) (see also Wright 2001).
Hollard and Delius (1982) trained pigeons on both a matching and oddity task using a
simultaneous matching procedure that included an observing response and correction
trials (incorrect choices being followed by repetition of the same trial until a correct
choice is made) during training. The training phase also used individually adapted
schedules in selection and repetition of stimuli to facilitate acquisition. The pigeons
were trained with white-on-black geometric shapes and were able to match novel
stimuli even when the shapes were rotated by 45, 90, 135 or 180°. (Observing responses
have also been used in matching experiments with other species, for example, capuchin
monkeys, Tavares and Tomaz 2002).

Differential reinforcement

Another experimental parameter that appears to enhance matching-to-sample
performance in pigeons is the use of differential reinforcement (previously discussed in
regards to conditional discrimination, see section 3.2.3). In a differential reinforcement
procedure each correct comparison choice is associated with a different outcome (a
procedure also shown to improve performance in other species such as rats, Carlson and
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Wielkiewicz 1976). For example, Linwick, Overmier, Peterson and Mertens (1988)
found pigeons that performed near chance on a same outcome procedure with a 4second retention interval were able to perform well above chance using differential
reinforcers with a 32-second retention interval. The effect has been demonstrated in
experiments when the differential reinforcement varied in hedonic value (e.g. food
versus water, Honig, Matheson and Dodd 1984; wheat versus corn, Edwards, Jagielo,
Zentall and Hogan 1982) and when the differential reinforcement was not hedonically
different (e.g. different feeder locations, Friedrich and Zentall 2011; different coloured
lights and lights versus tones, Miller, Friedrich, Narkavic and Zentall 2009). This
suggests the effect is not merely the result of different behaviours elicited by the
different reinforcers (such as pigeons showing increased pecking to stimuli linked with
food vs. non-food, Zentall, Sherburne and Steirn 1992) being used as an additional cue.

3.7.3.2 Oddity
The inverse of matching-to-sample is non-matching, or oddity-from-sample, in which
the S+ stimuli is that which does not match the sample (Irle and Markowitsch 1987).
This type of experiment is often conducted using successive stimulus presentation in a
similar manner to successive matching experiments. However, oddity can also be tested
using simultaneous stimulus presentation where the subject must select the different
stimulus from a number of same stimuli (Langworthy and Jennings 1972). However,
oddity differs from the paired comparison same/different procedure in that the subject is
selecting the odd stimulus from among a group of same stimuli, rather than comparing
two (or more) stimuli to determine if they are different (or, alternatively, not same).
Oddity is a commonly investigated relational categorisation task and has been
conducted using a wide variety of species (Bailey and Thomas 1998; Thomas 1996).
For example, it has been demonstrated in birds (e.g. Benjamini 1983; Blough 1989;
Lombardi et al. 1984; Pastore 1954; Wright and Delius 1994; Zentall and Hogan 1974),
goldfish (Goldman and Shapiro 1979), rodents (Bailey and Thomas 1998; Langworthy
and Jennings 1972; Nakagawa 1993; Wodinsky and Bitterman 1953), dolphins (Herman
and Gordon 1974) and primates (Bernstein 1961; Davis, Leary, Stevens and Thompson
1967; Levine and Harlow 1959; Moon and Harlow 1955; Thomas and Boyd 1973;
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Thomas and Frost 1983; Thomas and Kerr 1976; Shaffer 1967; Strong and Hedges
1966).
As with matching-to-sample, not all species appear to master the oddity task equally
well. Strong and Hedges (1966) compared cats, raccoons, chimpanzees and rhesus
monkeys on an oddity problem and found that neither cats nor raccoons achieved a 90%
criterion within the maximum number of sessions allowed. Both the rhesus monkeys
and chimpanzees were able to achieve criterion using identical training procedures, with
the chimpanzee needing the fewest number of sessions. Other reports on cats have
suggested they have difficulty mastering oddity problems (Boyd and Warren 1957;
Warren 1960). Warren (1960), for example, found only one of five cats achieved good
performance. Despite their success, even monkeys appear to be affected by perceptual
factors in oddity learning experiments (Macphail 1982).
However, as with matching experiments, authors such as Macphail (1982) claim species
difficulties with particular tasks can be due to procedural factors. Pigeons, for example,
demonstrated improved oddity learning with changes to contextual variables (e.g. when
an increased number of alternative (matching and incorrect) stimuli were presented
along with a single odd stimulus, Zentall et al. 1980) and where “negative instances”
(trials in which no correct response is possible) were interspersed among conventional
trials (Zentall and Hogan 1978).
Similarly, early reports suggested rats were incapable of learning the oddity task
(Koronakos and Arnold 1957; Oldfield-Box and Kay 1963). However, other studies
found rats were successful using different experimental procedures, such as prior
training on a serial reversal learning task using the same or similar stimuli (Wodinsky
and Bitterman 1953), unconventional reinforcement such as intracranial stimulation or
strychnine (Hudspeth 1964; Johnson and Levy 1968) or olfactory stimuli (Langworthy
and Jennings 1972).
Despite claims that non-primate animals have successfully performed oddity problems
on a ‘conceptual’ basis, some authors suggest that non-primate studies may have been
influenced by confounding variables or be subject to competing interpretations (Bailey
and Thomas 1998; Macphail 1982; Premack 1978; Steirn and Thomas 1990; Strong and
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Hedges 1966; Thomas 1994, 1996; Thomas and Boyd 1973). For example, Langworthy
and Jennings (1972) used ping-pong balls saturated with food odours to conduct a series
of olfactory-based oddity problems in rats. The rats performed significantly better than
chance, suggesting they had learned the ‘concept’. However Thomas (1996) argued that
as the food reinforcers were available only under the odd ping-pong ball the rats might
have been able to smell the food and choose the correct ball accordingly.
In a subsequent experiment, Thomas and Noble (1988) used a similar apparatus but
modified the procedure to control for olfactory cueing. However, they were uncertain of
their results because the rats only performed above chance on the second trial, leaving
open the possibility they had simply mastered a learning set. This means that they had
learned from their correct and incorrect choices in trial one and used that information
appropriately in trial two. Using this interpretation, the rats could be said to be using a
win-stay, lose-shift strategy (see section 2.2.2.1) – if they gain food (win) for choosing a
stimulus in trial one they stay with that stimulus in trial two, if they aren’t rewarded
(lose) for choosing a stimulus in the first trial they should shift to the alternate stimulus
in the second trial. The authors suggested additional studies using more extensive
training on each oddity problem, as Langworthy and Jennings (1972) had done, while
maintaining the cueing controls might lead to more conclusive results.
When one of the authors conducted such a study (Bailey and Thomas 1998), they found
that none of the rats exceeded chance on total correct responses on the first trials of the
60 transfer sessions (the criteria required by the authors). However, they found that one
of the rats had two statistically significant near-perfect runs of correct responses on trial
one during the early stages of the transfer sessions, leading the authors to conclude that
he had used an oddity cue at the beginning of the experiment, before abandoning it in
the later stages. Bailey and Thomas (1998) suggested that the rat may have changed
strategy because the scents used began to be repeated (albeit in different combinations),
with odours that had previously been correct now being incorrect, confounding firsttrial performance. The ability of rats to remember odoriferous stimuli may also have
affected the other rats overall performance, as well as a lack of motivation to utilise a
conceptual strategy in the first trial when a learning set strategy provided rewarding
results for the rest of each session. As to why only one rat showed significant first-trial
correct responding, the authors noted that it was the only subject to investigate all the
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stimuli before making a choice, leading them to suggest the introduction of a viewing
period.
Macphail (1982) claims that because oddity problems can be solved in ways that do not
require an oddity ‘concept’ (see section 3.7.6.1), it cannot be proved that non-humans
possess a generalised oddity principle. However, others (e.g. Bailey and Thomas 1998;
Strong and Hedges 1966; Thomas and Boyd 1973) have argued that successful
performance on the first trial of a new oddity problem can be used as evidence that the
solution is based on an oddity principle. Correct responding at levels considerably
above chance on first trials of oddity problems has been found in a number of studies,
including those with monkeys (Levine and Harlow 1959; Shaffer 1967; Thomas and
Boyd 1973).
Similarly, while Benjamini (1983) claimed a careful analysis of the results and
experimental procedures used in a number of oddity learning experiments with birds
(Berryman Cumming, Cohen and Johnson 1965; Fried 1972; Ginsburg 1957; Pastore
1954; Zentall et al. 1974) made it difficult to state definitively that the birds had actually
learned to respond to oddity rather than utilising other methods. For example, the
performance of Pastore’s (1954) canary could be attributed to formation of a
discrimination learning set; Berryman et al.’s (1965) pigeons appear to have utilised a
response sequence and Zentall et al.’s (1974) pigeons used positional cues. However,
when Benjamini (1983) used more rigorous criteria (e.g. evaluation based on the first
presentation of transfer trials, better experimental design) in testing oddity learning in
ravens and gulls, he concluded that both species were “highly capable of oddity
learning” (p. 191) and that the results were “the first unequivocal demonstration of
oddity learning by birds” (p. 187).
Thomas (1996) has created even stricter requirements, arguing that only primates have
demonstrated oddity concept learning under what he considers properly controlled
conditions (see section 6.1.5). He claims he has yet to find a non-primate study that can
withstand rigorous examination, although he says Langworthy and Jennings’ (1972) rat
study (above) came close. However the author blames this on methodological problems
rather than a lack of capability in non-primates and suggests it is only a matter of time
before a successful experiment (at least according to his criteria) is conducted.
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3.7.3.3 Paired comparison same/different
Unlike matching and oddity, same/different categorisation using the paired-comparison
same/different procedure has not been demonstrated in a wide variety of animals. It has
been shown in a number of what are generally considered the more ‘intelligent’ primate
species including monkeys (Bhatt and Wright 1992; Czerny and Thomas 1975;
Flemming et al. 2007; Fujita 1983; Katz, Wright and Bachevalier 2002; King 1973;
Wright and Katz 2006; Wright et al. 2003; Wright, Santiago and Sands 1984; Wright et
al. 1983), baboons (Bovet and Vauclair 2001; Wasserman, Fagot and Young 2001) and
chimpanzees (Premack 1971, 1976; Robinson 1955). However, many other species have
struggled with the task, leading authors such as Premack (1978, 1983b) to suggest that it
was unlikely any non-primate would be capable of same/different discrimination.
Wasserman et al. (1995) suggested that limiting factors in experimental procedure
might have led investigators to underestimate the cognitive capacity of their subjects in
same/different experiments. These include the overly restrictive use of only a few
experimental paradigms (Lombardi et al. 1984; Macphail and Reilly 1989) or the use of
only small numbers of simple stimuli (Santiago and Wright 1984). (See Wright 1992
and Zentall 1993 for further discussion).
As Wright et al. (2003) point out, many species that originally failed in same/different
experiments have since succeeded using “procedures that better fit their disposition” (p.
184). One such example is the pigeon. Despite their proficiency in perceptual
categorisation tasks (see section 3.4.3.1), early experiments with pigeons showed they
had difficulty in performing both matching-to-sample (see section 3.7.3.1) and pairedcomparison same/different categorisation tasks (Herrnstein 1985; Premack 1983b;
Thompson 1995), leading some authors (e.g. Mackintosh 2000; Pearce 1991) to doubt
whether a relational same/different ‘concept’ was within the cognitive abilities of
pigeons.

Multi-element displays

According to Delius (1994), however: “most of the evidence denying the identity-oddity
concept to pigeons must be dismissed … as being due to the employment of patently
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inadequate methods” (p. 37). Indeed, pigeons have now demonstrated pairedcomparison same/different categorisation after training with multi-element visual
stimuli. In one such study, Wasserman et al. (1995) exposed pigeons to a single slide
containing 16 elements arranged in a 4 x 4 array. Pecks to one side key were reinforced
if all the elements were the same; pecks to another side key were reinforced if all the
elements were different. The pigeons were trained to 83% correct with 16 arrays of each
kind and averaged 71% correct during the testing phase with novel slides. Young and
Wasserman (1997) elaborated on Wasserman et al.’s (1995) design by randomly
locating the 16 elements in a larger 5 x 5 array, effectively making the layout of each
slide unique. Both acquisition and transfer were even more rapid than that found by
Wasserman et al. (1995).
While not classified as same/different experiments, Honig and his colleagues have
reported that pigeons are able to discriminate between ‘uniform’ and ‘mixture’ multielement arrays (e.g. Honig 1991; Honig and Matheson 1995). In a series of experiments,
pigeons were required to peck at one side of the screen when presented with uniform
arrays (consisting of identical coloured squares) and on the other side when shown a
mixture array (containing squares of two different colours in various proportions).
Honig (1991) and Honig and Matheson (1995) found the pigeons could learn to
discriminate between uniform (same) arrays and the various mixture (different) arrays.
They concluded “it appears … that Uniform arrays are distinctive to the pigeons”
(Honig and Matheson 1995, p. 360). The uniform/mixture discriminations demonstrated
by Honig (1991) and Honig and Matheson (1995) utilised only two items (two different
coloured squares) and usually involved 36-element displays.
Cook and colleagues have also found that with multi-element stimuli pigeons are
capable of learning the same/different discrimination across a wide variety of
simultaneously presented visual items ranging from small, densely packed elements to
more diffuse arrays of shapes, objects and photos (e.g. Cook 2002a, 2002b; Cook et al.
1995; Cook et al. 1997; Cook, Katz and Kelly 1999; Cook and Wixted 1997; Gibson,
Wasserman and Cook 2006). The authors have found similar learning rates for these
different stimulus classes (Cook 2002a; Cook et al. 1997) and suggested “that the same
common discrimination framework or decision criterion is applied across all of these
distinct types” (Blaisdell and Cook 2005, p. 68). In addition, the authors have found that
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pigeons can transfer the discrimination not only to the same types of stimuli
experienced during training (Cook et al. 1995; Cook et al. 1997), but also to a different
range of stimuli (Cook et al. 1999; Cook et al. 2000).
Pigeons have also demonstrated same/different learning using an oddity-based variation
on the multi-element procedure in which the different arrays contain only one nonidentical item. For example, Cook et al. (1997) used 3 x 2 arrays of either six identical
elements (same) or five identical elements and one odd element (different) of varying
display types such as geometric shapes, digitised depictions of natural objects and black
and white and colour photographs. Similarly, Gibson et al. (2006) successfully used a
variation of the Wasserman et al. (1995) arrays containing either 16 same icons or 15
same and one different icon.
Meanwhile, Brooks and Wasserman (2008, 2010) created 16-item, multi-element
stimulus arrays made up of mosaics, each containing 16 cells which could be filled with
16 possible luminance levels. The mosaics were generated randomly and without
replacement to create trial-unique stimuli to help eliminate the possible role of
individual stimulus memory through repeated presentation. The pigeons were
successfully trained to 80% correct-choice performance, and testing a number of
experimental manipulations led the authors to conclude that the pigeons were not using
lower-level perceptual properties of the stimuli to perform the task.
The introduction of multi-element displays has been shown to enhance same/different
performance in species other than pigeons. For example, Flemming et al. (2007) found
rhesus monkeys initially failed in a paired-comparison same/different task in which they
had to select the S+ relation (designated at the beginning of a testing session) when
presented with a pair of images that was either identical or non-identical. The monkeys
were able to successfully complete the task when the stimulus arrays were increased
from two to eight elements.

Conditional rule

The introduction of multi-element displays is not the only experimental parameter
shown to improve same/different performance. In Flemming et al.’s (2007) study
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(above), once the monkeys had learned the task (either same or different for different
subjects) they were unable to repeat that performance after the rewarded relation (S+)
was reversed. To aid in S+ reversal learning, the authors introduced discriminative cues
(background colours) to indicate which of the two relations was S+ for that trial (see
section 3.7.4). Again, a change in the experimental procedure provided the information
the monkeys needed to perform the task.

Training set size

Another example of changes in experimental conditions enabling a subject to succeed in
same/different discriminations is increasing the number of training exemplars.
According to Wasserman et al. (1995, p. 251): “… larger sets of training stimuli
engender stronger generalisation performance in testing” (see also Wasserman 1993b;
Wasserman and Bhatt 1992). For example, capuchin and rhesus monkeys that showed
an initial lack of transfer in a same/different task using a small number of training
stimuli succeeded when trained with a larger number of training exemplars (Katz et al.
2002; Wright 2010; Wright and Katz 2006; Wright et al. 2003) and a similar effect is
seen in pigeons (Castro et al. 2010; Katz, Sturz and Wright 2010a; Katz and Wright
2006; Nakamura, Wright, Katz, Bodily and Sturz 2009; Wright 2010; Wright and Katz
2006). In addition, Schmidtke, Katz and Wright (2010) found the positive effect of
increasing the training set was enhanced by the use of differential reinforcement (see
section 3.7.3.1).
In fact, Delius (1994) argued that “the relative lack of evidence of same-different
discrimination transfer to novel stimuli [in pigeons] may have been due to the use of too
few training stimuli” (p. 33), a position echoed by Wright and Katz (2006). According
to Castro et al. (2010), one common factor of successful same/different discrimination
studies is the use of a relatively large pool of training stimuli (e.g. Blaisdell and Cook
2005; Flemming et al. 2007; Young and Wasserman 1997). They claim this is because
more exemplars enhance categorical knowledge by providing more information about
the category’s generic features or by reducing the salience of features specific to each
exemplar, or both. Prior studies in basic-level categorisation have found that even
humans’ ability to categorise novel stimuli improves as the number of training
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exemplars increases (Homa, Cross, Cornell, Goldman and Shwartz 1973). (See below
for further discussion of the effects of training set size).

Stimulus contact

Even a difference in testing procedure such as whether the subject touches the stimuli or
not can have a big impact on the speed with which tasks are learned (the observing
response effect is also seen in matching-to-sample studies, see section 3.7.3.1). Stimulus
contact has been shown to enhance learning in primates (e.g. Harrison, Iversen and Pratt
1977; Katz et al. 2002; Meyer, Treichler and Meyer 1965; Neiworth and Wright 1994;
Stollnitz 1965). Interestingly, in a test of same/different categorisation using capuchin
and rhesus monkeys, Wright et al. (2003) found that while stimulus contact was
required for rhesus monkeys to fully learn the same/different task, it was not necessary
for capuchin monkeys. However, this difference in performance may be a function of
the procedure rather than the particular species. In another experiment using a response
lever procedure and no stimulus contact, rhesus monkeys were able to fully learn the
same/different task (Wright et al. 1984). A study by Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn,
Savage-Rumbaugh and Hopkins (1989) suggested that the positive difference in
performance might be due to rhesus monkeys focusing on the effects of their hand’s
movement on the lever rather than on the hand itself.
Pigeons have also displayed improved performance with the introduction of stimulus
contact in a variety of experimental paradigms. In the Gibson et al. (2006) experiment
mentioned above, pigeons were initially unable to discriminate the displays of 16 same
icons from the displays containing 15 same icons and 1 different icon (16S vs. 15S:1D).
However, the pigeons were subsequently able to master the task after being required to
locate and peck at the odd item in the 15S:1D displays. Cook et al. (1995) also reported
rapid

acquisition

of

a

previously

unsuccessful

oddity-based

same/different

discrimination following the introduction of a peck requirement procedure.
In addition to using stimulus contact to improve attention, making the task choice by
responding directly to the stimulus has also been shown to improve discriminative
performance (Bitterman, Tyler and Elam 1955; Castro et al. 2010; Wodinsky, Varley
and Bitterman 1954). Castro et al. (2010) surmised that when experimental subjects are
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forced to respond away from the stimulus (such as by selecting one of two report keys),
the intermediate step between observing the stimulus and receiving reinforcement slows
learning of the correct response.

Number of stimulus elements

Despite these results, the introduction of methodological changes to improve
performance in same/different experiments has not gone without criticism. One of the
procedures that has attracted the most attention is the use of multi-element stimuli. It
has been argued that multi-element stimuli may in fact introduce perceptual cues that
subjects are using instead of relational or ‘conceptual’ ones. The contention is that the
subjects in these experiments are using the greater comparative variance (entropy) of
multi-element arrays or even mere perceptual regularity to perform the discriminations
(Katz and Wright 2006; Katz, Wright and Bodily 2007; Vonk 2003) (see sections
3.7.6.2.2 and 3.7.6.2.3 for more detailed discussions of perceptual regularity and
entropy). There is some evidence for this viewpoint. For example, in a pair of
experiments examining the effect of the number of stimulus elements on same/different
performance, the authors found that when the number of elements in the stimulus arrays
was reduced, both pigeons and baboons were unable to perform the discrimination
(Wasserman, Young and Fagot 2001; Young, Wasserman and Garner 1997). One way
to reduce the possibility that these types of perceptual cues are being used in
same/different discriminations is to conduct experiments using only two items to signify
same or different, with two-item displays having the lowest possible entropy difference
(Blaisdell and Cook 2005; Premack 1983b).
Initial reports that pigeons might be able to solve two-item same/different
discriminations have been mixed. Wright et al. (1983) found that while monkeys were
able to transfer a same/different discrimination to novel stimuli using a two-item,
simultaneous procedure in which the stimulus relation was indicated by pressing one of
two keys, pigeons were unable to do so. Even after nearly 20,000 training trials using
210 different pictures, the pigeons’ discrimination accuracy dropped from 80% to only
62% correct upon transfer to novel testing pictures.
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In a similar procedure, Santiago and Wright (1984) trained pigeons to peck one key
when presented with two identical colour pictures and another key when presented with
two different colour pictures. The pigeons were able to transfer the performance to
novel pictures, however, as with Wright et al. (1983) above, performance dropped from
that seen during the training trials. According to Katz and Wright (2006), this
performance was the first and best two-item same/different transfer in pigeons (before
their study), however the drop in performance with the introduction of the transfer
stimuli meant it was only “partial concept learning” (p. 84). Blaisdell and Cook (2005)
also claimed there was evidence of item-specific learning during task acquisition, as
well as the possible contribution of memorisation as the same and different stimulus
pairs were presented in a fixed sequence through both the training and transfer trials.
Edwards et al. (1983) trained pigeons to make one response (pecking a key) when
presented with a pair of matching shapes and another response (pecking a different key)
when shown a pair of shapes that was different. To further differentiate the response
keys, a correct response to each key was reinforced with a different outcome (i.e. access
to peas or wheat) (see discussion of differential reinforcement in section 3.7.3.1). The
authors claimed their study provided “evidence that pigeons can show reliable amounts
of concept transfer” (p. 354), but acknowledged that at the same time “performance was
primarily under the control of stimulus-specific associations” (p. 354). The pigeons
were unable to transfer the discrimination to the first trial of novel (coloured) stimuli
and showed evidence of item-specific, rather than relational, learning. The
experimenters did demonstrate savings in subsequent acquisition (better performance on
novel stimuli by subjects kept in the same rather than the reversed condition),
suggesting “some contribution of a conceptual representation to the task” according to
Blaisdell and Cook (2005, p. 68). However, Wilson et al. (1985b) found no evidence of
relationally based transfer in pigeons using a similar procedure.
In contrast to these ambivalent results for pigeons on two-item same/different learning,
Blaisdell and Cook (2005) have utilised a procedure that has garnered a more definitive
outcome. A common aspect of simultaneous same/different experiments has been the
requirement for the subject to make a different response to the presentation of two
stimuli depending on whether they are the same or different. In Blaisdell and Cook’s
(2005) experiment, the pigeons were simultaneously presented with two pairs of stimuli
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– one pair containing identical coloured shapes, the other containing items that differed
in both colour and shape – and were required to peck at the correct S+ stimulus pair.
The pigeons were able to successfully transfer the discrimination to novel stimuli.
Blaisdell and Cook (2005) argue that requiring subjects to respond directly to the S+
stimulus rather than a separate response key may have led to greater attention being paid
to the stimulus features (see above). In addition, they suggested the pigeons might have
been helped by other procedural aspects of their experiment such as the use of two
stimulus dimensions (colour and shape) being used, as well as the use of relatively
simple geometric stimuli to encourage relational, rather than item-specific, learning.
The experiment also used a large number of unique training exemplars. According to
the authors, this may have decreased the possibility for memorisation and increased the
birds’ need to pay attention to relational information, in contrast to the smaller training
sets employed by Santiago and Wright (1984) and Edwards et al. (1983) (see above).
Despite Blaisdell and Cook (2005) using a large number of different displays, Wright
and Katz (2006) criticised the study because those displays were made up of too few
unique training and transfer items resulting in insufficient variation and the potential for
only partial concept learning. According to Wright and Katz (2006), even humans
require variation in the exemplars to adequately learn rules (e.g. Chen and Mo 2004).
However, as Blaisdell and Cook (2005) point out, even though their displays were
composed of combinations of items from a set of only six different shapes and six
different colours, when combinations of same and different pairs are taken into account
there were 32,400 unique displays available for use.
Wright and Katz (2006) attempted to address what they saw as a flaw in Blaisdell and
Cook’s (2005) study and instead used an increasing training set of unique photos to test
pigeons for two-item same/different learning. They found that while the pigeons were
initially unable to perform the discrimination using smaller training sets, they were
finally able to meet the authors’ criteria for “full” concept learning (transfer equivalent
to baseline performance and both above 80%) using a 256-item set size. This result was
contrasted with the performance of two species of monkey in the same experiment that
were able to succeed using a 128-item set size. (Another two-item same/different
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experiment by Katz and Wright (2006) using pigeons showed increasing the training set
size from 8 to 1024 items improved transfer performance from 51.3% to 84.6%).
Wright and Katz’ (2006) findings led them to conclude that pigeons require a larger
training set than some other species to fully learn a two-item same/different task and
that previous failures by pigeons in these types of experiments could be attributed to the
use of too few exemplars. The authors stress that the pigeon’s need for more training
exemplars “does not necessarily mean that pigeons are cognitively deficient in
comparison with nonhuman primates in their ultimate ability to learn an S/D abstract
concept” (Katz and Wright 2006, p. 85). According to Delius (1994), the use of too few
training stimuli would enable pigeons, with their prodigious memory (see section
3.4.4.2.1), to respond in a rote fashion during training. This would inhibit concept
learning and make them more sensitive to the novelty of the transfer stimuli, thus
degrading their performance (the same phenomenon proposed for matching, see section
3.7.3.1). (Interestingly, Wright et al.’s, 1983, early study with pigeons failed using a
210-item set, see above).
Castro et al. (2010) took into account prior research on same/different discrimination
and designed what they believed might be “the most effective task for pigeons to exhibit
strong learning and transfer of a same-different concept” (p. 24). They used a
combination of procedural elements that had previously been associated with improved
same/different performance – prior training with multi-element stimuli, simultaneous
presentation of stimuli, a conditional discrimination rule, an observing response
requirement, direct responding to stimuli and a large training set size. The authors found
that while choice accuracy declined when the number of icons in the arrays dropped to 4
and 2, it was still significantly above chance.
Similar experimental innovations have been utilised with other species to demonstrate
two-item simultaneous same/different learning. A comparable direct response procedure
to that used by Blaisdell and Cook (2005) was employed by Chausseil (1991) to show
two-item simultaneous same/different learning in coatis (a relative of the raccoon). The
coatis were presented with two pairs of shapes (two same and two different) and were
reinforced for selecting the S+ pair. They were then able to transfer that performance to
novel shapes. They were also able to respond correctly to stimuli of different design to
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the training stimuli (e.g. increased number of items per array, items contiguous to each
other, use of hue/brightness as the cue). A similar procedure was also used successfully
with chimpanzees (Robinson 1955), where the subjects were trained using threedimensional geometric shapes and were able to transfer the discrimination to household
objects.
Rhesus monkeys in Flemming et al.’s (2007) study (see above) were initially unable to
extract relational information from a pair of clipart images, but were able to perceive
relations with the introduction of multi-element (eight-item) arrays. However, they were
unable to reverse the discrimination until a discriminative cue was used to facilitate
rule-switching (see section 3.7.4). Once these two factors (increased elements and
discriminative cues) were introduced, the monkeys were then able to perform the
discrimination with lower-item arrays, even back down to the critical two-element pairs.
Flemming (2011) again used a conditional background cue, as well as trial-unique
stimuli and a large training set, to test capuchin monkeys on a two-item same/different
task. He found two of the capuchins succeeded in the two-item task without prior
training with a multi-element array, while four additional capuchins succeeded with
four-item displays.
Finally, Fujita (1983) showed Japanese monkeys, who had previously struggled with
matching-to-sample tasks using a small training set (Fujita 1982; see Fujita 1983 for
more examples), were able to transfer a two-item same/different task using a training set
of only two different stimulus items by using simple stimuli (colours) and a variableinterval reinforcement schedule (in which a response is rewarded after an unpredictable
amount of time has passed).

Three-dimensional stimuli

Another

procedural

innovation

aimed

at

facilitating

two-item

simultaneous

same/different learning was used by Keddy-Hector et al. (unpub.) in a study with pigs.
Instead of the usual two-dimensional stimuli, the authors used three-dimensional stimuli
to represent same and different. The pigs were able to select one of two different
symbols depending on the object relation displayed using both artificial and naturally
occurring objects and transfer that performance to novel objects and novel
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combinations. According to the authors, the use of three-dimensional stimuli may be
more salient for animals. (Another factor that may have contributed to the pigs’ success
in the Keddy-Hector et al. (unpub.) study was the use of stimulus contact with the
objects at the beginning of each trial, see above).
Three-dimensional objects were also used in successful simultaneous same/different
experiments with dolphins (Mercado, Killebrew, Pack, Macha and Herman 2000).
Bovet and Vauclair (2001) used three-dimensional objects (food and non-food items) to
demonstrate simultaneous same/different categorisation in baboons, claiming it
“facilitated” performance (p. 474). Peterson, Meagher, Chait and Gillie (1973) even
suggested that the use of only two-dimensional stimuli may inhibit animals’
categorisation abilities. Weinstein (1941) found relatively comparable matching-tosample performance between rhesus monkeys and three-year-old children using threedimensional stimuli, but a large difference in ability favouring the children when twodimensional stimuli were used.

Functional same/different

Finally, aside from using low-entropy, two-item stimuli, another way to rule out the use
of low-level perceptual mechanisms in a same/different task is to use stimuli which
contain no perceptual cues to sameness or difference. Bovet and Vauclair (2001)
demonstrated that non-language trained baboons were able to identify pairs of items as
same or different based on functional criteria (i.e. food versus non-food items) and
transfer that learning to new exemplars (see section 3.5, associative categorisation). For
example, they had to classify as same an apple and a banana or a padlock and a cup and
as different an apple and a padlock – meaning they had to identify as same items that
were perceptually different. The authors claimed their subjects had mastered
“conceptual identity” and that the task was more difficult than perceptual
same/different. Because it was based on the use of “abstract relations not only between
objects, but also between concepts” (p. 470), the authors claimed it was equivalent in
difficulty to conceptual matching (see section 3.7.5).
A number of factors assisted in the baboons’ performance in Bovet and Vauclair’s
(2001) study. They had previously been successfully trained in functional (food vs. non163

food) categorisation (Bovet and Vauclair 1998, see section 3.5.2) and perceptual
simultaneous same/different categorisation using food and non-food items (Bovet and
Vauclair 2001, experiment 1, see above). The authors also suggested the baboons
performance was facilitated by the use of three-dimensional stimuli: “It is likely that the
use of 3-D stimuli made the function of the objects more salient (Bovet and Vauclair
2000) and, therefore, augmented the rapid generalisation from a few training objects to
novel food and nonfood objects and facilitated the demonstration of conceptual
identity” (Bovet and Vauclair 2001, p. 474).

3.7.3.4 Cross-modal same/different
An interesting variation of the same/different task is to utilise stimuli of different
sensory modalities within the same experiment. The results of cross-modal relational
categorisation experiments in animals have been mixed.
A number of primate species have demonstrated the ability to match stimuli in one
sensory modality to the same stimuli in another modality. For example, Cowey and
Weiskrantz (1975) used edible and inedible shapes presented first in darkness and then
in the light to demonstrate cross-modal matching from touch to vision in rhesus
monkeys, while Davenport and Rogers (1970) showed chimpanzees and orangutans
were able to use touch to select an object from between two different objects that
matched a visually presented object and transfer the performance to novel stimuli.
Hashiya and Kojima (2001) showed a chimpanzee could acquire an audio-visual
matching-to-sample task, in which a sample sound had to be matched to a photograph
that corresponded to that sound.
Learning the same/different task in one modality and then transferring it to another has
been less successful. There is evidence that, at least in some circumstances, the
‘identity’ concept required for relationally based matching-to-sample seems to be
limited to the modality and even to the general class of stimuli with which it was
developed. Monkeys can successfully transfer a matching performance in the visual
modality to novel stimuli after training on as few as two exemplars (D’Amato, Salmon
and Colombo 1985). However, without extensive training in the new modality, it does
not extend to audition (D’Amato and Colombo 1985) or to touch (Milner 1973) or even
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to other classes of visual stimuli (D’Amato and Colombo 1989; D’Amato, Salmon and
Colombo 1985). D’Amato et al. (1986) queried whether this limitation is due to the fact
that the matching concept is not well-articulated or because irrelevant contextual cues
gain stimulus control to an unusually strong degree in animals.
Similarly, Young and Harlow (1943) reported a high level of generalisation of the
oddity solution by rhesus monkeys using test stimuli that were similar in at least one
physical dimension to the training stimuli. However, when Meyer and Harlow (1949)
tested rhesus monkeys on oddity problems in which the test stimuli differed markedly
from the training stimuli, the monkeys were unable to generalise their oddity
performance (Benjamini 1983). A similar result was observed in Benjamini’s (1983)
testing of oddity learning in ravens and gulls, however, the author suggested that this
phenomenon was due, to some extent, to the restriction of stimulus variety in the
experimental situation.
Despite these poor results on immediate cross-modal transfer of same/different
discrimination, the fact remains that, with training, monkeys can perform the task in
more than one modality (see also Wright, Shyan and Jitsumori 1990). This supports
Herman et al.’s (1989) argument against the idea of “modality specificity”, in which
advanced, or even simple, cognitive skills are largely restricted to each species’
dominant sensory modality. Their study showed bottlenosed dolphins, considered an
“auditory specialist”, could perform approximately equally well on a visual matchingto-sample task as they did on auditory-based problems. Similarly, visually dominant
pigeons are able to learn auditory, as well as visual, same/different tasks (Cook and
Brooks 2009). Dolphins have also demonstrated the ability to perform matching-tosample in three different modalities – vision, passive listening and active echolocation
(Herman, Pack and Wood 1994).

3.7.3.5 Language-based same/different
While the vast majority of same/different experiments are conducted using the type of
matching-to-sample, oddity and paired-comparison procedures described above, a
number of experiments have been designed based on human language principles. One of
the more unambiguous demonstrations of same/different learning in animals, and that
165

which seems to mostly closely resemble the language-based human expression of
identity relations, is found in experiments in which arbitrary symbols are used to
indicate relational concepts. Premack (1971, 1976) demonstrated that chimpanzees can
learn to use tokens representing same and different and place them between objects
manifesting the corresponding relationship. The chimpanzees are then able to choose
the appropriate token when novel pairs of objects (either the same or different) are
presented.
It is worth noting, however, that authors such as Edwards et al. (1983) argue that the use
of response keys representing same and different used in more conventional
same/different experiments mirrors Premack’s use of tokens as symbols which act as an
“arbitrary stimulus that represents a class of conceptually related stimuli” (Edwards et
al. 1983, p. 350). Zentall, Edwards and Hogan (1983) describe their experiments (see
Edwards et al. 1983 in section 3.7.3.3), in which they trained pigeons with a variation of
Premack’s symbol procedure using response keys with shapes, hues and lights serving
as stimuli, as: “Teaching pigeons the ‘words’ same and different” (Zentall et al. 1983, p.
285). The authors used a number of experimental techniques to enhance stimulus
discriminability (e.g. observing responses, differential reinforcement, differential spatial
positions and redundant stimulus cues, see section 3.7.3.3). Despite the somewhat
ambiguous nature of their results (see section 3.7.3.3), the authors argued that their
results suggested that: “Pigeons appear capable of using the symbols ‘same’ and
‘different’ to categorise new exemplars of the concepts in a manner qualitatively, if not
quantitatively, similar to that of language-trained chimpanzees” (Edwards et al. 1983, p.
354).
Even more evocative of human-like same/different learning is the performance of an
African Grey parrot called Alex. After previously being trained to verbally identify the
stimulus properties of particular objects in response to queries from the experimenter
(e.g. “What colour?” – “blue”, “What shape?” – “four-corner”) (Pepperberg (1983),
Alex was then trained with groups of objects to verbally respond with the correct
category label (e.g. “colour” or “shape”) in response to the questions “What’s same?”
and “What’s different?” (Pepperberg 1987) or even report “none” to the same questions
when objects were totally dissimilar or identical respectively (Pepperberg 1988). Alex
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was able to transfer the performances to new combinations of training stimuli and to
novel stimuli.

3.7.4 Same/different conditional discrimination
This type of experiment combines two separate cognitive skills – the ability to
categorise stimuli based on whether they are the same or different (see section 3.7.3)
and to implement ‘if-then’ (if this happens then do that) conditional reasoning (see
section 3.2). According to Thomas’ (1980, 1986, 1996) hierarchy of learning abilities
(see section 1.3.2.1), the addition of the conditional discrimination procedure requires a
higher level of learning ability or ‘intelligence’ than relational categorisation alone and
sits at level seven of Thomas’ eight-level ordinal scale. According to Thompson and
Oden (1996): “An even more complex variation of a same/different discrimination is the
conditional S/D discrimination task” (pp. 151-152). There has not been an extensive
history using this type of experimental procedure; however it has been tested using both
the matching/oddity and the paired comparison same/different paradigms.
Spaet and Harlow (1943) combined conditional discrimination and oddity problems to
show rhesus monkeys could learn to choose the odd item among brass doorbell buttons
or T-shaped objects on a yellow tray, and choose either of the non-odd items on a black
tray. However, the large number of trials taken to master the task (4320-6840 trials) led
Thomas and Kerr (1976) to suggest that the monkeys most likely learned the specific
configurations.
Thomas and Kerr (1976) also combined a conditional discrimination with an oddity
task; however they used a one-trial procedure (i.e. using non-repeating stimulus
configurations) to eliminate the possibility of configuration learning. They took three
adult squirrel monkeys that had previously successfully acquired a one-trial oddity
problem and superimposed a tray-brightness, stimulus-response contingency. Responses
to the odd objects were rewarded on a white tray and responses to the non-odd objects
were rewarded on a black tray, with the objects being randomly selected from a
stimulus pool of 124 wood forms and plastic toys on each trial. The monkeys were all
able to achieve criterion performance of 90%, leading the authors to conclude they were
utilising a “conceptual” solution.
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Edwards, Miller and Zentall (1985) used only two shapes to train pigeons to respond on
the basis of either same or different in a simultaneous matching task based on the
presence of two different light levels in the conditioning chamber. Transfer tests were
conducted with two colour stimuli resulting in a weak but significant evidence of
transfer. Delius (1994) considered the result was “remarkable” considering the small
number of training stimuli. According to Delius (1994), the conditional variant was
likely to be responsible for promoting rule learning.
Burdyn and Thomas (1984) trained squirrel monkeys to select a pair of objects that
were the same when presented with a single, specific triangle shape and to select a pair
of objects that were different when presented with a single, specific heptagon shape. In
the second part of the experiment, the authors used symbolic cues – “conceptual
triangularity” as the cue for sameness and “conceptual heptagonality” as the cue for
difference – with the triangles and heptagons being selected randomly on each trial from
a pool of about 120 different variations of each shape. New pairs of objects were used
on each trial.
While the squirrel monkeys successfully learned the task, Burdyn and Thomas (1984)
were unsure whether they had demonstrated conditional reasoning (“if a triangle is
presented, then choose the ‘sameness’ pair”) or conjunctive reasoning “a triangle and a
‘sameness’ pair go together; therefore, choose the ‘sameness’ pair when you see a
triangle”). Although the paper was titled as “conditional discrimination”, the authors
acknowledged that either tactic would have solved the problem. Conjunctive reasoning
(used in tandem with a categorisation problem) is also at level seven of Thomas’
hierarchy (Thomas 1980).
More recently, Flemming et al. (2007) have demonstrated that rhesus monkeys are able
to perform same/different conditional discriminations using background stimulus
colours to indicate whether to choose same or different. The stimulus panels contained
two rows of clip-art images – one row of identical images and one row of all different
images. When the background of the panel was black, the different row was the
rewarded stimulus, when the panel was pink, the same row was rewarded. In this case,
the authors did not set out to directly test the same/different conditional discrimination;
rather they used the conditional cues to enable the monkeys to reverse a previously
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learned same/different discrimination. Flemming (2011) used the same conditional
procedure to demonstrate two-item same/different learning in capuchin monkeys (see
section 3.7.3.3).
Castro et al. (2010) showed pigeons could discriminate simultaneously presented arrays
of 16 same and 16 different icons when the correct choice was conditional on the colour
of the stimulus background, demonstrating “nearly perfect” transfer to novel testing
arrays. The pigeons were also able to perform the task using 24-, 20-, 12- and 8-icon
arrays, although accuracy declined with 4- and 2-icon arrays. In a further study, Castro
and Wasserman (2010) found that varying the size and spatial organisation of the
stimulus icons had almost no impact on conditional same/different discriminative
performance, suggesting learning was not tied to the particulars of the training stimuli.
The authors suggested this might be result of using a large pool of multidimensional,
colourful stimuli, making any one particular perceptual dimension less relevant.

3.7.5 Same/different second-order relationships
While not tested in this study, it is worth mentioning the final level of Thomas’ (1980)
hierarchy of cognitive abilities that also involves same/different discriminations –
second-order same/different relationships (also called relations-between-relations or
relational matching). This task involves a form of analogical reasoning, requiring the
subject to judge whether the relationship between one pair of stimuli is the same as, or
different from, the relationship between another pair. One way in which this ability is
tested is by seeing whether an animal can match a pair of identical objects with a
different pair of identical objects instead of a pair of non-identical objects. Likewise, a
non-identical pair should be matched with a different non-identical pair and not an
identical pair. Basically, subjects are shown a sample pair of items that are either the
same or different and must select the choice pair that is related in the same way (e.g. ‘if
AA, choose BB, not CD; if AB, choose CD, not EE’) (Flemming et al. 2007).
This type of task is even more complex than same/different because it involves not just
the relationship between similar or dissimilar elements, but also the relationship
between relationships (Fagot, Wasserman and Young 2001; Pearce 1997; Thompson
and Oden 2000; Tomasello and Call 1997). According to Thompson (1995, p. 211),
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second-order same/different tasks are “fundamentally more complex than either
physical matching or paired comparison S/D tasks.” Flemming et al. (2007) described
second-order same/different relationships as “…one conceptual task for which some
researchers propose a major difference in the abilities of some animals and those of
others … [the] ability to reason analogically, the highest degree of abstract
conceptualisation” (p. 55). Premack (1983a, 1988) argued that among non-humans only
language-trained chimpanzees are capable of analogical reasoning and there is some
experimental support for this position.
There is convincing evidence that analogical reasoning has been demonstrated in the
language-trained chimpanzee Sarah using tokens of different shapes, sizes and colours
and plastic symbols to represent same and different (Gillan et al. 1981; Premack 1976,
1983b). Sarah was able to correctly identify whether the relationship between one pair
of stimuli was the same as or different from the relationship between another pair of
stimuli (e.g. AA is the same as BB). She was also able to complete analogous
same/different relationships by selecting the correct stimuli (e.g. AA is the same as B?).
(Impressively, in addition to figural analogy problems based on same/different relations
such as size, colour and markings, she was also able to solve conceptual analogy
problems using household objects in which the relations were functional and spatial).
Chimpanzees with and without language training have been directly compared on a
simultaneous second-order same/different task in which the subject is presented with
two pairs of stimuli and is required to indicate the relationship between them (e.g. AA
and BB or, alternatively, AX and BY are both same, while AX and BB are different)
(Pearce 1997). Utilising this experimental design, Premack (1983b) and Premack and
Premack (1983) found language-naïve chimpanzees were unable to successfully
complete the task while language-trained chimpanzees performed the discrimination
fairly easily.
Other experiments suggest it may be some aspect of training with abstract symbols,
rather than language training itself, that encourages relational matching (Shettleworth
1998; Thompson and Oden 1996). Thompson, Oden and Boysen (1997) found
language-naïve chimpanzees could match same and different object pairs spontaneously.
However, the four of the five chimpanzees in the experiment that mastered the task had
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previously had training in the use of numerical problem solving and symbolic tokens,
while the fifth that lacked the prior training failed. A similar result is found in human
children. Gentner (2003) found five-year-olds are able to complete an analogical
reasoning task easily, but three-year-olds (who appear unable to referentially label real
world objects) fail the task. However, when aided by the presence of labels, the threeyear-olds’ performance is comparable to that of the five-year-olds, suggesting labels
play a critical role in relational matching (Flemming et al. 2007).
Flemming et al. (2007) had promising results with language-naïve rhesus monkeys, who
demonstrated the ability to “label” the relations in conditional paired-comparison
same/different discriminations by performing the discriminations bi-directionally – both
choosing the correct relational pair in the presence of the colour cue and choosing the
correct colour in the presence of the corresponding relation (see section 3.7.4). This led
the authors to speculate that the monkeys were using the cues as representational
symbols or tokens in a similar manner to chimpanzees who then manifested successful
relational matching performances (Premack and Premack 2003; Thompson and Oden
2000). Despite this, the monkeys were unable to learn a paired-relations matching-tosample task using trial-unique stimuli, leading the authors to concede that bidirectional
discrimination did not necessarily elevate the discriminative cues to the level of
symbols and that there was a qualitative difference between the relational matching task
demonstrated by language-trained chimpanzees and simply re-coding relations
symbolically.
Despite the evidence supporting Premack’s (1983a) contention that language training
(and possibly abstract symbol training) is a prerequisite for analogical reasoning,
subsequent studies have suggested he may have been premature. While not directly
testing relational matching, Spinozzi (1993) found that not only could non-language or
token trained chimpanzees perceive second-order relationships as infants, but older
chimpanzees could actually construct them by spontaneously sorting objects according
to second-order relations – that is, they were able to construct similarity-difference
relations between groups of objects.
Similarly, Oden, Thompson and Premack (1990) had suggestive results with nonlanguage trained infant chimpanzees. The authors found the young chimpanzees could
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spontaneously perceive second-order same/different relationships. The chimpanzees
were allowed more than five minutes to handle a pair of objects that was either the same
(AA) or different (WX). They were then given a new object pair, which was either the
same relation experienced in the first session (BB) or the alternative relation (YZ). The
relation experienced in the first session affected handling times in the second session.
Despite demonstrating the ability to detect second-order same/different relations,
however, the infant chimpanzees were unable to actually match object pairs based on
their relationship in a relational matching-to-sample task despite extensive training
efforts. Human children also fail to match same/different second-order relationships
before the age of about five years (House, Brown and Scott 1974; see above) but, like
the infant chimpanzees in Oden et al.’s (1990) experiments, can perceive those
relationships in preference-for-novelty tests at around 29 weeks of age (Tyrrell, Stauffer
and Snowman 1991).
Smith et al. (1975) found that two language-naïve adult chimpanzees were able to
master an actual relational matching task. However, Thompson and Oden (1996) claim
the chimpanzees may have been utilising non-relation configurational cues such as
symmetry or complexity. They also claim that because the experiment used differential
reinforcement, only trial-one data from the testing phase (which was not reported) was
relevant – despite the fact that the majority of relational categorisation studies do not
have this requirement.
Fagot et al. (2001) determined non-language trained baboons could successfully
discriminate relations between relations in a delayed relational matching-to-sample task
using 16-item arrays. However, the performance on the different arrays deteriorated as
the number of items in the arrays decreased, while the performance on the same arrays
remained high regardless of icon number. According to Flemming et al. (2007), these
results showed that for the baboons the task remained entropy dependent (see section
3.7.6.2.3); based more on a general perceptual sense of the different amounts of
variation in the arrays rather than a cognitive ‘concept’ of same versus different. A
similar procedure was used to demonstrate relational matching in pigeons (Cook and
Wasserman 2007) and, although they did not test for it, the authors acknowledged that it
was likely the pigeons’ performance would similarly degrade with lower-item arrays.
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More conclusively, language-naïve orangutans and gorillas have demonstrated secondorder relational matching based on shape and colour (Vonk 2003). The subjects were
able to correctly select the matching same stimuli even when the incorrect stimuli were
a closer visual match to the sample stimuli. They were also able to match stimuli
according to what dimension was shared between objects pictured in the same stimulus.
The author suggested the experiments showed that “language or symbolic token training
is not a necessary condition for the acquisition and instrumental use of concepts
pertaining to the relationship between items” (p. 85).
According to Vonk (2003), the fact that their subjects succeeded while chimpanzees
without language or symbol training failed (Premack 1983b; Premack and Premack
1983; Thompson et al. 1997) may have been due to species differences but was more
likely due to differences in the experimental procedures or insufficient testing in
chimpanzees. Vonk (2003) claims studies have indicated that non-language trained
chimpanzees and monkeys “may have greater capacities for making conceptual
judgments than was previously believed” (p. 86).
Finally, second-order same/different relationships have not yet been convincingly
demonstrated in non-primates, leading authors such as Tomasello and Call (1997) to
suggest that this cognitive ability may be unique to primates. Further testing of this
ability in non-primates is required – a good candidate would be a successor to Irene
Pepperberg’s language-trained African Grey parrot Alex (now deceased), who was able
to demonstrate a relatively sophisticated understanding of relationships by being able to
verbally identify the physical property of a group of objects that was either the same or
different (Pepperberg 1987) (see section 3.7.3.4).

3.7.6 Same/different categorisation theories
While there is now considerable evidence that a number of species are able to perform
same/different categorisations, authors such as Fetterman (1996) and Thompson (1995)
have pointed out that a key shortcoming of this type of research in animals is the failure
to identify how the subjects were able to accomplish the task.
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A number of theories have been put forward to account for both matching/non-matching
and paired comparison same/different performance in animals. As many authors agree
with Roitblat (1984, p. 85) that: “The processes controlling delayed matching-to-sample
may be very different from those controlling simultaneous matching or oddity”, the
theories that deal specifically with matching and oddity have been discussed separately
from theories accounting for same/different categorisation in general.

3.7.6.1 Matching/non-matching theories
It is worth noting that matching-to-sample and oddity-from-sample may be solved using
different mechanisms, at least in some species. Skinner (1950) predicted that since
matching and oddity appeared to be opposites, it should logically follow that it would be
no more difficult to acquire one task than the other. However, this has not always
proved to be the case, even in experiments conducted using similar experimental
procedures. For example, while the goldfish in Goldman and Shapiro’s (1979)
experiment showed no systematic differences in the acquisition of matching and oddity,
Cumming and Berryman (1965) found pigeons in a similar experiment demonstrated
marked differences between the two tasks. The pigeons’ matching performance started
at chance level accompanied by strong position and then small colour biases followed
by fairly rapid task acquisition to well above 90% accuracy. In contrast, oddity
performance began above chance level (suggesting a preference for oddity, according to
the authors) then rose more gradually to a maximum of about 90%.
In addition, matching and non-matching can themselves be learned using different
strategies. Katz, Bodily and Wright (2008) even found pigeons using both configural
and conditional strategies (see below) in the same matching experiment.

3.7.6.1.1 Conditional discrimination
Matching/non-matching tasks, which are usually carried out using successive
presentation of stimuli, have proved a popular method of testing same/different
relational categorisation. However, matching/non-matching tasks have also been subject
to the same criticisms that have been levelled against successive testing methods
generally: that is, that they can be solved using conditional discrimination rather than
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identity (see section 3.2). A number of authors refer to matching-to-sample only as a
conditional discrimination task (e.g. if the sample is A1, choose discriminative stimuli
A1) and not in terms of same/different categorisation testing. Roitblat et al. (1990)
describe delayed matching-to-sample as a conditional discrimination combining two
discrimination problems – a successive discrimination to identify the sample stimulus
followed by a simultaneous discrimination among the comparison stimuli to determine
which one matches the sample. According to Goldman and Shapiro (1979), three-key
matching procedures “are examples of conditional discriminations in which the centre
sample stimulus determines which discrimination is appropriate” (p. 260) while Hanggi
and Schusterman (1995) refer to match-to-sample as “a sequential form of the
conditional discrimination” (p. 544).
Similarly, oddity-from-sample can be solved using a conditional discrimination.
Acquisition may be accounted for in two ways – avoidance (e.g. if the sample is A1,
avoid choosing discriminative stimuli A1) or approach (e.g. if the sample is A1, choose
discriminative stimuli B2 or B3, whichever is available) (Carter and Werner 1978).
Experiments conducted by Berryman et al. (1965) favour an approach strategy in oddity
experiments with pigeons while Zerbolio and Royalty (1983) found evidence of an
avoidance learning strategy in matching and oddity testing in goldfish.
In support of the conditional discrimination explanation of matching/non-matching,
Shettleworth (1998) points out that pigeons trained using only a small number of stimuli
do not match novel samples but apparently memorise conditional rules, such as: “if the
sample was red, choose red” – the multiple-rule model of conditional discrimination
(see section 3.2.4.4). Only after training with a large number of stimuli for thousands of
trials are they able to acquire a generalised matching ability (Wright et al. 1988).
Furthermore, pigeons do just as well in symbolic matching, in which the sample stimuli
are arbitrarily associated with one or more different stimuli through reinforcement
(Zentall et al. 1989; see section 3.7.3.1).
Indeed, a number of experiments have supported the view that matching/oddity tasks
are simply examples of conditional discriminations (e.g. Berryman et al. 1965; Carter
and Eckerman 1975; Cumming and Berryman 1961). However, Macphail (1982), while
acknowledging that oddity can be solved using conditional discrimination, claimed that
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genuine matching or oddity learning could be guaranteed by demonstrating immediate
(trial 1 of transfer trials) transfer to novel stimulus configurations. He claimed that
performance had been successfully demonstrated (80% or better) in chimpanzees,
rhesus monkeys, cebus monkeys and squirrel monkeys (Moon and Harlow 1955; Strong
and Hedges 1966; Thomas and Boyd 1973). In addition, oddity tasks conducted using
the simultaneous method in which there is no sample stimulus are not subject to samplespecific cues and conditional interpretations (Schrier and Thompson 1980).
Sidman et al. (1982) claim: “We cannot tell by looking at a subject’s conditionaldiscrimination performance whether or not it involves true matching to sample” (p. 24).
According to Sidman and Tailby (1982), calling a conditional discrimination
performance matching-to-sample requires proof that the subject displays not only
conditionality, but also equivalence. This can only be determined by further testing to
prove that the relation possesses all three properties of an equivalence relation:
i)

Reflexivity (identity; A = A), e.g. if the sample is green, the subject selects
green (and this can be generalised to novel exemplars).

ii)

Symmetry (bidirectionality; if A = B, then B = A), e.g. if a subject has learned
to select vertical when the sample is green they should select green when the
sample is vertical.

iii)

Transitivity (mediated associativity; if A = B and B = C, then A = C), e.g. if a
subject has learned to select vertical when the sample is green and select
triangle when the sample is vertical, they should select triangle when the
sample is green.
(adapted from Sidman et al. 1982)

While strong evidence for reflexivity transfer in animals has been reported (e.g.
Wasserman et al. 1995; Young and Wasserman 1997; Zentall et al. 1981; Zentall and
Hogan 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978), the evidence for the other two requirements is less
conclusive (Zentall 1998). In a series of experiments Sidman et al. (1982) found that
monkeys and baboons were unable to solve a symmetry-based problem that five-yearold children could solve and monkeys were also unable to display transitivity when
tested. These results echo findings with pigeons and primates that have shown limited
ability to perform in symmetry and transitivity tests (D’Amato, Salmon, Loukas and
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Tomie 1985; Dugdale and Lowe 2000; Gray 1966; Hogan and Zentall 1977; Holmes
1979; Lionello-DeNolf and Urcuioli 2002; Richards 1988; Rodewald 1974; also see
reviews by Dugdale and Lowe 1990; Hayes and Hayes 1992; Saunders, Williams and
Spradlin 1996). However, Sidman et al. (1982) clarified that the lack of performance in
previous experiments did not prove that animals were necessarily incapable of identity
matching.
In fact, a number of studies have claimed to demonstrate symmetry, reflexivity and
transitivity in non-human animals (e.g. sea lions, Schusterman and Kastak 1993, and
macaques, McIntire, Cleary and Thompson 1987). However, as Dugdale and Lowe
(2000) point out, other authors have criticised these studies, arguing that the tested
relations were trained rather than emergent (see Dugdale 1988; Dugdale and Lowe
1990; Hayes 1989 and Saunders 1989 for critiques of McIntire et al. 1987, and Horne
and Lowe 1996, 1997 and Lowe and Horne 1996 for critiques of Schusterman and
Kastak 1993).
Manabe et al. (1995) claim they were able to demonstrate stimulus equivalence in the
budgerigar “of the same general type” (p. 125) as that described by Sidman and his coworkers. In one part of the experiment, the birds were trained to make high- or lowfrequency calls in response to particular colour stimuli. They were then trained in a
form-to-colour matching-to-sample task using the same colours. The birds
spontaneously made the correct frequency ‘colour’ call in the presence of the form that
had been paired with that colour. Manabe et al. (1995) examined the possibility that the
relations they found might be the result of some indirect aspect of the experimental
training. However, they argued that because one of their experiments showed evidence
of bidirectional spontaneous relations (i.e. if A = B and B = C, then A = C and C = A):
“It is hard to avoid the conclusion that something more than standard conditioning
processes underlies the emergent relations demonstrated in these experiments” (Manabe
et al. 1995, p. 126).

3.7.6.1.2 Relative novelty
The second criticism of matching as a test of same/different is that it can be solved
using relative novelty rather than identity (see section 3.7.2.1.5). A basic tenet of
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habituation theory is the ability to determine whether a stimulus has been encountered
before. Babies, for example, look less persistently at stimuli they have recently seen
than at stimuli they have not seen before. That is, they recognise a stimulus as being
either the same as or different from one recently viewed. A similar type of habituation
to recurring stimuli and orienting or arousal responses to novel stimuli has also been
found in a wide variety of non-human animals, including both vertebrate and
invertebrate species (Peeke and Herz 1973). Novelty preference has been demonstrated
in both monkeys and children using visual paired-comparison (VPC) tasks (which
replicate the successive matching/non-matching procedure), which usually involve the
subject looking a picture for sufficient time to habituate, and then being presented with
the same picture paired with a novel picture (Wright and Delius 2005). Typically they
look more at the novel picture than the familiar picture (e.g. Fagan 1974; Pascalis and
Bachevalier 1999; Zola et al. (2000).
Novelty and familiarity have proved salient ‘concepts’ for pigeons, the subjects of the
majority of matching-to-sample experiments (see section 3.7.3.1), with experiments
showing rapid acquisition (e.g. Macphail and Reilly 1989). Shettleworth (1998) also
points out that pigeons perform well in experiments in which they are reinforced for
responding to a novel slide the second time it appears, but not the first.
A number of authors have pointed out the potential for transfer of matching-to-sample
performance to be based on familiarity and novelty rather than identity (e.g. Oden et al.
1990; Thompson and Oden 1996). Shettleworth (1998) argues that the delayed
matching paradigm, in which the subject reacts first to the sample and then to the
comparison stimuli, is merely a test of relative novelty which requires the subject to
determine: “‘Which did I just respond to?’ rather than ‘Are these two things the same?’”
(p. 225), or, in the case of oddity, “Are these two things different?” (See also Wilson et
al. 1985a).
Premack (1983b) agrees, arguing that in the successive task the subject “simply reacts
to whether or not it has experienced the item before … ‘Old/new’ or
‘familiar/unfamiliar’ may be more suitable labels for this case than ‘same/different’” (p.
127). Zayan and Vauclar (1998) state that in matching experiments: “… a subject may
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simply recognise that a matching comparison stimulus is familiar rather than explicitly
judge it to be identical to the sample” (p. 89).
According to Delius (1994), while this type of generalised, passive detection of
familiarity and novelty may form the basis for more sophisticated mechanisms,
cognitive scientists require a more active and explicit detection of identity/oddity
relations to assert same/different categorisation. However, Zentall (2000b) argues that
even if matching experiments are based on familiarity, it makes no difference: “…
although it may seem more parsimonious to attribute the transfer of matching and
oddity to relative familiarity and novelty, such an account is conceptually
indistinguishable from generalized identity” (p. 202).

3.7.6.1.3 Exclusion effect
Another potential problem with matching as a same/different task is that it can be
mediated by factors such as the exclusion effect rather than identity (Thompson 1995).
The exclusion effect occurs when the comparison stimuli consist of an S+ stimulus and
a familiar S- stimulus. In these circumstances, the subject can respond correctly not by
matching but by excluding the familiar S- stimulus because it has previously been
associated with another sample (Schusterman, Gisiner, Grimm and Hanggi 1993).

3.7.6.1.4 Configural theory
Pearce (1997), a proponent of configural discrimination theory (see section 3.1.4.2.1.ii),
suggests a plausible account for matching can be made using configural learning rather
than same/different categorisation. There are a limited number of configurations of
sample and comparison stimuli that make up a typical matching problem. In order to
solve the problem, the subject merely has to associate the correct response with each
configuration (a similar theory was discussed as the configuration model of conditional
discriminations, see section 3.2.4.1). One example of this can be found in Johnson and
Levy’s (1968) oddity learning experiment with rats, in which the authors suggested the
rats had learned specific configurations rather than an oddity principle. Similarly Wright
(1997) found evidence of configural learning in pigeons in a matching-to-sample task.
However, as Pearce (1997) himself points out, the configural account cannot account for
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experiments in which the subjects have responded correctly to novel stimuli on the first
trial before they have had the chance to associate the configurations of those stimuli
with the correct choices (e.g. Herman and Gordon 1974; Kastak and Schusterman 1994;
Mishkin et al. 1962; Nissen et al. 1948; Oden et al. 1988; Wilson et al. 1985b).

3.7.6.1.5 Oddity preference effect
It has been suggested that the oddity preference effect (OPE) discussed earlier (see
section 3.7.3.1) may account for oddity transfer. Wilson et al. (1985a) concluded that:
“When pigeons are transferred to novel stimuli, they characteristically revert to their
oddity preference, and so it seems that even birds that have previously learned to ignore
their preference may revert to it with novel stimuli” (p. 308). This suggests that any
transfer to a novel stimulus may be due to OPE rather than a ‘higher order’ or relational
comparison (Wright and Delius 2005). Indeed, Berryman et al. (1965) found evidence
of OPE affecting performance in pigeons taking part in a simultaneous oddity problem,
with the pigeons beginning the experiment at levels well above chance and showing less
of a position preference effect than that seen in simultaneous matching experiments.
However, when Wright and Delius (2005) examined the impact of OPE on oddity
transfer, they found that while OPE might make some limited contribution to
performance, it was far too small an effect to account for high levels of transfer. Wright
and Delius (2005) also designed a series of oddity tests using procedures designed to
counter the effects of OPE. They were able to demonstrate novel-stimulus transfer
equivalent to training performance and claimed, “… these birds have fully learned the
abstract concept of oddity” (p. 431).

3.7.6.2 General same/different theories
3.7.6.2.1 Control by absolute stimulus features
Another criticism of many same/different experiments is that the subjects may be
responding on the basis of absolute stimulus features. One example is the brightness
differences in the stimuli, particularly in experiments using black and white shapes.
However, a number of experiments have demonstrated that animals can do more than
merely select the stimulus with the odd or matching brightness. These experiments have
shown successful transfer using same and different stimuli of the same brightness using
180

mirror images (Hollard and Delius 1982), matching stimuli of different sizes (Lombardi
and Delius 1990) and comparison shapes in reverse contrast (from white-on-black to
black-on-white) as well as comparison shapes in outline (Lombardi and Delius 1988).

3.7.6.2.2 Low-level perceptual mechanisms
Another possible alternative to relational learning in same/different experiments is the
use of low-level perceptual mechanisms. One procedure that lends itself to such
criticism is the use of multi-element stimulus displays (see section 3.7.3.3). While there
is evidence that perceptual processes play an important role in ‘conceptual’ behaviour
(e.g. Cook et al. 1995; Wasserman and Astley 1994), some scientists have gone further
and suggested that the subjects of multi-element same/different experiments are only
demonstrating a low-level perceptual mechanism. Katz et al. (2007) suggested that a
large number of items introduced the possible role of “global perceptual features” (p.
83) such as “linear orderliness” (Mandler 2004, p. 139). Mackintosh (2000) remarked
that “an obvious difference between a 4 x 4 array of As and a 4 x 4 array consisting of
16 letters A to P each occurring once, is that the former has a regular texture and the
latter does not” (p. 132).
Indeed, Wasserman himself points out the possibility that the grid arrangement of the
stimulus elements in the Wasserman et al. (1995) experiment (see section 3.7.3.3) may
have allowed for a solution based on the greater orderliness of the same versus different
stimuli (Young and Wasserman 1997) – an effect which may be emphasised when more
items are included in the array (Vonk 2003). However, both Young and Wasserman
(1997) and the authors of a similar multi-element array study (Cook et al. 1995, see
section 3.7.3.3) have argued that because transfer was not perfect their subjects must
have been doing more than merely responding to the overall texture of the stimuli and
were making a same/different judgment at a higher “conceptual” level (Cook and
Wixted 1997; Young and Wasserman 1997).
To test this proposition, experiments with pigeons (Young and Wasserman 1997) and
baboons (Wasserman, Fagot and Young 2001) were conducted using disorderly arrays
created by randomly placing 16 icons in an incompletely filled 5 x 5 grid instead of a
completely filled 4 x 4 grid. Both studies showed that spatially displacing the stimulus
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items to disrupt the regularity of the columns and rows had no effect on performance.
Young and Wasserman (2001a) and Brooks and Wasserman (2008) also demonstrated
that performance was unaffected by disarranging or rotating stimulus items.
Vonk (2003) argues against these findings as evidence for non-perceptually based
same/different discrimination in non-humans, claiming that perceptual regularity can be
present in an array “even when items are randomly arranged” (p. 78). However, Vonk
(2003) concedes that more convincing evidence is found in experiments in which
perceptual regularity could not be a factor. Young and colleagues used lists of
successively presented stimuli that were either all the same or all different and found
pigeons were able to determine whether the list consisted of same or different stimuli
even though they could not respond until the last stimulus was presented (Young,
Wasserman and Dalrymple 1997; Young, Wasserman, Hilfers and Dalrymple 1999).
Similarly, Wright and Katz (2006) argued against the symmetry/regularity hypothesis
on the basis of similar list-memory experiments with monkeys (Wright et al. 2003).
Further evidence against a low-level mechanism like orderliness was also demonstrated
in the pigeon (Young and Wasserman 1997) and baboon (Wasserman, Fagot and Young
2001) experiments mentioned above. Both studies found blurring the icons in multielement displays had a large adverse effect on performance – an effect that should not
have occurred if alignment was the only factor being used to make the discriminations
(see also Young, Wasserman and Ellefson 2007).
Katz et al. (2010b) tested whether repetition of stimulus features (translation symmetry)
was responsible for same/different performance in pigeons when only two items were
used. The authors used a successive procedure in which one stimulus was presented and
removed then, after a delay period, a second stimulus was presented that was either the
same or different and the pigeons were required to respond appropriately to each
condition. Delay intervals from 0 to 6 seconds were used to make any emergent features
like translation symmetry “imperceptible” (p. 36). Transfer trials were conducted after
each increase in delay interval. The authors found there was “no evidence of the
precipitous performance decline or default strategy that would be predicted by
translational symmetry” (p. 35). However, due to the successive nature of the
experiment, it is open to other interpretations (see section 3.7.2.1.2 and 3.7.2.1.5).
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A number of other experiments have also shown that at least some species are able to
perform same/different categorisation without reference to low-level perceptual
differences between the same and different stimulus presentations. For example,
Pepperberg (1987) showed an African Grey parrot could respond accurately to
questions such as “what is same?” between objects when the objects differed in colour,
shape or material (see section 3.7.3.4). Similarly, Bovet and Vauclair (2001) showed
baboons were able to classify pairs of objects as same or different based on a functional
(food versus non-food) rather than perceptual basis. Both the same and different object
pairs were perceptually different, discounting the use of perceptual cues (see section
3.7.3.3).

3.7.6.2.3 High-level perceptual mechanisms
Another theory about how animals perform same/different discriminations also resulted
from the multi-element experiments conducted by Wasserman and his colleagues. They
found that increasing the number of items in a display made the same/different
categorisation task “more obvious” (Young and Wasserman 1997, p. 168). The authors
attempted to quantify this effect in terms of a measure from information theory –
entropy. Entropy is a mathematical measure of display variability that is calculated
using the number of stimulus categories in a display. When all the items are the same,
entropy is zero. When all the items are different, entropy is maximal for the number of
items. As the number of unique items rises, so does the entropy value. So, the higher the
number of different items, the higher the entropy value for the different stimulus and the
greater the difference between it and the (zero-value) same stimulus. According to this
theory, the more items used in a multi-element display, the greater the entropy
difference between the same and different arrays and the more “obvious” the
discrimination.
Young and Wasserman (1997) suggest their entropy theory is the reason why pigeons
have experienced difficulty in same/different experiments using 2-item discriminations
(e.g. Edwards et al. 1983; Santiago and Wright 1984) while 16-item discriminations
such as that used by Wasserman et al. (1995) and Young and Wasserman (1997) have
proved more successful. They suggested it was not the absolute number of items in the
display that simplified the task, rather it was the fact that a larger number of items led to
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an increase in the maximal amount of variability (entropy) in the different displays. For
example, both a 16-item and a 2-item same array have an entropy value of 0.00.
However, a 16-item different array has an entropy value of 4.00 compared to a 2-item
different display with an entropy value of 1.00. So, in a 16-item task, the subject must
learn to discriminate between entropies of 0.00 and 4.00 while in a 2-item task they
must discriminate between entropies of 0.00 and 1.00 – “presumably a much more
difficult task”, according to Young and Wasserman (1997, p. 168).
Young and Wasserman (1997) analysed pigeons’ performance on multi-element
stimulus arrays. When they were presented with stimuli of intermediate degrees of
entropy (i.e. mixed arrays containing both a number of the same and different icons) the
pigeons didn’t treat all the mixed displays as different; instead they tended to identify
mixed displays with relatively few non-identical items as same and mixed displays with
a relatively high number of non-identical items as different. This led Young and
Wasserman (1997) to suggest that pigeons are sensitive to a spectrum of stimulus
variability rather than just a dichotomous same/different discrimination. Castro and
Wasserman (2010, p. 170) claimed pigeons “did not categorise the stimuli into ‘same’
vs. ‘different’, but that they dimensionalised the stimuli into ‘low variability’ vs. ‘high
variability’ …” Studies have shown that baboons and monkeys also respond to mixed
arrays proportionally, rather than as an all or nothing decision (Fagot et al. 2001; Smith,
Redford, Haas, Coutinho and Couchman 2008; Zentall, Wasserman, Lazareva,
Thompson and Rattermann 2008; see also section 3.8.2.1).
Based on their findings with pigeons, Young and Wasserman (1997) went further and
suggested that entropy might be the single cue that accounts for pigeons’ (and possibly
other non-humans’) same/different discrimination performance. “Pigeons, and perhaps
other species, may be translating the human concept of same/different into minimal
versus maximal entropy” (Young and Wasserman 1997, p. 168). If indeed this was the
case,

a

universal

entropy-based

explanation

for

non-human

same/different

discrimination could cast doubt on the ability of non-humans to perform relational (or
conceptual) categorisation (but see section 3.8.2.1).
Gibson et al. (2006) described entropy as a “single relational cue” and Young and
Wasserman (1997) used the term “relational sensitivity”, however the use of the term
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relational could be misleading. While sensitivity to entropy appears to involve
something more than just responding to a low-level perceptual cue such as uniformity, it
can be argued that it does not rise to the level of relational categorisation.
Entropy involves the extraction of a sense of the variability of a group of items that is
relatively difficult to detect with only a few items and becomes more apparent as the
number of items increases. Relational identity, on the other hand, is independent of the
number of items (provided there is more than one) and involves the ability to compare
individual items and make same/different judgments. Vonk (2003) describes entropy
detection as a simpler perceptual process which provides a way for subjects to solve
same/different problems “without necessarily having acquired concepts for ‘sameness’
and ‘difference’” (p. 77).
Gibson et al. (2006) decided to examine the possibility, arising from Young and
Wasserman’s (1997) findings, of an entropy-based unidimensional account of
same/different learning. According to this theory, subjects set a decision criterion along
the spectrum of possible entropy values allowing them to discriminate same from
different displays (Cook and Wasserman 2006). This account would also explain
oddity-based same/different discriminations in which the different displays contain only
one non-identical item (e.g. Cook et al. 1997; Zentall et al. 1980); albeit the entropy
decision criterion for the different displays would be much lower.
Some evidence for this unidimensional interpretation can be found in the contrasting
results of two same/different experiments using 2-item displays. Cook et al. (2003)
found pigeons readily acquired the discrimination, while Young, Wasserman and
Garner (1997) found that pigeons failed to master it. Because the Young, Wasserman
and Garner (1997) 2-item experiment was conducted after extensive training to
discriminate 16-item same/different displays, Gibson et al. (2006) speculated that the
pigeons had adopted a relatively high entropy decision criterion for selecting different
during the 16-item training and found it difficult to then utilise a more difficult low
entropy decision criterion during the 2-item experiment. However, it is worth noting
that the Cook et al. (2003) study was conducted using successively presented stimuli,
leaving open the possibility that more prosaic mechanisms were utilised (see section
3.7.2.1.2 and 3.7.2.1.5).
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More compelling evidence for an entropy-based explanation for non-human
same/different discrimination is found in the fact that some species that initially
struggled with two-item simultaneous same/different discriminations with low entropy
differentials were able to succeed in the task when multi-element stimuli with relatively
higher entropy differences were used (see section 3.7.3.3). Pigeons (Wasserman, Frank
and Young 2002; Wasserman, Young and Nolan 2000; Young, Wasserman and Garner
1997) and baboons (Fagot et al. 2001; Wasserman, Fagot and Young 2001; Wasserman,
Young and Fagot 2001), for example, appear to rely heavily on the amount of variety in
a display to discriminate same from different and their performance deteriorates as the
number of items in the displays is decreased. In addition, Castro et al. (2010) showed
that the amount of entropy in a display also affected reaction times in pigeons, with
longer reaction times for lower entropy displays. Even humans appear to be sensitive to
entropy in same/different tasks (see section 3.8.2.1).
However, some later experiments have cast doubt on a unidimensional entropy-based
explanation that would account for all same/different discriminations. Cook et al. (1997)
conducted same/different experiments in which four different types of displays were
used concurrently – differing in configuration (texture vs. visual search organisation),
type of elements (small and large coloured shapes, pictures of birds, flowers, fish and
humans) and the processing demands required by their global-local element
arrangement. The pigeons were able to discriminate all four display types at the same
rate and transfer all of them to novel stimuli. The authors suggest the results show that
“no single or simple perceptual attribute shared in common across the displays seems
sufficient to account for these transfer data” and that a likely explanation is “that the
pigeons developed and used a single generalised same-different rule applied to all
displays simultaneously” (pp. 428-429).
Specifically, Cook et al. (1997) claim an entropy-based account of their experiment was
unlikely because the entropy value for one of the same displays (1.00) was actually
larger than that of any of the different displays of the other three display types (0.590.65). If the pigeons were using entropy to make decisions they should have found
discriminations using the higher-entropy same displays much harder to learn and that
was not the case. The authors also trained pigeons specifically with different displays of
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three different levels of entropy. A unidimensional entropy model predicts that accuracy
should be greatest with the higher-entropy display, but the results did not bear this out.
Gibson et al. (2006) directly tested the unidimensional entropy approach by
simultaneously training pigeons to discriminate displays of 16 same icons from displays
of 16 different icons (16S vs. 16D) and displays of 16 same icons from displays of 15
same icons and one different icon (16S vs. 15S:1D). An entropy-based account suggests
that learning to discriminate between low (16S) and high (16D) entropy displays should
adversely affect learning to discriminate between two kinds of low entropy displays
(16S and 15S:1D). However, the pigeons were able to learn and transfer performance in
both tasks (albeit requiring an observing response to the odd item in the 15S:1D
displays).
Another experiment suggests that while entropy may be useful for learning a
same/different task, it can give way to more relationally based methods. Flemming et al.
(2007) found rhesus monkeys that were unable to perform a two-item same/different
discrimination succeeded when the number of items in the stimulus arrays was
increased to eight items, leading the authors to suggest that their subjects’ initial
conceptual knowledge “may better be described as a ‘uniformity versus chaos’
distinction” (p. 61). However, in contrast to the results with pigeons and baboons
(Wasserman, Young and Fagot 2001; Young, Wasserman and Garner 1997) mentioned
above, after the higher-entropy training the monkeys were able to perform lowerentropy discriminations using stimulus arrays of six, four and even two items.
Flemming et al. (2007) suggested this performance indicated that, unlike the pigeons
and baboons, the monkeys were not constrained by entropy by the end of the
experiment. They contended that entropy may have been required only to facilitate
learning of the task rules, at which point the monkeys were able to generalise the
performance to displays of any number of elements using a conceptual knowledge
“which quickly generalises to a ‘same versus different’ distinction in the way that we
more broadly conceive it” (p. 61).
The contrasting findings of Flemming et al.’s (2007) monkey study with those
conducted with pigeons (Young, Wasserman and Garner 1997) and baboons
(Wasserman, Young and Fagot 2001) may be due to procedural variations in the
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experiments or point to genuine differences in the way different species utilise
perceptual information to solve these types of tasks. Differences can be found even in
the way different species fail in a task. Young et al.’s (1997) pigeons’ decrease in
performance was primarily due to an increase in errors in response to the different
arrays while Wasserman, Young and Fagot’s (2001) baboons showed an increase in
errors on both same and different trials.
Further to Flemming et al.’s (2007) findings of entropy being used only in the learning
phase in rhesus monkeys, even more striking evidence against a universal entropy
account of same/different categorisation is found in experiments in which researchers
have demonstrated simultaneous same/different discriminations with pigeons, capuchin
monkeys and great apes starting with pairs of items and skipping the high-entropy
phases (e.g. Blaisdell and Cook 2005; Flemming 2011; Katz and Wright 2006, Wright
and Katz 2006; see section 3.7.3.3).
Gibson et al. (2006) posited an alternative theory to the unidimensional entropy
account, suggesting that the nature of the same/different training causes pigeons to
process different attributes of the same/different arrays. Wasserman and Young (2010,
p. 17) suggested that “different experimental tasks may prompt organisms to deploy
different mechanisms to solve them”. Training with 16-item arrays containing all
identical or all non-identical icons (e.g. Wasserman et al. 1995; Young and Wasserman
1997) led pigeons to respond to a quantitative dimension of entropy, while training with
arrays containing all identical or single-odd-item arrays (e.g. Cook et al. 1997; Zentall et
al. 1980) led pigeons to learn about the more qualitative properties of sameness and
differentness. Similarly, Flemming (2011) theorised that experimental methodology,
such as the use of simplified stimuli (e.g. Blaisdell and Cook 2005) or large sets of trialunique stimuli (e.g. Flemming 2011), could encourage subjects to focus less on the
perceptual features of stimuli and allow more relationally guided behaviour to emerge.
In both these experiments, subjects were not limited by entropy like the subjects of
many previous studies and were able to successfully learn and transfer two-item
same/different discriminations.
Perhaps the most telling evidence against a unidimensional entropy theory of
same/different discrimination is found in experiments designed so that there are no
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entropy cues at all for subjects to use. As discussed in section 3.7.6.2.2, Young and
colleagues experiments using successive presentation of ‘lists’ of same or different
stimuli shows convincingly that even if entropy has been used by pigeons in previous
multi-element experiments, they are able to perform same/different discriminations
without reference to entropy-infused stimuli (Young, Wasserman and Dalrymple 1997;
Young et al. 1999; see also Cook et al. 2003 above). Similarly, as discussed in section
3.7.6.2.2, Alex the African Grey parrot’s ability to correctly label “What is same?”
about a group of objects (colour, shape or material) (Pepperberg 1987) and Bovet and
Vauclair’s (2001) functionally based same/different experiment with baboons obviously
do not rely on entropy-based cues.

3.7.6.2.4 Relational categorisation
A common theory put forward by experimenters to explain their subject’s ability to
categorise on the basis of same and different is that the animals understand the
relationship between the stimuli (e.g. “respond same” for paired comparison
same/different tasks and “match like with like” for matching tasks) (Thompson 1995).
However, as can be seen by the absolute theories described above, many authors
continue to resist relational explanations for complex discriminations in non-humans.
Often this can be interpreted as a laudable attempt to follow Lloyd Morgan’s canon that:
“In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which
stands lower in the psychological scale” (Morgan 1894, p. 53). There is also the
possibility that because the ability to utilise relational information in problem solving is
considered a more ‘advanced’ process, they prefer to ascribe more prosaic absolute
methods to animals. This attitude is reflected in the blanket statements of some authors
about the impossibility of non-human animals using relational information to solve
categorisation problems (see section 3.8).
Wilson et al. (1985a) tried to test for relational learning, contending that a relational
explanation could be offered for matching and oddity performances if two criteria were
met – firstly, matching and oddity discriminations were learned faster than a
comparable non-relational conditional discrimination and, secondly, positive transfer
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was shown when subjects were shifted from one matching or oddity discrimination to
another. However, the authors claimed the pigeons in their experiment (at least using
their particular experimental paradigm) did not meet these criteria, casting doubt on
claims of relational learning in pigeons.
Despite this resistance, the results of numerous same/different ‘concept’ learning
experiments (see section 3.7.3) have led even an absolute theorist such as Pearce (1997)
(see section 3.1.4.2.1) to acknowledge that relational processes may be used to solve
these types of discriminations. Pearce (1997) has allowed that matching experiments in
which animals respond correctly on the first trial with novel stimuli (e.g. Levine and
Harlow 1959; Shaffer 1967; Thomas and Boyd 1973) indicate “at least some species,
therefore, seem capable of solving discriminations on the basis of relational
information” (pp. 125-126). In addition, ‘simple’ absolute theories such as conditional
discrimination and relative novelty cannot account for successful performance in
categorisation using simultaneous same/different procedures. As discussed in section
3.7.3.3, a number of primate and non-primate species have demonstrated simultaneous
same/different performances that have not so far been explained by perceptual or
procedural factors. Katz and Wright (2006), for example, claim the impressive transfer
results of their two-item same/different experiment “help to establish (or at least
indicate) that the pigeons are basing their judgments on the relationship between the
items of each pair and not some other cue(s) that may happen to covary with this
relationship” (p. 84).
Elmore, Wright, Rivera and Katz (2009) demonstrated that even when pigeons failed to
transfer a simultaneous same/different task to novel stimuli, they could show evidence
of relational learning. Similarly, Wright and Katz (2009) showed that monkeys and
pigeons who were unable to transfer a two-item same/different task to novel picture
stimuli using a small training set (see section 3.7.3.3) could still show evidence of
relational learning by performing well with novel combinations of training pictures and
inverted pictures, a test they should have failed if they had learned the task itemspecifically (e.g. if-then or configural learning).
In the final analysis, it seems likely that both relational and absolute discrimination
theories could prove valid depending on the situation – for example, different animals
190

could perform the same tasks using different methods or the same animal could utilise
different methods depending on the task being undertaken (see sections 3.7.6.2.3, 6.4.4
and 6.4.5). It is also possible that the testing procedure itself may influence how animals
undertake these types of experiments. While absolute theories have proved most
effective at predicting the results from successive discriminations, relational theories
have been found to better explain the results of simultaneous discriminations (Mazur
2002). As discussed in sections 3.7.2.1.5 and 3.7.6.1.2, both Premack (1983a) and
Shettleworth (1998) claim that the only true test of same/different categorisation is
when the stimuli are presented simultaneously. Similarly, there are a number of
competing theories as to how matching/non-matching tasks can be performed (see
section 3.7.6.1), whereas there is more support for a relational account of paired
comparison tasks (Pearce 1997; Shettleworth 1998).

3.7.6.2.5 Concept learning
While there is considerable endorsement for relational explanations for at least some
types of same/different experiments, more contentious is the popular application of the
term ‘concept’ to these and other types of categorisation experiments – an issue that will
be addressed in section 3.8.

3.8 Concept learning
Do animals exhibit conceptual behaviour? C. Lloyd Morgan asked this question in 1894
and after more than a century comparative psychologists are still arguing (Wasserman et
al. 1988). Numerous authors have claimed conceptual ability accounted for the
successful performance of animals in experiments at each of the three levels of
categorisation described in this chapter – perceptual, associative and relational.
However, there is continuing debate about whether concepts can be attributed to
animals and even about what is meant by animal concept learning.
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3.8.1 Definitions
Few terms have been used in psychological and epistemological
theory in as many different senses as ‘concept’ and its derivatives.
(Herrnstein 1990, p. 137)
Considering the large and diverse body of literature relating to categorisation and
concept learning, there is a surprising lack of consensus about both the definition of the
term ‘concept’ and to what processes it should be applied. Even in the field of human
psychology, there is little agreement about the precise definition of a concept. While
most authors would ascribe to a loose definition in which a human concept is viewed as
knowledge that facilitates the categorisation process (Barsalou 1991, 1992), this
knowledge is often portrayed as existing independently of behavioural and
environmental factors. Many human studies focus on the knowledge on which
conceptual behaviour is presumably based rather than the role of experience in creating
and maintaining that behaviour (Zentall et al. 2002).
Obviously, it is impossible to investigate directly whether animals possess this type of
‘knowledge’. However, instead of speculating about hypothetical knowledge structures,
it is possible to take a more operational approach and instead examine “what individuals
are doing when they are said to behave conceptually and how they came to behave that
way” (Zentall et al. 2002, p. 238). A variation of this idea was put forward by Lea
(1984b), who argued that the use of terms such as ‘concept formation’ and
‘conceptualisation’ when referring to complex categorisation experiments could be
interpreted on two levels – what was being categorised and how the subject achieved the
categorisation.
To claim conceptualisation in non-humans on the basis of Lea’s (1984b) first level –
what is being categorised – suggests that animals learn a ‘concept’ in the sense that they
learn (by whatever mechanism) to group stimuli into open-ended categories based on
human concepts defined by the experimenter, e.g. people, trees, fish etc (see section
3.4). According to Zayan and Vauclair (1998, p. 89): “It is generally assumed that
reference to ‘concepts’ is made only to emphasise ‘the fact that the categories are
usually defined in terms of a human language concept’ (Watanabe et al. 1993, p. 353).”
While some authors would argue that applying the term ‘concept’ to these types of
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cognitive abilities is semantically misleading (see section 3.8.4), in principle this is a
fairly conservative interpretation that would be widely accepted based on the
preponderance of experimental evidence.
Conceptualisation in non-humans according to the second level – how the categorisation
is achieved – is more controversial. In the period following the publication of the type
of open-ended perceptual categorisation experiments discussed in section 3.4.3, there
seemed to be two fairly disparate schools of thought. Many early animal categorisation
experimenters claimed virtually all their subjects’ performances were due to human-like
conceptual abilities (see section 3.8.3.1), while other authors refused to believe that
animals could ever use concepts in a similar manner to humans (see section 3.8.2.1).
More recently, however, information gleaned from experiments designed to examine
how, rather than merely whether, animals perform open-ended categorisation tasks
seems to have encouraged both schools of thought to move away from such extreme
positions. A number of authors in the anti-animal concept school have acknowledged
that some species, under particular circumstances, might be capable of using human-like
concepts (see section 3.8.2.2), while many scientists in the pro-animal concept arena
have become more circumspect about exactly what types of experimental performances
can truly claim to be conceptually mediated (see section 3.8.3).

3.8.2 Arguments against animal concept learning
3.8.2.1 Exclusive to humans
The idea that abstract conceptual behaviour is the exclusive province of humans is an
old one, dating back at least as far as the famous English philosopher Locke, who
stated: “… the power of Abstracting is not at all in [nonhuman animals]; and … the
having of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes;
and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to” (Locke
1690/1975, p. 159) (see also Descartes 1637/1994 and Morgan 1894 for similar views).
The idea that the ability to form and use concepts is exclusively human is one that is
still held by many scientists (e.g. Davidson 1985, 1999; French 1995; Huber 2001; Lea
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1984b; Pearce 1997; see sections 1.2 and 3.7.1). One reason for this could be the
importance of abstract concepts in human development and adult cognition (Wright et
al. 2003). For example, in children the abstract concept of ‘sameness’ plays a critical
role in cognitive development (e.g. Daehler and Bukatko 1985; Piaget and Inhelder
1969/1966). In adults, James (1950/1890, p. 459-460) called it “the very keel and
backbone of our thinking” and “the most important of all the features of our mental
structure”. Deacon (1997) went so far as to label the capacity to determine abstract
relations, such as those that seem to unite many categories, as the essence of what it
means to be human (see Zentall et al. 2002).
This type of viewpoint was challenged by the deluge of perceptually based animal
‘concept’ experiments that arose from Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) perceptual
categorisation study with pigeons (see sections 3.4.3 and 3.8.3.1), as well as the many
associatively and relationally based experiments that have claimed conceptual
explanations (see section 3.8.3). However, some authors reject a conceptual
interpretation of these experiments out of hand; claiming that because the ability to form
concepts is so closely linked with language it must be uniquely human.
Chater and Heyes (1994), for example, argue that concepts can only be defined using
language and so only humans are capable of forming them. According to Chater and
Heyes (1994, pp. 236-237), “concepts can be ascribed only to language-users” because
“we simply do not know how to turn the claim that nonlinguistic animals have concepts
into an empirically substantive question.” Huber (2001) acknowledges the difficulty of
proving conceptual behaviour is not involved in categorisation tasks, but still claims the
idea of a concept is too entwined with natural language to even examine the possibility
in non-humans. He views categorisation as occupying a middle ground between simple
discrimination and conceptualisation, which he defines as the “linguistic manipulation
of classes of objects, events or ideas by using symbolic representations and by attaching
to them verbal names” (Chapter 1, online). Huber (1995) further argues that the
influence of language theory on the problem of categorisation is misleading. Rather than
linking categorisation with symbolic manipulation and acquiring logical rules, the
author argues that there are much simpler and older mechanisms at work in terms of
perception and even in common-sense knowledge.
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Thompson (1995) is a proponent of the humans-only view of concept learning, but
expands the criteria to include our closest relatives, chimpanzees. According to
Thompson (1995, p. 213), in ‘conceptual’ tasks such as second-order same/different
relations and mirror-mediated self-recognition tasks, “there appears to be a fundamental
distinction between humans and chimpanzees on the one hand and other non-human
primates on the other hand … with the possible exception of chimpanzees, no one
species … exhibits the full range of conceptual knowledge …”
Many authors consider these views to be anthropocentric. For example, Zentall et al.
(2008), after reviewing numerous studies they claim provide evidence of perceptual,
associative and relational ‘concept learning’, concluded: “We cannot say that nonhuman
animals have cognitive capacities that are equivalent to those of adult humans; but, we
do believe that there is now good evidence that many species of animals are likely to
have some of the same conceptual abilities that have typically been reserved exclusively
for humans” (pp. 38-39).
A variation of this argument is that rather than animals being able to perform a ‘highlevel’ human task that instead many of the processes involved in human
conceptualisation are in fact relatively basic, perceptual mechanisms. According to
Goldstone and Barsalou 1998, p. 232): “Concepts usually stem from perception, and
active vestiges of these perceptual origins exist for the vast majority of concepts.” A
number of human cognition researchers have suggested that making a distinction
between ‘low-level’ perceptual processes and ‘high-level’ conceptual processes might
be misleading; rather that there is a continuum from perceptual to conceptual (Castro et
al. 2010; Goldstone 2004; Goldstone and Barsalou 1998). Castro et al. (2010) surmise
that conceptual processes arise when perceptual processes become less bound to the
perceptual specifics of stimuli.
One possible perceptual mechanism that has been suggested as common to both humans
and animals in solving same/different concepts is that of entropy. As discussed in
section 3.7.6.2.3, animals such as pigeons and baboons have been shown (in some, but
not all, circumstances) to utilise perceptual variability (entropy) to solve same/different
tasks. A number of studies have shown that humans also can and do use entropy to
solve same/different discriminations. Young and Wasserman (2001b) found a minority
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of college students used entropy to solve a same/different task, while reaction times and
choice accuracy suggested that the majority of students were sensitive to entropy
(Castro, Young and Wasserman 2006; Young and Wasserman 2001b). According to
Castro and Wasserman (2010, p. 170): “All organisms – even humans, who are capable
of using language – may rely on variability when solving a same–different
discrimination; so, the perception of variability may truly be the substrate of abstract
conceptual thinking …” (see also Wasserman, Young and Cook 2004).
However, it is also worth noting that even if humans and animals do both use entropy,
they may not do so in exactly the same way. Fagot et al. (2001) compared the
performance of humans and baboons tested on similar relational matching tasks of
varying degrees of entropy and found that while both species were influenced by
entropy, the performance of the humans was far superior, both in terms of learning
speed and choice accuracy. While species differences over the suitability of the
experimental methodology may account for some of this discrepancy (see section
1.3.1), the study also showed that humans and baboons responded differently to varying
degrees of entropy. Humans responded same only to arrays with a very low degree of
entropy while baboons also responded same to higher-entropy arrays, showing a more
gradual transition from same to different and a more inclusive criterion for same. A
similar effect was seen in a same/different task with humans and monkeys (Smith et al.
2008), with the authors describing the performances as qualitative, categorical and rulebased in humans versus quantitative, continuous and similarity-based in monkeys.
Castro et al. (2010) suggested that rather than a dramatic discontinuity between species,
the disparity was due to different species setting different decision criteria along a
continuum of variability, with humans having an entropy cut-off point close to 0.00,
while other species set the cut-off point higher so larger increments in variability are
required to report different (see also Cook and Wixted 1997; Fagot et al. 2001; Smith et
al. 2008). Fagot et al. (2001) hypothesised that this difference may be due to the more
restrictive definition of same in humans engendered by language use, leading the
authors
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3.8.2.2 Language-trained animals
The view that concepts are uniquely human because they are inherently language-based
was given an interesting twist with the advent of language-trained animals. In a series of
publications, David Premack claimed animals could learn abstract concepts if, and only
if, they had had language training (Premack 1978, 1983a, 1983b, 1988; Premack and
Premack 1983). (It is worth noting that Premack (1983b) considered second-order
same/different tasks (see section 3.7.5) as “abstract” while perceptual, associative and
basic same/different tasks were not). In one of these experiments Premack (1983b)
found language-naïve chimpanzees were unable to solve a second-order same/different
problem that a language-trained chimpanzee was able to solve fairly easily. Premack
and others have argued that animals without language training probably rely on “a more
image-based code or on the recognition of a small set of relevant features” (FabreThorpe et al. 1998, p. 303). While seeming to allow animal concept learning, the
language-training exception still meant that animals without specialised training
provided by humans were still incapable of conceptualisation.
Huber (2001), who argues against concepts in non-humans (see section 3.8.2.1), is also
willing to make an exception for language-trained animals. He bases this on the belief
that it is language itself, not being human, that is the prerequisite for concept learning.
The author goes on to cite the example of the language competencies of great apes
(Ristau and Robbins 1982) as “clearly involving far more than mere categorisation”
(Chapter 1, online). Similarly, Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980) claimed that language
training was the decisive factor that enabled two chimpanzees to acquire functionally
based “concepts” in their associative categorisation experiment (see section 3.5.2) while
a third, non-language trained chimpanzee failed. The failure of cebus monkeys to
transfer a matching task to other modalities led D’Amato and Colombo (1989) to
suggest that the ability to construct symbolic representations of same/different afforded
by language training “may prove a necessary prerequisite for an abstract matching
concept” (p. 236).
Despite this support for language-based concept learning, there is some debate
surrounding whether animals can in fact learn a human-like language. In a chapter
examining animal language training experiments, Wynne (2001, p. 161) claims that “in
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reality it is unlikely that anything approximating a human language capacity has been
demonstrated in any non-human species” and that “many of the claims made on behalf
of these animals have been exaggerated”. Further, Chater and Heyes (1994) claim that
while the performance of language-trained animals such as Premack’s chimpanzee
(Premack 1971, 1976) and Pepperberg’s parrot (Pepperberg 1987) (see section 3.7.3.4)
is impressive, the fact that it is impossible to know what the animals mean when they
use words like “same” and “different” means this type of experiment does not provide
proof of animal concepts as it “does not indicate how, if at all, the animal defines or
conceives of the stimuli to which it is exposed” (p. 232).
Whether animals can learn language or not, other researchers have come to believe that
language is not an essential prerequisite for conceptualisation. Allen (1999, p. 39), for
example, claims that “it would be a mistake to think that [language] is the only basis for
conceptual representation available”, while Herrnstein (1990, p. 155) states: “Language
is a sufficient condition to permit the inferring of concepts, but it is not also a necessary
one”. Smith et al. (2008) questioned whether the explicit (i.e. qualitative and rule-based)
responding seen in human same/different conceptualisation is linked by representational
necessity to language or is the result of the vast majority of neuroscience research using
human participants. The authors wondered whether there were non-linguistic forms of
explicit cognition that animals might use, such as symbolic, semantic or Boolean.
A number of authors have set out to test Premack’s claims about the necessity of
language training in conceptual behaviour. Thompson et al. (1997) demonstrated that
language-naïve chimpanzees were able to perform a second-order same/different
problem similar to that used by Premack (see Premack 1983b) (although they only
extend the conceptual umbrella to include chimpanzees with symbol use training).
Burdyn and Thomas (1984) also argued against Premack’s assertions regarding
simultaneous same/different requiring language-training in animals, pointing out that
their experiments had demonstrated “the squirrel monkey’s ability to make conceptual,
simultaneous same-different judgements. None of these monkeys had language training
…” (p. 412). Similarly, Edwards et al. (1983) asserted that the results of their
same/different experiments (see section 3.7.3.4) showed that “pigeons can show reliable
amounts of concept transfer under conditions analogous to those described by Premack
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(1976) as being able to qualitatively distinguish humans and language-trained
chimpanzees from other animals” (p. 354).

3.8.2.3 Requires a unique mental structure
Scientists in the mentalist tradition of human psychology have more stringent
requirements than simply having language as a prerequisite for conceptual abilities.
Examples of such requirements include verbal expression of a rule, the ability to
mentally manipulate (and discuss) the concept and the possession of a unique mental
structure that is active only when an example of that concept is presented externally or
is active internally. While Lea (1984b) argues that the first two requirements are
obviously unhelpful when dealing with animals, as well as being obscure, he agrees
with the necessity of the third.
The use of a unique mental structure requires that the concept should be more than the
sum of its component features, or component instances – that is, it does not rely solely
on perceptual similarity. To use Blough’s (1984) example, if a subject is taught an
instance of ‘person’ as a tall man in a white coat it would generalise to another instance,
such as a short woman in a maroon sweater, and would generalise in this particular way,
not to all white objects or all objects of a certain height. The traditional test of concept
discrimination – transfer to novel stimuli – is inadequate to determine whether this
unique mental structure is being used to perform the discrimination as such transfer can
be accounted for by methods based on perceptual similarity, such as feature learning
(see section 3.4.4).
A number of experiments have been conducted specifically to test whether conceptual
behaviour can be demonstrated according to Lea’s (1984b) criteria. Vaughan and
Herrnstein (1987) tested pigeons with a tree/no tree categorisation task. The experiment
used two concurrently available variable-interval schedules of reinforcement, with the
alternating schedules signalled by slides either containing trees or not. In most natural
categorisation experiments, one category is associated with reinforcement and the other
with non-reinforcement. Here, both categories (tree/non-tree) were correlated with equal
levels of reinforcement. Despite this, the pigeons were able to categorise the stimuli and
transfer the performance to novel stimuli. Their results led the authors to claim that: “To
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the extent that a class may be construed as a concept if it is superordinate to the
exemplars drawn from it, as Lea (1984[b]) has argued it may, the present results suggest
that pigeons can conceptualise, not merely categorise” (p. 15).
According to Bhatt and Wasserman (1989), Lea’s (1984b) requirement that concepts be
mediated by a unique mental structure can be interpreted as a demand for categorisation
based on secondary stimulus generalisation – that is, the formation of equivalence
classes of stimuli grouped together by mediating associations rather than just by
perceptual similarity. One way to test for equivalence classes is to use pseudocategories
(see section 3.5.2). Bhatt and Wasserman (1989) conducted a series of experiments to
test whether categorisation training led to the formation of equivalence classes in
pigeons and found that: “The lack of evidence of secondary generalisation implies that
our pigeons failed to meet Lea’s (1984[b] criterion for conceptual behaviour” (p. 213).
However, other authors such as Vaughan (1988) and Wasserman et al. (1992) used
different experimental procedures and claimed they were able to demonstrate
equivalence class formation. According to Wasserman et al. (1992): “Each study found
clear evidence that new categories of functionally equivalent stimuli were formed,
thereby supporting the view that much of the richness and complexity of human
conceptual behaviour is to be found in the behaviour of nonhuman and nonverbal
animals” (p. 379).
Huber (2000) agreed that the grouping of stimuli according to their reinforcement
history may be interpreted as the formation of a “functional concept” (p. 252) according
to Lea’s (1984b) definition and that “it is reasonable to speak of the formation of
nonsimilarity-based or superordinate concepts” (p. 253), however he believed that
because the results can be explained in terms of mediated or secondary generalisation
they should not be described as conceptualisation in a human sense.

3.8.3 Arguments for animal concept learning
As discussed above (see section 3.8.2), trying to determine whether animals have
concepts based on requirements for facilitating knowledge, language and mental
structures is a self-defeating task. According to Zentall et al. (2002, p. 239), “concepts,
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defined largely in terms of abstract knowledge, provide a slippery foundation for an
experimental analysis.” However the authors point out that it is possible to “recast the
notion of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for conceptual
behaviour” (p. 239). Many experiments have been conducted using a variety of criteria
to determine if animals are behaving conceptually.

3.8.3.1 Perceptual categorisation as concept learning
Despite the ongoing controversy, comparative psychologists have a long history of
ascribing human-like conceptual abilities to non-humans and one type of study that has
attracted a lot of these claims is perceptual categorisation. The label ‘concept’ began to
be applied regularly, and fairly broadly, to animals about 90 years ago (e.g. Bingham
1913). By the 1920s and 1930s a number of experiments indicated rats could be trained
to select a triangular stimulus despite differences in form (e.g. scalene or isosceles),
brightness, orientation or background (e.g. Fields 1928, 1929, 1932; Lashley 1938a).
This was taken as evidence that rats could acquire the “abstract idea” or “concept” of
triangle (Fields 1932; Washburn 1926) (see Chater and Heyes 1994). This use of the
term was supported by one of the early definitions of conceptual behaviour provided by
Keller and Schoenfeld (1950) who proposed a fairly liberal definition which was largely
the same as that for categorisation – that conceptual behaviour is demonstrated when an
organism responds similarly to members of one class of stimuli and differently to
members of other classes. Their definition stresses generalisation and discrimination:
“… when a group of objects gets the same response, when they form a class the
members of which are reacted to similarly, we speak of a concept” (p. 154) and
“Generalisation within classes and discrimination between classes – this is the essence
of concepts” (p. 155).
In 1964 Herrnstein and Loveland claimed their pioneering perceptual categorisation
experiment using person/non-person visual stimuli (see section 3.4.3.1) demonstrated
pigeons possessed “greater powers of conceptualisation than are ordinarily attributed to
animals” (p. 549) and that “the evidence for a concept is incontrovertible” (p. 551).
Following Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) experiment, an increasing number of
animal perceptual categorisation experiments were conducted and broad definitions of
concept learning continued to be offered. Malott and Siddall (1972, p. 3), for example,
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declared: “When an organism makes the same response to all members of a given
stimulus class, we term this behavior conceptual”, while Zentall and Hogan (1975, p.
233) asserted: “Concept learning involves making a common response to those
members of a class of stimuli that have certain specifiable characteristics.” According to
Schrier and Brady’s (1987) study of categorisation of humans in slides by rhesus
monkeys: “On the basis of the available evidence, a concept interpretation appears to fit
the facts better than one based on simple stimulus generalisation” (p. 142). Morgan et
al. (1976) even claimed pigeons could learn the “concept” of the letter ‘A’.
The application of the word ‘concept’ to examples of perceptual categorisation by nonhumans continues. In a 1998 textbook on animal cognition, Roberts classified
categorisation in non-humans as “concept learning” based on perceptual similarity
(perceptual concept learning), relationships between stimuli (relational concept
learning) and common associations (associative concept learning). Mazur (2002) used
the terms categorisation and concept formation interchangeably. He also said that while
the distinction between discrimination and concept formation was not always clear-cut,
the most important difference was that while discrimination experiments use only two
stimuli (S+ and S-), concept formation experiments use many stimuli divided into a
positive group (S+) and a negative group (S-).
The label ‘concept’ is even still applied to categorisations of relatively basic stimuli.
Wynne (2001) defined a concept as an abstract or perceptual category, a grouping
together of items that share common features or functions. He even defined ‘triangles’
as a simple concept, as did Sappington and Goldman (1994) in testing the “concept of
triangularity” in horses. In their study testing categorical discrimination of direction in
frequency-modulated tones with Mongolian gerbils, Wetzel et al. (1998) described the
stimuli as an “ascending-descending concept” (p. 29). According to the authors:
“Categories are concepts formed by the brain suitable to classify perceptional objects
into members and non-members of a category” (p. 36).

3.8.3.1.1 Transfer tests as proof of perceptual concept learning
In response to criticism that animals were merely memorising in the early perceptually
based ‘concept’ experiments, authors began to require proof that the categorisation
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extended beyond the training stimuli by testing for transfer to novel stimuli. As
mentioned in section 3.8.3, this is an example of using demonstrable behavioural
criteria, rather than more theoretically based requirements such as knowledge, language
or mental structures (see section 3.8.2), to determine whether a performance is
conceptually based. “The behavioural evidence that an animal perceives, or has learned,
a natural object concept … is an animal’s ability to transfer its performance
spontaneously to novel exemplars of the category …” (Thompson 1995, p. 176).
As Herrnstein et al. (1976) explained, since conceptual behaviour permits organisms to
categorise open-ended classes of stimuli, differential responding to both old and new
members of the categories being studied should be a requirement of concept learning.
Many perceptual categorisation experiments (e.g. Bhatt et al. 1988; Lubow 1974;
Malott and Siddall 1972; Siegel and Honig 1970) have asserted that the ability to
categorise perceptual stimuli and extend the classification to novel members of the
category was sufficient evidence to prove conceptualisation. According to Hanggi
(1999, p. 250): “A necessary test before attributing an ability such as concept or
category formation is that of novel stimulus presentation.”
Despite the continued support for animal perceptual categorisation as ‘concept’
learning, there has also been considerable criticism. Wasserman et al. (1988), for
example, have queried whether successful transfer to novel stimuli is sufficient to
demonstrate categorisation, let alone concept learning. According to the authors, a
number of studies that have used novel-stimulus transfer to demonstrate
‘conceptalisation’ have in fact been successful because the subjects simply couldn’t tell
the difference between the training and transfer stimuli (although the authors claimed
their own study was designed to avoid this pitfall). “… true conceptual generalisation
can be said to have occurred if and only if the testing stimuli differ discriminably from
the training stimuli” (Wasserman et al. 1988, p. 244).
Huber (2001) claims it is anthropomorphic to only require transfer to prove concept
learning and points out that studies like Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) did not
adequately examine the possibility that the successful performance of the ‘concept’ task
was due to some visual clue in the slides or non-visual property of the experimental
procedure. “… evidence for anything more interesting than pure picture memorization is
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not per se indicative of the acquisition or use of a ‘complex visual concept’” (Huber
2001, Chapter 1, online). A number of critics (e.g. Allen and Hauser 1991; Davidson
1999; Stephan 1999) claim that perceptual categorisation experiments such as those
conducted by Herrnstein and colleagues “do not show that the participating animals
master any concepts at all” (Stephan 1999, p. 82). According to Davidson (1999), the
ability to discriminate certain things from others is insufficient evidence of having a
concept. “A creature does not have the concept of a cat merely because it can
discriminate cats from other things in its environment” (p. 82).
Troje et al. (1999) said that in the early period of animal categorisation experiments,
researchers such as Lubow (1974) and Poole and Lander (1971) were largely influenced
by human cognitive psychology, “often leading to questionable interpretation of the
original findings in terms of human language concepts” (p. 354). Watanabe et al. (1993)
agreed, suggesting the use of the term “concept” in the titles of early papers (e.g.
Herrnstein and Loveland 1964; Lubow 1974; Poole and Lander 1971) was “premature”
(p. 356).
Even among those who conducted the early experiments, there has been some
circumspection about making conceptual claims for results that may in fact demonstrate
more prosaic abilities. As mentioned previously, Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) made
fairly ambitious claims about the pigeon’s conceptual ability for their pioneering
perceptual categorisation experiment (see section 3.8.3.1). In fact, when Greene (1983)
replicated the ‘person’ experiment almost 20 years later, it was discovered that the
pigeons were using “conceptually irrelevant” features in the slides as well as the
“conceptually relevant” features of the people instances (see section 3.4.4.6).
Presumably in light of such evidence, Herrnstein later refined his use of the umbrella
term ‘concepts’ and created a hierarchy of discrimination levels (see section 1.3.2.1). He
used this new system to re-label his 1964 study as an example of open-ended
categorisation rather than conceptualisation (while allowing for the possibility that some
perceptual categorisation experiments may still demonstrate conceptualisation)
(Herrnstein 1990).
More recent articles, such as Wright et al. (2003), claim that perceptually based
categorisation does not demonstrate a concept in the true sense of the word and consider
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a term such as category learning would be more appropriate for these types of
experiments. As Zayan and Vauclair (1998, p. 89) point out: “As noted by Herrnstein
(1990) and Thompson (1995), the operational distinction between open-ended
categories and concept is difficult to make, especially since the role of conceptual
mediation is difficult to assess, given the still imprecise nature of the mechanisms that
control categorical behaviours.”
Lea (1984b) goes further and suggests that because all the theories put forward to
account for transfer in perceptual categorisation experiments rely on the novel stimuli
bearing some form of similarity to, or sharing common elements with, at least one
training stimulus, successful open-ended categorisation can be accounted for by
perceptual discrimination and generalisation processes. He argues that categorisation
cannot be considered unequivocally conceptual unless the categories are held together
by relationships that do not depend solely on physical similarity. Hanggi (1999) agreed,
asserting that: “For true conceptualisation, one must have representations that transcend
perceptual features” (Hanggi 1999, p. 250).
An interesting example of perceptually based categorisation that claims to demonstrate
a concept according to this criterion is a cross-modal study conducted by MartinMalivel and Fagot (2001) with baboons. One of the two subjects was able to match
pictures of baboons and humans with relevant audio recordings. According to the
authors: “Clearly, cross-modal effects cannot be accounted for by the feature, prototype
or exemplar theories, which posit that categorisation is exclusively controlled by the
perceptual characteristics of the stimuli. Alternatively, our results cannot be explained
to satisfaction by the ‘secondary stimulus generalisation’ account … We propose that
[the subject] developed amodal abstract concepts of the human and baboon categories,
and referred to these concepts while responding in the task” (p. 212).

3.8.3.1.2 Feature learning as concept learning
In response to criticisms of the earlier experiments (see section 3.8.3.1.1), a number of
perceptual categorisation studies were conducted in the late seventies using simpler,
more carefully specified sets of stimuli (e.g. Cerella 1979; Lea and Harrison 1978;
Morgan et al. 1976). These studies indicated that pigeons were ‘merely’ associating
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pictures, and/or the features they contained, with reward (Mackintosh 2000) leading to
the increasing popularity of non-conceptual categorisation theories such as feature
learning (see section 3.4.4.4).
However, other psychologists incorporated the new ideas into their conceptual
framework and considered feature learning sufficient criteria for saying an animal had
acquired a concept. It is from this tradition that the term “higher order concept
formation” (e.g. Lubow 1974) arises. According to this idea, because even simple
discriminations involve feature learning, complex discriminations must involve some
more elaborate type of concept (Lea 1984b).
Honig and Stewart (1988) argued that, for animals, “concepts are discriminated
accretions of characteristics typical of a particular class that control the same patterns of
behaviour” (p. 550). According to the authors, while humans tended to adopt a template
model for concepts (analogous to the exemplar model, see section 3.4.4.3), it was
possible that for animals conceptual discriminations “may be based on stimulus
generalisation between instances of the same class on the basis of specific, punctate
features” (p. 550). The authors further suggested that a feature-based definition of
animal conceptualisation meant a broader range of stimulus classes could be defined as
concepts for animals. In a functional sense, an animal’s discrimination of more
commonly posited perceptual experimental ‘concepts’ such as humans, fish or trees (see
section 3.4.3) might not be very different from its discrimination of individuals, or, as in
the case of Honig and Stewart’s (1988) study, geographic locations.
There is some support in human psychological literature for a purely feature-based view
of conceptualisation. According to Thompson (1995), feature-based concept theories
include the early classical view – that all members within a category share a finite set of
necessary and sufficient features – and more recent theories based, respectively, on
probabilistic feature analysis and the retention of multiple exemplars (Smith and Medin
1981).
Even if a feature-based definition of conceptualisation were accepted, a number of
authors have recently begun to cast doubt on whether animals do in fact form concepts
using feature learning. Support for a more parsimonious feature account comes from a
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number of feature learning experiments that have shown persistent reliance on irrelevant
features of a target concept. As mentioned in section 3.4.4.4.1, the monkeys in D’Amato
and Van Sant’s (1988) ‘person present’ experiment showed persistent errors to slides
containing patches of red while pigeons in Greene’s (1983) re-evaluation of
Herrnstein’s experiments found similar background control of categorisation
performance.
D’Amato and Van Sant (1988) argue it is extremely difficult to distinguish between
stimulus generalisation and the formation of an abstract concept because both are based
to some degree on physical similarity. “Transfer to new positive exemplars might arise
from the animal’s abstracting a variety of relevant features from previous positive
instances and assembling them into an abstract representation, such as a prototype,
which would qualify as concept-mediated transfer. Or it might be due to ‘mindless’
generalization from a specific relevant or even irrelevant feature of previously
encountered positive exemplars” (p. 52).
Further support for this view was found by analysing subjects’ misclassifications in a
number of studies. Experimenters have sometimes found better performance on stimuli
rated by the experimenters as intermediate to poor examples of the concept being tested
(eg. Herrnstein and De Villiers 1980). Huber (2001) suggests that this indicates the
subjects may have been responding to factors other than the experimenter’s intended
concept. According to Huber (2001), such experiments demonstrate that animals do not
learn about the defining features of a concept and ignore all other features, rather they
“learn about any feature that occurs with some positive probability on trials and are
followed by a specific psychological consequence (e.g. food)” (Chapter 3, online).
Thompson (1995) believes it shows the subjects’ choices were determined by “the
specific range of exemplars experienced during training and not by the particular
features of a prototype” (p. 188).
Alternatively, experiments by Schrier and Brady (1987) and Schrier et al. (1984) have
shown a reduction in concept-learning performance by monkeys on exemplars rated as
‘poor’ by experimenters. However, the authors also considered this evidence against
human-like concept learning in their subjects. “… if our monkeys had a unitary concept
similar to our own, we would … have expected them to do better than they did at
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categorising intermediate-to-poor and most poor slides, which humans do readily …”
(Schrier and Brady 1987, p. 142).
Another group of psychologists claim that, even if categorisation performance is solely
controlled by relevant features, feature learning is still insufficient evidence of concept
formation. Huber (2001) cites as evidence for this view a number of experiments
(Jitsumori 1993; Lea and Ryan 1983; Von Fersen and Lea 1990) in which the total
number of possible features belonging to the stimuli were predetermined and it was
demonstrated that responding had come under the control of those features. According
to Huber (2001), because experiments such as these show that a clearly specified feature
model is able to adequately explain categorisation performance then “it would be
superfluous to ascribe to pigeons the formation of a concept” (Chapter 3, online).

3.8.3.1.3 Do pictures represent real objects?
Recently a more fundamental question than the necessity of language or a unique
mental structure has been raised in the debate over whether animals possess human-like
concepts of perceptual categories such as ‘person’ and ‘tree’, or are merely able to
categorise stimuli based on those concepts using more prosaic means. In simple terms,
at issue is what animals see when they look at experimental slides. Do they in fact
recognise the objects and scenes depicted in slides as representations of real objects and
scenes or do they merely see an array of shapes and colours? The importance of this
question cannot be underestimated in light of the fact that most of the research on
natural animal ‘concept learning’ has used colour photographs as discriminative stimuli
(Watanabe 1993).
Some authors have pointed out that experimental slides are designed to suit the optical
abilities of humans and there may be biological reasons why an animal might not
perceive a picture in the same way as a human. Birds, for example, perceive ultraviolet
wavelengths invisible to humans and their presence or absence in slides may affect how
they discriminate between them. Many animals also have a higher flicker fusion
frequency than humans (e.g. Adret 1997) so videos might be perceived as a succession
of individual frames rather than uninterrupted motion. Based on these kinds of
biological grounds, whether animals perceive experimental stimuli as representations of
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real objects may depend on both the species and the type of stimuli being used
(Shettleworth 1998).

D’Amato and Van Sant (1988) argue that continuing attempts to identify concepts in
animals using photographs may be futile because animals may have highly developed
concepts that cannot be revealed by two-dimensional photographs. And, even when an
animal does classify slides in the same way as a human, that doesn’t mean it has formed
the same concept as different species have been shown to use different means to achieve
the same result.
The most commonly used subject of perceptual ‘concept learning’ experiments, the
pigeon, has been extensively tested on the correspondence between images and reality
with mixed results (see Bovet and Vauclair 2000; Fetterman 1996; Shettleworth 1998).
On the negative side, there is evidence that pigeons don’t recognise anything special
about pictures of real objects. For example, pigeons are relatively unaffected by
stimulus distortions such as inversions and mirror images that disrupt discriminations in
people and monkeys (Phelps and Roberts 1994). Pigeons also learn serial lists made up
of colour photographs and random kaleidoscopic images with equal ease, while humans
find the kaleidoscopic images more difficult to remember (Wright, Cook et al. 1990;
Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick and Cook 1985). These types of experimental results
led Fetterman (1996) to suggest that: “There is not a great deal of evidence that
nonhuman animals, especially pigeons, perceive pictorial stimuli in the same way
humans do” (p. 8).
This uncertainty over whether even the concept learning ‘poster’ animal in fact
perceives experimental stimuli as representations of real objects casts doubt over
whether at least some animals can in fact discriminate on the basis of either supposedly
pre-existing concepts such as ‘tree’ (Herrnstein et al. 1976) and ‘person’ (Herrnstein
and Loveland 1964) or learn a new concept based on depictions of unfamiliar objects
such as ‘fish’ (Herrnstein and de Villiers 1980). According to Watanabe et al. (1993), in
these early ‘concept’ experiments “there is no implication that their subjects in any
sense recognise the pictures as representations of real objects” (p. 356). The fact that
pigeons do equally well categorising on the basis of stimuli depicting non-realistic
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images such as squiggles (Vaughan and Greene 1984) and dot patterns (Watanabe 1988)
offers some support for this view.
However, there is evidence that animals can perceive pictures as real objects. A number
of studies have shown that monkeys can spontaneously respond to pictures as if they
were the real objects (e.g Kyes, Mayer and Bunnell 1992; Rosenfeld and van Hoesen
1979) and even jumping spiders court mates and attack prey they see on television
(Clark and Uetz 1990). Other studies involving associatively based training have also
shown object-picture equivalence. For example, monkeys can recognise familiar group
members in slides Dasser (1987) and baboons can transfer from real objects to cut-out
pictures in a food/non-food categorisation task (Bovet and Vauclair 1998). In a more
specific test, Davenport and Rogers’ (1971) demonstrated that photographically naive
chimpanzees and orangutans can proficiently match objects with colour and black-andwhite photographs and perform fairly well with silhouettes and line drawings.
Even pigeons, despite some experiments casting doubt on their ability to perceive
pictures as real objects (see above), have demonstrated object-picture correspondence in
some studies. For example, Looney and Cohen (1974) showed an upright silhouette of a
pigeon was better at producing reinforced conspecific attack behaviour than an inverted
silhouette, an outline of a pigeon or a piece of coloured paper. In more direct studies,
Cabe (1976), Delius (1992), Lumsden (1977) and Watanabe (1993, 1997) found
pigeons were able to transfer categorisations between pictures and solid objects and “see
the pictures as representations of real objects” (Watanabe 1997, p. 188). Wilkie, Willson
and MacDonald (1992) conducted a review of a number of studies and claimed: “Our
review of the evidence suggests that animals such as pigeons likely do see photographs
as corresponding to the natural stimuli” (p. 91).
In addition to conflicting experimental results such as those above, some studies even
seem to provide evidence for both positions regarding animals’ perception of twodimensional stimuli within the same experiment. Cole and Honig (1994) showed
pigeons were able to more quickly find food in particular locations in a room after being
positively reinforced on pictures of those locations compared to pigeons that were
reinforced on pictures showing room locations that did not contain food. However,
when the experiment was reversed (with pigeons being trained in the room and tested
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on the pictures), the differential performance disappeared. Another example of a mixed
result from investigations of picture-real life correspondence was found by
Vandenheede and Bouissou (1994), who discovered that sheep respond appropriately to
slides of conspecifics but not to slides of humans. Similarly, chickens react to images of
conspecifics and predators as if they were the real thing, apparently on the basis of
shape and motion, however they find insufficient detail in slides and videos to recognise
other chickens individually (Patterson-Kane, Nicol, Foster and Temple 1997). Monkeys,
on the other hand, do recognise familiar group members in slides (Dasser 1987).
Despite the mixed results, experiments have demonstrated that at least some animals in
some situations do treat experimental stimuli in the form of slides and videos as
corresponding to the real objects. However, merely being able to categorise pictures of
objects does not automatically mean that an animal is treating the pictures as
representations of, or equivalent to, real objects. According to Bovet and Vauclair
(2000, p. 143), “the establishment of some equivalence between the real object and its
pictorial representation is dependent upon both the stimulus’ dimensions and
experimental and/or motivational conditions.” In addition, Watanabe et al. (1993) point
out that even if animals do recognise pictures as representations of objects, and use
concepts to make category discriminations, “we do not know that their concepts are
identical to those of the experimenter” (p. 357).

3.8.3.2 Associative categorisation as concept learning
As mentioned previously, associative categorisation has received much less attention
than perceptual and relational categorisation. Consequently, there has been little
discussion of whether non-human associative categorisation constitutes concept
learning – do animals have a concept of ‘food’, for example. One example is that of
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1980), who claimed two of the chimpanzees in their
associative categorisation experiment (see section 3.5.2) had “acquired a concept of
‘food’ and ‘tool’ that was functionally based, generalisable, and symbolically encoded.
(p. 923). Similarly Dasser (1988a, 1988b) refers to monkeys having a “social concept”
because they can correctly identify mother-offspring pairs (see section 3.5.1).
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However, as with perceptual categorisation, the fact that more prosaic explanations for
these types of experiments have been put forward, such as language training and
mediated generalisation (see section 3.5.3), casts doubt on conceptual mechanisms
(although it has been suggested that the secondary stimulus generalisation demonstrated
in pseudocategory experiments can itself be used as evidence of Lea’s (1984b)
conceptual requirement of a “unique mental structure”, see section 3.8.2.3). Pearce
(1997) goes so far as to say that the possible role of mediated generalisation, in which
perceptually dissimilar items are categorised based on a pre-existing or artificially
created common response, means that “it remains an open question as to whether or not
success by animals in solving any categorisation problems ever implies the possession
of a concept” (p. 124).

3.8.3.3 Relational categorisation as concept learning
The increasing popularity of experiments based on relationships between stimuli has led
a number of authors to a new definition of concept learning. This definition rejects the
use of the term ‘concept’ when applied to perceptually based experiments because they
can be solved on the basis of the absolute properties of the stimuli themselves (Lea
1984b). Instead, they reserve the term concept for tasks that can only be solved using
the relationship between stimuli (see section 3.6.2). According to Vonk (2003, p. 77):
“Researchers investigating natural concept formation in non-human species have had
difficulty disentangling the role of conceptual versus perceptual processing. Because the
concept of how environmental stimuli are related is independent of their physical
properties, some of the strongest evidence for ‘abstract’ concept formation comes from
researchers examining the extent to which non-human species can understand the
relationships between items.”
There is considerable support for the idea of relational categorisation providing
evidence of concept learning. Benjamini (1983), in reference to his experiment
demonstrating oddity learning in ravens and gulls, said: “It may be defined also as a
form of ‘abstract learning’ or ‘concept formation’, assuming that these terms refer to
transfer which can not be explained by (a) stimulus generalisation along physically
definable dimensions or (b) non-specific transfer effects” (p. 187). Many other authors
have described same/different categorisation in terms of concepts (e.g. Cook et al. 1995;
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Cook et al. 2003; Fagot et al. 2001; Flemming et al. 2007; Hoeschele et al. 2012;
Santiago and Wright 1984; Wasserman et al. 1995; Wright 2010; Wright and Katz
2006; Wright et al. 2003; Young, Wasserman and Dalrymple 1997). The description of
relational categorisation as conceptualisation is not limited to same/different
experiments. Jaakkola et al. (2005), in a study of relative numerosity, described
bottlenose dolphins as “understanding … the concept of numerically ‘less’” (p. 296)
while Avargues-Weber et al. (2011) claimed their honeybees had displayed
“above/below conceptual learning” (p. 904).
A number of authors have also made clear conceptual distinctions between perceptually
and relationally based categorisations (e.g. Monen, Brenner and Reynaerts 1998). In his
later writings Herrnstein (1990) defines stimuli grouped according to some principle of
perceptual similarity as open-ended categories, while stimuli grouped based on criteria
other than perceptual similarity are called concepts. Avargues-Weber et al. (2011, p.
898) stated that: “Relational rules such as ‘same’ or ‘different’ … are considered as a
form of abstract conceptual cognition as they involve learning beyond perceptual
generalisation.” Wright et al. (2003) claimed that while perceptual categorisation should
more accurately be referred to as category learning, “sameness” is an abstract concept
because it transcends stimuli features and instead depends on the relationship between
stimuli: “Abstract concepts are rules about relationships (e.g. identity) among stimuli”
(p. 184). Similarly, Tavares and Tomaz (2002) defined conceptual learning as “the
ability to solve problems by using an abstract rule” (p. 132).
As with other forms of categorisation, transfer to novel stimuli is considered evidence
of conceptual behaviour. Wasserman et al. (1995) claimed for the pigeons in their
experiment that “accurate choice responding in the presence of [novel stimuli]
constituted the prime evidence of same-different conceptualisation” (p. 249). Wright
and Katz (2006) stated: “In our opinion, a subject that has learned an S/D concept ought
to be able to perform as accurately with novel stimuli as with training stimuli (p. 235)
and Katz et al. (2007) maintain abstract-concept learning “involves judging a
relationship between stimuli based on a rule … The rule is considered to be abstract
when it can be applied to novel stimuli” (p. 80). Tavares and Tomas (2002, p. 132) said
“the critical test for assessing concept formation is the presentation of new stimuli
items”, while Wright and Lickteig (2010, p. 274) stated: “Transfer to novel stimuli is
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very strong evidence that subjects have learned the relationship among stimuli and the
abstract concept”. Similarly, Giurfa et al. (2001) claimed for their subjects that:
“Because the bees continue to choose the appropriate matching (or non-matching)
stimulus even in new situations, we conclude that they can form and use a concept of
sameness … and difference … in making their choices” (p. 932).

3.8.3.3.1 Matching/non-matching as concept learning
The most common testing procedures for same/different categorisations are
matching/non-matching and paired comparison same/different, both of which can be
conducted using simultaneous or successive presentation of stimuli (see section 3.7.2.1).
While many authors have claimed same/different conceptualisation on the basis of
delayed matching/non-matching tasks (e.g. Giurfa et al. 2001; Zentall and Hogan 1974;
Zerbolio and Royalty 1983), a number of authors have raised questions about whether
procedures such as matching/oddity and the use of successively presented stimuli can be
mastered using means other than relational information, let alone concept learning (see
section 3.7).
Some authors have even distinguished between simultaneous same/different and
matching-to-sample as representing different types of concepts, referring to subjects of
match-to-sample studies as having displayed a “matching concept” (Colombo et al.
2003; Wright 1997). Tavares and Tomaz (2002), in a delayed matching/non-matching to
sample study in capuchin monkeys, stated: “Success in these tasks have been interpreted
as ‘concept’ learning, since the rule that allows subjects to make a correct choice is the
concept ‘matching’ or ‘non-matching’, regardless of the physical properties of the
various stimuli presented in each problem” (pp. 131-132). However, Thompson (1995,
p. 209) claims that due to the problems of interpretation, “results from MTS [matchingto-sample] studies are often difficult to evaluate with respect to the investigators’ claims
that their animals do or do not have a matching concept”.
As discussed in sections 3.7.2.1.5 and 3.7.6.1.2, Premack (1983a, 1983b) believes that
when stimuli are presented successively, as in a delayed matching-to-sample task, that
the resultant performance has “relatively little to do with same/different. The animal
simply reacts to whether or not it has experienced the item before” (p. 354). Similarly,
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Shettleworth (1998) argues that subjects in successive matching-to-sample experiments
may be responding according to “‘Which did I just respond to?’ rather than ‘Are these
two things the same?’” (p. 225). According to Premack (1983a, 1983b), a true
same/different judgement requires that the stimuli be presented simultaneously.

3.8.3.3.2 Paired-comparison same/different categorisation as concept learning
Even when stimuli are present simultaneously, not all authors are willing to ascribe
conceptual meaning to relational categorisation. Mandler (2004, p. 140), for example,
stated: “Whatever the pigeons are responding to does not appear to be anything like a
human concept of same-different.” Similarly, in examining studies by Cook et al.
(1995) and Wasserman et al. (1995) using multi-element stimuli (see section 3.7.3.3),
Shettleworth (1998) wonders whether the successful findings in fact reveal a true
“same/different concept” or are merely evidence of a low-level perceptual mechanism.
According to Shettleworth (1998, p. 227), “the line between abstract concepts and direct
perception of relationships may not be easy to draw”. Animals may have an implicit
knowledge of abstract relationships contained in a specific perceptual module, yet be
unable to access it to make explicit discriminations. For example, biological motion
(Thompson 1995) and connectedness (Hauser 1996) could arguably be described as
either abstract concepts or as higher-order properties that are perceived directly
(Shettleworth 1998). (See also section 3.7.6.2 for discussion of possible non-conceptual
explanations for simultaneous same/different categorisation).
However, both Cook et al. (1995) and Wasserman et al. (1995) argue that their subjects
must have been doing more than merely responding to perceptual cues in their studies
because transfer was not perfect. They claim the pigeons must have processed the
individual elements and then made a same/different judgment at a higher, conceptual
level: “This generalization decrement suggests that the birds did discriminate specific
icons in the visual arrays as well as their relation to one another” (Wasserman et al.
1995, p. 252).
According to Wasserman et al. (1995), the results of studies such as theirs and those of
Cook et al. (1995), Edwards et al. (1983) and Santiago and Wright (1984) demonstrate
that “… it is becoming increasingly clear that the pigeon is capable of evidencing
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advanced forms of conceptual behaviour … thus arguing against Premack’s (1983[b])
earlier conclusion that, among nonhuman animals, only language-trained chimpanzees
can show same-different conceptualisation” (p. 252). Similarly, Cook et al. (1995, p.
259) claim: “The conceptual behaviour engaged in by our pigeons suggests that these
animals may indeed be capable of forming generalised same-different concepts.”
A number of authors have argued that even if animals make use of a more concrete
perceptual mechanism like entropy (see section 3.7.6.2.3) to solve same/different
discriminations, it does not mean they are utilising methods that are non-conceptual
(e.g. Fagot et al. 2001; Wasserman et al. 2002; Zentall et al. 2008). Further, it has been
argued that humans also utilise some common perceptual mechanisms in performing
same/different conceptualisation (see section 3.8.2.1).
Other authors are willing to acknowledge same/different categorisation as concept
learning, but only when the task involves second-order same/different relationships. In
examining the results of experiments by Oden et al. (1990) studying second-order
same/different tasks in chimpanzees (see section 3.7.5), Thompson (1995)
acknowledges that recognising second-order same/different relationships and being able
to actually match object pairs based on their relationship are both solved using relational
features. However, he claims the difference between the two tasks reflects the difference
between recognition and discrimination, “with the term ‘conceptual’ reserved for the
latter ability only” (p. 213). According to Flemming et al. (2007, pp. 55-56):
“Successful performance on a relational matching-to-sample task provides the necessary
evidence that an animal has the most heightened degree of abstract conceptualisation.”

3.8.3.4 Conceptual hierarchies
While a number of authors describe animals as either having or not having concepts,
others have elaborated on their definitions of animal concepts by describing levels of
complexity in conceptual behaviour. Malott and Siddall (1972) claimed experiments
demonstrating the acquisition of basic or easily defined concepts such as triangularity
showed the acquisition of a “simple concept”, that is, “one in which the stimulus
properties can be easily specified” (p. 3). Experiments using more complex stimuli that
could not be easily specified, such as ‘person/non-person’ (Herrnstein and Loveland
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1964), showed acquisition of a “complex concept”. Wright et al. (2003) describe
perceptual concepts as “natural concepts” and relational concepts as “abstract concepts”
and claim that: “Judgments of relationships that transcend individual features of the
stimuli can be considered higher order learning, and therefore abstract-concept learning
can be considered higher order” (p. 184).
Similarly, Wasserman et al. (1995, p. 252) claimed “conceptual behaviour appears to
involve relatively concrete basic-level (Bhatt et al. 1988) and higher-order (Wasserman
et al. 1992) categories as well as much more abstract stimulus relations (Cook et al.
1995; Edwards et al. 1983; Santiago and Wright 1984; the present results)”. Vonk and
MacDonald (2004) examined levels of abstraction in “natural concept formation” (p. 3)
in orangutans, the levels comprising discriminating between orangutans and
humans/other primates (concrete level), primates and other animals (intermediate level)
and between animals and non-animals (abstract level).
Flemming et al. (2007) view conceptual behaviour as a “continuum”, asserting that
“there is little debate over whether non-human animals exhibit at least basic conceptual
abilities”, but claimed that some abilities, such as analogical reasoning, were at the
“highest degree of abstract conceptualisation” (p. 55). Burdyn and Thomas (1984, p.
411) claimed: “Class concepts are the ‘elements’ of conceptual knowledge (behaviour),
and relational concepts are higher order concepts based on relations (conjunctive, etc.)
among such elements. There are two types of class concepts, absolute and relative, as
distinguished by the necessity to compare stimulus choices in order to affirm that an
exemplar is a member of a class.”
Thomas (1986) defined concept learning as discrimination based on some common
characteristic shared by a number of stimuli. In his learning-intelligence hierarchy,
Thomas (1980) placed conceptual abilities at the top end of his eight-level scale of task
complexity – ranging from the most basic (absolute or relative class concepts) to the
highest degree of abstract conceptualisation (relations between relations, or analogical
reasoning) (see section 1.3.2.1). In 1996 he refined his hierarchy further by using an
operational distinction to distinguish between the two most basic “conceptual” abilities.
According to Thomas (1996), categorisation based on the physical attributes of the
stimuli is an “absolute class concept”. Using this definition, the features that determine
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an object’s class membership are inherent in the object. For example, the defining
features of a tree are inherent in each tree. Conversely, Thomas (1996) defines a
“relative class concept” as one in which the defining features are not inherent in the
objects but are relative among the objects, such as which object is odd, larger or which
set of objects manifests fewer. The operational distinction between the two is whether
the subject must compare the stimuli to determine which one manifests the concept –
relative (requires comparison) versus absolute (no need to compare).

3.8.4 Conclusion
The diversity of views described above shows that there is still no definitive answer to
C. Lloyd Morgan’s (1894) question asked at the beginning of section 3.8 about whether
animals exhibit conceptual behaviour and which, if any, categorisation tasks can be used
as evidence of conceptual abilities. While animals have demonstrated that they can
solve categorisation problems based on perceptual, associative and relational concepts
defined by human experimenters, it is still uncertain whether they use concepts in same
manner as humans to solve them (Monen et al. 1998; Watanabe et al. 1993).
In a 1998 textbook on animal cognition, Roberts defined concepts in human cognition
as “mental categories into which people place experiences of the world” and claimed
“analogs of most forms of human conceptualisation can be found with other species” (p.
335). At least in his earlier writings (see section 3.8.3.1.1), Herrnstein suggested that
animal concepts may differ in degree, rather than kind, from those of humans. “There
has been reluctance to assume that the sorting done by human beings is of the same
nature as that done by animals. Given the large difference in degree between the
concepts of man and animals, a difference in kind has long seemed plausible … But …
our findings show that an animal readily forms a broad and complex concept when
placed in a situation that demands one” (Herrnstein and Loveland 1964, p. 551). In a
comprehensive review of animal ‘concept learning’, Zentall et al. (2008, p. 13)
concluded that, “not only are nonhuman animals capable of acquiring a wide variety of
concepts, but that the underlying processes that determine concept learning are also
likely to be quite similar”.
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However, as D’Amato and Van Sant (1988) point out, research has shown that different
species often rely on different means to achieve the same result (see section 3.7 for
examples). In the same manner, just because an animal classifies stimuli into the same
categories as a human, doesn’t mean that it has formed the same concept or utilised the
same methods. A number of authors are willing to use the term concept regarding
animal categorisation, but clarify that it is not necessarily the same as a human concept.
In their study of categorisation of humans in slides by rhesus monkeys, Schrier and
Brady (1987, p. 142) stated that “… to say that a concept is involved does not imply that
it is like the one we have.” Similarly, Huber (2000, p. 253) argued: “The notion that
some patterns of animal categorisation correspond to human concepts does not
necessarily imply that the content or structure of the animal and human concepts are
identical.” Chater and Heyes (1994) claim that in reviewing the status of research on
“animal concepts”, they found the results indicated that “… an animal cannot have the
same concept SAME, or the same range of SAME concepts, as a human, but leave
intact the claim that animals can be ascribed some sort of SAME concept” (p. 231).
As mentioned earlier (section 3.8.1), one the main problems in the debate about concept
learning in animals is that of semantics – what abilities are being claimed for nonhumans when the word “concept” is used. One solution would be to define the term
when it is used in a particular experiment, as Thomas and Kerr (1976) did: “Conceptual
behaviour, as defined here, refers to selective responses to stimuli which are
consistently correct in terms of predetermined and discoverable reinforcement
contingencies but which do not depend upon prior experience with the specific stimuli
presented on a given trial” (p. 335).
Other authors have suggested that the term should not be used at all. Huber (2001)
claims the concept debate is “fruitless” because the present definition of a “concept” is
based on the human experience. The author claims that even if animals do use
something more than perceptual mechanisms to perform complex categorisations, there
is currently no plausible account of what animal concepts might involve (such as
clusters of features or something more abstract or knowledge-based). In their review of
animal concepts, Chater and Heyes (1994) state that “we have assumed that cognitive
terms are useful in comparative psychology only to the extent that they can be used in
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the same way in discussion of humans and animals, and we have argued that ‘concept’
is not such a term” (pp. 235-236).
One possibility would be to find a new term that more clearly spells out exactly what
abilities are being tested in experimental studies. Lea (1984b) proposes the use of the
term “concept discrimination experiments” for studies of the type pioneered by
Herrnstein and Loveland (1964) to emphasise that the stimuli concerned are defined in
terms of a concept (albeit the experimenter’s) while leaving open the question of
whether the subject uses a concept to make the discrimination (e.g. Ghosh, Lea and
Noury 2004). Shettleworth (1998) goes further and omits the use of the word concept
altogether, arguing that perceptually based experiments, at least, should be referred to
operationally as “category discriminations” leaving open the question of whether the
animals have learned a concept in any sense. As mentioned in section 3.8.3.1.1, Wright
et al. (2003) favour the use of the term category learning for experiments based on
perceptual mechanisms: “Abstract concepts are easily confused with so-called ‘natural’
concepts (e.g. trees, water, fish), which use the same term ‘concept’. Although in one
sense subjects do learn the concept of a category of items, the terms would be less
confusing if such learning was referred to as category learning” (p. 184).
While some type of semantic clarification may prove valuable, it does not address the
central issue of whether in fact animals use human-like concepts to perform
categorisations or employ some other means. Despite writing decades ago, Premack
(1983a) sums up the current understanding of non-human conceptualisation by
describing it as “shrouded in mystery” and attesting that: “… how any species forms
concepts or, indeed, what is a concept, is largely unknown” (p. 357). Cheney and
Seyfarth (1990) agree that the notion of a concept when applied to animals is
“inherently vague”. “We may be able to agree that a concept is something more than a
collection of individual exemplars or even a prototype, but in many respects its precise
features cannot help but remain elusive” (p. 89).
However, this uncertainty is insufficient reason to conclude that all animal
categorisation involves nothing more than simple perceptual mechanisms. More than a
century ago, many authors believed only adult humans were capable of
conceptualisation (Morgan 1894). It has since been demonstrated that humans begin to
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integrate new information into fairly sophisticated categories by 10 months of age
(Younger and Cohen 1985). In a similar manner, further research may yet definitively
demonstrate that at least some species are capable of using human-like concepts to
perform some types of categorisation tasks.

3.9 Rationale
Having

examined

the

experimental

history

and

theoretical

background

of

discrimination, conditional discrimination and categorisation, it is important to
summarise the rationale behind the selection of the experimental tasks used in this
study.
Previous experiments have already demonstrated that echidna’s possess basic
discrimination learning abilities (Buchmann and Rhodes 1978; Gates 1978; see section
2.2.2.4). The next step in order of complexity (according to hierarchies such as those
proposed by Herrnstein, 1990, and Zayan and Vauclair, 1998; see section 1.3.2.1)
would be to examine the echidna’s ability to discriminate based on complex perceptual
categories, such as person/no-person (Herrnstein and Loveland 1964), tree/no-tree
(Herrnstein 1979) etc. However, for the purposes of this study, it was decided to move
directly to the level of relational categorisation. There were a number of reasons for this
decision.
Firstly, on a practical level, complex perceptual categorisations such as those
demonstrated by Herrnstein and others (see section 3.4.3) use stimuli which require a
relatively sophisticated visual apparatus to discriminate. As has been discussed
previously, the echidna’s visual system is much less effective than that of the most
commonly used experimental subject, the pigeon (see section 2.1.4.1). Conducting
Herrnstein-type experiments with an echidna might lead to the subject’s performance
being adversely affected by an inability to differentiate between stimuli. As Hodos
(1986) points out, experiments designed to be similar to human intelligence tests can be
biased towards animals with good pattern vision, leading to poor performance by
species with lesser visual abilities. Because of this it was decided to use stimuli
comparable to that used successfully in Gates’ (1978) visual acuity study in which
echidnas

demonstrated

the

ability

to

discriminate

shapes

(circle/triangle,
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horizontal/vertical lines) on black and white stimulus boards (see section 2.2.2.4). This
type of stimulus has been used successfully in relational categorisation (and specifically
same/different) experiments (see section 3.4).
A second reason for deciding to test relational rather than perceptual or associative
categorisation was also motivated by biological reasons. As discussed in chapter 2.2, the
echidna has an unusual and comparatively large and complex brain structure, including
a surprisingly voluminous frontal lobe. While it is by no means certain that these
anatomical anomalies are indicative of increased cognitive abilities or that structures
such as the echidna’s frontal cortex are functionally equivalent to those found in other
animals or humans, their presence suggests that echidnas may be capable of ‘higherlevel’ cognitive tasks and provides a strong inducement to conduct more complex
testing. More specifically, it has been suggested that the prefrontal cortex may play a
crucial part in abstract-concept learning such as same/different. “Among neural
structures that play a critical role in abstract-concept learning, the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) stands out” (Wright 2010, p. 250) (see also Freedman and Miller 2008).
Thirdly, in addition to the goal of performing cognitive experiments on a rarely tested
and unusual species (see section 2.3), this study also attempts to add to the debate about
cognitive evolution (see section 1.6). This has been accomplished by examining
whether a phylogenetically and physiologically ‘primitive’ species can perform
‘advanced’ cognitive tasks.
Relational categorisation fulfils the requirement of a ‘higher-level’ cognitive task (see
sections 3.7.6.2.4, 3.8.3.3, 3.8.3.4 and 6.2.2.1). While perceptual and associative
categorisation can potentially be explained in terms of more prosaic associative learning
mechanisms (see sections 3.4.4 and 3.5.3), there is considerable support for the idea that
abstract relational learning requires more than just a sophisticated visual processing
system. Many authors agree that relational categorisation constitutes a more complex
and ‘advanced’ task than perceptual and associative categorisation. For example, Wright
et al. (2003, p. 184) claim that: “Judgments of relationships that transcend individual
features of the stimuli can be considered higher order learning …” Similarly, Huber
(2001, Chapter 2, online) believes that “the ability to learn relational or abstract
concepts is more likely to provide evidence of intelligence” while Thomas (1996, p.
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160) suggests that the distinction between the two level 6 abilities on his cognitive task
hierarchy (see section 1.3.2.1) – absolute (perceptual) and relative (relational)
categorisation – “may have profound implications in terms of the cognitive ability of
different species”.
Furthermore, while perceptual categorisation seems to be fairly widespread, having
been demonstrated in a wide variety of species from bees to primates (see section 3.4.3),
the prevailing school of thought is that relational learning is a relatively uncommon
cognitive ability fairly high up on the various hierarchical cognitive models. This makes
testing for this type of learning in the echidna an interesting contribution to the existing
literature – if the echidna can successfully perform same/different relational learning
either a ‘primitive’ species is capable of a ‘higher-level’ task or perhaps the ability is
more widespread than previously thought.
If the subject succeeded in the same/different task, it was decided to further test the
abilities of the echidna with an even more supposedly difficult and rarely tested task. In
accordance with Thomas’ (1980, 1986, 1996) hierarchy of learning abilities, it was
decided to introduce the additional complication of a conditional discrimination to the
same/different experiment to raise it to the level of an even more complex level 7
process (see section 1.3.2.1).
Finally, while there is considerable support for relational categorisation as a ‘higherlevel’ ability, there is still no consensus about whether it constitutes concept learning, or
even what cognitive processes that phrase implies. However, there seems to be greatest
support for a definition that encompasses relational rather than perceptual or associative
mechanisms (see section 3.8.3.3). Since a number of authors are of the opinion that
concept learning is such a ‘high-level’ skill that they consider it the exclusive domain of
humans (see section 3.8.2.1), it is suggestive that many other authors raise relational
categorisation to the level of concept learning. If animals do indeed categorise on the
basis of something resembling human concepts – a capacity that would certainly be
considered a ‘higher-level ability’ – a more likely candidate would be found in the
realm of relational categorisation in which animals must rely on something other than
perceptual cues (Vonk 2003; see section 3.8.3.3). While this debate is by no means
settled, the potential link between relational categorisation and some form of
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conceptualisation is another reason to consider it a more likely candidate as an
‘advanced’ task and gives further impetus to the selection of relational learning for this
experiment.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL METHODS

225

4.1 Subject
4.1.1 Pitpa
The subject was a 13-year-old female short-beaked echidna (Tachyglossus aculeatus
aculeatus) kept in captivity at Taronga Zoo in Sydney, Australia. The subject, named
Pitpa (ARKS number 870143), was born in captivity and was parent-reared. She was
identified by a blue and yellow plastic tag attached to a spine on her right-hand side
towards the rear and a tattoo “8” located on her ventral side. Pitpa was weighed monthly
throughout the course of the experiments and maintained an average weight of around
4.5-5kg. She experienced no major health problems during the experiments.
The nature of these experiments meant that the subject had to be comfortable with
continual handling, not become stressed by a new environment and be outgoing and
willing to explore new things. Zoo staff described Pitpa as easy to handle – she was
often used for keeper talks to educate zoo visitors – as well as curious and interested in
her surroundings. She was considered one of the zoo’s best “escape artists” with a long
history of “jail breaks” from extremely secure enclosures, including one during the
course of this experiment. These factors (apart from the escape) made Pitpa an ideal
subject for these experiments.
The subject was housed in an off-exhibit 10 m x 10 m open enclosure with a substrate
of plants, logs, leaf litter, bark and earth. She was maintained on a high-fat diet (see
Appendix) and received 100 ml of food daily. She had free access to water at all times.
Pitpa was an experimentally naïve subject who had previously only experienced normal
husbandry activities with zoo staff, as well as being used in animal education talks.

4.1.2 Use of single subject
4.1.2.1 Reasons for use of single subject
One of the problems with conducting studies with echidnas that require controlled
laboratory-type settings is the difficulty in obtaining and maintaining subjects.
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According to Gates (1973, p. 53): “Unfortunately, echidnas are not readily available; are
sometimes difficult to keep in good health, and take some time to become accustomed
to handling!”
As a protected species, it is difficult to get permission to take echidnas from the wild (a
special licence must be obtained from the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service) –
a problem cited by Gates (1973, p. 10) in which only “borrowing” echidnas from other
sources allowed his experiments to be concluded. Nicol (2003, p. 795) claims that the
fact that echidnas are now “highly protected” is partly to blame for a reduction in
echidna neuroscience studies. Echidnas, particularly those taken from the wild, can also
be difficult to maintain in captivity. Gates (1973), for example, was forced to terminate
one experiment when four out of five of the subjects died.
Habituating echidnas to handling can also be particularly difficult, as was the case with
two of the potential subjects of this experiment. Echidnas, with their covering of long,
sharp spines, are hard to handle even when co-operative. When they feel threatened they
adopt defensive postures, such as digging themselves into the ground or curling up in a
ball (see section 2.1.5), positions from which they cannot be forcibly moved without
risk of injury to the animal (and the handler). Augee et al. (2006, p. 100) described the
echidna as “a remarkably strong animal for its size” due to its musculoskeletal structure.
Gates (1973, p. 88), in discussing the difficulty in restraining echidnas, described them
as having “immense muscular power and body flexibility in extricating themselves from
a wide range of situations”. Gates (1973) spent up to a month handling some of his
subjects on a daily basis before he could commence testing and even then some animals
“regressed” in later experiments. He gave up on one animal after seven weeks of daily
handling were unsuccessful.
It was originally planned that this experiment would be conducted using more than one
subject and the zoo provided three other echidnas – Rozelle, Cruegar and Cass – in
addition to the final subject, Pitpa. Rozelle became ill and had to be removed. While
Pitpa was handled regularly in her role in zoo education talks, Cruegar was not used to
being handled and became stressed in the apparatus, either trying to get out or curling
up in a corner, and paid no attention to the stimuli even when tempted with food. Cass
was even less used to handling than Cruegar and buried himself as soon as someone
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entered the enclosure. Attempts to habituate Cruegar and Cass were made for several
weeks, however due to time constraints and ethical considerations in continuing to
stress the animals; it was decided not to use those echidnas. Cruegar stayed in the
enclosure for the duration of the experiments so Pitpa, who was raised with other
echidnas, would not be socially isolated; Cass was put back into the zoo’s main echidna
population. The zoo’s other ‘tame’ echidnas were needed for zoo activities and were not
available for research.

4.1.2.2 Precedent for single-subject experiments
While the use of one subject is not optimal, it is more of an issue for studying natural
behaviours than for this type of artificial cognitive testing. Rather than testing what a
particular species does do, the objective of this type of study is to determine what
members of a species can do. Abilities demonstrated by an individual show those
abilities are within the capacity of that species – variation between individuals means
some individuals may be less capable, others possibly more so. (See Hanggi 1999;
Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991).
This type of single-subject testing has an established history including a number of
well-known experimental series such as Irene Pepperberg’s cognitive experiments with
Alex the African Grey parrot (e.g. Pepperberg 1983, 1987, 1988; Pepperberg and
Brezinsky 1991), Kastak and Schusterman’s equivalence studies using a single
California sea lion, Rio (Schusterman and Kastak 1993, 1998) and a number of longterm primate language studies (e.g. of Washoe by Gardner and Gardner 1969 and of
Kanzi by Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994). Other studies using single experimental
subjects include matching-to-sample with a dolphin (Roitblat et al. 1990), analogical
reasoning in the chimpanzee (Gillan et al. 1981), object-object relations in the
chimpanzee (Tanaka 1996) and conditional discrimination learning in a harbour seal
(Hanggi and Schusterman 1995).
As in these studies, the results here are applicable to the species as a whole in terms of
demonstrating the capability of echidnas. Regarding the use of single-subject
experiments, Hanggi (1999, p. 244) states: “A positive finding, regardless of the
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training methods or history of the subject, implies that this aptitude is within the
capacity of the species”. (See also Pepperberg and Brezinsky 1991).

4.2 Apparatus
The apparatus was a custom-built plywood y-maze variant, with dimensions as shown
in Figure 1, which was located within the echidnas’ living enclosure.

Figure 1: Three-dimensional diagram of the apparatus showing
stimulus panels and covered food dishes

Figure 2: Photo of the apparatus situated in the enclosure at Taronga Zoo
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The apparatus walls were of sufficient height, 50cm, to prevent an echidna from
climbing out and a wooden floor stopped the subject both from digging out and from
probing the ground for additional food. It was painted with several coats of non-toxic
green paint to prevent deterioration in the outdoors. A number of small holes were
drilled at the edges of the maze arms to provide drainage. The apparatus was built to
provide a three-choice option, however the third arm was walled off for these
experiments, as only two-choice testing was required.
At one end of the two-choice section of the apparatus was a 96cm x 80cm start box. The
front wall of the start box contained two hinged swinging doors, on which the stimulus
panels were fixed with Velcro, which the subject pushed through to enter one of the
maze arms. The doors only swung one way, from the start box into the maze arms, so
the subject could only choose to go through a door once per trial. Many same/different
experiments are designed so the subjects must select the S+ stimulus at a location
removed from the stimulus itself (e.g. pressing a lever, pecking a key) (see section
3.7.2.1). However this experiment uses a procedure similar to that used by Blaisdell and
Cook (2005), Chausseil (1991) and others (see section 3.7.3.3), in which the subject is
required to respond directly to the S+ stimulus. According to Blaisdell and Cook (2005),
responding directly to the S+ stimulus may lead to greater attention being paid to
stimulus features, a view shared by Castro et al. (2010, p. 36), who suggested “direct
responding may facilitate discrimination learning”. The actual design using stimulus
panels attached to push-through doors is similar to that used by Gates (1978) in his
study of visual discrimination in the echidna and also by Sappington and Goldman
(1994), who trained horses to push through stimulus panels to gain a food reward.
The back wall of the start box was removable. During testing it was in place to prevent
the subject from leaving the apparatus or the other echidna in the enclosure from
entering. When trials were not being conducted the back wall was removed and the
swing doors tied open using elasticised straps to allow the echidnas free access to the
empty apparatus. This was done so the subject would not be tempted to explore an
unfamiliar environment during testing and be distracted from the task at hand.
Located at the end of each maze arm was a round metal food dish (12cm in diameter x
6cm deep) of the same type as those generally used to feed echidnas at the zoo. It was
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important to control for olfactory cueing, particularly as echidnas have a very acute
sense of smell (see section 2.1.4.2). A previous experiment testing oddity learning in
rats (Langworthy and Jennings 1972, see section 3.7.3.2) was criticised for
methodology which allowed for the possibility that the rats learned the problem simply
by smelling where the food was located (Thomas 1996).
To prevent the echidna from detecting the smell of food inside the dishes, the food
dishes were not located immediately behind the swing doors but at the end of relatively
long maze arms (approximately two metres). In addition, each dish was covered with a
20cm x 20cm plywood lid. An earlier experiment conducted with other echidnas at
Taronga Zoo (Quince 1998) had tested this method and concluded that the wooden lids
prevented the echidnas from locating food in the dishes on the basis of olfactory cues.
This was confirmed by a further study conducted using the same equipment (Burke et
al. 2002). Anecdotally, it seems unlikely that Pitpa would have walked to the end of the
maze arm and lifted the lid off the food dish on every trial if she could smell whether or
not there was food in the dish.

4.3 Stimuli
4.3.1 General stimuli
Each stimulus consisted of a 21cm x 21cm laminated panel containing black-and-white
figures created using Microsoft Publisher and printed with a laser printer (hp LaserJet
1000). Apart from the plain black and white stimuli used in Experiment 1, the panels
contained a variety of geometric and irregular figures selected from Microsoft Publisher
autoshapes which were deemed basic enough to be visible to the echidna from within
the start box approximately 20-30cm away. This was the distance estimated by Gates
(1978) to be the “choice” point at which echidnas were able to discern and discriminate
visual stimuli in his examination of echidna visual capabilities. The stimulus panels in
this study were slightly smaller than those used by Gates (1973) (which were 26cm x
26cm) due to restrictions imposed by the size of the apparatus swing doors, but were
considered (and proved to be) discernible by the subject.
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4.3.2 Same/different stimuli
For the same/different discrimination sections of this experiment (Experiments 4 to 7),
it was decided to use relatively simple, black-and-white stimulus items rather than more
complex visual stimuli such as photographs of natural scenes that are often used in
same/different experiments with pigeons (e.g. Cook et al. 2000; Santiago and Wright
1984). In addition to concerns about the echidna’s visual acuity (see below), the choice
of stimuli was based on a number of objectives. Firstly, it would determine whether
echidnas could categorise objects they had not previously encountered in their
environment, suggesting an ability to adapt to a range of situations rather than just
natural environments (Huber 1995). Secondly, the use of uncomplicated stimuli would
also help avoid introducing confounding information found in pictures of natural scenes
(Hanggi 1999). According to Vonk (2003): “With natural stimuli it can be difficult to
de-couple the role of perceptual and conceptual processing” (p. 84). Complex visual
stimuli have been found to lead to stimulus-based perceptual errors such as the subjects
attending to irrelevant stimulus features. An example of this problem was seen in the
“red patch” errors found in D’Amato and Van Sant’s (1988) perceptual categorisation of
“person present” experiments discussed earlier (see section 3.4.4.4.1). In particular, the
use of black-and-white stimuli avoids the possibility of colour information interfering
with the processing of other elements in the stimuli (Lamb and Riley 1981), as well as
making allowance for the uncertainty surrounding the echidna’s capacity for colour
vision (see section 2.1.4.1).
The same/different stimulus items in this study were presented in multi-element arrays
on panels made up of either all the same or all different items in a design popularised by
Wasserman et al. (1995) (see section 3.7.3.3). The echidna’s visual acuity was a
consideration in determining the size, type and number of elements to be used per panel.
Wasserman et al. (1995) used fairly small elements consisting of relatively complex line
drawings and 16 elements per panel. However, as the echidnas’ visual acuity is
significantly poorer than that of a pigeon (Gates 1978; Hodos 1993; see section 2.1.4.1)
it was decided to make the size of the stimulus panels and elements greater than that
used by Wasserman et al. (1995). Wasserman and his colleagues used 7cm x 7cm
displays and 1cm x 1cm elements, whereas this study utilised 21cm x 21cm panels and
6-10cm wide elements. It was also decided to employ only four elements per panel and
232

use simple, relatively easy to distinguish geometric shapes as stimulus items. The use of
geometric shapes has proved a popular stimulus for categorisation experiments with a
number of species, e.g. coatis (Chausseil 1991), pigeons (Blaisdell and Cook 2005),
horses (Hanggi 1999) and primates (Vonk 2003).
Another consideration in selecting the number of shapes on each panel was the
suggestion that the Wasserman et al. (1995) study may have been solved on the basis of
a generalisable order-disorder rule due to the fact that the same arrays had a greater
linear orderliness of rows and columns than that of the different arrays (see section
3.7.6.2.2). While later experiments indicated that pigeons were able to successfully
perform the task using non-linear, disorderly arrays (Young and Wasserman 1997), the
use of four rather than 16 items in the arrays for this experiment reduces the chance of
this effect confounding the results. With only two items in any direction it is unlikely
that perceptual grouping principles would organise the display into rows or columns
(see Palmer and Rock 1994). Fewer items also reduces the likelihood of an entropybased explanation for the subject’s performance as fewer items means less difference in
variability between the same and different arrays than with higher-item arrays (see
section 3.7.6.2.3).
The shapes used on the stimulus panels were selected to include both regular and
irregular shapes of different sizes and orientations to deter the subject from using
perceptual cues such as uniformity, regularity or relative brightness in the
same/different tests, a criticism that has been levelled at many other same/different
experiments (Delius 1994). For example, both of the panels in Figure 3 below belonged
to the same category.

Figure 3: Two of the same stimulus panels used in Experiment 4
demonstrating variation in both uniformity and relative brightness

As with Wasserman et al.’s (1995) study, the same shapes were used in both the same
and different panels to control for item-specific cueing from individual shapes. For
similar reasons, the six shapes used in the same panels for the same/different
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experiments were each used the same number of times (four) in the six different panels.
Each shape also appeared in different positions on the panel as far as was possible –
three of the shapes appeared in all four positions, while the other three shapes appeared
in three different positions and appeared in one of the positions twice.

4.3.3 Conditional stimuli
For the conditional phases of this study, the stimuli were designed to contain both the
geometric shape elements discussed above and conditional cues in the form of the
background colour of the panels. This is similar to the combined stimulus method
designed by Lashley (1938b), which has also been called the “two-choice visual”
conditional discrimination (Schrier and Thompson 1980) (see sections 3.2.2.1.4 and
3.2.3). As in this experiment, this method of using background colour as a conditional
cue has been used to study both conditional discrimination (Lashley 1938b) and
conditional same/different categorisation (Castro et al. 2010; Flemming 2011;
Flemming et al. 2007).

4.4 Procedure
4.4.1 Scheduling
Echidnas hibernate for varying lengths of time from early winter to early to late spring
(Grigg et al. 1992, see section 2.1.8) so the testing was conducted during the warmer
months (November to April). Zoo staff had indicated the echidnas were generally active
in the early afternoon coinciding with their usual feeding time so the trials were all
performed at that time of day.

4.4.2 Pre-training
After several days familiarisation with the new enclosure, an initial preliminary training
phase was conducted to teach Pitpa the experimental procedures. She was first taught to
remove the lids from the food dishes. She successfully learned how to remove the lids
(by placing her snout on the undersurface of the lid and pushing it up and off) after only
a few attempts (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Photo of Pitpa lifting off a
food dish lid

Figure 5: Photo of Pitpa pushing through
a swing door

The apparatus was then placed in the enclosure and left open for several days to
familiarise the subject with the test area. Pitpa was then trained to push through the
swing doors for a food reward in the maze arms (see Figure 5), with care being taken
not to favour one arm over the other. When this was accomplished and the subject
appeared comfortable using the apparatus, the test phase began.

4.4.3 General trial procedure
For all experiments, a trial consisted of the simultaneous presentation of one pair of
stimuli – basically the two-choice simultaneous discrimination method described in
Sutherland and Mackintosh (1971), also called a paired comparison task (see section
3.7.2.1.1). In the later same/different experiments (Experiments 4 to 7), the pair
consisted of two multi-element arrays in a similar procedure to that used by Blaisdell
and Cook (2005); Castro et al. (2010) and Flemming et al. (2007) in their same/different
and conditional same/different studies (see section 3.7.4).
One session of trials was conducted per day. Testing was conducted every day starting
at approximately 1pm. A number of sessions were cancelled due to heavy rain, lack of
subject motivation (e.g. not looking at the stimuli, not interested in food and trying to
get out of the apparatus), subject in torpor and on one occasion for minor veterinary
treatment.
Because of the echidnas’ tendency to sleep for some of the day or even enter torpor for
short periods even in the summer months (see section 2.1.8), it was decided to begin
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testing only when the echidna was awake and motivated. The session was initiated
when the subject indicated a willingness to proceed. This was determined by observing
the subject’s behaviour – it was considered the subject was motivated when she
displayed behaviours such as approaching and following the experimenter (often trying
to climb up the experimenter’s leg) and walking around the apparatus and trying to
climb inside. Lack of motivation was considered indicated when the subject stayed
buried in the enclosure after the experimenter entered, even when tempted with food.
After the apparatus was returned to testing configuration (back wall of the apparatus put
in place and the swing doors lowered), the stimuli were attached to the swing doors.
Food dishes with lids were placed at the ends of the maze arms, with the dish behind the
correct stimulus containing 10ml of food, the other empty. For each day’s session only
one of the dishes was used to contain the food reward, the other remained empty so
there was no possibility of even a small reward for an incorrect choice. The dishes were
swapped between the maze arms so the dish containing food was always located behind
the correct stimuli.
Initial testing with the subject showed a tendency to rush straight through one of the
doors as soon as she was placed in the apparatus rather than examining both doors,
possibly due to her lower position relative to the stimulus panels and the physical
constraints on tilting her head upwards (see section 2.1.3). Due to this tendency, it was
decided to include a viewing period as part of the experimental procedure. At the
beginning of each trial the subject was lifted into the start box and held at the rear of the
box centred between the two doors facing the stimuli at eye-level for approximately 3-5
seconds of viewing time.
One example of the advantage of a viewing period was shown in an experiment by
Bailey and Thomas (1998), in which the only rat to show successful first-trial transfer in
their study of olfactory oddity learning was the only one that investigated all of the
stimuli before making a choice (see section 3.7.3.2). The decision to provide a viewing
time was also based on sample identification theories such as the drift model of sample
encoding (Roitblat 1984; Roitblat and Harley 1988), which describes how increasing
sample durations allows a subject to more strongly encode a sample stimulus, and
sequential sampling theory, which assumes that “the subject’s confidence in its
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identification of the stimulus grows monotonically with increasing numbers of looks
…” (Roitblat et al. 1990, p. 91). An observation period has also been used with other
species such as pigeons (e.g. Gibson et al. 2006; Wright and Katz 2006) and rhesus
monkeys (Katz et al. 2002; Wright and Katz 2006; Wright et al. 2003).
After the viewing period, the subject was placed straight down on the floor of the start
box in the same central position between the two doors. The subject selected a door and
pushed through into the arm behind. She then walked down the maze arm to the food
dish, which either contained food if the choice was correct or was empty if incorrect. A
choice was considered to have been made when the subject pushed through one of the
doors. In common with Gates’ (1973) procedure, an error was not recorded if the
subject approached, but did not push, the incorrect door. (On several occasions she
headed for one door then ‘changed her mind’ and chose the other).
After Pitpa either ate the food or lifted the lid to discover an empty food dish, she was
placed in a holding area (a large, empty plastic garbage bin in the unused third arm of
the apparatus) during the inter-trial period while the food dishes and stimuli were
changed. The echidna could not see over the top of the bin to observe in which maze
arm the food was placed (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Photo of Pitpa in the holding bin during the inter-trial interval

During the early experiments in this study, it was decided to use a correction trial
procedure in which the subject repeated the same trial until a correct response was made
(e.g. Burdyn and Thomas 1984; D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Hollard and
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Delius 1982; Santiago and Wright 1984). Wasserman et al. (1995, p. 250) described
their use of correction trials in terms of the pigeons being “punished” for incorrect
responses, however the rationale in this study was that it gave the subject the
opportunity to make correct responses to previously incorrect selections and thus
facilitate learning. According to Santiago and Wright (1984), the correction procedure
can also “help remove response biases that otherwise develop” (p. 500).
During the correction trials (Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and the first part of
Experiment 3) the stimuli and food dishes remained untouched for the next trial if the
subject made an incorrect choice and continued in that configuration for each trial until
a correct choice was made. The echidna was not moved to the holding area between
correction trials and was merely taken back to the start box after she had exposed the
empty food dish. When a correct choice was made the echidna was removed to the
holding area and the stimuli and food dishes reset for the next trial. A correct choice
was recorded only if the subject selected the S+ stimulus on the first trial of that
configuration. During non-correction trials, which were used for the later experiments,
the subject was removed to the holding area between each trial and the stimuli and food
dishes reset for the next trial whether the choice was correct or not.
Under both correction and non-correction conditions, the session was concluded when
10 correct choices were made and there was no upper limit set on the number of trials it
took the subject to reach that criterion. As 10ml of food was given per trial, the
echidna’s entire daily allotment of food was consumed during the session and no
supplementary feeding was given other than insects caught by the animal in the
enclosure.
While some authors (e.g. Brodigan and Peterson 1976; Cumming and Berryman 1961;
Edwards et al. 1983; Katz and Wright 2006; Wasserman et al. 1995) restrict the daily
food intake of subjects during an experiment to ensure they are “kept hungry and
therefore in a well-motivated state” (Gates 1973, p. 33) others do not deprive their
subjects of food to enhance performance (e.g. Flemming et al. 2007; Tavares and
Tomaz 2002). In this case, such a procedure was prohibited by zoo ethics regulations.
However, the subject appeared quite food motivated throughout the experiment, except
for periods where she had entered torpor. In fact, Tavares and Tomaz (2002) suggested
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that not depriving subjects of food and water (in addition to conducting testing in the
subjects’ living area, as was also done here), may have led to better experimental
outcomes in their study due to a reduction in stress. Like Pitpa, the capuchin monkeys in
Tavares and Tomaz’ (2002) experiments initiated testing, suggesting the process was
not unduly stressful for them.
To control for position habit, the S+ and S- stimulus panels were randomly alternated
between the left and right doors according to a randomisation schedule generated at
www.randomizer.org. Measures were also taken to control for auditory cues, both from
the noise of the Velcro on the stimulus panels and from the sounds of the experimenter
and the dishes. Regardless of whether the panels had to be changed or not, both panels
were removed and replaced for each trial. The experimenter stood in the same maze arm
each time the food dish was replenished irrespective of which maze arm the food dish
was located. In addition, both dishes and both lids were picked up and put down
whether the dish containing food had to be swapped into the other maze arm or not. As
discussed previously (see section 4.2) olfactory cues were also addressed through the
use of distance and wooden lids on the food dishes.

4.4.4 Transfer trials
To determine whether Pitpa had learned the task and not just memorised the training
stimuli, transfer trials using novel stimuli were conducted. This is considered by many
authors as the best way to test for ‘concept learning’ (see section 3.8.3.3). “Most
important, to demonstrate either categorisation or conceptualisation, it is imperative to
show that discriminative responding occurs with untrained test stimuli rather than only
with training stimuli” (Hanggi 1999, p. 250).
During the transfer trials, novel pairs of stimuli were introduced randomly throughout
each session (using the randomisation schedule) to ensure the subject did not become
confused about the task, leading to an overall deterioration in performance. According
to Thompson (1995, p. 209): “Abruptly introducing all novel stimuli to an animal that
has experienced only familiar ones during training can disrupt performance and thereby
mask any evidence of conceptual learning.” (See also D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo
1985; Mercado et al. 2000; Pack et al. 1991).
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This approach has been utilised in pigeon same/different discrimination experiments
from the Wasserman laboratories, where ‘warm-up’ trials are used before starting
testing sessions (e.g. Gibson et al. 2006; Wasserman et al. 1995; Young and Wasserman
1997). In the Wasserman et al. (1995) study, for example, testing sessions began with
32 warm-up trials showing all the training stimuli twice; then two randomly selected
training trials were shown followed by one randomly selected testing trial until all the
testing stimuli were seen once. Each testing session was also separated by two
retraining sessions procedurally identical to the training sessions.
The method of interspersing training and test stimuli used in this experiment is a
variation on that used by Bhatt et al. (1988), in which repeating stimuli were shown in
odd-numbered sessions and novel stimuli shown in even-numbered sessions in a pigeon
perceptual categorisation experiment. It is similar to that used by Burke, Everingham,
Rogers, Hinton and Hall-Aspland (2001) and Wetzel et al. (1998), in which novel and
training stimuli were presented randomly in studies of sea lion perception and
categorical discrimination of tone direction in Mongolian gerbils respectively. The
procedure has also been used with chimpanzees (Robinson 1955) and monkeys (Fujita
1983).
Interestingly, Wasserman et al. (1995) utilised the multi-element facet of their
experiment to test the effect of using previously trained elements (icons) in testing
stimuli. In Part 1 of their study, the authors compared the results of using testing stimuli
made up of icons from the training phase to testing stimuli consisting of all new icons.
Contrary to their expectations, the authors found chance performance with the
previously seen icons but significantly different from chance performance with the
novel icons. In addition, there was a significant disparity between the results for same
and different stimuli. On the novel icon arrays, the average accuracy to the same arrays
was not significantly different from chance (46% correct), whereas the average accuracy
to the different arrays was significantly different from chance (82% correct) – a trend
that was reflected in each of the four testing sessions. Of the familiar icon arrays,
average accuracy to the same arrays was below chance (28% correct), whereas average
accuracy to the different arrays was significantly different from chance (75% correct) –
a performance differential that was significantly different from chance.
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The same/different performance anomaly was not observed in the second part of
Wasserman et al.’s (1995) experiment in which all the testing icons were novel (in the
sense that they had not previously been differentially reinforced). However, the authors
suggest there were a number of confounding factors in Part 2 that might have influenced
the result. There were twice as many training and testing stimuli in Part 2 (reducing the
risk of memorisation according to the authors) and the pigeons had had prior experience
with the experimental paradigm in Part 1. The subjects had also already seen the
supposedly “novel” testing stimuli in Test 1 (although the authors point out that it was
just four times each 28 days previously, the pigeon’s prodigious memory has been well
documented – see section 3.4.4.2.1).
Regardless, the results of Wasserman et al. (1995) indicate that using novel stimuli
containing previously untrained (and in the case of this study previously unseen)
elements appears to be a more effective method of testing task generalisation that
reusing training icons in the testing phase and thus the former method has been
employed here.
Wasserman et al. (1992) and others have advocated for nondifferential food
reinforcement on transfer trials (e.g. Gibson et al. 2006; Wasserman et al. 1995; Young
and Wasserman 1997). They argue food should be given regardless of whether a choice
is correct so that repeated testing can be conducted without the confounding influence
of explicit training effects. However, it could be argued that this approach could be
equally confounding, as the subjects would be effectively being trained to respond to
incorrect stimuli during transfer trials. Another possibility is to provide no
reinforcement at all during transfer trials; however the potential for experimental
extinction of responding to test stimuli (Young and Wasserman 1997) and reduction of
subject motivation would then arise.
In contrast, other authors (e.g. Flemming et al. 2007; Zentall and Hogan 1975) use
differential food reinforcement during transfer tests – that is, only correct responses are
reinforced with food rewards in the same manner as training trials. Zentall and Hogan
(1975) claim this method enhances detection of the most sensitive measure of transfer in
testing for ‘concept learning’ – that is, the rate at which a second problem is learned.
This experiment has taken this approach.
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4.5 Analysis of results
4.5.1 General analysis
The results of the experiments were analysed using two-tailed binomial tests and
assessed against an alpha level of .05 to determine whether they were significantly
different from chance (50% correct). The calculations were performed using the java
applet: http://users.abo.fi/jtuomain/speech/z_score.html. Chi-squared tests were used to
compare performance between blocks and between stimulus types and assessed against
an alpha level of .05 using the Java applet:
http://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/chisquare/Default2.aspx.

4.5.2 Results across blocks
In order to minimise stress on the subject and reduce the chance of her losing interest, it
was decided in conjunction with zoo staff to limit the number of trials conducted each
day. Each day’s session ended when the subject completed 10 correct trials, with the
number of trials taken to reach that criterion ranging from 10 to 22 trials throughout the
course of the study. However, analysing the data based on each daily session would
utilise too few trials to provide a reliable assessment of the subject’s performance. In
addition, the echidna’s behaviour could be expected to vary between days due to a
variety of factors such as weather, temperature and food motivation, an issue
exacerbated by the outdoor experimental setting. For these reasons, the session data was
collated into blocks (usually of five sessions each) for analysis. Dividing the data for
each experiment into blocks, rather than analysing the results of each experiment in its
entirety, provided the opportunity to track changes in performance as each experiment
progressed.
Collating the daily session data into blocks also provided a better basis for comparison
with similar studies undertaken with other species. For example, in their seminal paper
on same/different learning in pigeons, Wasserman et al. (1995) analysed their results
using a daily testing session of 144 trials. Another well-known same/different study was
conducted by Pepperberg (1987) under similar constraints to this one – working with a
single subject (an African Grey parrot called Alex) who often had short session lengths
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due to the subject’s lack of motivation (p. 426). Pepperberg measured performance by
aggregating the session data into a single block of 113 transfer test trials.

4.5.3 Task criteria
The criterion for the training phase of each experiment was two consecutive blocks
significantly different from chance. For the transfer trials, the criterion was one block
significantly different from chance and no significant difference between the training
and transfer blocks. Katz and Wright (2006) stressed the importance of performance on
novel stimuli being at least as good as the training performance. According to Katz and
Wright (2006), transfer equivalent to baseline is important because anything less than
this is partial transfer, implying there are multiple cues controlling behaviour.
Due to the time constraints on the availability of the subject, both in terms of how long
the zoo would allow the subject to be off-exhibit and the fact that echidnas periodically
enter torpor and sometimes true hibernation during colder weather (see section 2.1.8), it
was decided to limit each experiment to a maximum of 20 sessions.

4.6 Ethics considerations
Ethics approval for the experiments carried out during this study was given by the
Zoological Parks Board of NSW Animal Care and Ethics Committee. A number of
measures were undertaken to enhance the welfare of the subject including:
•

Providing a large, natural living enclosure containing trees, branches, artificial
and natural shelters, water containers large enough to allow bathing and a
sufficient dirt layer above the floor fencing to allow natural burrowing
behaviour.

•

Housing a second echidna in the enclosure to prevent social isolation.

•

Monthly weighing to monitor the subject’s health.

•

Keeping a daily record of behaviour, feeding activity and physical appearance
of the subject to help identify any problems.

•

Immediate access to veterinary treatment when required.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
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5.1 Experiment 1: Black/white discrimination
5.1.1 Introduction
This experiment was conducted in part to provide the subject with discrimination
training and also to confirm the results of a study of visual acuity in the echidna by
Gates (1973), which found that echidnas were capable of making a visual discrimination
between black and white stimuli. Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) also demonstrated
black/white discrimination in their study of instrumental reversal learning in the
echidna; however the visual stimuli were combined with tactile cues.
It also provided the opportunity for an admittedly limited study of the echidna’s longterm memory. It was originally planned that this series of experiments would be
conducted during the Australian summer months (December – February) when echidnas
are most active. However, during the first season of testing a number of the zoo’s
echidnas, including the planned subject of these experiments, developed a bacterial skin
complaint that prevented them being available to participate until late March. Testing
began after the familiarisation phase was completed, however after only six sessions the
subject lost interest in food, and thus the trials, as the temperature dropped and she
entered torpor (see section 2.1.8). When testing resumed seven months later in
November, the same black and white stimuli were used and the experiment repeated.

5.1.2 Method
5.1.2.1 Stimuli
The stimuli were one black panel and one white panel as seen in Figure 7 (see also
Figure 2).
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Figure 7: Stimulus panels for Experiment 1 –
black/white discrimination, S+ = black

5.1.2.2 Procedure
Both Part 1 (conducted in March) and Part 2 (conducted in November) of the
black/white visual discrimination experiment were carried out using correction trials, so
the subject was shown the same stimulus configuration for each trial until a correct
choice was made. However, a correct response was recorded only if the first choice was
correct. The subject was shown 10 pairs of stimuli during each daily session and the
number of correct choices out of 10 was recorded. The correct choice for this
experiment was black.
Six sessions were conducted in Part 1 of the experiment, for reasons discussed in
section 5.1.1, and 10 sessions were conducted in Part 2.

5.1.3 Results
5.1.3.1 Part 1 – March/April
While the results of Part 1 do not meet the target criterion of two consecutive blocks
significantly above chance, examination of Figure 8 suggests the subject was learning
the black/white discrimination before the experiment was stopped. For the purpose of
analysis the results were grouped into two blocks of three sessions each. A two-tailed
binomial test was conducted on the cumulative score of each block (number correct out
of 30), with chance being 15/30. The results for both the first block (correct responses =
15/30, z = 0, p > .05) and the second block (correct responses = 20/30, z = 1.83, p > .05)
did not differ significantly from chance.
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Figure 8: Number of correct responses to black/white discrimination task,
S+ = black (correction trials). First six sessions show Part 1 of the experiment
(March/April), the next 10 sessions show Part 2 of the experiment (Nov/Dec)

5.1.3.2 Part 2 – November/December
For analysis, the data were grouped into two blocks of five days each. When the blocks
were analysed using a two-tailed binomial test on the cumulative score of each block
(number correct out of 50, chance = 25/50), the results were fairly similar for each
block. Both the first block (correct responses = 41/50, z = 4.53, p < .001) and the second
block (correct responses = 40/50, z = 4.24, p < .001) were highly significantly different
from chance, meeting the criteria for successful learning of this task.
Significantly different from chance (p < .05) for an individual session was calculated to
be 90% (9/10 correct responses) using a two-tailed binomial test. The subject achieved
that result or better on six out of the 10 sessions; including three consecutive days
immediately following day 1 (see Figure 8).

5.1.3.3 Side bias
The results of both Parts 1 and 2 were then examined to determine how many times per
session the subject chose either the right-hand or left-hand side (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Number of left/right choices in black/white discrimination task, S+ = black
(correction trials). ◊ = the number of left-hand choices, ▲ = the number of right-hand choices,
■ = the number of correct responses. First six sessions show Part 1 of the experiment
(March/April), the next 10 sessions show Part 2 of the experiment (Nov/Dec)

Visual examination of Figure 9, which compares Pitpa’s selection of the left-hand and
right-hand maze arm during Experiment 1, indicates she had a strong tendency to a
‘left’ side bias during Part 1 of the experiment. During Part 2 of the experiment,
conducted approximately seven months later, she seemed to show a (less pronounced)
preference for the right arm.

5.1.4 Discussion
The results of this experiment confirm the findings of Gates (1973, 1978) by
demonstrating that echidnas are capable of performing a visual discrimination between
black and white stimuli. This would certainly be expected, as this ability seems to be
extremely common among animal species (see section 3.1.3). Pearce (1997) claimed
that, to his knowledge, no vertebrate has ever been shown to be incapable of solving
discrimination problems and even a single complex cell, the protozoa Paramecium, can
be trained to discriminate between two auditory stimuli (Hennessey, Rucker and
McDiarmid 1979).
Although it is difficult to compare performances of subjects in different experiments
due to discrepancies in apparatus and experimental procedure, it is interesting to note
that the subject of this study was able to solve this discrimination with comparable
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rapidity to the echidnas in Gates’ (1973, 1978) study, which in turn was similar to that
obtained with rats by Sutherland and Mackintosh (1971).
Gates (1973, 1978) conducted six daily sessions of 18 correct trials per session for a
total of 108 correct trials. By session five, having experienced 72 correct trials in the
previous four sessions, all three echidnas were achieving 90% or better (significantly
above chance) in individual sessions. Pitpa was exposed to 60 trials in Part 1 of the
experiment and then had a seven-month break. In Part 2, she had one session of 10
correct trials, then scored 90% or better in the next three sessions. Her performance
deteriorated slightly during the middle sessions of Part 2, but improved again by the end
of the experiment.

5.1.4.1 Side bias
It is a common finding in experiments where animals are required to choose between a
number of stimuli that subjects initially show a positional bias before they solve the
discrimination (e.g. Carter and Eckerman 1975; Cumming and Berryman 1961, 1965).
Some authors have suggested that positional cues are more salient than visual cues
(Sutherland and Mackintosh 1971) and the results of this experiment seem to support
that view, with the subject showing a strong initial positional bias before learning to
respond on the basis of the black/white stimuli.
A number of early authors (Krechevsky 1932, 1938; Lashley 1929) explained the side
bias tendency by suggesting that when animals are presented with a discrimination they
rapidly form a single hypothesis, such as ‘choose right’, which they discard when it
proves inadequate and then choose another one, such as ‘choose black’, until they find
one that is consistently rewarded. According to Krechevsky (1932, 1938), hypotheses
could only be learned and tested one at a time and a position habit should form and
dissipate before a discrimination is solved.
However studies such as that conducted by Turner (1968) have shown that animals can
learn about the nature of the stimulus even when they are exhibiting a position habit.
Turner found responding time was affected by the nature of the stimulus (in this case
black or white), with the subjects gradually taking longer to choose the preferred
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position to the incorrect stimuli and vice versa. Other studies also support Turner’s
conclusion (e.g. Bitterman and Coate 1950; Ehrenfreund 1948; Spence 1945) and the
idea that discriminations are solved by testing one hypothesis after another has been
generally discredited (Pearce 1997).
The results of this experiment also tend to support Turner’s findings. Firstly, the overall
speed with which the subject learned the discrimination suggests she was learning about
the stimulus early in the experiment. In addition, while Figure 9 shows her performance
tended to improve during sessions in which she exhibited reduced side bias, her
accuracy showed gradual improvement throughout the experiment at the same time as
her tendency to side bias was reducing. These results indicate she could learn about
stimulus properties at the same time as she was testing a position habit.

5.1.4.2 Memory
While admittedly providing only limited data, the results also suggest some form of
long-term memory retention has occurred (see Figure 8). In Part 1 of the experiment, the
results showed the expected learning curve. On the first day of Part 2, conducted seven
months later, the subject achieved a similar result to those observed on the final days of
Part 1. The subject then scored significantly different from chance results (90% or
better) for the individual sessions on days two, three and four. While a drop in
performance can be seen during the middle two days, indicating the subject may have
tried alternative strategies or been distracted by internal or external factors, in the final
four days of the experiment the subject was again significantly different from chance on
individual sessions on three out of four days. Anecdotally, it was also observed that
very little retraining in the use of the apparatus was required after the seven-month
interval.
These results are consistent with the findings of Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) on the
echidna’s long-term memory capability. In that study, three echidnas that had taken part
in a study of instrumental learning were re-tested one month after the experiment ended.
They rapidly achieved levels of performance comparable to those seen at the end of the
original experiment.
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However, the results of this study seem to contradict the finding of Burke et al. (2002).
The echidnas in that experiment were unable to remember the location of a previously
rewarding food location to employ either a “win-shift” or “win-stay” foraging strategy
using a retention interval of 90 minutes, despite being able to do so at shorter retention
intervals (two and five minutes).
As discussed in section 2.2.2.2, the contrasting results of long-term memory
performance between this experiment and that of Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) and the
Burke et al. (2002) study, suggest there may be different memory mechanisms at work
in different tasks. Both this study and Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) used visual stimuli,
while Burke et al. (2002) examined spatial memory. Like hummingbirds and rats
(Gaffan and Davies 1981), echidnas may have only evolved a short-term spatial
memory while also possessing an effective long-term visual memory. It is also possible
the artificial spatial scale of the Burke et al. (2002) study may account for the subjects’
inability to remember locations at greater time intervals. It is also the case that Burke et
al. (2002) was a working memory study in which the subjects had to remember
locations that changed on a daily basis, making the task more difficult than a static
spatial memory task. While outside the scope of this study, further experiments may
help answer these questions and determine the extent of the echidna’s long-term
memory capabilities.

5.2 Experiment 2: Shape discrimination
5.2.1 Introduction
Like black/white discrimination, shape discrimination has been successfully
demonstrated in many species (reviewed in Sutherland 1961) including rats (Dodwell
1957), cats (Warren and Baron 1956), monkeys (Harlow 1944), sheep and calves
(Baldwin 1981), goats (Baldwin 1979), horses (Sappington and Goldman 1994),
pigeons (Towe 1954), chickens (Bingham 1913) and the octopus (Sutherland 1958).
Gates (1973) conducted the only other known shape discrimination testing in echidnas
and claimed his experiment suggested that echidnas were able to discriminate between a
circle and a triangle. However, his results were not entirely conclusive. Two of his
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subjects were able to learn the discrimination in fewer than the criterion 500 trials, one
showed no sign of learning in 500 trials and the other was terminated at 360 trials
because it lost weight and refused to eat in the discrimination box.
This study attempts to repeat Gates’ (1973) experiment and either support or challenge
his findings. This study also used a circle and a triangle as the stimulus shapes – firstly
to replicate Gates (1973), but also because circle/triangle is the most commonly tested
shape discrimination (Sutherland 1961) and because those shapes were considered fairly
easy to distinguish, particularly considering the echidnas limited visual acuity (see
section 2.1.4.1).

5.2.2 Method
5.2.2.1 Stimuli
The stimuli for this experiment consisted of a two white panels each containing a single
large black shape – a circle and a triangle (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Stimulus panels for Experiment 2 –
circle/triangle shape discrimination, S+ = circle

5.2.2.2 Procedure
As with Experiment 1, this experiment was conducted using correction trials (the
subject was shown the same stimuli for each trial until a correct choice was made).
Again, a correct response was recorded only if the first choice was correct. The subject
was shown 10 pairs of stimuli during each daily session and the number of correct
choices out of 10 was recorded. The correct choice for this experiment was the circle
panel.
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After an initial 10 sessions of trials the results did not differ significantly from chance,
so a further 10 sessions were conducted for a total of twenty sessions.

5.2.3 Results
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Figure 11: Number of correct responses to circle/triangle
shape discrimination task, S+ = circle (correction trials)

The data were grouped into four blocks of five sessions and analysed using a two-tailed
binomial test on the cumulative score of each block (number correct out of 50, chance =
25/50). While block one was significantly different from chance (correct responses =
35/50, z = 2.83 p < .01), block two was not significant (correct responses = 31/50, z =
1.70, p > .05). Blocks three and four were both significantly different from chance
(correct responses = 35/50, z = 2.83, p < .01 for both blocks). The significant results
from blocks three and four meet the criterion for learning the task.
While the pattern of results for individual sessions was fairly erratic, with no clear
learning curve exhibited, evidence of learning was demonstrated across blocks, with the
final five sessions showing the most consistent responses (see Figure 11).
The only individual session result that was significantly different from chance (90%, p
< .05, two-tailed binomial) was on day 1. The subject did not achieve above 80% in an
individual session for the remaining 19 sessions.
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5.2.3.1 Side bias
The results were then examined to determine how many times per session the subject
chose either the right-hand or left-hand side (see Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Number of left/right choices in circle/triangle shape discrimination task,
S+ = circle (correction trials). ◊ = the number of left-hand choices, ▲ = the number
of right-hand choices, ■ = the number of correct responses

Visual examination of the graph indicates the subject initially showed a bias for the lefthand side but by the second half of the experiment that bias diminished. The more
consistent results during this period suggest that this is because she was selecting on the
basis of the correct stimulus regardless of side.

5.2.4 Discussion
The results of this experiment show that an echidna is capable of learning a visual
discrimination using shapes, supporting Gates’ (1973) finding. In addition, both Pitpa
and the subjects of Gates’ (1973) study that met the experimental criteria took less time
to learn the discrimination than rats on a similar task (Fields 1932).
However, the results also suggest the subject found this task more difficult to learn than
the black/white discrimination used in Experiment 1 (see section 5.1). The shape
discrimination took longer to learn than the black/white discrimination and, unlike
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Experiment 1, the subject only achieved 90% in one individual session. While
consistency improved in the later sessions, the early individual sessions were erratic,
with a good result one day followed by a poor result the next and vice versa, a pattern
also seen in Gates’ (1973) experiment. This could suggest the subject was trying
different methods to solve the problem or that the training experienced in Experiment 1
may have interfered with learning – for example, she may have been trying to select the
stimulus that looked blackest. Alternatively, the inconsistent results could merely be the
result of variation in daily performance due to external or internal factors. However, by
the end of the shape experiment, the subject was achieving more consistent results
suggesting one of the former scenarios is more likely.
Gates (1973) found echidnas were easily able to learn to discriminate between black and
white stimuli as well as stimuli containing horizontal and vertical lines. However, as
with this experiment, the subjects took longer to learn the shape discrimination, an
occurrence Gates also attributed to the inherent greater difficulty of the task. This
phenomenon has also been observed in pigeons. Conditional discrimination experiments
conducted by Cumming and Berryman (1965) indicated that while pigeons can easily
learn to match hues they have great difficulty learning to match geometric forms (Carter
and Werner 1978). While further study would be needed to make direct comparisons,
the idea of shape being more difficult to discriminate than hue makes intuitive sense. It
seems self-evident that shape would be a more complex visual stimulus than
black/white. It also seems logical that shape would be a more difficult discrimination
than horizontal/vertical, as orientation is a basic visual feature while shapes are
composed of different combinations of orientations. However, other species have
demonstrated contradictory results. Sappington and Goldman (1994), for example,
found the horses in their study took longest to learn the black/white discrimination and
showed a general decrease in the time taken to learn successively more difficult shape
discrimination problems (although this could also be the result of growing familiarity
with the testing scenario).
It is worth noting that neither this study nor that of Gates (1973) conclusively shows
that echidnas discriminate on the basis of the shape of the whole triangle or the whole
circle – a point that could be made about most shape discrimination studies. They may
utilise some feature of the stimulus (such as the base of the two shapes) to make the
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discrimination, a phenomenon that has been observed in rats (Gates 1973). This idea
receives some support from Gates’ (1973) experiment testing the echidna’s ability to
learn a mirror-image discrimination. While the subjects were able to discriminate
between a triangle and an inverted triangle fairly easily, they were unable to
discriminate between left-right (horizontal) mirror-image triangles within the 500-trial
limit set by the experimenter. While the subjects may have been successful given more
time, or simply been unable to perform the discrimination, Gates (1973) also suggests
another possibility. If the subjects were using only a part of each shape to make the
discrimination based on its presence or absence in a particular area of the stimulus panel
then, depending on the area chosen, the upright-inverted triangle problem might be
easier to learn than the left-right (horizontal) triangle problem. For example, the
difference between the bottom of a triangle versus the tip of a triangle (as seen in the
inverted problem) might be easier to learn than the difference between the right and left
corners of a triangle (as seen in the left-right horizontal problem). Further study would
be needed to determine the validity of a feature-based theory and what, if any, features
of the stimuli were being used.
However they accomplish the discrimination, the combined results of this and Gates’
(1973) study suggest that echidnas can perform shape discrimination. In addition, it
demonstrates that echidnas have the visual acuity to differentiate between solid
geometric shapes in preparation for the experiments conducted later in this study.

5.2.4.1 Side bias
As in Experiment 1 (see sections 5.1.3.3 and 5.1.4.1), the subject seemed to learn the
correct visual stimulus despite an initial left-side bias. However, the graph does not tell
the whole story as it only shows the first choice on each trial. Interestingly, on a number
of occasions when Pitpa incorrectly chose the right-hand side, she continued to
incorrectly choose the right-hand side during the correction trials (during which the
stimuli remained unchanged) multiple times, up to a maximum of 10 times during one
particular trial. She did not exhibit the same behaviour towards the left-hand side on as
many occasions and certainly not to the same extent. This right-hand perseverance was
also seen several times in Experiment 1, however despite the behaviour she eventually
learned to choose the correct visual stimulus in both experiments.
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5.3 Experiment 3: Conditional shape discrimination
5.3.1 Introduction
This experiment was designed to train the subject in the conditional discrimination
procedure. That is, using the same pair of stimuli, choose one stimulus under one
condition and the other stimulus under another condition. The shapes that the subject
had learned to discriminate in Experiment 2, circle and triangle, were used again here.

5.3.2 Method
5.3.2.1 Stimuli
For this experiment two pairs of stimulus panels were used. The first pair was the same
as that used in Experiment 2 – white panels containing a black circle and a black
triangle. The second pair of panels was identical to the first except the panels had a
black background and white shapes (see Figure 13). This method of using stimuli that
combine both the conditional and discriminative cues as the background and foreground
of the stimulus respectively first came to widespread notice in an experiment by Lashley
(1938b), who tested conditional discrimination in rats using a white upright and an
inverted triangle as the discriminative cues and backgrounds that were either black or
made up of horizontal stripes as the conditional cues (see sections 3.2.2.1.4 and 3.2.3).
In this experiment, however, both the discriminative and conditional cues changed in
each set of stimuli.

Figure 13: Stimulus panels for Experiment 3 – circle/triangle
conditional discrimination, S+ = circle (black-on-white panels),
triangle (white-on-black panels)
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5.3.2.2 Procedure
In Experiment 1 the subject was reinforced for choosing the circle shape on the blackon-white panels and that condition was also reinforced here. However, when the second
pair of panels was presented (white-on-black) the subject was rewarded for choosing the
triangle. This then fulfilled the ‘if … then’ requirements of a conditional discrimination
– i.e. if the stimulus pair is black on white, then choose circle; if the stimulus pair is
white-on-black, then choose triangle (see section 3.2.1).
Using the randomisation schedule selected for these experiments (see section 4.4.3),
both the position of the correct response (left or right) and the choice of paired stimuli
(black-on-white or white-on-black) were randomly determined.
The initial set of 10 sessions was conducted using correction trials in the same manner
as Experiments 1 and 2. However, the final six sessions were non-correction trials (see
Sutherland and Mackintosh 1971) with the stimulus pair and food position being
changed for each trial whether a correct choice was made or not (see section 4.4.3). The
session ended when 10 correct choices had been made.

5.3.3 Results
5.3.3.1 Correction trials
No real evidence of gradual improvement could be observed when the results for the
correction trials were graphed (see Figure 14). The best two individual sessions, which
were both significantly different from chance (90%, p < .05), were found in the middle
two days.
When the results for these trials were grouped into two blocks of five days and analysed
using a two-tailed binomial test, it was found performance in the first block was
significantly different from chance (correct responses = 38/50, z = 3.67, p < .001).
There was a slight deterioration in the second block, however it was still a highly
significant result (correct responses = 37/50, z = 3.39, p < .001), meaning the subject
fulfilled the task criterion.
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5.3.3.2 Non-correction trials
In the non-correction condition the results were in the form 10/x (where x = the number
of trials taken to reach 10 correct responses) instead of y/10 (where y = the number of
correct responses from a total of 10 trials) as used in the correction trials. To provide a
more consistent basis for comparison for this experiment, the non-correction trials were
also graphed and analysed using the results from the first 10 trials to also give a y/10
format. (All subsequent experiments were conducted using only non-correction trials,
however for comparative purposes both measures of performance were graphed and
analysed.)
The results of the non-correction trials were fairly consistent throughout the six sessions
(Figure 14) when analysed with a two-tailed binomial test using both measures of
performance. Averaged across the six sessions the results were highly significantly
different from chance when analysed both as y/10 (correct responses = 49/60, z = 4.91,
p < .001) and 10/x (correct responses = 60/73, z = 5.5, p < .001) and improved on the
correction trial results.
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Figure 14: Number of correct responses to circle/triangle conditional
discrimination task, S+ = circle (black-on-white panels), triangle (white-on-black
panels). The first 10 sessions show the results of the correction trials, the
subsequent six sessions show the results of the non-correction trials. ◊ = the
number of trials until 10 correct responses were made, ■ = the number of correct
responses in the first 10 trials
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A further analysis was conducted to determine if the prior training in the black-on-white
(S+ = circle) condition (see Experiment 2) had any effect on the results. The results for
each condition (black-on-white, S+ = circle and white-on-black, S+ = triangle) were
calculated separately using the y/10 data for both the correction and non-correction
trials (black-on-white panels = 57/77 correct; white-on-black panels = 67/83 correct). A
chi-squared test found no significant difference in performance between the two colour
conditions (x2 = 1.03, p = 0.31). The results were then converted into percentages in
order to graphically compare the varying proportions of the colour conditions in each
session caused by the randomisation procedure (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15: Percentage of correct responses to the circle/triangle conditional
discrimination task for each colour condition (using y/10 data, y = the number
of correct responses from a total of 10 trials). The final six sessions were
non-correction trials. ■ = white-on-black panels (S+ = triangle) (novel stimuli),
◊ = black-on-white panels (S+ = circle) (previously trained)

5.3.4 Discussion
The results of this experiment show an echidna is able to perform a conditional
discrimination using a similar combined stimulus method to that used by Lashley
(1938b) to demonstrate conditional discrimination in rats. However, while the results of
this experiment seem to demonstrate a more sophisticated discrimination than the first
two experiments, the subject may have simply memorised each stimulus configuration
instead of utilising a more generalised conditional discrimination rule, an explanation
described by the configuration model (see section 3.2.4.1). The fact that the results
260

indicate a fairly shallow learning curve seems to support this conclusion. This would
need to be tested using a larger number of training stimuli and transfer trials – which
was done in Experiments 5 and 7. As the purpose of this experiment was mainly to
familiarise the subject with the conditional discrimination procedure to be used in later
experiments, transfer trials were not conducted.
Performance may also have been confounded by transfer from the Experiment 2
discrimination to the new ‘negative’ (white-on-black) stimuli. That is, she may have
viewed both the black-on-white circle and the white-on-black circle as the same.
However, this seems less likely following Gates (1973) finding that an echidna that had
successfully learned the circle/triangle shape discrimination did not immediately
transfer the discrimination when presented with ‘negatives’ of the stimuli. Despite being
rewarded for choosing the same shape for both the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ stimulus
pairs, performance on day one of transfer testing fell to a statistically random 50%.
Another possibility is that the overall results were based on the echidna doing very well
on the previously trained black-on-white condition, but performing at chance for the
new white-on-black condition. However, when the results of each colour condition were
compared (see section 5.3.3.2 and Figure 15), it showed there was no significant
difference in performance between the two conditions.
On a procedural level, performance did not appear to deteriorate when sessions were
changed to the non-correction condition, indicating the subject did not require this extra
‘training’ to perform the task, and the rest of the experiments were conducted in the
non-correction condition.

5.4 Experiment 4: Same/different categorisation,
S+ = same
5.4.1 Introduction
The previous experiments proved that the subject was capable of performing
discriminations based on colour and shape; however these stimuli are defined by simple
physical characteristics. This experiment attempted to determine whether an echidna
could discriminate between stimuli that have more abstract properties emerging out of
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the relationship between stimuli rather than the stimuli themselves – an ability that has
been described as a higher-level’ cognitive task (see sections 3.7.6.2.4, 3.8.3.3 and
6.2.2.1). To ensure the subjects were not merely memorising all the stimuli, transfer
trials were conducted using novel stimuli.

5.4.2 Method
5.4.2.1 Stimuli
Training trials

For this experiment, the stimuli all had black backgrounds containing four white shapes
each. There were six different same panels containing four identical shapes and six
different different panels containing four non-identical shapes made up of combinations
of the shapes used for the same panels. The six shapes were each used the same number
of times in the six different panels and, as far as possible, in different positions (see
Figure 16).

Figure 16: Stimulus panels for Experiment 4 – same/different
discrimination, S+ = same

Transfer trials

For the transfer trial, six new same panels and six new different panels were introduced
using six novel shapes (see Figure 17) arranged in the same fashion as the training
stimulus panels (see Figure 16).
As the circle and triangle shapes had been used in previous experiments, these shapes
were not used for any of the same/different trials.
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Figure 17: Novel stimulus panels for Experiment 4 – transfer of
same/different discrimination, S+ = same

5.4.2.2 Procedure
As discussed in section 5.3.4, all experiments were now being conducted using noncorrection trials in which incorrect responses were not repeated.

Training trials

Each pair of stimuli that were presented consisted of one same and one different panel.
For this experiment, the same panel was rewarded. The randomisation schedule was
used to determine whether the correct response was located on the left or right door and
the same and different panels were shuffled between each trial to randomise the stimuli.

Transfer trials

During the transfer trials, novel pairs of stimuli were introduced randomly throughout
each session using the randomisation schedule. The results were then analysed to
determine if there was a drop in performance when the new stimuli were introduced.

5.4.3 Results
The learning phase results were grouped into two blocks of six sessions, with the
transfer trials a separate block of six sessions, and the results analysed using a twotailed binomial test. As mentioned earlier, to provide easy comparison with the previous
experiments the results were graphed (see Figure 18) and analysed using two measures
of performance – y/10 (y = the number of correct responses in the first 10 trials) and
10/x (x = the number of trials until 10 correct).
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Figure 18: Number of correct responses to same/different task,
S+ = same. The first 12 sessions show the learning phase, the subsequent six
sessions show the transfer trials. ◊ = the number of trials until 10 correct
responses were made, ■ = the number of correct responses in the first 10 trials

Training trials

In the learning phase, performance was highly significantly different from chance in the
first block (y/10: correct responses = 45/60, z = 3.87, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses =
60/78, z = 4.76, p < .001) and the second block (y/10: correct responses = 48/60, z =
4.65, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses = 60/75, z = 5.20, p < .001).

Transfer trials

Performance in the transfer phase was also highly significantly different from chance
(y/10: correct responses = 52/60, z = 5.68, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses = 60/71, z =
5.82, p < .001) and was not significantly different from performance in the second block
of the training phase using a chi-squared test on 10/x data (x2 = 0.51, p = 0.48).
Using the 10/x data, the results were analysed to compare the subject’s performance on
the novel stimuli to that of the training stimuli used in the transfer trials (training stimuli
= 28/33 correct, novel stimuli = 32/38 correct). A chi-squared test found no significant
difference between performance on the training and the novel stimuli (x2 = 0.01, p =
0.94). The results were then converted into percentages in order to graphically compare
the varying proportions of each stimulus type in each session caused by the
randomisation procedure (see Figure 19).
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Figure 19: Percentage of correct responses to training and novel stimuli during
same/different transfer trials, S+ = same (using 10/x data, x = the number of trials
until 10 correct). ○ = percentage of correct responses to training stimuli,
▲ = percentage of correct responses to novel stimuli

It has been asserted by some authors (e.g. Chausseil 1991; Herman et al. 1994;
Macphail 1982; Thomas 1996; Thomas and Noble 1988) that the demonstration of
‘conceptual’ behaviour must be based on first-trial transfer data otherwise the subject
could be utilising ‘non-conceptual’ mechanisms such as specific stimulus configurations
or a limited sample-specific recognition procedure (also see sections 3.2.4.5, 3.7.3.2 and
6.1.2). Pearce (1997) also requires first-trial, novel stimulus transfer to acknowledge a
performance as relationally based (see section 3.7.6.2.4). However, Wright and Katz
(2006) argue that simply reporting what happened on the first presentation of transfer
stimuli would have “little if any statistical power” (p. 235). While this study takes the
latter view, it is worth noting that on day one of the transfer trials performance on the
novel stimuli was both substantially better than chance and even slightly better than that
for the repeated training stimuli – 83% correct (novel stimuli) versus 71% correct
(training stimuli).

5.4.4 Discussion
This experiment shows that the subject was able to categorise stimuli on the basis of the
same/different concept, the first time this ability (or any form of categorisation) has
been demonstrated in the short-beaked echidna or any monotreme. The fact that the
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results in the transfer trial were not significantly different from those of the second
block of the learning phase and that there was no significant difference in performance
between the training and novel stimuli in the transfer trials indicates she was not merely
memorising the stimuli but had learned to apply a generalised same/different criterion.
The parity of Pitpa’s performance between the training and test stimuli in the transfer
trials is in contrast to that found in a perceptual categorisation task with pigeons using a
similar testing procedure with interspersed novel and repeating stimuli (Bhatt et al.
1988). While the pigeons in that study were able to categorise the novel stimuli at levels
far exceeding chance, they performed better on the repeated stimuli suggesting that,
unlike Pitpa, memorisation may have facilitated their performance to some degree.
This ability to transfer performance to novel stimuli is the generally accepted criterion
for same/different discrimination (Thompson 1995; Wright and Delius 2005; see section
3.7.2.1.1 and 3.8.3.3). As mentioned in section 3.8.3.3, in their well-known study of
same/different learning in pigeons Wasserman et al. (1995) asserted that “accurate
choice responding in the presence of [novel stimuli] constituted the prime evidence of
same-different conceptualisation” (p. 249). However, some authors have created more
rigorous criteria. Wright and Katz (2006) asserted that: “In our opinion, a subject that
has learned an S/D concept ought to be able to perform as accurately with novel stimuli
as with training stimuli (p. 235). According to the authors, if transfer is merely at a level
between chance and the baseline training results, the performance can only be said to be
“partial” concept learning that suggests multiple cues are controlling behaviour. To
claim “full” concept learning Wright and Katz (2006) have the more stringent
requirement that transfer be equivalent to baseline and both performances are above
80% to ensure that the subject is utilising relational information in both the transfer and
training trials (e.g. Katz et al. 2002; Wright 1991; Wright et al. 2003; Wright et al.
1983). Pitpa was also able to satisfy this requirement, with an average of 80% correct in
the final block of the training trials and an average of 87% percent in the transfer block.
While comparing species performance based on different, or even the same,
experimental procedures is problematic (see section 1.3.1), Pitpa appeared to solve the
task relatively quickly compared to some other species (see section 3.7.3). According to
Castro et al.’s (2010, p. 36) analysis of their pigeons’ performance: “… fast learning
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and relearning suggests that pigeons had mastered a same-different concept rather than
having learned specific responses to specific configurations of stimuli.”

Simultaneous presentation of stimuli

Same/different categorisation is considered a ‘higher-level’ task only if it is based on
relational learning, so the testing procedures were chosen to maximise the possibility of
the subject utilising relational rather than more prosaic methods to perform this task.
One decision was how the stimuli would be presented. Same/different categorisation
experiments can be conducted using simultaneous or successive presentation of stimuli;
however it was decided to use simultaneous presentation for a number of reasons.
Successive presentation of stimuli allows for the possibility that same/different
categorisations are performed using factors other than the relationship between stimuli
and there is some debate about whether successive procedures like delayed matching-tosample require particularly sophisticated cognitive abilities. As discussed in section
3.7.6.1, a number of authors contend that the matching/non-matching paradigm can be
solved using less difficult means than identity, such as conditional discrimination (“if
red sample, pick red”). Even if an animal is able to demonstrate a generalised matching
(or non-matching) ability and is not just memorising conditional rules, it can be argued
that they are just responding on the basis of relative familiarity (“what did I just respond
to”) or are subject to other mediating factors (Shettleworth 1998).
On the other hand, a number of authors have concluded that simultaneous procedures
are more likely to provide evidence for relational learning (Castro et al. 2010; Mazur
2002; Premack 1983a; Shettleworth 1998; see section 3.7.2.1.5). Premack (1983a,
1983b) has argued that the procedural differences between successive matching-tosample and simultaneous same/different tasks lead to important conceptual differences
in what is learned and that the only true test of same/different categorisation is when the
stimuli are presented simultaneously. In addition, Premack (1983b, p. 127) claims:
“There is not only a clear procedural difference between the two procedures, but also a
striking difference in difficulty. The successive task is far easier than the simultaneous
task.” (See also Pearce 1997 and Shettleworth 1998 for fuller discussion).
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The fact that Pitpa was able to solve the same/different task using a simultaneous
procedure gives added credence to claims of relational and even conceptual
discrimination (see sections 3.7.2.1.5 and 3.7.6.2.4). According to Castro et al. (2010, p.
36): “… it is likely that simultaneous presentation not only promotes comparison of the
Same and Different arrays, but that it also encourages learning of the relational samedifferent concept.”

Number of stimulus elements

This study utilised a multi-element stimulus array similar to that introduced by
Wasserman et al. (1995) and others (see sections 3.7.3.3 and 4.3.2), albeit containing
fewer elements than most of these studies. One reason for using fewer (and simpler)
shapes per panel than the Wasserman et al. (1995) model was to help compensate for
the echidna’s poorer visual acuity. However, it also served the purpose of reducing the
potential for the subject to use perceptual cues contained in multi-element stimuli that
have cast doubt on the results of these types of studies (see section 3.7.6.2.3).
One of these perceptual cues is uniformity, in which the same arrays appear to have a
greater linear orderliness of rows and columns than the different arrays. As discussed in
section 3.7.6.2.2, Young and Wasserman (1997) pointed out that the pigeons in the
similarly designed Wasserman et al. (1995) experiment may have solved the
discrimination on basis of uniformity instead of using relational information. Young and
Wasserman (1997) argued against this proposition on the basis of the performance
decrement between the training and testing arrays and perhaps more convincingly by
demonstrating that pigeons could perform the discrimination with nonlinear, disorderly
arrays. It is important to note that just because pigeons can perform same/different
categorisation without reference to perceived orderliness does not mean that another
species like the echidna can do likewise. However, this explanation seems much less
likely in this experiment due to differences in the design of the multi-element arrays. As
discussed previously (section 4.3.2), the use of only four items per stimulus panel, as
well as the selection of shapes of different size, regularity and orientation, reduced the
possibility of this effect confounding the results.
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It has also been suggested that entropy (a numerical calculation of variability) may be
behind the success of non-human subjects using multi-element displays in
same/different categorisation experiments. Basically, the higher the number of items in
the multi-element array, the greater the entropy of the different displays and the greater
the difference between them and the (zero entropy) same displays. According to some
authors, non-human subjects might be using this entropy difference, rather than
relational information, to solve same/different discriminations (Young and Wasserman
1997; see section 3.7.6.2.3 for full discussion).
Experiments demonstrating that non-human subjects can perform same/different
discriminations using very low-entropy, two-item stimuli (e.g. Blaisdell and Cook 2005;
Katz and Wright 2006; see section 3.7.3.3) or even language-based procedures where
entropy is not a factor, such as that used with Alex the African Grey parrot (Pepperberg
1987; see section 3.7.3.4) are considered evidence that at least some non-human
subjects under certain conditions are capable of performing same/different
discriminations without relying on entropy (see full discussion in section 3.7.6.2.3).
Some authors have even suggested that the only way to ensure that relational
information is used to solve same/different discriminations is to use two items (e.g.
Blaisdell and Cook 2005; Premack 1983b).
This study used four items – a lower number than that used in most multi-element
displays, but still higher than the two-item ‘gold standard’. However, it could be argued
that the entropy difference between a two- and four-item display is still fairly negligible.
While the 16-item different multi-element array used by Wasserman and colleagues
(e.g. Wasserman et al. 1995; Young and Wasserman 1997) has an entropy value of 4.00,
the entropy value of a four-item different display is 2.00, much closer to that of a twoitem display with an entropy value of 1.00.
In addition, experiments with a number of species have indicated that the point at which
entropy differences become manifest is around eight-items (or a different stimulus
entropy value of 3.00). Rhesus monkeys tested using a similar procedure to that used
here required training with eight-item displays (in addition to conditional cues similar to
those used in Experiments 5 to 7) before being able to perform the task using lower
entropy stimuli (Flemming et al. 2007). When baboons were tested with displays
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containing two to 24 elements, the baboon responded indiscriminately when presented
with displays of either two or four elements, leading the authors to determine the
baboons were utilising entropy differences to solve the discrimination with the higheritem displays (Wasserman, Young and Fagot 2001). Similarly, when Young,
Wasserman and Garner (1997) assessed the performance of pigeons using stimulus
arrays containing a decreasing number of items (16, 14, 12, 8, 4 and 2) they found that
while reducing the number of items to 12 or 14 icons did not affect performance,
reducing the number of items in the displays to 8 icons led to a significant decrease in
choice accuracy. Castro et al. (2010) found a similar effect in a conditional
same/different task (see section 3.7.4 and Experiments 5 and 7 below), with a high
percentage of correct responses using 24-, 20-, 16-, 12- and 8-icon arrays, but much
lower accuracy with 4- and 2-icon arrays.
There is no reason to suppose that echidnas are any more sensitive to detecting lowlevel entropy variations than other animals, so the fact that Pitpa was able to succeed
with comparatively low-entropy, four-item arrays goes some way towards supporting
the possibility that she was responding to the stimuli on the basis of relational
information.

Training set size and stimulus type

Another interesting aspect of this experiment is the fact that Pitpa was able to correctly
transfer to novel stimuli after training with a relatively small training set of just six same
and six different stimulus panels. It has been suggested that training set size may
represent a quantitative difference in performance in same/different categorisation, with
smaller set sizes being associated with more ‘advanced’ species such as humans and
apes (Wright et al. 2003). As discussed earlier (section 3.7.3.1), monkeys and
chimpanzees are able to match novel stimuli in a match-to-sample task using a stimulus
set as small as two items, although the monkeys did not show complete transfer
(D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Oden et al. 1988). On the other hand, pigeons in
previous matching studies using single-element stimuli have required training with a
large number of stimuli (e.g. Wright et al. 1988). A similar trend has been demonstrated
with pigeons in simultaneous same/different studies using single-element stimuli, with
the most convincing demonstrations found using large training sets (e.g. Blaisdell and
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Cook 2005; Wright and Katz 2006) and studies demonstrating gradual improvement in
performance as training set size was increased for pigeons, capuchin monkeys and
rhesus monkeys (Wright 2010) (see section 3.7.3.3).
There is little consensus about the ramifications of training-set size. For example,
Wasserman and Bhatt (1992) suggested repetition of a finite number of training stimuli
can weaken ‘concept’ learning and Wright and Katz (2006) claimed too few training
stimuli led to item-specific rather than relational learning. However, Mackintosh (2000)
has claimed that when a large number of training stimuli are used then “… it becomes
difficult to rule out the possibility that transfer will be based on the physical similarity
between supposedly novel test stimuli and some of the stimuli used in training” (p.
132).
It is possible that the small learning set required to achieve criterion performance in this
study may be a reflection of the nature of multi-element stimuli. The pigeon
same/different study of Wasserman et al. (1995) also utilised multi-element stimulus
arrays and, unlike previous pigeon relationally based studies, required only a small
learning set (8 same arrays and 8 different arrays in Part 1) for the subjects to learn the
task. It is possible that multi-element stimulus arrays may prove easier to learn than the
more commonly used single-element stimuli. It is worth noting that performance in the
Wasserman et al. (1995) study improved in Part 2 when 16 same arrays and 16 different
arrays were used. As discussed in section 4.4.4, it is possible that that result was
confounded by the prior learning in Part 1 and the use of both previously trained (Part
1) and previously seen (Part 2) icons in the testing stimuli. However, other research on
perceptual and abstract categorisation has also shown that larger training sets lead to
stronger generalisation performance in testing (see Wasserman 1993b for a review).
It is also possible that another factor in reducing learning set size may be the use of
stimuli of a relatively basic perceptual nature. Both this experiment and that of Blaisdell
and Cook (2005) used relatively simple geometric shapes as stimulus elements, in
contrast to more intricate clipart images and photographs used in other studies (see
section 3.7). Flemming (2011) suggested that the success of Blaisdell and Cook’s
(2005) experiment might be attributed to the simple stimuli encouraging a focus on the
relational information present, rather than a focus on specific stimulus features (see
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section 3.7.6.2.3). Other experiments that have demonstrated that pigeons and monkeys
require much larger learning sets (e.g. Katz et al. 2002; Wright and Katz 2006; Wright
et al. 2003) have used the more complex types of stimuli. Lombardi et al. (1984) point
out that colour photographs, for example, are exceptionally salient and memorable for
pigeons (Nelson and Wasserman 1981) and they can generalise extensively between
them (Wright and Cumming 1971). If, as some believe, large learning sets discourage
the use of simple solutions such as item-specific learning and encourage the use of a
more economical generalised principle (Lombardi et al. 1984; Wasserman and Bhatt
1992; Wright and Katz 2006), it follows that pigeons, with their prodigious memory for
pictorial stimuli (see section 3.4.4.2.1), would require extremely large learning sets to
acquire a generalised same/different ability when these types of stimuli are used.

Number of training trials

In addition to a small learning set, Pitpa was able to successfully transfer performance
to novel stimuli after just 153 training trials (including both correct and incorrect
responses). While this is relatively high compared to some primate studies (for example,
those showing primates can match novel stimuli after learning just one matching
problem – D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Oden et al. 1988; see section 3.7.3.1),
it is impressive compared to pigeons. Wasserman et al. (1995), for example, trained
pigeons in their multi-element same/different task for 8000 trials in Part 1 and 4480
trials in Part 2 of their experiment before moving to the testing phases (see section
3.7.3.3). As discussed above, multi-element stimuli similar to that used in this
experiment appears to enable pigeons to successfully learn same/different
categorisations using a much smaller learning set than that required for other
experimental procedures. However, they still seem to require a relatively large number
of training trials to achieve criterion. The fact that Pitpa was able to transfer the
performance to novel stimuli using a relatively small number of training trials makes it
less likely that she made use of stimulus generalisation (see section 3.1.4.1.1) as the
basis of transfer, which is a danger with using large numbers of training stimuli (Wright
and Katz 2007).
This disparity between the number of training trials required for this study compared to
that of Wasserman et al. (1995) may be a reflection of species differences. Pigeons are
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notorious for requiring a very large number of trials to perform match-to-sample tasks
compared to many other species that have been studied, requiring training for thousands
of trials before they are able to acquire a generalised matching ability (e.g. Wright et al.
1988; see section 3.7.3.1). It has been suggested that this is due to the pigeon’s large
capacity and propensity for rote learning, which would inhibit the use of a generalised
identity rule (Delius 1994; see section 3.7.3.1). In addition, pigeons have displayed a
propensity for attempting to perform perceptual categorisations using small, fine details
(as illustrated by Cerella’s 1980, 1982, 1986 cartoon experiments discussed in section
3.4.4.4.1). It is possible this tendency is also operating in same/different experiments.
This may lead them to attempt multiple rules to solve the task that work some of the
time, thus requiring many trials to learn a generalised rule.

Stimulus contact

One aspect of this experiment that may have assisted Pitpa’s performance is the use of a
viewing period and direct stimulus contact. A number of studies have found the
introduction of stimulus contact (and the accompanying improvement in attentiveness)
has facilitated various types of cognitive studies, including same/different
discrimination (e.g. Cook et al. 1995; Gibson et al. 2006; Wright et al. 2003; see section
3.7.3.3).

5.5 Experiment 5: Same/different conditional
categorisation (1)
5.5.1 Introduction
In Experiment 4 the subject successfully learned to discriminate on the basis of the
same/different concept and in Experiment 3 was able to perform a conditional
discrimination based on shape. This experiment attempted to combine these two
abilities and determine if the subject could perform a conditional discrimination based
on the same/different concept.
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5.5.2 Method
5.5.2.1 Stimuli
For this experiment there were two sets of stimuli. The first set was the transfer stimulus
panels used in Experiment 4 (Figure 17) in which each panel contained four white
shapes on a black background. There were six different same panels containing four of
the same shapes and six different different panels containing four different shapes made
up of combinations of the shapes used for the same panels. The six shapes were each
used the same number of times in the six different panels and, as far as possible, in
different positions. The other set of stimuli were identical to the first, except they
contained black shapes on a white background (see Figure 20, see also Figure 5).

Figure 20: Stimulus panels for Experiment 5 – conditional
discrimination, S+ = same (white-on-black panels), different
(black-on-white panels). The same panels are the transfer
panels used in Experiment 4 (Figure 17)

5.5.2.2 Procedure
The subject was shown a pair of stimuli from either the white-on-black or the black-onwhite set which contained a same and a different panel. She had previously been
rewarded for choosing same when using the white-on-black panels in Experiment 4 and
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that condition was also reinforced here. However, in this experiment, when the subject
was presented with a pair of black-on-white panels she was reinforced for selecting
different. A similar procedure using a pair of multi-element stimuli, one containing all
identical stimuli, the other containing all non-identical stimuli, with background colour
indicating S+ for each trial was also used by Flemming et al. (2007) with rhesus
monkeys.
As with previous experiments, the randomisation schedule was used to determine
whether the correct stimulus was placed on the left or the right door. The schedule was
also used to determine whether a stimulus pair from the white-on-black or the black-onwhite set was used in each trial. The stimulus panels were shuffled between each trial to
randomise the selection of individual panels.

5.5.3 Results
The trials were grouped into in four blocks of five sessions. The results were then
graphed (see Figure 21) and analysed with a two-tailed binomial test using two
measures of performance – y/10 (y = the number of correct responses in the first 10
trials) and 10/x (x = the number of trials until 10 correct).
Performance in block 1 was significantly different from chance (y/10: correct responses
= 33/50, z = 2.26, p < .05; 10/x: correct responses = 50/73, z = 3.16, p < .01), block two
was not significant (y/10: correct responses = 31/50, z = 1.70. p > .05; 10/x: correct
responses = 50/84, z = 1.75, p > .05). In block three the results were significant (y/10:
correct responses = 33/50, z = 2.26, p < .05; 10/x: correct responses = 50/79, z = 2.36, p
< .05). However, in block four the results were mixed. In the y/10 format the results
were just barely significant (correct responses = 32/50, z = 1.98, p < .05), while in the
10/x format the results were significant (correct responses = 50/76, z = 2.75, p < .01).
Visual examination of Figure 21 suggests more consistent performance in the last two
blocks.
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Figure 21: Number of correct responses to same/different conditional
discrimination task, S+ = same (white-on-black panels), different
(black-on-white panels). ◊ = the number of trials until 10 correct responses
were made, ■ = the number of correct responses in the first 10 trials

A further analysis was conducted to examine whether the comparatively poor results in
this experiment were due to the subject selecting same, the correct response in the
previous experiment, regardless of the colour condition.
The results for each condition (white-on-black and black-on-white) were calculated
separately (using the 10/x data) (white-on-black = 95/152, black-on-white = 105/160).
A chi-squared test found no significant difference between performance on the same
versus the different trials (x2 = 0.33, p = 0.57). The results were then converted into
percentages in order to graphically compare the varying proportions of each stimulus
type in each session caused by the randomisation procedure (see Figure 22).
The graph indicates some improvement in different results and deterioration of same
results towards the end of the experiment.
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Figure 22: Percentage of correct responses to the same/different conditional
discrimination task for each colour condition (using 10/x data, x = the number
of trials until 10 correct). ■ = white-on-black panels (S+ = same) (previously trained),
◊ = black-on-white panels (S+ = different) (novel stimuli)

5.5.4 Discussion
Despite the fact that the subject seemed to be showing some improvement in the final
block of sessions, she seemed to find this task much more difficult than the previous
experiments. While she technically reached the training criterion (two consecutive
blocks significantly above chance), it was by such a small margin, particularly the y/10
figure for Block 4, that it was decided the result was insufficiently robust to claim she
had mastered this task.
A chi-squared test and visual examination of the graph (Figure 22) comparing the
number of correct responses to the same stimuli, on which she was trained to a high
standard in Experiment 4, to correct responses to the different stimuli, which she had
not previously encountered, revealed no evidence the poor results were due to the
subject favouring same. Indeed there is some indication the subject started to perform
better on the different panels at the expense of the same panels towards the end of the
experiment, perhaps indicating she was learning the different condition. However, in
general the results suggest the introduction of the conditional discrimination led to
confusion and an overall deterioration in performance.
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While the test situation appeared adequate for the echidna to successfully learn the
previous tasks, this ‘combination’ discrimination is considered more difficult than more
basic ‘either/or’ discriminations. According to Gates (1973), difficult discriminations
are more liable to break down when the behavioural paradigm and test situation are
unsuitable. Given the echidna’s success on the previous discrimination experiments in
this study, it seems unlikely that factors such as modality, apparatus, motor issues or
motivation were the cause of the echidna’s seeming inability to master this problem.
However, due to the increased difficulty of this task, it was possible that the subject
required more training to learn the task. As has been discussed a number of times in this
study, the fact that an animal cannot learn a task under one set of circumstances does
not necessarily mean that they are incapable of learning the task (see sections 1.3.1 and
3.7.3). Considering the subject did show some signs of learning and to ensure the
subject had every chance to perform successfully in this experiment, it was decided to
train the different condition separately, then retest the conditional same/different
experiment and see if previous training in both conditions would facilitate learning.

5.6 Experiment 6: Same/different categorisation,
S+ = different
5.6.1 Introduction
Following the lack of success with the same/different conditional discrimination tests
conducted in Experiment 5, this experiment aimed to enable the subject to learn the
different condition separately in the same manner as the same condition was learned in
Experiment 4.
In addition, blind trials were also conducted at the end of the experiment to demonstrate
there was no unintentional cueing from the handler during these experiments.
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5.6.2 Method
5.6.2.1 Stimuli
The stimuli used for this experiment (see Figure 23) were the black-on-white different
panels used in Experiment 5 (see Figure 20), with the same stimuli being used for the
blind trials.

Figure 23: Stimulus panels for Experiment 6 – same/different
discrimination, S+ = different. The panels are the different
panels used in Experiment 5 (Figure 20)

5.6.2.2 Procedure
Training trials

One pair of stimuli was presented per trial with each pair consisting of one same and
one different panel. For this experiment, the different panel was reinforced. A
randomisation schedule was used to determine whether the correct response was located
on the left or right door and the same and different panels were shuffled between each
trial to randomise the stimuli. Due to the fact that the same/different discrimination had
been successfully tested in Experiment 4, and that this experiment was designed
primarily to train the different condition before repeating the conditional same/different
experiment, it was not considered necessary to perform transfer trials.

Blind trials

The blind trials were conducted in the same manner, however a 42cm x 103cm plywood
board was placed on top of the start box directly above the swing doors (see Figures 24
and 25).
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Figure 24: Three-dimensional diagram of the apparatus with the blind board

Figure 25: Photo of the apparatus with the blind board

The board blocked the view of the stimulus panels on the doors, preventing the handler
from knowing on which side the correct stimulus was located. Another person was
enlisted to change the stimulus panels and the food dishes between trials while the
handler stood at a distance and facing away from the apparatus.
At the beginning of each trial the handler lowered the subject underneath the blind
board to view the stimuli and make her selection.
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5.6.3 Results
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Figure 26: Number of correct responses to same/different task,
S+ = different. The final five sessions show the blind trials.
◊ = the number of trials until 10 correct responses were
made, ■ = the number of correct responses in the first 10 trials

The results were analysed using a two-tailed binomial test in two blocks – the seven
initial training sessions and the five blind trial sessions. The results were graphed (see
Figure 26) and analysed using two measures of performance – y/10 (y = the number of
correct responses in the first 10 trials) and 10/x (x = the number of trials until 10
correct).

Training trials

Performance in the block of training sessions was highly significantly different from
chance (y/10: correct responses = 50/70, z = 3.59, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses =
70/94, z = 4.74, p < .001).

Blind trials

Performance in the block of blind sessions was also highly significantly different from
chance (y/10: correct responses: 38/50, z = 3.68, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses =
50/70, z = 3.59, p < .001).
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A chi-squared test using the 10/x data showed there was no significant difference
between the training and blind trial results (x2 = 0.19, p = 0.66).

5.6.4 Discussion
Despite the lack of transfer trials, the results of this experiment training the different
condition provide some confirmation of the Experiment 4 results showing the subject is
able to learn an abstract discrimination on the basis of the same/different concept. The
results of this experiment are comparable to those of the same discrimination in
Experiment 4, with both showing results significantly different from chance. The results
are also much improved on those in Experiment 5, indicating the subject’s poor
performance in that experiment was most likely due to the test itself and not some other
factor.

Blind trials

The results for the training trials and the blind trials were both highly significantly
different from chance, and a chi-squared test confirmed that there was no significant
difference between them, indicating the introduction of the blind board did not lead to
deterioration in performance. This suggests that inadvertent handler cueing did not
contribute to the subject’s performance in these experiments.
Support for this view can also be found in the fact that Pitpa performed poorly in the
previous experiment. As discussed in section 5.5.4, the inability of a subject to perform
a particular task while succeeding on others trained in the same manner suggests that the
subject is unlikely to be making use of inadvertent experimental cues or more basic
associative processes relating to stimulus reinforcement (see Huber 2001).
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5.7 Experiment 7: Same/different conditional
categorisation (2)
5.7.1 Introduction
In previous experiments, the subject was successfully trained on both the same and the
different discrimination concepts. Having been trained in both concepts, this experiment
repeats the conditional concept discrimination tested in Experiment 5 to determine
whether the additional training on the different concept would improve her performance
on this task.
One possible reason for an improved performance could be that the subject had merely
now memorised all the stimuli. To determine this, transfer trials with new stimuli were
conducted at the end of the experiment.

5.7.2 Method
5.7.2.1 Stimuli
Training trials

The stimuli for the first part of the experiment (see Figure 27) were the same as those
used in Experiment 5 (see Figure 20).

Transfer trials

The stimuli for the transfer trials were created using six novel shapes arranged in the
same fashion into six same and six different black-on-white panels and six same and six
different white-on-black panels (see Figure 28).
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Figure 27: Stimulus panels for Experiment 7 – conditional discrimination,
S+ = same (white-on-black panels), different (black-on-white panels).
These panels are the same as those used in Experiment 5 (Figure 20)

Figure 28: Novel stimulus panels for Experiment 7 – transfer of
same/different conditional discrimination, S+ = same
(white-on-black panels), different (black-on-white panels)
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5.7.2.2 Procedure
Training trials

The sessions were conducted in the same manner as Experiment 5.

Transfer trials

During the transfer trials both novel and existing pairs of stimuli were randomly
presented using the randomisation schedule. To ensure that transfer in this experiment
was truly above chance, it was decided to conduct an additional block of five sessions
after transfer criterion had been reached.

5.7.3 Results
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Figure 29: Number of correct responses to same/different
conditional discrimination task, S+ = same (white-on-black panels),
different (black-on-white panels). The first 10 sessions show the learning
phase, the second 10 sessions show the transfer trials. ◊ = the
number of trials until 10 correct responses were made, ■ = the number
of correct responses in the first 10 trials

The learning phase trials were grouped into two blocks of five sessions and the transfer
trials were grouped into two blocks of five sessions and the results analysed using a
two-tailed binomial test. The results were graphed (see Figure 29) and analysed using
two measures of performance – y/10 (y = the number of correct responses in the first 10
trials) and 10/x (x = the number of trials until 10 correct).
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Training trials

Performance in block one of the training phase was highly significantly different from
chance (y/10: correct responses = 40/50, z = 4.24, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses =
50/62, z = 4.83, p < .001) as was performance in block two (y/10: correct responses =
40/50, z = 4.24, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses = 50/61, z = 4.99, p < .001), meeting
the training criterion.

Transfer trials

Performance in block one of the transfer phase was also highly significantly different
from chance (y/10: correct responses = 41/50, z = 4.53, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses
= 50/62, z = 4.83, p < .001) as was performance in block two (y/10: correct responses =
39/50, z = 3.96, p < .001; 10/x: correct responses = 50/65, z = 4.34, p < .001). The
subject met the transfer criterion as performance in the first block of the transfer trials
was not significantly different from performance in the second block of the learning
phase using a chi-squared test (x2 = 0.04, p = 0.85).
Using the 10/x data, the results were then analysed to compare the subject’s
performance on the novel stimuli to that of the training stimuli (block one: novel stimuli
= 31/40 correct, training stimuli = 19/22 correct; block two: novel stimuli = 33/41
correct, training stimuli = 17/24 correct). A chi-squared test found no significant
difference between performance on the training and the novel stimuli in either block one
(x2 = 0.71, p = 0.40) or block two (x2 = 0.79, p = 0.37) of the transfer trials. The results
were then converted into percentages in order to graphically compare the varying
proportions of each stimulus type in each session caused by the randomisation
procedure (see Figure 30).
The results also show that Pitpa’s performance on the novel stimuli on day one of the
transfer trials was 100% correct and even better than that for the repeated training
stimuli presented during the same session (75% correct).
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Figure 30: Percentage of correct responses to training and novel stimuli during
same/different conditional discrimination transfer trials, S+ = same (white-on-black
panels), different (black-on-white panels) (using 10/x data, x = the number of
trials until 10 correct). ○ = percentage of correct responses to training
stimuli, ▲ = percentage of correct responses to novel stimuli

5.7.4 Discussion
The fact that the results in the first block of the transfer trials were not significantly
different from those of the second block of the learning phase and that there was no
significant difference in performance between the training and novel stimuli in the
transfer trials indicates that transfer did take place. This result is further strengthened
by the fact that the highly significant transfer performance was repeated in a second
block of transfer trials. The transfer results suggest the subject was not merely
memorising the stimulus combination in each condition as suggested by the
configuration model (see section 3.2.4.1) or learning stimulus specific relations using
the multiple-rule model (see section 3.2.4.4). Rather, that the subject was able to use a
single generalised rule (see section 3.2.4.5) to perform a conditional discrimination
based on simultaneously presented same/different relations – a rarely tested task that has
been previously demonstrated in monkeys (Burdyn and Thomas 1984; Flemming 2011;
Flemming et al. 2007) and pigeons (Castro et al. 2010) (see section 3.7.4).
To ensure that the monkeys in their experiment had not learned equivalence classes
based on the identity of the stimuli rather than relying on the ‘concepts’ of same and
different, Flemming et al. (2007) conducted transfer tests with novel stimuli almost a
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year after the original study. The success of those tests led the authors to conclude that
item-specific learning was not responsible for the monkeys’ behaviour and was seen as
“evidence that the concepts of same and different were learned” (p. 58). This argument
also holds true for Pitpa’s transfer performance. Flemming et al. (2007) did utilise trialunique novel stimuli in their transfer tests while the transfer stimuli in this experiment
were randomly repeated, however the fact that Pitpa’s performance showed no
significant deterioration when the novel stimuli were introduced suggests there was no
equivalence class-based learning phase with the new stimuli and that she continued to
respond on the basis of conditional cues and relational information.
Furthermore, as with Experiment 4 (see section 5.4.3), the condition required by some
authors of successful performance on the first appearance of novel stimuli was fulfilled
as Pitpa scored 100% on the first presentation of the novel stimuli on day 1 of the
transfer trials. Indeed, Thomas and Kerr (1976) claim successful performance on firsttrial transfer tests “precludes the possibility that specific stimulus patterns had been
learned and thus permits the conceptual interpretation” (p. 336).
One issue that must be addressed is the differing results of Experiments 5 and 7. The
fact that the subject was now able to succeed in the same task that she had struggled
with in Experiment 5 may be the result of the subject receiving training in both sets of
conditions (same and different) before this experiment instead of just same. In their
experiment combining conditional discrimination and oddity problems, Thomas and
Kerr (1976) claimed that “prior mastery of the oddity concept was essential to the
conditional discrimination task” (p. 336).
This theory gains some support from the fact that the study demonstrating conditional
same/different discrimination in rhesus monkeys utilising a similar paired
discrimination procedure to that employed here (Flemming et al. 2007) also separately
trained its subjects to criterion in each conditional rewarded relation (same and
different) before changing to randomly alternating the conditional rewarded relation on
a trial by trial basis. Following separate training in each conditional relation, the rhesus
monkeys in Flemming et al.’s (2007) experiment “rapidly learned to select the correct
relation” (p. 58) in randomly alternating trials just as Pitpa did. Similarly, Burdyn and
Thomas (1984) pre-trained their squirrel monkeys in a regular same/different task (as
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was done here) and separate same and different conditional tasks before testing with the
alternating conditional procedure.
While not dealing with the addition of a conditional component, Edwards et al. (1983)
point out that in the successful simultaneous same/different procedure used by Premack
(1976), the chimpanzee was given explicit training in both the same and different
categorisations. However in matching-to-sample and oddity-from-sample experiments,
in which pigeons appear to learn very little about the alternative to which they have
been trained (see Carter and Eckerman 1975; Cumming and Berryman 1965; Zentall et
al. 1981), their ability to utilise a generalised rule when novel stimuli are presented is
reduced (Zentall and Hogan 1978). Although the additional pre-training provides a
plausible explanation for Pitpa’s eventual success, another possibility is that
performance was facilitated merely by the subject having had more training with the
testing paradigm.
The fact that the subject took much longer and required more training to learn this task
compared to the standard same/different categorisations in Experiments 4 and 6
suggests that she found the conditional task more difficult. This finding supports
Thomas’ (1980, 1986, 1996) hierarchical model that places same/different conditional
categorisation (“relational concepts I”) as a “level 7” task above the standard
same/different categorisation (relative class concept) on “level 6”.
It seems logical that a task that requires the subject to make a selection based on two
separate discriminations, in this case both ‘black or white’ and ‘same or different’,
would prove more difficult than tasks in which they only have to decide on the basis of
one discriminative rule. In fact, as discussed in section 3.2.1, numerous studies have
indicated that a single discrimination is learned more quickly than a conditional
discrimination using the same stimuli (Mackintosh 1974). Indeed, Pitpa learned each of
those single discrimination tasks relatively quickly in Experiments 1 and 4. A similar
phenomenon has also been found in pigeons. Matching-to-sample studies have shown
that pigeons have greater difficulty matching accurately using compound samples in
which they have to attend to more than one rule compared to single-rule samples (Carter
and Werner 1978).
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However, in Flemming et al.’s (2007) study with rhesus monkeys, the addition of
discriminative cues actually seemed to facilitate learning of same/different
discrimination reversals in which the monkeys had previously shown perseverative
errors. Similarly, Castro et al. (2010) found pigeons learned the conditional
same/different task (both the training and transfer sections) faster than the
same/different task in other experiments (e.g. Young and Wasserman 1997). However,
there were a number of experimental differences other than the conditional rule between
the two experiments that may have accounted for the improved performance, including
type of icons, observing response requirement, the size of the icon pool, simultaneous
presentation of stimuli and direct responding to the stimuli (see section 3.7.3.3). It is
also worth noting that the performance of Castro et al.’s (2010) pigeons dropped when
the multi-element stimuli were reduced to 4 and 2 items, suggesting entropy played a
role in their performance (see section 3.7.3.3).
Further experiments would be needed to determine exactly how Pitpa solved this task.
For example, as Thomas et al. (1990) have pointed out (see section 3.2.1 and 3.2.3),
there is no way of knowing whether the putative hierarchical design of this type of
experiment – in this case background colour as the superordinate (conditional) cue
modulating the selection of the subordinate (discriminative) cue of same/different
shapes – was the way in which Pitpa actually solved the discrimination. In fact, some
experiments have suggested that rather than an “if-then” hierarchical strategy,
simultaneous presentation of stimuli leads animals to learn “what goes with what” (e.g.
Thomas and Schmidt 1989). In the case of this experiment, it can only be said with any
certainty that one cue modulated responding to the cue with which it was paired.
Thompson and Oden (2000) have suggested a non-relational method of solving the
conditional same/different task in which the subject only has to perform a single
physical matching operation. In this scenario, in the presence of the same cue the
subject should choose the set in which one item matches the other (A is A). In the
presence of the different cue, the subject merely has to choose the other set without any
reference to relationship between the different items. Flemming et al. (2007, p. 59)
endorsed Thompson and Oden’s (2000) belief that, “an organism that understands
conceptual relations must also be able to abstractly recode those relations so that they
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can be applied in different experimental paradigms.” That is, that the subjects should be
able to label relations in some way.
Flemming et al. (2007) tested whether the rhesus monkeys in their conditional
same/different experiment were using the conditional cues in the manner suggested by
Thompson and Oden (2000) by applying Thompson and Oden’s (2000) criteria and
seeing whether the colour cues could operate in a bi-directional manner as labels for the
relations of same and different. They found two of the five monkeys were able to
choose the correct colour in the presence of the S+ relation (same or different) –
essentially labelling those relations, according to the authors, and suggesting the
monkeys were using relational information to solve the task. This test was not
conducted in this study. However, unlike Flemming et al.’s (2007) monkeys, Pitpa had
already demonstrated the ability to solve the same/different task without the use of
conditional cues in previous experiments (see Experiments 4 and 6), suggesting she was
both capable of and practised at performing discriminations using relational information
without needing to resort to Thompson and Oden’s (2000) single-matching procedure.
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CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
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6.1 Cognitive abilities of echidnas
This study set out to determine whether an evolutionarily ‘primitive’ animal could
perform a ‘high-level’ cognitive task. As discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, this study
firstly confirmed the results of two echidna studies demonstrating black/white
discrimination (Gates 1973; Buchmann and Rhodes 1978) and one study showing
circle/triangle shape discrimination (Gates 1973). It also demonstrated an echidna is
able to perform what are considered to be relatively difficult and rarely demonstrated
tasks in non-humans – same/different categorisation and conditional same/different
categorisation (see sections 5.4 and 5.7). However, what is less certain is what mental
abilities were being utilised by the subject to master the more complex tasks – whether
she used relatively prosaic perceptual mechanisms or relied on the relationship between
the stimuli or even an identity ‘concept’ to solve the discrimination.

6.1.1 Relational categorisation
As discussed in section 3.7.6, there are a number of theories about how animals are able
to successfully perform same/different categorisations. One of the first considerations in
any type of categorisation experiment is to ensure that the subject did not use basic
perceptual mechanisms rather than relational cues to master the task. In this case, the
fact that the subject was able to transfer the same/different discrimination to novel
stimuli in Experiment 4 (S+ = ‘same’) and Experiment 7 (conditional same/different)
suggests she was doing more than merely memorising stimuli. Katz and Wright (2006),
for example, claimed the impressive transfer performance of their pigeons in a
same/different experiment indicated the birds were basing their judgments on the
“relationship between the items … and not some other cue” (p. 84).
The transfer results also met the more stringent requirements of some authors of transfer
performance equivalent to baseline and above 80% and the utilisation of only first-trial
transfer data (see sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4). Even an elemental theorist like Pearce
(1997) allowed that correct selection on the first trial of transfer tests in matching
experiments indicated that at least some species could solve discriminations using
“relational information” (p. 125-126). (See also section 3.7.6.2.4).
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For many authors, successful transfer performance is considered sufficient evidence of
relational categorisation (see section 3.7.2.1.1 and 3.8.3.3). However, others have
suggested that some or all animals may utilise more prosaic associative mechanisms to
solve same/different tasks (see section 3.7.6). According to Jerison (1985, p. 30):
“Operant conditioning procedures have been remarkably successful in training animals
to act as if their performance was based on ‘higher mental processes’, even when it was
demonstrably based on associative learning.”
It is important to remain open to more prosaic explanations for Pitpa’s success in this
experiment. It has been shown in a number of studies that animals can respond to
stimulus features other than those intended by the experimenters (Lashley 1938a;
Thomas 1994; see also section 3.4.4.4.1). According to Hanggi (1999): “At best,
researchers can attempt to control for such cues by designing stimuli that are equal in
brightness and lacking other cues to which an animal may respond” (p. 251). In this
experiment, the stimuli were designed to prevent inadvertent cueing from factors such
as brightness, perceptual grouping, entropy, uniformity, colour and individual shapes
(see section 4.3). In addition, a number of other methodological decisions were made to
help ensure Pitpa used relational information rather than some other means to perform
this experiment. These included apparatus design and operation to prevent inadvertent
cueing from extraneous visual, olfactory and auditory cues (see sections 4.2 and 4.4.3)
and the introduction of blind trials to rule out experimenter cueing (see section 5.6).
(Some of these are also discussed in Thomas’ (1996) list of requirements for conceptual
learning in section 6.1.2).
In terms of the experimental procedure, a simultaneous same/different method was used
instead of the delayed matching/non-matching to sample procedure because matching
tasks can potentially be solved using non-relational means such as conditional
discrimination and relative novelty (see section 3.7.6.1), whereas simultaneous
procedures are more like to be solved using relational means (see sections 3.7.2.1.5,
3.7.6.2.4 and 5.4.4).
While it is not possible to categorically state that Pitpa did not make use of some
undetermined mechanism or cue, the measures taken in the design of this experiment to
prevent inadvertent cueing, and the fact that performance was not uniform, dropping
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with the introduction of a more complex ‘conditional’ experimental paradigm (see
sections 5.5 and 5.6.4), provide a reasonable degree of confidence that the results were
relationally based.

6.1.2 Concept learning
While it seems likely that Pitpa used some form of relational information to solve the
same/different discrimination in this experiment, did she in fact demonstrate concept
learning? While there has lately been more circumspection around claiming
conceptualisation for non-human categorisation performance, there are still many
authors willing to label the type of performance demonstrated in this study as
“conceptualisation” (e.g. Wasserman et al. 1995), “concept learning” (e.g. Blaisdell and
Cook 2005; Flemming et al. 2007; Wright and Katz 2006; Wright et al. 1984) and
“abstract-concept learning” (e.g. Wright et al. 2003) (see section 3.8.3.3).
However, as discussed in section 3.8.1, there is no general consensus on a definition of
concept learning. Lea (1984b) has argued that the term can be interpreted on two levels
– what was being categorised and how the subject achieved the categorisation.
According to the first, most parsimonious definition – categorisation of stimuli grouped
according to human-defined concepts, in this case sameness and difference – Pitpa was
capable of conceptualisation. However, most recent studies that claim conceptual
performance tend to require evidence that the subject demonstrated the ability to make
the discrimination based on something other than low-level perceptual cues (e.g. Young
and Wasserman 1997). In fact, there are cautionary tales about scientists overestimating
an animal’s discriminative abilities.
As noted in section 3.4.4, a number of perceptual categorisation studies that set out to
train animals to discriminate on the basis of a perceptual ‘concept’ have found the
subjects actually mastered the task using less complex means (e.g. Greene 1983; Honig
and Stewart 1988; Huber et al. 1999). D’Amato and Salmon (1984) point out that there
is a “natural, and quite understandable, tendency of investigators to stress the cognitive
accomplishments of the animal subjects with which they are most intimately connected”
and warn that care must be taken that reported complex cognitive processes are not “in
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the eye of the beholder” (p. 164). With this warning in mind, Pitpa’s performance has
been examined using a number of widely accepted criteria for concept learning.
The most commonly cited criterion for conceptualisation is that a categorisation
performance can be generalised to novel stimuli. Wasserman et al. (1995, p. 249)
described successful transfer of performance to novel stimuli as “the critical test for
conceptualisation” (see also sections 3.8.3.1.1 and 3.8.3.3 for discussions of transfer
tests as evidence of concept learning). As discussed in relational categorisation above
(section 6.1.1), Pitpa was able to transfer the task to novel stimuli, including the more
stringent requirements for overall and first-trial performance levels.
While transfer of a categorisation performance to novel stimuli has traditionally been
considered sufficient evidence of concept learning by many authors, a number of other
criteria have been proposed. Firstly, there are arguments that only some types of
experiments can be considered as tests for conceptualisation. While some authors claim
that conceptualisation can be applied to perceptually based tasks (see section 3.8.3.1),
others argue that concept learning can be more definitively demonstrated when it is
based on abstract thinking (Vonk 2003, see section 3.8.3.3) – that is, rather than relying
directly on perceptual cues (so-called perceptual concepts such as ‘tree’ and ‘human’,
see section 3.4) they are solved by judging the relationship between stimuli. Wright et
al. (2003), for example, state that: “Abstract concepts are rules about relationships (e.g.
identity) among stimuli” (p. 184). The fact that the successful performance of the
same/different task by Pitpa appears to be based on the utilisation of relational rather
than perceptual information gives some weight to conceptual claims.
It has been further argued that ‘true’ same/different concept learning requires not only
transfer to novel stimuli, but also the use of simultaneous (rather than successive)
presentation of stimuli. Premack (1983a), for example, claimed that the successive
matching-to-sample (or oddity-from-sample) task can be solved using more prosaic
methods such as familiarity, while simultaneous presentation is more likely to involve
conceptual learning (see section 3.7.2.1.5). This experiment fulfilled the simultaneous
procedure criterion.
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In addition to simultaneous procedures, some authors have suggested that subjects
should utilise only two items to demonstrate same or different (Blaisdell and Cook
2005; Premack 1983b). After the two-item same/different task is learned, “the degree to
which this behaviour transfers to novel situations having same and different relations is
taken as evidence of concept formation” (Blaisdell and Cook 2005, p. 67). The main
objection to multi-element stimuli being used to represent same or different in these
types of experiments is that they have sometimes been found to be controlled by
perceptual mechanisms such as symmetry or entropy rather than the relationship
between elements (e.g. Young and Wasserman 1997; Young, Wasserman and Garner
1997; see sections 3.7.6.2.2 and 3.7.6.2.3).
This experiment uses four rather than two items to indicate same or different, however
the stimuli were designed to reduce the potential for low-level perceptual mechanisms
such as symmetry or brightness (see section 4.3.2) and there is experimental evidence to
suggest that entropy only starts to influence performance in displays containing eight
items or higher (see section 5.4.4), making it unlikely that these cues would have
supplanted relational or conceptual behaviour in this case.
In addition to the more general criteria discussed above, Allen (1999), Thomas (1996)
and Katz et al. (2007) have created more formal sets of criteria for concept learning
against which Pitpa’s performance can be judged. Allen (1999) proposes a three-clause
schema by which an organism might “reasonably be attributed a concept” (p. 37).
i)

The subject systematically discriminates some Xs from some non-Xs.
Allen (1999) specifically states that same/different categorisation and transfer
to novel stimuli fulfil the requirements of condition (i).

ii)

The subject is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors
between Xs and non-Xs. Allen (1999) cites as an example of the fulfilment of
this requirement the behaviour of pigs in a study conducted by himself and
others (Keddy-Hector et al. unpubl.). After the pigs were performing at an
overall rate of about 90%, they would still occasionally make wrong choices.
Before any feedback was provided, some pigs would attempt to back away
from their incorrect choice. As mentioned in section 4.4.3, Pitpa also
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occasionally headed towards an incorrect choice, then changed direction and
selected the correct one.
iii)

The subject is capable of learning to better discriminate Xs from non-Xs
as a consequence of its capacity (ii). According to Allen (1999), this clause is
harder to articulate and defend, however he believes evidence of this type of
integrated processing mechanism linking perceptual categorisation and
recognition of perceptual error suggests the operation of an independent
representation of what the perception is supposed to represent, i.e. a concept,
and provides a stronger case for the attribution of a concept. Allen (1999)
offers no examples of this clause being statistically proven and it cannot be
demonstrated here, however Pitpa’s demonstration of endogenous error
detection (clause ii) suggests that fulfilment of clause (iii) might be possible.

Thomas (1996) has created an even more elaborate set of rules that the author argues
must be met in order to show that an animal has responded conceptually.
i)

The subject must be able to respond correctly to new exemplars. Pitpa’s
performance did not deteriorate with the introduction of novel stimuli so she
fulfilled this requirement. However, Thomas also required transfer tests to
conform to optimal criteria, which were either the use of trial-unique stimuli
(i.e. using each stimulus only once) or using only the results of the first trial
with new exemplars as evidence of ‘concept’ use. There is some support for
requiring trial-unique stimuli for transfer trials to eliminate the possibility that
learning could contaminate transfer performance (e.g. Katz and Wright 2006;
Katz et al. 2002; Wright 1997; Wright et al. 1988; Wright et al. 2003). While
this experiment did not use trial-unique stimuli, the issue of transfer
performance contamination was addressed using Thomas’ other optimal
criterion – using only the results of the first trial with new exemplars. In both
the

same/different

experiment

(Experiment

4)

and

the

conditional

same/different experiment (Experiment 7), performance with the novel stimuli
on day one of the transfer trials (the first appearance of the novel stimuli) was
83% and 100% respectively and showed no deterioration relative to the
repeated training stimuli.
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ii)

Inadvertent experimenter cueing of animals must be avoided. This was
certainly a danger in this experiment as the experimenter was working in direct
physical contact with the subject. However, experimenter-naïve blind trials
were undertaken to address this issue. Handler cueing also seems less likely
due to the variable nature of the results for different experiments. If the
subject’s performance was due to handler cueing it seems likely the results
would be fairly uniform. In fact, the results suggest the subject found some
tasks, such as the initial presentation of the same/different conditional
discrimination in Experiment 5, more difficult than others.

iii)

The results must be replicated by other experimenters using other animal
subjects. Hopefully this will be undertaken in the future (see section 6.5).

iv)

The odour of food reinforcers must not be uniquely linked to the correct
stimuli. This was particularly important in this experiment as the subject has a
very good sense of smell (see section 2.1.4.2). As discussed in section 4.2,
both distance and wooden lids on the food dishes (which had been successfully
tested in several previous experiments) were used. These measures seemed
effective as the subject visually checked on each trial whether the dish
contained food or not.

v)

Irrelevant stimulus cues, such as brightness, must be avoided. The
different shapes used on the stimulus boards were of varying surface areas so
both the same and different boards would be of varying degrees of brightness
and no brightness level would be associated with either condition (see section
4.3.2).

vi)

The possibility of memorising specific patterns or properties of objects
must be precluded. The possibility of the subject memorising patterns is
unlikely as both the same and different boards were arranged in the same
pattern. In terms of the properties of the stimuli, the same set of shapes was
used in both the same and different boards and they contained both
symmetrical (e.g. square) and asymmetrical (e.g. lightning bolt) shapes (see
section 4.3.2).

vii) Responding based on stimulus generalisation must be precluded. The
visually basic nature of the stimuli makes it unlikely the subject would fail to
discriminate a new item from one she had seen previously.
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More recently, Katz et al. (2007) put forward the three criteria that they believed were
important to establish abstract-concept learning, all three of which were fulfilled in this
experiment (see chapter 5).
i)

Transfer stimuli must be novel.

ii)

Transfer stimuli should not be repeated. Alternatively, trial 1 performance
should be used.

iii)

Full abstract-concept learning in which baseline performance is equal to
transfer performance should be achieved.

Based on all of the above criteria, it seems valid to claim that Pitpa demonstrated a
same/different ‘concept’ in terms of Lea’s (1984b) first level (she was able to categorise
on the basis of human-defined categories) and appeared to be utilising relational, rather
than simply perceptual, information to do so. Like Wasserman et al.’s (1995) pigeons,
she came to respond “in accord with the abstract concept that collections of numerous
complex visual stimuli are all the same or that they are all different” (p. 249). As to
Lea’s (1984b) second level of conceptualisation – how it is performed – this study, in
common with other animal behaviour experiments, cannot definitively determine
whether the performance was based on processes equivalent to those utilised by
humans. In addition, as Watanabe et al. (1993) point out, even if animals are using
concepts, they might not be the same ones as the experimenter.
However, it is also possible that it might not be an either/or proposition between
conceptually based performance in humans and more basic perceptual mechanisms in
animals. As discussed in section 3.8.2.1, some authors argue that even in humans
conceptual behaviour incorporates perceptual mechanisms. According to Goldstone and
Barsalou (1998), the distinction between perceptual and conceptual is artificial and
particular tasks lie along a perceptual-conceptual continuum. Wasserman et al. (2002, p.
356) agree, stating: “The degree to which a process is conceptual thus depends on the
degree to which it is independent of the perceptual details.” There were obviously some
perceptual aspects to this discrimination performance common to all such studies, as
Pitpa had to identify and compare the items to make an appropriate response. However,
as discussed in chapter 4, in addition to transfer trials numerous steps were taken to help
ensure this study was not affected by perceptual cues that would override relational
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information. According to Wasserman et al. (2002), these types of precautions lend
credence to the idea that the performance was closer to the conceptual than to the
perceptual end of the continuum.
Whatever the mechanism used to discriminate relational concepts in categorisation
experiments, one question that has been asked is whether those concepts are preexisting or are taught as part of the experimental procedure (see section 3.4.4.1). A
number of authors have claimed the former for their subjects. Herrnstein and Loveland
(1964, p. 551), for example, claimed for their perceptual categorisation study that: “The
speed with which their performances improved, coupled with the complexity and
variety of even the first slides used, strongly suggests that they entered the experiment
with the concept already formed” and Lombardi et al. (1984, p.6) stated: “… we think
they already had [the oddity concept] before the experiment began”. Some support for
this view was provided by Irle and Markowitsch’s (1987) study showing squirrel
monkeys can perform a non-match-to-sample task without specific training. Similarly,
Wasserman et al. (2002) found pigeons attended to the same/different relations among
items in visual displays despite their not being rewarded for doing so.
However, other authors believe it may be impossible to determine whether subjects are
demonstrating the acquisition of a new concept or the use of an existing concept due to
the confounding influence of the subject’s acquisition of the reinforcement
contingencies (Bailey and Thomas 1998; Thomas and Ingram 1979). Hayes and Nissen
(1971, p. 79) even went so far as to say: “We cannot imagine any set of operations,
applied to any subject, that could detect a concept without at the same time operating to
induce its formation.” Thomas and Ingram (1979, p. 42) added: “In other words, the
acquisition of new concepts and the detection of existing concepts are hopelessly
confounded with the subject's acquisition of the reinforcement contingencies, thus, the
distinction between newly learned and existing conceptual behaviours is scientifically
meaningless.”
If Herrnstein and Loveland’s (1964) theory is correct, the speed with which Pitpa
learned the same/different task would suggest she already possessed a same/different
‘concept’, however, in light of the concerns expressed above, it is also possible her
rapid acquisition of the task was instead indicative of a relatively proficient learning
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ability. The question of what this study might indicate about the echidna’s cognitive
abilities will be dealt with in the next section.
Finally, even if it could be definitively demonstrated that an animal could perform a
same/different task using the same conceptual mechanisms as a human, that does not
mean that the animal would possess the full range of a human’s ability to conceptualise.
“Because of the proximity of the term ‘concept’ to ‘abstract thinking’, we must be
careful not to conclude too swiftly that fulfilling basic prerequisites of concept
formation is indicative of the full range of cognitive phenomena that come with
conceptual thinking in humans” (Chittka and Jensen 2011, p. R118).

6.2 Echidna intelligence
Having

demonstrated

same/different

categorisation,

conditional

same/different

categorisation and (according to many authors) relationally based concept learning, can
any generalised claims be made about the cognitive abilities of the echidna? As
discussed in the introduction (chapter 1), researchers have come up with numerous
definitions for ‘cognition’ and ‘intelligence’. Cognition seems to be a less loaded term
than intelligence. While the former is associated with more general mental processes,
the latter has strong associations with high-level ‘academic’ abilities in humans.

6.2.1 Cognition
To start with the less contentious term – did the subject of this experiment exhibit
behaviour that could be described as cognitive? According to a popular textbook by
Shettleworth (1998, p. 5), cognition is merely the “mechanisms by which animals
acquire, process, store, and act on information from the environment”, while McLean
(2001, p. 243) states: “… the terms ‘cognitive’ and ‘cognition’ both encompass a range
of mental abilities from simply perceiving and sensing through understanding and
conceiving a notion.” Under these types of catch-all definitions, every behaviour from
the simplest stimulus reflex to a scientist studying quantum physics could be called
cognition.
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On the other hand, there are those who attempt to deny cognitive processes in animals
altogether (see discussion in Tomasello and Call 1997) or reserve some cognitive
processes for primates (Premack 1983a). According to Premack (1983a, p. 360):
“Cognition (as a kind of computation) presupposes abstract representation, and I know
of no evidence for representation of this kind in the nonprimate.” Premack (1983a)
claims evidence for “abstract representation” in the realm of relational categorisation is
found only at the level of second-order same/different categorisation (see section 3.7.5)
and he considers it “improbable” that the task will ever be performed by non-primates.
However, a number of authors have taken a middle road. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990)
suggested a definition of cognition as “the ability to relate different unconnected pieces
of information in new ways and to apply the results in an adaptive manner” (p. 9).
According to the authors, this definition is useful when applied to animal studies
because it examines cognition in terms of what animals do without specifying any
underlying mental mechanisms.
Tomasello and Call (1997) put forward an approach in which “all behavioural
adaptations involving some degree of flexibility and complexity are seen as cognitive”
(p. 431). So, when attempting to achieve a goal, a cognitive adaptation presupposes both
a flexible way of perceiving and understanding a situation and a flexible choice of
behavioural means. They contrasted this type of behaviour with innate, inflexible
behaviours created by evolutionary processes that are not open to modification by the
individual organism (for example, ants remove anything that smells of oleic acid from
their nests, whether it is a dead ant or an obviously live ant coated with oleic acid by
experimenters, Wilson 1971). The authors further stated that just because a behaviour
has been elicited with instrumental conditioning does not mean that cognitive processes
are not being used – the options for the subject may have been limited by the
experimenter, however the subject must still utilise flexible perceptual and behavioural
strategies to varying levels of complexity to solve the problem.
Zentall (1999) agrees with the ‘flexible’ view of cognition – that it firstly involves
behaviours that cannot be explained by basic associative mechanisms (see section
1.2.1.2) and secondly implies that there is some form of active processing of stimuli that
occurs between stimulus input and response output. Zentall (1999) claims that one of
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the behaviours that satisfies these conditions is the active structuring of stimuli
according to abstract relationships such as identity, or ‘sameness’.
So, while not universally accepted, based on the above definitions, it is not
unreasonable to claim that Pitpa’s performance in this experiment was cognitive.

6.2.2 Intelligence
There are numerous problems with using artificial tests to determine intelligence in
animals. The performance of a species is a combination of its abilities and the
particulars of the task presented (Bitterman 1960, 1965). Thus, the failure of a species
(or individual) to perform a particular task does not necessarily mean that they are
incapable of doing so. Rather, it may be that the experimental situation was in some
way unsuitable – “some contextual variable, such motivational level or response
requirement, may have been inappropriate” (Kamil 1994, p. 17). (See section 3.7.3 for
examples).
Some authors have even questioned the overall applicability of intelligence testing in
animals. Hodos (1986) points out that intelligence tests are biased in design towards
humans and their closest primate relatives. For example, they are primarily visual,
which favours primates over animals which rely more on other sensory modalities. “…
one should judge animal intelligence not from the perspective of human behaviour, but
from the perspective of how well the animal is adapted to the demands of its own
environment. I see little value in asking how well a crow performs as a human being”
(Hodos 1986, p. 85). Similarly, Zentall (2000b, p. 198) cautions “… we humans are the
ones deciding what is intelligent behaviour. We make up the rules and the testing
procedures, and those tests may be biased in favour of our particular sensory, motor and
motivational systems. We should avoid letting such non-intellectual differences affect
our assessment of intellectual capacity.”
In addition to these issues, there is the broader problem of definition. Intelligence is a
problematic term even when applied to humans and any claims of what constitutes
‘intelligent’ behaviour depend entirely on the definition being used. As discussed in the
introduction (chapter 1), researchers have come up with numerous definitions for
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intelligence. Some authors use the term to label what are generally considered fairly
basic mental processes. For example, Jolly (1966) equated intelligence with learning
and the solving of discrimination learning problems and Thomas’ (1996) hierarchy
encompasses tasks from habituation (level 1) to biconditional concepts (level 7) as
relating to various levels of relative intelligence (see section 1.3.2.1). On the other hand,
others like Macphail (1982, 1985, 1987) believe that animal behaviour is governed by
only basic forms of learning (habituation and associative learning) and does not contain
anything resembling human intelligence (see section 1.2).
Many authors believe animals are more than the automatons that Macphail suggests,
and that animal intelligence can be found in those behaviours that are not governed by
basic associative mechanisms. Tomasello and Call (1997) suggested that an organism
may be said to have solved a problem “intelligently” when it does not use overt trialand-error, but rather relies on information from a source other than direct perception –
that is, that it utilises some form of mental representation such as memory, inference,
categorisation or insight.
Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) also distinguish between animal intelligence that involves
“knowing how” (the ability to perform a specific task based on recognition of a
particular stimulus) and “knowing that” (the ability to use knowledge more generally
and flexibly that can be divorced from a particular response) (see also Dickinson 1980;
Whiten and Byrne 1988). Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) suggest that while abilities such
as the dance ‘language’ of honeybees and the navigational skills of homing pigeons are
impressive, the animals cannot apply their knowledge to problems in another context.
Because of this, “we rarely think of animals like homing pigeons or bees as intelligent
in the human sense, primarily because their sophisticated performance seems limited to
specific, highly circumscribed spheres” (p. 17).
Finally, Hodos (1986) makes the useful distinction between “intelligence” as an abstract
concept (based on the judgement of the observer) and “intelligent behaviour” which is
observable and measurable. “The hallmark of intelligent behaviour, in the sense in
which the term is used to describe human behaviour, should be how the individual
animal reacts in the face of a new challenge to its survival” (Hodos 1986, p. 85).
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Using these definitions for this experiment; because Pitpa’s performance seemed to
involve more than basic associative mechanisms, consisted of a task widely considered
to be relatively complex and demonstrated the flexibility of performing an unfamiliar
task in a novel context, it is not unreasonable to say she behaved intelligently.
According to Fagot et al. (2001, p. 317): “It is a highly advanced intellectual feat for
animals like pigeons and baboons to detect the sameness or differentness of a collection
of visual stimuli and to make two distinctively different responses in order to report
those same-different relations …”
The next step is to examine the implications of this potentially ‘intelligent’ behaviour.
The fact that a ‘primitive’ species was capable of performing a relatively complex task
can be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly, that that species has a relatively high
level of intelligence compared to other species; secondly, that it is a specific cognitive
module that bears no relation to performance on other tasks or thirdly, that it implies
that the task is not, in fact, a relatively rare ‘high-level’ ability and is in fact quite
widespread among numerous species.

6.2.2.1 High level of general intelligence
According to some authors, the echidna’s ability to perform a ‘high-level’ task is
suggestive of a relatively high level of general intelligence. As discussed previously
(section 3.8.3.4), many authors consider same/different categorisation to be such a task.
Wasserman, Young and Fagot (2001, p. 163) point out that: “The categorisation of two
or more items as the same as or different from one another requires a level of abstract
conceptualisation that was previously thought to be unique to human beings” while
Edwards et al. (1983, p. 349) describe same/different concept learning as “clearly
indicative of a cognitive capacity not typically attributed to non-humans”. According to
Wright and Katz (2006, p. 234), “The ability to judge relationships that transcend
stimulus features is … considered higher-order learning” while Huber (2001, Chapter 2,
online) believes that “the ability to learn relational or abstract concepts is more likely to
provide evidence of intelligence”.
The addition of the conditional component to the same/different procedure is considered
to make the task even more difficult. In their 1995 study, Hanggi and Schusterman
suggest that conditional discrimination learning is a “complex problem” requiring
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“higher-order cognitive skills” (p. 543), while Thompson and Oden (1996) describe
conditional same/different categorisation as an “even more complex variation of a
same/different discrimination” (p. 151).
Because of the perceived difficulty of the same/different task, a number of authors have
used the concept learning abilities of different species as a “measure of intelligence or
general cognitive ability” (Wright and Katz 2006, p. 235). These include D’Amato,
Salmon and Colombo (1985), Herman et al. (1989), Herrnstein (1990), Premack (1978,
1983a, 1983b), Thomas (1980, 1996), Thompson (1995) and Thompson and Oden
(2000). According to this criterion, it could be argued that the results of this experiment
indicate that echidnas (or at least this one) are relatively intelligent. Similarly, Pitpa’s
ability to quickly adapt to the unfamiliar setting and procedures of the experimental
process is also suggestive. According to Macphail (1982, p. 4), “intelligence ... is held
to manifest itself in all those situations in which subjects are required to adapt to novel
circumstances”.
As discussed earlier (sections 1.3.2.1 and 1.3.2.2), Thomas (1996) is more systematic
and claims that a species’ ranking on his hierarchy of cognitive abilities equates to its
relative intelligence. Thomas’ (1996) own criteria for demonstrating conceptual learning
were used to assess the results of this experiment (see section 6.1.2). It can be argued
that, pending independent replication, this experiment meets those criteria. If that is the
case, using Thomas’ intelligence hierarchy model (1996), an echidna has demonstrated
level 3 learning ability (black/white discrimination), level 6 learning ability (the
same/different class concept) and level 7 learning ability (a class concept
(same/different) in a conditional relationship (if white-on-black then ‘same’, if blackon-white then ‘different’)). Thomas’ system also assumes that an animal that can
perform successfully at one level can perform successfully at each of the preceding
levels (Thomas 1996).
If Thomas’ claims are accepted, it would suggest the echidna, far from being
cognitively ‘primitive’, ranks fairly highly in terms of overall intelligence. In fact other
authors have used Thomas’ hierarchy to assess the learning ability or ‘intelligence’ of
their subjects (e.g. Sappington and Goldman 1994 with horses; Burdyn and Thomas
1984 with squirrel monkeys).
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However, as discussed in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.2, making generalisations about either
general or comparative intelligence based on the ability to perform a single task is
fraught with pitfalls. As Hodos (1986, p. 84) points out: “… intelligence is not a
biological property, like height or brain size; it is an abstraction based on value
judgements about an organism’s behaviour made by an intelligence tester. If the persons
or animals do not do well on the test, they are judged to have low intelligence. If they
possess ample quantities of the behavioural characteristics that the observer values, they
are said to be rather intelligent.”
Similarly, the creation of some kind of species intelligence hierarchy based on
experimental results has been heavily criticised by many authors, in part due to the
multitude of species differences and experimental variables that can influence
performance (see sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.2). According to Tomasello and Call (1997, p.
430): “It is simply not meaningful or useful to discuss … which animal species is ‘more
intelligent’ or more ‘cognitively advanced’ than another” and we should “expunge this
way of talking from our scientific discourse”.
Despite these objections, it does not follow that there is no value in examining the
performance of different species on tasks of varying complexity (see section 1.3.2). For
example, Pepperberg (1983) explained her view of the value of task hierarchies in
examining the accomplishments of Alex the African Grey parrot (see section 3.7.3.4):
“Acquisition of categorical concepts, rather than categorical instances, is viewed by
many researchers to imply advanced cognitive abilities (Premack 1978; Thomas 1980).
While we are not attempting to find where our subject may fit on any relative
‘intelligence’ scale, we do believe that consideration of the hierarchies by which
researchers attempt to assess intelligent behaviours enables the accomplishments of our
subject to be better understood” (p. 184).
So, while making grandiose claims about the comparative intelligence of echidnas
based on this study is ill-advised, it is not unreasonable to assert that the reverse idea of
echidnas as cognitively ‘primitive’ due to their evolutionary history (see chapter 2) must
be challenged as they have demonstrated the ability to perform what are generally
considered to be cognitively demanding tasks previously thought to be the exclusive
domain of more evolutionarily ‘advanced’ animals.
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6.2.2.2 Isolated cognitive module
The arguments of the authors in the preceding section (6.2.2.1) seem to suggest that the
echidna’s successful performance of a conditional relational categorisation task in this
experiment is evidence of more generalised cognitive ability. However, while this study
has stressed the importance of not underestimating the mental abilities of the echidna
based purely on its position in the evolutionary timeline, it is equally important not to
overestimate its abilities based on the results of a few artificial tests. It does not
necessarily follow that competence in one area generalises to abilities in other fields.
Psychology traditionally ordered animals according to a phylogenetic scale from
‘primitive’ single-celled organisms at the bottom to ‘advanced’ man at the top, with the
rest of the animals arranged in a linear fashion in between (Hodos and Campbell 1969)
– a theory which has been rejected by many scientists (see section 1.3.1). While it
cannot be denied that there is a general trend towards increasing complexity in both
cerebral development and behaviour throughout the evolutionary timeline, it is by no
means a constant progression from ‘simple’ to ‘complex’. As Oakley and Plotkin (1979)
point out, complexity or competence in one area does not guarantee those attributes in
all areas – for example, man is inferior in the water to a fish – and the demands of an
animal’s ecological niche can lead to the development of particular skills more
sophisticated than its general problem solving abilities.
As discussed in section 1.4, modular-based cognitive theory suggests that animals can
develop a relatively sophisticated cognitive skill in one particular area in response to
ecological demand, while continuing to utilise more basic cognitive mechanisms in
other areas. Essentially, animals can display what may be labelled ‘intelligent’
behaviour in one area, but not another. As Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 17) point out,
“animals often seem to have a kind of ‘laser beam’ intelligence – extraordinarily
powerful when focused in a single domain but much less well developed outside that
narrow sphere”. For example, honeybees dance to communicate only about food and the
spatial location of objects and not other information, probably due to the fact that it is a
“specialised adaptation that cannot be extended to other contexts” (Cheney and Seyfarth
1990, p. 259).
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This type of specialisation occurs throughout evolution, with some areas becoming
more sophisticated while others remain unchanged. According to Salas et al. (2003),
“the brains of extant vertebrates are likely a mosaic of both primitive and derived
characteristics” (p. 73). An example of uneven development can be found in human
physical evolution. In a number of aspects of skeletal morphology (dentition,
persistence of the clavicle, number of digits on hands and feet) we are more like
ancestral generalised mammals than are rats, cats, sheep or horses. While our brains are
progressive, we are primitive in many other ways (Jerison 1973).
According to theories put forward by authors such as Huber (1995), Jerison (1976) and
McLean (2001) (see section 1.4); cognitive abilities are the result of selective ecological
pressures on species in areas such as food acquisition, home range size and
environmental variation. The results of this experiment in demonstrating ‘higher’
mental abilities in the area of categorisation are congruent with the echidna’s ecology
and behaviour (see section 6.3). However, it does not necessarily follow that the echidna
would be equally competent in tests of other ‘higher’ abilities. Cheney and Seyfarth
(1990), for example, posit that non-human primates possess an intelligence that is
highly domain-specific, with little transfer across domains. Their theory is based on the
fact that vervet monkeys can display a relatively high level of ‘intelligence’ in one
domain (e.g. vocal communication), but not in other domains that seem to require no
more complex computational procedures (e.g. inferring the location of predators from
tracks and other signs).
To apply this idea to the echidna, tool use is considered by some authors to be a fairly
sophisticated cognitive ability involving an understanding of causal relationships and an
ability to decide between relevant and irrelevant aspects of various problems (Hauser
1997; Limongelli, Boysen and Visalberghi 1995; Mulcahy, Call and Dunbar 2005).
However, tool use would appear to be superfluous to the echidna, as it already possesses
very effective digging (large front and rear claws) and probing (snout and long tongue)
apparatus for its foraging needs (Griffiths 1989), as well as lacking the physical
capability to easily handle objects. As such, it would not be expected to have developed
sophisticated abilities in the area of tool use.

310

Wright and Katz (2006), who have extensively studied same/different learning in birds
and primates, offer some support for a modular view of relational categorisation.
“Abstract-concept learning and abstract thinking may be dependent upon specially
evolved cognitive (brain) structures or cognitive ‘modules’ to perform these higherorder cognitive tasks (e.g. Cosmides and Tooby 1994; Geary and Huffman 2002;
Gigerenzer 1995, 1997; Hermer and Spelke 1996; Wagner and Wagner 2003)” (p. 235).
So, even if Pitpa’s performance in this particular task were generally considered to be
‘intelligent’, there is currently no evidence to suggest that it reflects a more generalised
intelligence. Further study of other ‘higher’ abilities in the echidna would help to shed
further light on this issue.

6.2.2.3 Common cognitive ability
The view of relationally based same/different learning as a ‘higher-order’ cognitive task
that reflects favourably on species that can successfully perform it (either in terms of
general intelligence or as a specific cognitive module) receives considerable support
from the literature (see sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2). However, there is another
possibility. That is, that same/different categorisation is a common cognitive ability that
has not been widely demonstrated due to inappropriate experimental techniques and a
lack of cross-species testing.
The idea that similarity, or sameness, plays a fundamental role in human cognition has a
long history (Wasserman and Young 2010). James (1950/1890, p. 459) claimed: “This
sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking” and that it was “the
most important of all the features of our mental structure” (p. 460). Some authors, both
then and now, consider the ability to recognise abstract concepts such as sameness as
not only important to, but also exclusive to, humans (see section 3.8.2.1). Others have
used the results of studies conducted with a small number of species to suggest that at
least some animals can recognise relational sameness (see section 3.7.3). However, a
number of authors have gone further and suggested that because of, rather than in spite
of, the fundamental importance of sameness in human cognition, that the ability is
evolutionarily ancient and widespread.
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Behavioural ecology assumes that “most patterns of behaviour, like most morphological
structures, have evolved and serve some adaptive function” (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990,
p. 10). According to some authors, one of the most basic adaptations is the ability to
recognise change. “Most basic to the function of perception, and necessary in the
context of adaptation to changing environments, is the ability to detect invariances that
reflect the generic characteristics of objects and events” (Hanggi 1999, p. 244).
Delius (1994, p. 25) claims that:
The question whether animals are able to command the abstract twin
concept of identity and oddity is among the earliest to be
experimentally investigated by comparative psychologists interested
in exploring the phylogenetic origins of cognition. That is not
surprising, as the capacity of detecting equality or inequality relations
among events of variegated nature must be considered an essential
prerequisite for several forms of reasoning.
Delius (1994) further argues that the ability to classify objects on the basis of either
sameness or oddity in both birds and mammals (including humans) “may be derived
from a very basal, phylogenetically primitive stimulus-specific habituation mechanism
controlling the orienting response and alternative specific responses” (p. 25). James
(1950/1890) suggested that even “creatures extremely low in the intellectual scale [like
polyps] may have conception. All that is required is that they should recognise the same
experience again” (p. 463). As discussed in section 3.8.2.1, there is experimental
support for the idea that at least some of the processes involved in human
conceptualisation are in fact fairly common perceptual mechanisms.
As discussed in the introduction (section 1.2), there are those who believe not only that
a particular ability, such as same/different categorisation, is phylogenetically
widespread, but that the intellectual abilities of animals are all the same and utilise only
basic associative mechanisms – the so-called general process learning theory.
Macphail’s (1985) “null hypothesis” is based on the idea that there is no difference in
the intellectual capabilities of non-human vertebrate animals, so if one animal can
perform a task, they all could, provided suitable testing procedures could be devised.
According to Macphail (1982), based on his theory there is no reason to suppose any
mammal with adequate vision could not develop visual concepts. The problem with this
idea is Macphail’s assumption that if an ability has been demonstrated in two distantly
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related species, it can be found in all species, despite the lack of empirical evidence.
According to Kamil (1994), Macphail is guilty of “an extreme willingness to believe in
the untested intellectual capacities of animals” (p. 20).
Macphail goes further and claims that unless it is proved that experimental variables are
not responsible for species differences, his hypothesis that there is no differences in
intelligence among vertebrates must hold (Kamil 1994). However, it can never be
conclusively proved that a species lacks a particular learning ability; it can always be
argued that adequate testing methods have not yet been utilised. As Kamil (1994) states:
“Proving that there is no set of circumstances in which an animal can learn a particular
task (e.g. that frogs cannot acquire language-like behaviour) is impossible” (p. 20).
One way to mount a case against Macphail’s contention that experimental variables are
responsible for any demonstrated species differences is to find external criteria (e.g.
natural history or ecology) that correctly predict differences in performance among a
number of species. For example, Rumbaugh and Pate (1984) used an encephalisation
index to successfully predict species differences among 11 non-human primate species
when tested on a complex learning task. It is highly unlikely that experimental variables
could have produced this correlation by chance, casting doubt on the universality of
Macphail’s contention (Kamil 1994). (See also section 1.2.2).
Despite these criticisms, one of the underlying assumptions of Macphail’s hypothesis is
demonstrably true – changes to experimental variables can both improve performance
and enable previously unsuccessful species to perform specific cognitive tasks. The fact
that a species fails to master a particular task in an experiment does not ‘prove’ that they
don’t have that cognitive ability. The failure may be caused by any number of variables,
such as unsuitable experimental procedures or motivational issues – an idea that is
supported by the fact that some species that initially failed in same/different tasks
succeeded when different procedures were tried (see section 3.7.3).
Wright et al. (2003) support the view that experimental variables may account for
species differences in same/different categorisation. They claim that both task-based
hierarchical (section 1.3.2) and modular (section 1.4) views tend to underpin these
experiments, making them an all-or-nothing test – the subjects either have the ability or
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not. Because of this, experiments testing this type of cognitive ability often tend to be
one-shot demonstrational experiments rather than parametric manipulations, however
the outcome is often not as clear as the authors’ suggest. For example, some
experiments that have purported to demonstrate ‘abstract-concept’ learning in pigeons
and monkeys have been based on test performances considerably weaker than the
training performances. Conversely, experimental variables have also been shown to
negatively skew the outcomes (see Wright et al. 2003; section 3.7.3 for examples).
According to the authors, “there are many ways for abstract-concept learning to fail and
many fewer ways for it to succeed. It is, however, only the latter result that is
significant” (Wright et al. 2003, p. 195).
These factors led Wright et al. (2003) to favour a general process account of
same/different categorisation over one based on the idea of selective cognitive
modularity (see section 1.2.3). Specifically, that same/different learning is likely to be
“a general property of virtually all vertebrates, independent of whether such ability
arose through homology (shared ancestry) or homoplasy (shared ecological pressures)”
(p. 195). However, unlike Macphail, the authors acknowledged that there are “different
degrees of generality” (p. 195) and there may be quantitative differences between
species. They also stressed that further exploration of the mechanisms of same/different
categorisation was the key to ultimately determining whether differences in
performance reflect a fundamental, qualitative difference in cognitive capability,
supporting a modular account, or merely a quantitative difference affecting task
acquisition, supporting a general process account.
Even if one accepts the view that same/different categorisation is a universal cognitive
ability, it does not necessarily follow that all species do it in the same way. William
James (1950/1890) pronounced over a century ago that “it is the bane of psychology to
suppose that where the results are similar, processes must be the same” (p. 528). It is
possible that while same/different categorisation may be relatively common, different
species may have evolved different methods to perform the same task. Smith et al.’s
(2008) comparison of humans and monkeys in a same/different task led them to state
that: “… different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in
the same way” (p. 361). Some species may indeed use ‘higher-level’ relational analysis
or even human-like concepts, while others may use more prosaic mechanisms. It is
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worth noting that while many species have demonstrated same/different learning using
delayed matching to sample procedures, which can potentially be solved using
relatively basic cognitive processes (see section 3.7.6.1), only a few species have so far
been shown to successfully perform the task using the supposedly more difficult
simultaneous procedure, which is more likely to be solved using relational information
(see section 3.7.2.1.5).
For example, Giurfa et al. (2001) found that even honeybees were able to learn a
delayed matching and non-matching to sample task and transfer the performance to new
stimuli and even to different stimulus modalities (olfactory to visual). The experiment
was also repeatable in different laboratories using different experimental set-ups,
procedures and subjects. According to the authors: “Our results question the view that
vertebrates, and in particular primates, may be the only animals able to form ‘sameness’
or ‘oddity’ concepts. They also show that higher cognitive functions are not a privilege
of vertebrates” (p. 932). However, it is worth noting that this study was conducted using
a successive matching/non-matching procedure, which has been criticised by authors
such as Premack (1983a, 1983b) as having “little to do with same/different” (Premack
1983b, p. 127) (see sections 3.7.2.1.5 and 3.7.6.1).
According to Wynne (2001), further research with a wider range of species is necessary
to form an opinion about the distribution of same/different categorisation. “Studies of
concepts such as same-different … have only been carried out on a very narrow range
of species … – far too few to be able to draw any conclusions about the distribution of
these kinds of ability” (Wynne 2001, p. 189). However, according to Shettleworth
(1998, p. 18), “Studying a few very diverse species, it could be argued, is the best way
to reveal processes general to all species” and McLean (2001, p. 242) claims “… it is
the diversity of those species which appear to exhibit higher mental abilities … which
provides reasonable grounds on which to speculate about the ubiquity of such abilities
within animals in general”.
In light of these conflicting viewpoints, it is prudent to be cautious about the broader
implications of this experiment (see also Kamil’s, 1994, criticism of Macphail above).
However, the fact that a monotreme has been added to the list of species that have
demonstrated simultaneous same/different categorisation gives additional credence to
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the idea that the ability to classify objects as same or different may be a more basic and
widespread skill than authors such as Herrnstein (1990), Thomas (1980, 1996),
Thompson (1995) and Pearce (1997) have suggested. For example, Mercado et al.
(2000) claimed that similarities between the same/different categorisation performance
of dolphins and primates was surprising considering their very different evolutionary
history, ecology and neurology. “Such parallels suggest that mammalian brains analyse
environmental features using ‘basic’ processes that are evolutionarily old and, therefore,
likely common across a wide range of mammalian species” (p. 92).
In Delius’ (1994) review of same/different learning in pigeons, the author sought to
demonstrate the ubiquity of same/different abilities among mammalian species by going
“one further evolutionary stage back” (p. 26) from primates to birds. This study can be
viewed in a similar light by establishing same/different learning in one of the oldest
mammalian species (see section 2.1.2). The fact that such an evolutionarily and, in
many respects, physiologically ‘primitive’ animal as the echidna is capable of
successfully performing this task could be used to support either a general process
account (same/different as a universal cognitive process) or a modular account
(same/different as a more commonly distributed cognitive module).

6.3 Reasons for ‘high-level’ performance
While some authors believe that same/different categorisation is a fairly basic,
widespread cognitive ability (see section 6.2.2.3), there is plenty of support for the idea
that successfully performing the task (particularly with the added conditional
configuration) is indicative of either a high level of general intelligence (section 6.2.2.1)
or the possession of a sophisticated cognitive module (section 6.2.2.2). While there is
currently little evidence to support the idea of the echidna as a species of relatively high
intelligence, it is certainly true that the results of this experiment demonstrate an
unexpected cognitive faculty in a species once viewed as an “animated pin-cushion”
(Buchmann and Rhodes 1978, p. 144). Because of this, it is worth examining why what
are considered by many authors to be relatively advanced cognitive abilities may have
developed in an animal of the “lowliest status in the mammalian series” (Smith 1902
cited in Griffiths 1968, p. 101).
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As discussed earlier (sections 1.4), evolutionary theory suggests that cognitive abilities
do not develop without some ecological impetus (e.g. Dawkins 1986; Humphrey 1976),
so it is unlikely than a cognitive ability demonstrated in laboratory experiments does not
have some correlation in a species’ natural behaviour. For example, Cheney and
Seyfarth (1990) argue that the ability of squirrel monkeys and chimpanzees to solve
transitive inference problems (see section 3.2.2.1) in captivity is based on their
understanding of dominance hierarchies in the wild rather than simply being an artefact
of human training.
A number of possible catalysts for the evolution of cognitive abilities in humans and
other animals have been proposed, some of which are examined below for their
potential applicability to the echidna. While these factors are dealt with separately here,
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. As Falk (1990) points out, it is notoriously
difficult to establish one factor as a “prime mover” (p. 334) of brain evolution and
cognitive development, while Tomasello and Call (1997) find implausible “the view
that there should be a ‘single cause’ of the evolution of intelligence in recent
evolutionary history” (p. 354). It is perhaps more likely, and closer to biological reality,
that a combination of factors accounts for the evolution of cognitive abilities (Eckhardt
1987; Foley 1990). With this in mind, it is still worth exploring some possible triggers
for cognitive development in the echidna.

6.3.1 Neurophysiology
A physiologically based explanation as to why an echidna might be able to perform a
purportedly difficult cognitive task is found in the relative complexity of some aspects
of its neurophysiology. According to a number of popular indices, the brain of the
echidna is considered ‘advanced’ – relatively large brain size compared to body weight
and spinal cord mass, fairly large and highly gyrified cerebral neocortex, extremely
large frontal cortex and relatively complex sensory processing mechanisms (see section
2.2.1). These features are considered by many authors to be correlates of a high degree
of ‘intelligence’ (e.g. Byrne 1993; Falk 1990; Jerison 1973, 1985; Pearce 1997; see
section 2.2.1).
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Many authors believe that species with larger brains show greater behavioural flexibility
and more of the general ability to respond appropriately to novel events (see section
2.2.1.1). It could be argued this was demonstrated by Pitpa’s rapid acclimatisation to the
experimental process and acquisition of the tasks (see chapter 5 and section 6.2.2.1),
although the effect of her being a relatively ‘tame’ animal must also be considered (see
section 6.4.5). More specifically, the relatively large prefrontal cortex of the echidna
might relate directly to relational categorisation. According to Ashby and Waldron
(2000, p. 10), in humans there is “abundant evidence that the prefrontal cortex is
critically important” for category learning. It has also been suggested that the prefrontal
cortex (or an analogue to the mammalian prefrontal cortex in the case of animals such
as pigeons) plays a critical role in abstract-concept learning such as same/different
categorisation (Freedman and Miller 2008; Wright 2010; see section 3.9).
However, while a relatively complex neurophysiology suggests the mechanism by
which echidnas might perform complex cognitive tasks, it does not address the
causative selective pressure for an increase in both brain structure and cognitive
development. The energetic cost of neural tissue suggests that there must be some
fitness advantage to the large size of the echidna’s frontal cortex (see section 2.2.1.1).
So why does a seemingly simple animal like the echidna have such highly developed
brain structures, particularly when the other Australian monotreme, the platypus, does
not? As discussed earlier (section 2.2.1.1), factors such as the echidna’s low body
temperature and metabolic rate may help explain how echidnas are able to
physiologically support a larger brain, but not why their seemingly superfluous cerebral
apparatus developed.
The comparative approach to brain size in humans and other animals has yielded a
variety of theories to account for brain expansion. According to Eckhardt (1987, p.
207): “Expansion in brain size … was in all likelihood a response shaped by many
influences and one which produced benefits broadly related to enhanced cognitive
powers.” Large relative brain size and neural complexity (and the presumed
corresponding increase in cognitive abilities, see section 2.2.1) has been linked to a
number of life history, ecological and social parameters (Foley 1990), some of which
are examined below in relation to the echidna.
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6.3.2 Life history
A number of aspects of life history have been shown to significantly correlate with
relative brain size in primates and other mammals. However, many of these such as
gestation length, neonate weight and weaning age (Harvey, Martin and Clutton-Brock
1987) are difficult to compare to the echidna due to its unusual (for a mammal)
reproductive techniques. A lack of data makes comparisons on the basis of factors such
as age of first reproduction and interbirth intervals (Harvey et al. 1987) also
problematic.
One factor that can be compared is that of extended life span, which has been linked to
large relative brain size (Allman, McLaughlin and Hakeem 1993; Harvey et al. 1987).
Echidnas are long-lived animals that have been recorded living for up to 49 years in
captivity (Griffiths 1978; see section 2.1.5), although exactly what part this may have to
play in brain encephalisation has not yet been fully explained. According to Smith
(1990), “larger brains would be of little use to short-lived mammals” (p. 365). One
theory, known as the “cognitive buffer hypothesis”, suggests that large brains allow
species to better survive environmental challenges through flexible behaviours, leading
to increased survival rates and a longer reproductive life (Sol 2009; see section 2.2.1.1).
Some evidence for this theory has been found in studies on primates (Allman et al.
1993) and birds (Sol, Szekely, Liker and Lefebvre 2007).

6.3.3 Tool use and language
Tool use has also been suggested as a prime catalyst for enlarged brain size and the
subsequent purported increase in ‘intelligence’; however this theory has been subject to
contradictory evidence and criticisms of an androcentric interpretation of prehistory
(Conkey and Spector 1984; Jarvenpa 1993). In addition, it is difficult to determine
whether increased brain size is a cause or a consequence of tool use. Irrespective of its
validity, it is extremely unlikely to apply to the echidna, which has never been observed
using tools and appears to have no need to do so as it is physically well equipped to deal
with its everyday foraging activities (see sections 2.1.7 and 6.2.2.2).
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Similarly, while the use of language has been touted as a possible catalyst for brain
expansion in humans (Cheney, Seyfarth and Smuts 1986), this obviously is not a valid
theory for the mostly non-vocal echidna (Rismiller 1999).

6.3.4 Social demands
Many authors believe a complex social environment has led to the development of
sophisticated cognitive abilities in animals such as dolphins (Herman 1980) and
primates, including humans (Bovet and Washburn 2003; Byrne and Whiten 1988;
Cheney and Seyfarth 1985; Humphrey 1976; Jolly 1966; Whiten and Byrne 1997).
Barton (1996), for example, found a consistent correlation in primates between
neocortex size and social group size and Dunbar (1992) and Sawaguchi and Kudo
(1990) found correlations between sociality and relative brain size in several primate
species. Herman (2002) even suggests that: “Social living and social pressures may be
major selection forces driving the evolution of intellect” (p. 275).
As the echidna is a mainly solitary animal (see section 2.1.6) there has been little
selective pressure for the development of social abilities and any subsequent increase in
‘intelligence’. A number of authors claim that the neurological seat of this socially
mediated ‘intelligence’ is found in the neocortex – that is, relative neocortical volume is
a function of group size and the larger the group, the larger the neocortex (Dunbar
1993). This view led Hassiotis et al. (2003) to ask “why an animal like the echidna,
which leads a solitary existence and has no known complex social life, has such a
highly gyrified cortex” (p. 828).
However, the link between social complexity and intelligence is by no means
established, with authors such as Kamil (1994) considering such an argument
premature. According to Penn and Povinelli (2012), “the relationship between
encephalisation and social complexity is spotty at best” and “there is little support for
the hypothesis that sociality was the causal agent for increased encephalisation in
mammals” (p. 531). The authors claim their argument is supported by the fact that there
are a number of examples where there appears to be no relationship between sociality
and encephalisation, such as across extant Carnivora (e.g. cats, dogs, bears, weasels)
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(Finarelli and Flynn 2009). Similarly, social complexity does not appear to be linked to
brain size in birds (references in Healy and Rowe 2007).
Other scientists argue there is nothing specific about the neocortex that indicates it
controls social behaviour, and indeed, some species of insect (which have no neocortex)
have very complex social organisation (Jerison 1993). These authors claim neocortex
size (and by inference ‘intelligence’) may be due to selection from factors other than or
in addition to social ones (Janson 1993). These could include the development and
enlargement of sensory-perceptual and motor systems (Jerison (1993) – factors that
would be driven by ecological, rather than social, demands.

6.3.5 Environmental demands
According to proponents of mosaic evolution (see section 1.4), cognitive abilities
evolve in response to ecological demands. In line with this idea, a number of authors
have suggested that an examination of the ecology and natural behaviour of subjects can
provide some basis for speculation about their experimental performance. For example,
in analysing the exceptional learning set performance of the marsupial fat-tailed dunnart
(Bonney 2001) (see section 1.3.1), Wynne (2001) suggests that the most likely
explanation is found in their habitat – which involves catching fast-moving insects and
invertebrates in an arid and predator-filled environment. In a comparative study of
configural learning in quokkas and fat-tailed dunnarts, Bonney and Wynne (2003)
found only the dunnarts were able to fully complete the experimental tasks. According
to the authors, the dunnarts’ challenging ecological niche leads them to be highly
responsive to stimuli predicting reinforcement while the quokkas’ less demanding niche
(grazing for vegetation in protected communities) may not require the same level of
processing of multiple or conflicting stimuli.
So what ecological challenges have echidnas faced that have led them to evolve the
ability to perform complex same/different categorisations? At first glance, echidnas
don’t seem to have particularly demanding problems in their environment. They have
no real predators (except man) and have virtually no social structure (see sections 2.1.5
and 2.1.6) – factors often associated with ‘higher-level’ learning abilities (see section
6.3.4). However, in her study of same/different learning in coatis, Chausseil (1991)
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concluded that the coatis comprehension of the same/different principle was not crucial
to the coatis in their natural environment in a specific sense, rather that “it is related to a
more general ability, namely the versatile utilisation of visual cues in their
environment” (p. 35).
This versatility in dealing with environment cues becomes even more important when a
species needs to adapt to extremely variable environments, a factor that has also been
linked to the development of certain cognitive abilities. Tomasello and Call (1997)
surmise that when rapid ecological changes during individual lifetimes are the rule,
evolution would favour the development of flexible learning and assessment capabilities
over rigidly programmed behavioural systems. “… it is presumably the case that
cognitive adaptations have evolved most frequently in situations in which
environmental conditions change with some rapidity during the lifetime of the
individual” (Tomasello and Call 1997, p. 12). More specifically, Huber (1995) claims
animals that have adapted to a wide variety of environments require a greater filtering
mechanism to identify disparate stimuli, leading to the development of perceptual
categorisation skills. Similarly, Shettleworth (1998) suggests the ability to acquire new
discriminations improves with experience and that the processes involved “are likely to
be important in variable environments in nature” (p. 215).
This theory fits in with what is known about the echidna’s distribution (see section
2.1.1). Together with the house mouse, the echidna has the most widely divergent
habitats of all mammalian species and is found in every major terrestrial ecosystem
from desert to alpine (Augee et al. 2006; Griffiths 1968, 1978). Examples of the
echidna’s behavioural flexibility in response to divergent environmental conditions are
found in its hibernation and reproductive behaviours (see sections 2.1.8 and 2.1.9). It is
also congruent with the echidna’s neuroanatomy. Quantitative neuroanatomical studies
have demonstrated that the enlargement (or decrease) of certain parts of the brain is
consistent with species’ special adaptations to different environments (Kruska 1988).
Jerison (1976) suggested that a large forebrain (and the echidna’s is proportionately
larger than man’s, see section 2.2.1.3) is the result of adapting to the demands of diverse
ecological niches. When a species has to deal with diverse environments, one
hypothesis is that large brains have evolved to allow the behavioural flexibility to cope
with novel or altered conditions (see section 2.2.1.1). To test this theory, global
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databases of introductions to novel environments of more than 600 bird introduction
events (Sol et al. 2005) and 400 mammal introduction events (Sol et al. 2008) were
examined and the results suggest larger brains do help birds and mammals respond to
novel conditions. This led the authors to conclude that “enlarged brains function, and
hence may have evolved, to deal with changes in the environment” (p. 5460).

6.3.6 Foraging demands
Another ecological factor that might contribute to cognitive development is the
demands of foraging. McLean (2001) suggests that the manner in which an animal
locates and captures food exerts significant selection pressure for the evolution of
cognitive abilities. He argues that natural selection dictates that animals should evolve
appropriate mental abilities to deal with the requirements of their particular ecological
niches. “Locating and capturing food should correlate closely with, and be significantly
indicative of, mental ability in animals” (McLean 2001, p. 246). Other authors have
suggested the predator-prey “arms race” also leads to increasing intelligence: “… as
prey species grew cleverer, their predators and competitors survived only by also
becoming cleverer, and vice versa” (Jolly 1966, pp. 153-154).
Ostensibly, the foraging demands of the echidna do not seem to be particularly
cognitively demanding and certainly therian anteaters do not show the degree of
encephalisation seen in the echidna (Hassiotis et al. 2003; see section 2.2.1.2).
However, according to McLean (2001), foraging for food that has a patchy distribution
presents unique challenges requiring the evolution of “higher mental abilities” (p. 241)
(see also Krakauer and Rodriguez-Girones 1995). The energy savings of remembering
the location of food patches would be highly adaptive in terms of saving wasted
foraging trips. Because of this, it would be expected that species that forage from food
patches would show cognitive abilities not found (or at least not to the same degree) in
species whose food is distributed relatively homogeneously, such as folivores. Echidnas
forage mainly on termite mounds and ant’s nests – which represent food “patches”.
McLean’s theory suggests that echidnas should have faced a greater evolutionary
imperative to develop more sophisticated mental abilities than species whose food is
more evenly distributed or in closer proximity. McLean’s theory is supported by the
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findings of Foley (1990) and Clutton-Brock and Harvey (1980), who linked patchy
resource distribution with greater encephalisation in primates.
In addition to patchy resource distribution, another foraging factor that may lead to
increased cognitive development is optimal foraging. It has been argued that the kinds
of learning studied in conditioning experiments such as this one have evolved under
selective pressure to forage optimally (Lea 1981). Like many animals, the echidna has
demonstrated the ability to employ optimal foraging strategies and adjust its foraging
efforts in response to prey abundance, quality and defence (see section 2.2.2.1).
According to Augee et al. (2006), such “farming of prey” (p. 49) would require a
detailed mental map of prey species, location, depth, density and nutritional value, as
well as the ability to take into account the influence of time of year and temperature on
prey behaviour. The authors argue the echidna uses its “massive frontal cortex” to
process this information and think about alternative actions, a safer option than trying
them first in the real world. “Sophisticated processing in the frontal cortex of this wealth
of data could be essential for forward planning … These functions in the echidna might
represent what we would call conscious awareness …” (Augee et al. 2006, p. 49).
The ability to undertake this type of detailed forward planning and decision-making
may contribute to the echidna’s ability to perform in categorisation training tasks.
According to Hanggi (1999, p. 250): “Individuals may also use categorisation abilities
to more easily locate forage, avoid predators, and travel over large areas of terrain”
while Giurfa et al. (2001) suggested in their same/different experiment with honeybees
that: “Such concepts might contribute to improve foraging activities” (p. 932).

6.3.7 Home range size
Some authors (e.g. Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1980) have theorised that the size of an
animal’s home range, and the concomitant need for greater spatial memory, may
contribute to larger brains and greater learning abilities. Milton (1981) described a
possible correlation between brain size and the size of animal’s home range. He
suggested the larger brain of the spider monkey, Ateles geoffroyi, compared to the
howler monkey, Alouatta palliate, was due to the far larger home range of the spider
monkey and the consequent extra brain space required for a larger mental map.
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However, this purported increase in overall brain volume does not seem to relate to
neocortex size, at least in primates. When Barton (1993) analysed volumetric brain
structure data collated by Stephan, Frahm and Baron (1981) in light of a number of
variables, he found that only breeding group size, not home range size, accounted for
increased neocortical size. Furthermore, while Hassiotis et al. (2003) speculated that the
echidna’s enlarged frontal cortex might be related to the enhanced spatial and/or
olfactory memory required by its home range, there are comparably sized eutherian
mammals with bigger home ranges (Nicol et al. 2011; see section 2.1.6) that don’t
exhibit the same cortical enlargement.

6.4 Methodological issues
6.4.1 Generalisation of artificial experiments
Like other psychologically based studies of this type, this experiment is limited in its
general applicability to categorisation behaviour in the wild. Herrnstein (1985, p. 144)
points out that “… what an animal does in a particular setting is not likely to be the
proper measure of what it is capable of doing generally” and Cheney and Seyfarth
(1990, p. 6) claim that one of the problems with laboratory experiments is that “their
relevance to the animals’ natural social behaviour is often unclear”.
Authors such as Huber (1995) and Kamil (1994) have argued that an assessment of an
animal’s knowledge is typically underestimated by its performance in a classical
learning situation. For example, Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) claim that the use of
arbitrary stimuli like lights, shapes and tones that an animal would never encounter in
its natural habitat increases the chances that an animal may not understand the problem
or lack motivation in what it perceives as an unfamiliar or even hostile environment.
According to Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 6), the use of artificial stimuli “increases
the likelihood that results will underestimate or fail to reveal a subject’s true ability”.
One example of this phenomenon is found in the contrast between the relatively poor
performance of marmosets in more traditional experimental settings (e.g. Miles and
Meyer 1956) with the more successful results of Menzel and Juno (1982, 1985) using
group-living marmosets in a more naturalistic environment (Kamil 1994). Similarly,
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Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) used the inability of squirrel monkeys to categorise on
the basis of pictures of birds vs. other animals in an artificial categorisation task to
claim monkeys were unable to make this type of abstract categorisation. However, other
authors have demonstrated that young vervet monkeys can distinguish between birds
and other animals in the wild (Huber 2000).
Alternatively, it is also possible that the results of laboratory experiments might
overestimate the cognitive abilities of wild animals. For example, research with captive
apes has demonstrated cognitive abilities not yet found in the same species in their
natural habitat – a disparity explained by some authors as resulting from training
animals in skills they would not naturally need nor possess (see review in Cheney and
Seyfarth 1990). However, as Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) point out, the natural
existence of such abilities cannot be discounted while systematic reviews of laboratoryinduced skills have yet to be conducted in the wild.
Kamil and Yoerg (1982) have argued that more natural environments better preserve
“ecological validity” and, as Tomasello and Call (1997, p. 117) noted, “Perhaps
exemplars of real birds that fly and sing, for example, would make a difference in how
subjects categorise animals”. However, while this may be the case, such naturalistic
stimuli does not allow for the specifics of the controlling features of stimuli to be
isolated and identified in the same manner as artificially constructed stimuli. As Huber
(2000) points out, observations in the wild are not sufficiently reliable to discount
laboratory experiments and processes based on perceptual and associative theories.
According to Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 5), laboratory experiments are valuable
because: “Their precision and control … are unlikely to be matched by any study
conducted in the field. Different experiments can focus precisely on different cognitive
skills and allow one to state explicitly what would constitute evidence that an individual
possesses a particular ability.”
Vaughan and Herrnstein (1987) claim that although many researchers question the
applicability of artificial laboratory experiments, this reasoning suggests that animals
use different behavioural principles in artificial situations than they use in nature. The
authors suggest it is more likely that the same basic behavioural principles are used in
both settings and that they can best be initially discovered in a simplified and contrived
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situation. Lefebvre et al. (2004, p. 234) echo Macphail’s (1982) view that: “Contrary to
passive observation of animals in the wild, the response to the unnatural demands of
captive experiments can reveal the full range of an animal’s capabilities … and these
responses are assumed to reflect the way individuals deal with changes in their natural
environment.” Vaughan and Herrnstein (1987) suggest a combination of the two
approaches could be productive – using the more simplified and controlled experimental
procedures to establish basic processes, then building on that knowledge to explore
more complex situations, including those that more closely resemble the natural
environment.
As discussed previously (see section 1.5), the question being addressed by the type of
experiments conducted in this study is not do the subjects do this behaviour in the wild,
but can they do it at all, and artificial stimuli and controlled experimental conditions are
necessary to identify the specifics of these kinds of behaviours. So, while the general
applicability of these results to the natural behaviour of echidnas must be treated with
caution, artificial experiments such as this one at the very least demonstrate that
echidnas are capable of conditionally mediated relational categorisation under these
experimental conditions. Evolutionary theory suggests that cognitive abilities do not
evolve unless they serve some adaptive function (see section 6.3); however it is
uncertain whether these results reflect a specific ability utilised in the wild or are
indicative of a relatively robust, generalised learning ability. Further study using
experimental techniques more closely resembling ‘natural’ settings could be helpful in
illuminating how (or even if) these specific abilities manifest themselves in the
echidna’s ‘normal life’ (see section 6.5).

6.4.2 Procedural issues
One of the less satisfactory aspects of this experiment was the fact that the experimenter
was in direct physical contact with the subject, leaving open the possibility of
inadvertent cueing. Unfortunately, housing restrictions imposed by the zoo made it
impossible to conduct the experiments within an automated apparatus. While the issue
of cueing was addressed with the use of experimenter-naïve blind trials (see section
5.6), it would be preferable if future experiments made use of a fully automated
apparatus which does not require experimenter handling.
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Another procedural issue related to the environment within which the experiment was
conducted. Zoo policy meant that the subject had to remain within the confines of its
enclosure and could not be relocated to an indoor laboratory setting for the experiments
(although they did take place in an off-exhibit area). The outdoor setting meant that
there were distractions from a number of sources (e.g. birds, falling leaves, people
walking near the enclosure, loud noises from zoo construction work etc.), although
some attempt to ameliorate changes in environmental conditions was made by
conducting the experiments at approximately the same time of day. On the other hand, it
could also be argued that the more familiar naturalistic environment was less stressful
and perhaps contributed to the echidna’s ability to perform to the best of her ability (see
section 6.4.1). In fact, some experiments have shown that animals perform better when
they are tested in their home environments compared to remote testing chambers (see
Crofts et al. 1999).

6.4.3 Modality
Despite the subject succeeding in the task, it could be argued that the modality was not
optimal for an echidna. Thomas (1996) claims that the focus of a cognitive study should
be on the processes involved rather than on specific tasks or apparatuses. Task
variables, such as the stimuli, rewards, responses, environmental conditions etc. should
be optimal for the species being studied so it is able to perform to the best of its ability.
In this study, visual stimuli were used for reasons of practicality and species
comparison. However, while many birds and mammals are considered visually
dominant animals (Cook 2000), vision has historically been considered to be of little
importance to the echidna (Elliot Smith 1902; Griffiths 1968; Walls 1942) and indeed
evidence seems to indicate that it relies heavily on olfactory, auditory and tactile
sensory information (Gates 1973) (see section 2.1.4). However, as discussed in section
2.1.4.1 and demonstrated in this experiment, anatomical and behavioural studies have
shown that the echidna is capable of a reasonable level of visual acuity and
discrimination. As the echidna appears to primarily use its other senses to forage, it
raises the question of what use the echidna makes of its visual abilities or, in other
words, why they have evolved.
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One possibility suggested by Gates (1973) is that vision is used as a valuable
supplement to the other senses in performing certain activities, as has also been
suggested for the bat (Suthers, Chase and Braford 1969). In echidnas, vision might be
used for activities such as predator detection, general orientation or locating food
sources – particularly when those activities are conducted at greater distances than the
range of its other senses. Vision might also be used when the echidna’s other senses are
being used for other tasks, such as using its vision for predator detection when its
olfactory, tactile and auditory systems are involved in foraging and feeding (Gates
1973).
The idea of echidna vision being used for predator detection is supported by the
anatomical structure of its eye. Its flat corneas, protruding eyes and lack of physical
obstruction near its eyes would give the echidna a fairly panoramic view ideal for
detecting predators (Gates 1973). As Gates (1973) pointed out in his study, echidnas are
very sensitive to even slight movements in their vicinity and immediately assume a
defensive posture.
If the echidna does in fact use its visual sense to supplement its other senses, it may help
explain its ability to perform visual same/different categorisations. The sorts of visual
activities proposed by Gates (1973) for the echidna – such as predator detection,
orientation and location of distant food sources – would be greatly enhanced by the
ability to efficiently categorise on the basis of same and different. There is also the
possibility that the echidna utilises same/different categorisation in its dominant sensory
modalities and that there is some level of cross-modal transfer of the ability to its
subordinate visual sense.
This study adds further support to the argument that cognitive tasks, or at least
same/different categorisation, is not limited to a species’ dominant sense (Herman et al.
1989; see section 3.7.3.4). However, given that the echidna appears to rely more on its
olfactory, auditory and tactile senses than its vision (Gates 1973, section 2.1.4), it might
be beneficial to base a future study on one of its more dominant senses (see section 6.5).
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6.4.4 Number of subjects
This study was originally designed to be conducted using four subjects instead of one.
However, as discussed previously (see section 4.1.2.1), one subject became ill and two
others were not used to being handled and became stressed both by handling and being
in the apparatus. More extensive attempts to habituate them would have been
prohibitively time consuming, as well as ethically questionable in a zoo setting, and the
decision was made to continue with one subject. The single subject, Pitpa, was used to
continual handling in her role as a demonstration animal for educating zoo visitors and
did not appear stressed in the apparatus. Unfortunately, the zoo could not spare any
more of their ‘tame’ echidnas for this experiment, as they were required for zoo
activities.
While more than one subject would have been preferable, as discussed in section 1.5,
these experiments were testing for the ability of a species to perform a particular task, a
question that can be answered with a single subject (see section 4.1.2.2). Because of this
it was decided to continue with one subject in a similar manner to other cognitive
studies of this type (e.g. Pepperberg 1983, 1987, 1988; Roitblat et al. 1990;
Schusterman and Kastak 1993, 1998; see section 4.1.2.2).
One issue with using only a single subject is the possibility of inter-individual
differences with respect to task strategy (Chittka and Jensen 2011). For example,
Elmore et al. (2009) found different methods being employed by pigeons in the same
simultaneous same/different task, with evidence of item-specific learning by one pigeon
and relational learning by two others. Similarly, while single-subject experiments can
demonstrate a species’ capability, they do not provide any indication of how common
an ability might be within that species. In this instance, it is impossible to determine
where Pitpa falls in the normal spectrum of echidna capability. This study may not have
mapped the full of range of an echidna’s ability, as other individuals may have been
able to perform at a higher level. On the other hand, the use of a captive echidna,
particularly one that has been raised in captivity, may mean Pitpa’s performance was
exceptional (see section 6.4.5).
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6.4.5 Use of captive subject
While the use of a ‘tame’ echidna facilitated the undertaking of this experiment, it also
raises some questions about the generality of the results to wild echidnas. Pitpa is one of
only a few echidnas born and raised in captivity (the vast majority of captive echidnas
live some portion of their lives as wild animals, Augee et al. 2006) and has spent years
being trained and interacting with humans in her role as a zoo demonstration animal.
According to Hyland (1993), thirty years of animal research on animals placed in novel
and challenging (so-called ‘enriched’) environments has demonstrated a number of
neural changes – increased cortical thickness and brain weight; altered cortical
histology, neurophysiology and neurochemistry, and increased dendritic branching
(reviews in Diamond 1988; Renner and Rosenzweig 1987; Rosenzweig and Bennett
1996; see also Hahn, Jensen and Dudek 1979). Rosenzweig (1971), for example, found
experience-related effects increased the cortical volume of rats in the order of 5 to 10
per cent. Enriched animals have also been found to outperform their non-enriched
counterparts on a variety of behavioural measures (Hyland 1993).
These results raise the question of whether Pitpa’s conditioning and the zoo
environment in general constitute an ‘enriched’ environment which may have led to
neurological ‘enhancements’ that contributed to her successful performance in these
experiments. This is a difficult question to answer, particularly as some scientists take
the opposite view. McGrew (1992) suggests that animals raised in captivity may have
an impoverished existence compared to those in the wild, which may lead to more
stereotypical, less complex behaviour and cognition. Indeed, it could be argued that a
wild echidna would experience greater enrichment than a captive one, as it lives in a
much bigger, more varied environment and deals with issues not experienced by captive
animals, such as finding food and avoiding predators. In one of the few experiments
directly comparing captive and wild animals in cognitive testing, Brodigan and Peterson
(1976) found that wild-caught pigeons performed significantly better on a conditional
discrimination task than domestic pigeons. The authors speculated the difference could
be due to genetic or environmental factors, but stressed the need for further study.
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Whether or not captivity constitutes an enriched environment, one advantage that Pitpa
shares with other long-term experimental subjects as well as domestic animals is that
she was very accustomed to training and handling (see section 4.1). According to Nicol
(1996, p. 375): “… domestic animals often perform better on learning tasks than wild
animals because they are less fearful.” This may help explain Pitpa’s faster task
acquisition compared to that found in Gates’ (1973, 1978) wild-caught echidnas which
he struggled to habituate to handling, a problem also encountered in this experiment
with captive, but non-handled, echidnas (see sections 4.1.2.1, 2.2.2.4 and 5.2.1).
Another issue is whether Pitpa, or indeed other seemingly high-performing individuals
such as Alex the African Grey parrot (see section 3.7.3.4), are just particularly ‘bright’
or ‘trainable’ animals and not necessarily representative of the majority of their species.
Differences in performance between individuals of the same species are often seen in
cognitive studies. According to Keddy-Hector et al. (unpub.), “there is a tremendous
amount of variation in the learning abilities of individuals” (p. 4). Sappington and
Goldman (1994), for example, found a great degree of variation between the six horses
used in their discrimination and concept learning experiments – from rapid and accurate
responding up to the level of complex pattern categorisation to little learning beyond an
initial black/white discrimination. Similarly, individual goldfish in Goldman and
Shapiro’s (1979) matching/oddity experiment showed variable results ranging from
57% to 88%. Individual variation in cognitive experiments has also been demonstrated
in other species including pigeons, rats, sea lions, pigs, monkeys and chimpanzees
(Keddy-Hector et al. unpub.) (see also D’Amato, Salmon and Colombo 1985; Elmore et
al. 2009; Kastak and Schusterman 1994; Martin-Malivel and Fagot 2001).
One factor that could affect a particular individual’s performance is age. Nissani,
Hoefler-Nissani, Lay and Htun (2005) also found what they described as “remarkable
variability” (p. 27) among the Asian elephants in their visual discrimination study –
some elephants acquired the black/white discrimination in the first session after
comparatively few trials, others took several sessions and hundreds of trials, while still
others failed to learn the task by the end of the experiment. The variable performance
correlated with the age of the subjects, with the older (but not elderly) elephants faring
worse. The authors proposed the “age effect” may have been due to differing learning
abilities between young and mature elephants or possibly due to a decline in the visual
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acuity of captive adult elephants. In any case, Pitpa was still a relatively young animal
when she participated in these experiments (see sections 2.1.5 and 4.1.1).
While these issues are relevant, they also apply to the numerous other cognitive studies
undertaken with trained, captive animals (e.g. Gillan et al. 1981; Hanggi and
Schusterman 1995; Herman et al. 1989; Pepperberg 1983, 1987). As discussed
previously (section 4.1.2.2 and 6.4.4), the performance of this subject demonstrates that
an echidna is capable of this cognitive performance. Whether that is reflected in the
general wild population is a matter for further study (see section 6.5).

6.5 Further study
There are a number of avenues for further study resulting from this experiment. Firstly,
independent replication is vital to ensure that some artefact of this experimental
procedure, despite the precautions taken (see section 6.1.1), did not result in inadvertent
cueing. In addition, further experimentation could help address some of the limitations
of this study (see section 6.4). Testing this task with a variety of subjects; for example,
multiple subjects, wild echidnas, echidnas of different ages and sex, would also help
determine whether the ability is widespread among echidnas (see sections 6.4.4. and
6.4.5).
In terms of how the experiment is conducted, there is value to be had both in making the
procedure more ‘artificial’ as well as more ‘natural’. A more controlled, laboratory
setting would help reduce environmental cues and enable the elimination of
experimenter handling (see section 6.4.2). It would also facilitate the investigation of
the mechanisms underlying same/different categorisation in echidnas. Thompson
summarised the state of research on relational categorisation in animals:
There is increasing evidence … that animals categorise their world and
do so on the basis of perceptual, if not abstract, relational similarity.
On the one hand, investigators have developed standard procedures
that permit them to map the nature and range of these concepts. On the
other hand, they are sadly lacking in theory. Our understanding of the
actual information controlling conceptual behaviour in animals lags far
behind our ability to document categorical classes.
(Thompson 1995, p. 213)
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Since Thompson’s somewhat negative assessment, some progress has been made in
experimentally examining the mechanisms by which pigeons and primates in particular
perform same/different categorisations (see section 3.7.6). However, previously
demonstrated examples of extra- and even intra-species variability in how such tasks are
accomplished (see sections 3.7.3 and 3.7.6) suggest it would be fruitless to speculate
whether such mechanisms might also apply to echidnas. Further research into the
factors controlling the echidna’s same/different discrimination would prove a valuable
addition to this area of study (see below).
At the other end of the spectrum, conducting experiments designed to mimic naturalistic
environments could also prove valuable (see section 6.4.1). Delius (1992) claims that
increasing the ecological validity of traditional experimental procedures can lead to
optimal learning, while Vaughan and Herrnstein (1987) suggest the use of experimental
techniques that more closely resemble natural conditions could help illuminate how a
task is applicable to an animal’s wild behaviour. Some of these techniques could
include the use of three-dimensional objects as stimuli (e.g. Burdyn and Thomas 1984;
Spaet and Harlow 1943), the use of open-ended, polymorphous stimulus classes (e.g.
Herrnstein and Loveland 1964), pitting qualitatively different reinforcers against each
other (e.g. Hursh 1978) and allowing the subject to regulate the reserves of varying
qualities of reinforcers (e.g. Collier and Rovee-Collier 1981; Lea 1982; Snyderman
1983a, 1983b) (see Vaughan and Herrnstein 1987). More challenging, but potentially
equally valuable, would be to try and conduct experiments within an actual natural
setting using natural stimuli.
As mentioned above, this study was conducted using visual stimuli despite it not being
the echidna’s dominant sense (see section 6.4.3). Another possible variation on this
experiment would be to repeat the test using one or more of the echidna’s more
dominant senses – olfactory, auditory or tactile, or even its unusual electroreceptive
abilities (see section 2.1.4.5). It would seem logical that the echidna would be more
effective using one of these sensory modalities rather than its subordinate visual sense,
although the results of experiments with other species (see section 6.4.3) suggest this
may not necessarily be the case. Further investigation would be needed to test this
theory. While there have been no cognitive experiments conducted on the echidna using
olfactory or auditory stimuli, the fact that the echidna has demonstrated impressive
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instrumental learning using visual/tactile stimuli is promising (Buchmann and Rhodes
1978; see section 2.2.2.4). Demonstrating same/different discrimination in a different
modality would suggest that the task in echidnas is a generalised competence that is not
modality specific and raises the possibility that this capacity is due to a single, higherorder abstraction mechanism (Cook and Brooks 2009). A related area of study would be
to examine the echidna’s ability to perform cross-modal same/different categorisation
(see section 3.7.3.1). Echidnas have already displayed some level of cross-modal
integration in the Buchmann and Rhodes (1978) experiment in which visual and tactile
cues were used concurrently (see section 2.2.2.4).
Another possibility for further testing would be to perform the same/different task using
more complex visual stimuli varying in colour, form and size (Thomas 1996). For
example, while in this study the stimuli varied in form only, a more difficult scenario
could be constructed by also varying colour and/or size across both the same and
different stimuli in non-informative ways. The subject must then determine the relevant
cue as well as performing the same/different task. These types of ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’
same/different problems have been tested in monkeys (Thomas and Frost 1983) and
humans (Steirn and Thomas 1990). Of course, whether the colour variable could be
used would depend on the extent to which the echidna possesses colour vision (see
section 2.1.4.1). Until that issue is settled, perhaps variations in brightness levels could
be used.
Despite the echidna’s successful performance utilising the parameters of this
experiment, it would be instructive to investigate how changing those parameters might
affect the results. For example, there is evidence that methodological factors such as
larger training sets, more icons per array and a greater number of training trials have led
to a stronger performance in paired same/different tasks in other species (see sections
5.4.4 and 3.7.3). It would be interesting to see how any or all of these factors affected
performance in the echidna. For example, reducing the number of stimulus elements
from the four used in this study to the even lower-entropy two used in some other
experiments (see sections 3.7.3.3 and 3.7.6.2.3) would be informative. If Pitpa (or
another echidna) found the two-item task more difficult it would suggest that in this
experiment Pitpa may have made use of entropy to perform the same/different task, a
factor that has been demonstrated in other species such as pigeons, baboons and
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monkeys (see section 3.7.6.2.3). If echidnas do use entropy, testing them with mixed,
proportionally based same arrays would also provide information about whether they
use a qualitative, rule-based approach (shown by selecting only very low entropy
stimuli as same and everything else as different) or a quantitative, similarity-based
method (shown by distinguishing small-disparity stimuli as same and large disparity
stimuli as different (see sections 3.7.6.2.3 and 3.8.2.1).
Experiments could also be conducted to see if an echidna’s same/difference
performance was affected by changes to the physical characteristics of the stimulus
arrays – if these changes had a detrimental effect on performance it would suggest the
echidna’s learning is strongly tied to the particulars of the training stimuli rather than
using a more general same/different ‘concept’. For example, varying the location of the
items within the stimulus arrays (Castro and Wasserman 2010; Wasserman, Fagot and
Young 2001; Young and Wasserman 1997) or rotating the stimulus items (Hollard and
Delius 1982; Young and Wasserman 2001a) would help indicate whether some visual
aspect of the stimulus arrangement was contributing to successful performance. Another
possibility would be to vary the stimulus icons along a single dimension (Castro and
Wasserman 2010). For example, would Pitpa still recognise a group of stimuli as same
if they were the same in every respect except they differed in size? This would also help
indicate how rigid the same classification is in echidnas. It could be argued that some
level of flexibility would be adaptive because objects in the environment must be
recognised under different conditions – e.g. lighting, angles and distances. (See Castro
and Wasserman 2010; sections 3.7.4 and 3.7.6.2.2).
Wasserman et al. (1995) have also raised questions about the effect of permitting (e.g.
Wasserman et al. 1995; Castro et al. 2010; this study) or prohibiting (e.g. Santiago and
Wright 1984) training icons from appearing in both the same and different stimulus
arrays. While including the same icons in both arrays reduces the possibility of itemspecific cueing from individual shapes (see section 4.3.2), testing with non-repeating
icons would negate the influence of item-specific memorisation on the learning process
– which might either retard learning by removing that assistance or improve it by
forcing the subject to rely only on relational cues. Studying the effects of any of the
above types of experimental variables would be a productive avenue for further research
in determining the processes behind the echidna’s performance.
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In addition, it would be interesting to study how an echidna performs in other variations
of the same/different task (see section 3.7.3). For example, using a delayed matching-tosample task (which would also allow for an examination of the echidna’s working
memory, e.g. Tavares and Tomaz 2002) or an oddity problem. An echidna could also be
tested on conditional same/different using a conceptual conditional cue in the same
manner as Burdyn and Thomas (1984) (see section 3.7.4). Another possibility would be
to see if the echidna could master same/different categorisation using some variation of
response keys or a go/no-go procedure to indicate whether items are the same or
different (e.g. Edwards et al. 1983; Keddy-Hector et al. unpub.; Santiago and Wright
1984; Wright et al. 1984; Wright et al. 1983).
Finally, a valuable topic for future study would be to repeat these experiments with
another monotreme, the platypus. Despite being members of the same taxonomic group,
the platypus is thought to have evolved separately from the echidna for between 17 and
80 million years (see section 2.1.2), has a very different physiology and (semi-aquatic)
ecology and does not possess the highly gyrified cerebral cortex or large frontal cortex
of the echidna. It would be instructive in evolutionary terms to see whether the platypus
could replicate the echidna’s performance.

6.6 Conclusion
This study has contributed to the existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it has
added to the very limited amount of information on the echidna’s cognitive abilities,
demonstrating for the first time that an echidna can perform a same/different
categorisation using both unconditional and conditional discrimination procedures. This
is of particular interest due to the echidna’s unusual neurophysiology and unique
evolutionary history, providing a valuable comparison case in animal cognition studies.
Secondly, it has added to the literature on same/different relational learning by
expanding the number of species in which this ability has been found, as well as
demonstrating for the first time that it has also evolved in monotremes. As Wasserman
(1993b) points out: “Beyond rats, pigeons, monkeys, and apes, researchers know rather
little about cognition in nonhuman animals. The field welcomes the systematic study of
underrepresented species” (p. 222).
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Thirdly, it adds to the general debate about animal ‘intelligence’. According to a
hierarchical phylogenetic intelligence ranking, the echidna’s evolutionary history would
place it squarely in the ‘primitive’ category. However this study shows it is capable of
performing learning tasks more usually associated with more ‘highly evolved’ animals.
This may be related to the relatively advanced nature of some aspects of the echidna’s
neurophysiology – lending support to the argument that large, gyrified brains are
associated with a greater degree of cognitive complexity and hence ‘intelligence’.
Adding the echidna to the list of species that have demonstrated supposedly ‘advanced’
mental abilities has provided support for the argument that such abilities are more
widespread that previously thought – either as generalised abilities or cognitive
modules.
Finally, this study makes a contribution towards increasing the general understanding of
the extent and variety of the mental capacity of animals. While this is important from a
purely scientific standpoint, studies such as this also have far-reaching practical
applications. It is important for the management and welfare of both domestic and
captive wild animals to neither under- nor overestimate the mental abilities of animals,
both in terms of providing appropriate and sufficient behavioural enrichment and in
facilitating the implementation of effective training techniques. Both these factors
would result in more successful husbandry and a reduced incidence of stress and
unwanted behaviours. In terms of conservation, increased knowledge of the mental
abilities of animals should assist in understanding the evolutionary niches required for
the preservation of species.
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Appendix
SHORT-BEAKED ECHIDNA FOOD MIX
Low Fat Diet - December to June

Mincemeat (Beef)

4 kg

Wheatbran

500g

Eggs

19

Glucodin (Glucose supplement)

1716g

Olive Oil

336ml

Vitamin E Powder (Equine E)

47g

Calcium Carbonate

47g

Note: Soluvet is added on a daily basis when making up the above previously prepared
mix. Currently is 4gr Soluvet to 495ml water and 540g of meat mix.
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